Summary of the German campaigns and the most important other
strategic and tactical measures from 1939 to Sept 1944.

Note: The meaning of the following is:
A. Time of the issuance of the order by the FÜHRER and reason thereof.
B. Plan of operation in general and strength.
C. Special occurrences during the course of the operation. Trans. note
   1. To strengthen: All incomplete facts could be given by Lt Gen
   (Gen d Inf) von GREIFFENBERG and Maj Gen (Gen Lt) HEUSINGER,
   both of whom are in this camp; for the Air Corps generally
   speaking there are no other facts available.

I. Poland

A. When the negotiations of the Polish Foreign Minister in London
brought about the Anglo-Polish treaty at the end of March of beginning
of April 1939, one could expect that a peaceful solution was in the
Preparations were to have been completed by the end of August.
The final issuance of the order for the campaign came sometime
between the 15th and 20th of Aug. 1939 after the signing of the
treaty with Soviet Russia. The start was ordered for the 25th of Aug.
but on the 24th Aug. in the afternoon, it was postponed until the
1st Sept. in order to await the results of new diplomatic maneuvers
towards the English ambassador.

B. There was no order for a concentration at the OKW. At the OKH
there were probably only records of maneuvers and training trips
across the last several years. The attack was prepared with a
strong south wing out of Silesia in a NE direction, including a
concentration of Panzer Divisions, - the northern enveloping wing
of Prussia was strongly reinforced on order of the FÜHRER, overruling the
plans of the OKH, and committed in mass E of the Vistula,
weaker forces out of East Pommerania through the Tucheler Heide
and over Graudenz in the middle. Capture of Danzig was a special
task to be executed with commitment of part of the LUFTWAFFE. About
40 Divisions were employed, including 5 Panzer Divisions. The rest
10 Divisions, were deployed in the Westwall, main strength between
Luxembourg and Switzerland.
the march was planned without mobilization at first, as in the case of the occupation of Prague and Tschechien in March 1939. During the time between the 25th of Aug. and the 1st of Sept., the most important orders for mobilizations were put through on pressure from the OKH because without these troops the concentration was not deemed strong enough.

It was not clear for a long time why the main forces of the Polish were not met until the Army of BLASKOWITZ ran into a bad crisis on its march over Posen in the direction of Warsaw because the north flank was attacked by these forces. The north wing was held up longer than expected by the Polish fortresses on both sides of Lonza....The penetration of the city of Warsaw by the Army of the South was only possible after strong artillery and air bombardment in spite of the fact that armored troops had been at the edge of the city for some time already. .... Military agreements had been made by the Foreign Secretary with Soviet Russia which were not known to the OKW. This necessitated the redeployment and retreats of German troops because the Russian forces were contacted. This led to some friction with the Russians.

II. France

A. (Source was) in Berlin towards the end of Sept. 1939, shortly after the first hints were dropped at the Headquarters in Zoppot about intentions for an attack on France. Preparations were to have been completed within six weeks. Orders to alert (units) on the 12th of Nov. 1939 were given on the 5th of Nov. following an address by the Chief of the Army from a written document to his supreme commanders. He was repeatedly interrupted by Hitler during the address. He expressed opposition to the proposition of starting the campaign at this time. Because of the weather the order of the 5th of Nov. was postponed for two days, then until the middle of Dec., then again for 3, and later for 5 days postponed. From the middle of Dec. 1939 the campaign was postponed indefinitely. With the weather getting better the intention was announced again to alert the units in the first half of Jan. 1940, but because of the bad winter it was postponed until the
spring of 1940. Final order was given on about the 7th of May for the 10th of May. But the password was not given until the evening of the 9th of May.

B. There were no plans prepared by OKW. At OKH offensive against France was probably not even theoretically studied. A thesis had been prepared in the fall of 1939 with the conclusion that it was altogether impossible for the German Army in its present condition to attack France. Because of that there was great confusion at the orders when they were received. Concentration for deployment was along lines of 1914 but without a known main effort. The southern Netherlands were meant to be territory for marching through and occupation and to provide a forefield for anti-aircraft defenses of the Ruhr Valley. Many changes were made during the period of waiting from Jan. to Feb. 1940 such as the change in the Führer, breakthrough in the middle (Ardenne) to the Channel and rolling up of both flanks. This thought was gaining more and more support. Then it was made as the basis of the plan of operations. Special considerations were given to the employment of airborne troops, first to occupy the Belgian Redoubt area around Ghent, later with the loss of some orders with the above contents because of an emergency landing by an airplane on Belgian soil; in the Netherlands an immediate occupation would be necessary on the big bridges (Meerdyck) and the Albert Canal (Fort Eben-Emael) to secure the North-South lines of communications.

