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W. WARLIMONT

ADDITIONAL NOTES TO MY POSITION IN THE O.K.W.  
WITH REGARD TO THE INDICTMENT

1. It may be repeated that the denomination "Deputy Chief of Staff of the Arméd Forces Operation Staff" was in existence up ffrom January 1, 1942 only.  
Up to that date, there was but a "Chief of the Division for National Defense", who ranked in the samw line with about 15 or 20 other division chiefs (Abteilungschefts) in the O.K.W. and some 100 or 200 in the high commands of the three armed forces.
2. The chiefs of these divisions had the position of regimental commanders only. Their degrees differed from major to colonel. They were generally - as for instance the Chief of the Division for National Defense - subordinated to department chiefs (Amtschefts).
3. When during and because of the war the functions of the divisions broadened and the tendency prevailed to keep on the chiefs in their positions, regardless of their being promoted to higher ranks, it became usual to change the denomination of "divisions" in "department-groups" ("empire-building").  
These also were the reasons for changing the denomination of the Chief of the Division of National Defense in "Deputy Chief of Staff of the A.F.O. Staff". In this particular case the denomination "department-group" was avoided, because Jodl as well as I myself detested the bureaucratic odor of the pacetime organization, marked by expressions like "departments" and "department-groups".
4. The position of the Chief of National Defense with regard to the other division-chiefs in the O.K.W., can be deemed as one of a "primus inter paris", because the operative functions, invested for the O.K.W. in this division, always in the German army were regarded as the most distinguished ones. It was for this reason too that he was the official representative of the department's chief (Jodl).  
The same principle applied to the chiefs of the operative divisions in the general staffs of the three armed forces.  
This however was an unwritten law only.
5. According to the organization in the top and to established regulations, it was up to the C.I.C. of the three armed forces and their staffs, not to the chief O.K.W. and his subordinates, to prepare the operations along the lines which the Fuehrer gave to them himself verbally. Thus, the chief of their general staffs and the chiefs of their operative divisions had by far more to do with these preparations and the operations than the Chief of the A.F.O. Staff or even of the Division for National Defense. With regard to mobilization, the same applies to the respective chiefs of the org. divisions.\*  
In their respective offices, the plans and orders and maps for the impending operations including org. activities originates; it was the task of the C.I.C. and theirs only, to submit their considerations and plans to the Fuehrer. They communicated directly with each other by liaison officers to coordinate their plans before the O.K.W. got a copy. It even was their

ambition to cut out the O.K.W., just on operative questions as much as they possibly could.

In the A.F.O. Staff of the O.K.W. and its Division for National Defense, the plans of the three armed forces, when agreed on by the Fuehrer, were put together in a "directive" of the O.K.W. The reaction of the high commands of the three armed forces to these directives shows more clearly perhaps than many explanations what they really were:

General Halder, in a comprehensive study of the relations between O.K.W. and O.K.H., submitted to the British authorities, which I read only here, refers to these operative directives of the O.K.W. in general as "just returning the thoughts (Gedankengut) worked out by the General Staff of the O.K.H., in other terms".

Goering, when receiving the first directive of the O.K.W. at the eve of the campaign against Poland, commented on it as follows: "What am I to do with this scrap of paper? I knew that all long ago."

In addition, General Jodl, on operative and tactical questions made it just a point of his to converse all by himself with the chiefs of the operative divisions of the three armed forces, so that there was still less what remained to be done for me and my officers in this field. (Witnesses available)

6. In this way it came about that:

A. Before and during the campaign against Poland (see my study "Poland 1939")

I as the Chief of the Division for National Defense had to record only, on the orders of Keitel, the first directive which the Fuehrer had already given to the C.I.C. (March-April 1939).

I do not know even today when the C.I.C. of the three armed forces submitted their op. plans to the Fuehrer, much less having been present at these occasions.

No study, plan or map was drawn up in the office for National Defense except copies of those submitted by the C.I.C. and a "time table", which correlated their principal intentions.

No member of the Division for National Defense accompanied the Fuehrer and his staff when he left Berlin for conducting the campaign.

My knowledge of the course of events during the campaign is restricted to what I learned occasionally from Keitel, Jodl, or the O.K.H.

B. Before and during the campaign against Norway and France, in principle the same conditions prevailed, so that I had to base my reports in the study "Military Political Proceedings Around the Campaign in the West" mainly on what I was informed of later on, partly at Mondorf in the summer of this year only.

C. Before and during the campaign against Russia

the division for National Defense, in the fall of 1940, on the order of Jodl, had to prepare exceptionally a study, how the operations against Russia could be carried through. It was Jodl's outspoken intention then, in this way to dispose personally of the most important fundamental data from the sources of his own office, before the C.I.C. of the army was to submit the considerations of the army to the Fuehrer.

I with the whole of my division, during the main period of preparations in the winter of 1940-41 stayed in the vicinity of Berlin while the Fuehrer with his staff was at Berchtesgaden and I used to call there at Jodl about once in a fortnight.

I once more was not present and was not supposed to be when the C.I.C. of the three armed forces submitted their plans to the Fuehrer as is proved even by several documents shown to me here in the interrogation of October 12, concerning the reports of the C.I.C. of the army in December 1940 and February 1941.

I even did not take part in the daily situation report to the Fuehrer - until the end of December 1941 - when, up from the beginning of the Russian campaign headquarters were established in East Prussia.

7. These conditions were known to all the men in the high echelons of the three armed forces. Any member of these may verify that the Chief of the Division for National Defense or the Deputy Chief of Staff of the A.F.O Staff had no influence whatsoever on the main resolutions in preparing or waging warfare and that his position was in no way to be compared to that of the leading men. Witness; whom I may nominate: Ministerialrat Greiner, Camp Overursel; General Halder, here; Capt. Scheidt, here.
8. All the evidence I am able to give on the main events of 1938-39 and the first periods of war, with special regard to the political and military coherences, is contained in the various exposees\*\* which I have submitted without the slightest pressure and in the complete conviction that I had nothing to hide but perhaps something important to tell.

\* Within the army General Staff, there still were up to the fall of 1942, two or three intermediate agencies between the Chief of the General Staff and the Chief of his operative and other divisions, the so-called "Oberquartiermeister" (the last ones were the generals von Stuelpnagel, Halder, von Manstein), who may well be regarded as ranking in one line with the Chief of the A.F.O. Staff on the O.K.W., but high above of the Chief of the Division for National Defense. A similar institution existed in the General Staff of the Air Force.

\*\* Norway, the Balkans and some more will follow.

/s/ WARLIMONT