There were about 80 div. Many of them had been newly organized. Included were about 10-15 Armored and Motorized Divisions most of whom were in the center (Army Group RUNDSTEDT).

C. The first part of the operations went almost exactly according to plan until the armored forces were halted in the Pas de Calais by order of Hitler because of unfavorable terrain. Meanwhile the OKH was expecting great results from a breakthrough of the motorized forces around Dünnkirchen.

Supplementary thoughts about Denmark.

The decision to occupy D. resulted from studies about the occupation
of Norway, mainly to shorten the lines of communication overseas and to build a secure communications bridgehead to Norway. Only a very weak force was employed under command of KAUPISHEIM. The main force was to have crossed the German border to Jütland or the 9th of Apr., while one battle group of less than 3 Regt. strength was transported on a passenger liner to Copenhagen, where they landed early on the 9th Apr. and took possession of the capital. Resistance was extraordinarily small. They were able to negotiate with the king and the government, and, if my memory serves correctly, on that same day led to the further peaceful occupation of the country. During the following developments the considerations which led to the occupation of D. proved to be correct. The airfield by Aalborg and the harbor at Skagen helped very much in the deployment of troops for the Norwegian operation. Greater difficulties were not encountered in the occupation until the development of the general military situation of Germany about the spring of 1944. This was the basis for strikes and unrest.

Supplementary thoughts on Norway

In Norway too they tried to negotiate with king and government immediately after the entrance of German troops in order to carry through the occupation without any unnecessary loss of blood. The negotiations were led in the name of HITLER by the German minister in Oslo (von Renthe-Fink?). As far as I remember, they failed because of the German demand that QUISLING be included in the new Norwegian government. The king and government were then able to get away from the German attack.

The success of the LUFTWAFLE against the embarkation of The English at Dunkirk was grossly overestimated. Change of direction towards the Somme and Aisne was brought about in a short time as part of the 2nd part of the campaign. The goal, to break the MAGINOT LINE from the rear was accomplished in connection with attacks across the Upper Rhine. It was planned to have one Italian Army participating for that purpose but this was dropped on the objection of Italy. The Italian attack in the Alps did not relieve the burden.
III. Norway

A. At the end of Dec. or beginning of Jan. 40 they werealerted because of expected English landings on the Norwegian coast, especially near Stavanger, and the establishment of English air installations in southern Norway (Intelligence thereof was given by QUILISING who was in Berlin many times for that purpose).

The accomplishment of the task was planned for an as early time as possible, but was postponed until the 9th of Apr. because the Baltic Sea was frozen.

B. Nothing but improvisations without any base whatsoever. There weren't even any maps. Studies from Jan 40 on led to the plan that the most important harbors and airports should be occupied by surprise from both air and sea. Heavy weapons and other necessities should precede the landings. They were to have come to the Norwegian harbors camouflaged as normal traffic. All but the 2nd and 3rd Mt Div were newly organized. There were about 10 divisions altogether. Also participating were strong forces of the LUFTWAFFE including several airborne units, and almost the entire fleet.

C. The plans for landing were discovered when a German supply ship foundered and the survivors came to the Norwegian shore in the afternoon of the 8th of Apr. Because of that there was unexpected resistance in the Oslo Fjord with heavy losses to the fleet. The surprisingly fast countermeasures on the part of England, their landings in Mamsos and Andalsnes caused temporarily much worry. It was a blow too that all the ships, that had preceded the main force, loaded with heavy weapons had been destroyed. Because of that and the destruction of almost the entire destroyer flotilla at Narvik, the situation was very difficult for several weeks. Again and again there was talk about the possibilities of retreat from Narvik over the land route in the direction Drontheim. This was stopped only then when the English and French troops evacuated and after the offensive against France.

The occupation of Denmark occurred, generally speaking, without friction.
IV. Proposals for landings on the British Islands. (SEEBÖFEN/SEALION)
A. (Serious thought was being given) in July 1940. From the start this was done in an unusually uncertain way. Even after renewed proposals to conclude a peace with England failed after the REICHSTAG speech of 19 July, all plans and preparation seemed more like a practical study of the problem. Execution was proposed for the fall (Sept., at latest Oct) 1940. No order was ever really issued except for the \textit{implied} employment of the LUFTWAFFE.

B. Everything was improvised. There were absolutely no plans. An aerial war against the British air force was to have preceded. Not until the English anti-aircraft installations could be neutralised would the invasion fleet be alerted. OKH insisted on strongest possible deployment of initial forces, at least two, if possible, three \textit{invasion invasion groups}. The general goal for the operations was London. The fleet was only capable to lead an invasion on southeast England because it didn't have enough strength for any other. \textit{Inferior} Employment of about 30 divisions was planned in several echelons.

C. They gave up on it because the aerial war did not succeed on account of poor weather. Added to that was the constant fear of Hitler about the great loss of personnel in case of troopships being destroyed.

V. Afrika

Because of the bad defeat of the Italian troops under MARESCHAL GRAZIANI in the fall of 1940 in the western Egyptian desert, the decision was made to send German forces to Africa. It is my opinion that this was done more out of political than strategic reasons. It seemed that one wanted to strengthen the position of the Italian partner who had fought in France already with little success, and to support MUSSOLINI himself against the King faction.

German B. It was planned to employ one armored division. GEN.
FREIHERR VON PUNZK went ahead to observe. When he came back he reported, besides the military results of his mission, that he had the \textit{impression} that the Italian military leadership in North Africa was
rather cool towards the proposal of employment of German troops.

In the beginning of Jan 1941 the first troops arrived in the area of Tripolis. They were now under the command of the Fieldmarshal-to-be Rommel. In spite of their small forces they were able to take hold of the leadership in the following battles.

C. This brought about that the German supreme headquarters took an ever increasing and deciding part in the leadership in North Africa even though that was against the agreement reached with Italy. GEN VON RINTELEN, the military attaché in Rome, was used for that purpose at first. He was appointed direct representative of the German high command to the Italian high command. When later in the fall and winter 41-42 strong forces of the LUFTWAFFE were employed by FELDMARSCHALL KESSELRING, as commander of the 2nd Air Fleet, took over this function more and more. The Italian chief of the supreme high command, GEN CAVALLERO, was always receptive under these influences but his successor, GEN AMBROSIO, from the beginning of 1943, there were more and more difficulties due to the unfavorable military situation.

With the fluctuating battles it was first of all the purpose of the German command to hold the eastern border of Cyrenaica. When it was possible in the spring of 1942 to occupy Tobruk and to chase the English out of the rest of Tripolitania, it was the German high command who instigated offensive operations against the lower Nile which led up to the narrow of EL ALMEN contrary to the Italian plans. The German forces were increased meanwhile to a strength of 4 divisions. Around this time and during the late summer of 1942 there were ever increasing supply difficulties. That happened mainly because of the many ship sinkings and the long route without sufficient transport facilities. The supply problem was alleviated temporarily by the strong air attacks on Malta. The occupation of Malta was planned too with sea and air invasion by German troops. This plan was chucked in favor of the occupation of Crete which happened as an annex to the Balkan campaign. The increasing British resistance at El Almeln forced them to cease
the Malta attacks. Attempts to employ the Italian fleet for protecting the supply ships more failed as did also, what HITLER wanted done, that fast war ships were to be used for supply purposes. MUSSOLINI himself was also against all such demands. The German shipping in the Mediterranean Sea which had proved itself very good in ferrying troops across to Africa, was by now almost completely at the bottom of the sea. In spite of all these difficulties Rommel was ordered to defend El Alamein under all conditions. The order was then also followed after the English attack of the end of Oct. where they were trying to force a decision. On 31 Oct. or 1 Nov. HITLER directed a strong, personal appeal to Rommel which included the same order. ROMMEL reached the decision independently to give up the position at El Alamein against these orders, after the line had been broken through at several points. The message to that effect didn’t reach the FuHRER Supreme high command until the morning of the 2nd Nov., after the movement had begun already the evening previous at 2200. ROMMELS intention was to stop first of all at Marsah-Matruk, and then especially in the old positions on the Lybian-Agyptian border. Both failed.

X. The attempts failed also to increase the supply over Greece and Crete. Even the poor condition of the railroads in the Balkans, especially south of Saloniki, and the need for shipping space and convoy vessels in the eastern Mediterranean Sea foiled this try. Meanwhile there was strategic danger farthest retreat possibilities because of the Anglo-American landings in French North Africa on the 8th Nov. 1942.

VI. Balkans

The decision to take part in the Balkans was brought about only then when the Italians were altogether impotent in Greece. This Italian operation was not part of German plans and wasn’t even reported from the Italian side previously. It was even denied by the Italian military command when there were indications to that effect at the time of the meeting between PETHAIN and HITLER in Aug. 1940. At that time HITLER ordered his special train to detour over
Florence as fast as possible in order to find out from MUSSOLINI himself about the Italian plans. He arrived late in the forenoon of the day when the Italian troops had invaded Greece early in the morning from Albania. (This was just about a repeat performance of the spring of 1939. At that time the Italians, at that time under the leadership of GEN PARIANI, broke off the first German-Italian military talks in Innsbruck without giving any reason for it. When FELDMARSHALL KEITEL, who led the negotiations from the German side, landed in Berlin, the Italian military attaché, GEN MARRAS told him that the Italian troops would occupy Albania the next morning. )

The FÜHRER had tried to stop this independent Italian operation. This attempt failed, and so did the other. HITLER tried to have MUSSOLINI occupy the island of Crete rather than the Greek mainland.

HITLER was always very sorry that German forces had to be employed in Greece, as he remarked repeatedly, because of his love for the ancient Greek culture. Several months later, around Christmas time, the employment of German forces came for the first time under consideration after the military observation trip by GEN ZEITZLER which was occasioned by the poor showing of the Italians in the Albanian-Greek campaign. He was reconnoitering mainly the crossings over the Balkans and the Rhodope Mts.

B. The approach-march came within the next few months under the leadership of FELDMARSHALL LIST (12th Army). This was camouflaged by the strong "military missions" which went into Rumania about that time. These "missions" were at the same preparations for the campaign against Russia.

The military forces couldn't be pushed across the Danube because of the ice Bulgarian territory at this time and therefore could wait till some later date. This problem was handled with special care out of consideration for the neutrality of Bulgaria and the worry about what position Turkey would take.

At first it was the goal of the operations to force a breakthrough in the Metaxas line without violating Yugoslav sovereignty. Then
Greek Thrace was to have been occupied, whereupon they would move forward on both sides of the Pindos Mts. into middle and southern Greece in order to envelop the Greeks opposite the Italian attack from the West. The English landings in Greece, the strength of which was uncertain, did not alter these plans. All of a sudden these plans had to be changed suddenly because Yugoslavia had abrogated the three-power treaty which she had just signed at the end of March 1941 and thus put herself on the side of the enemies of Germany. Within six to eight days direction of the approach-march of the eastern section of the 12th Army was changed from the south to the west direction of attack. That is, towards Skopje to Nisch. At the same time a new attack force was established under Feldmarschall von Wethers in Styre and Carinthia. Before the preparations had been completed, the beginning of operations was ordered against both Greece and Yugoslavia at the same time for one of the first days in April (6 Apr.?)

Heavy air attacks preceded the occupation of Belgrad. A few days later the armored troops pushing from Nisch and forward outfits of a SS Div. which had been ferried across the Danube, took the place almost simultaneously. Hitler gave the SS troops the credit. Immediately the entire Yugoslav army capitulated but it was not possible to mop up all fighting forces in the mountaneous regions. As and the roving gange of the Balkans which had never been rotted it, laid the groundwork for the battles later under the direction of Milevitch and Tito. These two have tied up constantly large German forces.

Meanwhile it was the purpose of the eastern German attack group which invaded Greek Thrace through Bulgaria, to stay away from the Turkish border as far as possible but also to prepare themselves against a military surprise from Turkish side by the approach-march one German Armored Corps in the area NE of Sofia. Bulgarian troops occupied the territories of Yugoslavia and Greece which they demanded without ever actually taking part in any fighting.

All the German troops that could be spared in Yugoslavia were to face west of the Pindus Mts. Even then the Italians had been
been unable to gain any successes by themselves. The new deployment of forces broke Greek resistance quickly, opposite of the Italians. Around the same time fast German troops arrived at the Greek capital after they broke the last serious resistance at Thermopylae. The English troops did not get into the fighting very much and in the meantime they were embarking at the southern Greek ports. They had heavy losses there, supposedly, inflicted on them by the German LUFTWAFFE.

At the armistice negotiations several complications were encountered. The Greeks did not want to capitulate to the Italians but only to the Germans because they were never beaten by the Italians. In spite of that most of the military govt. on the Greek mainland with a few exceptions, was taken over because by the Italians mainly because of political reasons. Besides, it was necessary to free the German troops as fast as possible for the Russian campaign.

Crete:

In the last days of the Greek campaign HITLER came back to his original idea, to occupy Crete, thus to secure the forefield of the Greek coast, to seal off the Aegean Sea, and to win a springboard and bridgehead on the way to North Africa. After detailed studies the occupation of Crete received priority over that of Malta. Preparations for this campaign were the responsibility of the LUFTWAFFE under the command of GEN (Gen Obst) LÖHR. In addition to strong forces of the LUFTWAFFE including parachute troops, one Mt Div. of the army was committed by air. Execution of the plans were ordered as soon as the preparations had been completed (May 1941) Success was bought at the expense of a high proportion of losses in personnel and equipment.
Annex to Section A. Africa (V)

Rommel's attack of Oct. 1942 from his position at Alam Halfa toward El Uad had the lower Nile for its operational objective, with the further intention from there on. After a successful conclusion of the fighting in the CAUCASUS, to achieve operational coordination to reach the BLACK SEA in a coordinated operation with the troops pushing from TANGANICA. The attack

The attack was delayed by the unexpected rains before it got started. The reason, in Rommel's opinion, to the failure of the RAP first of all, which, as covered operations, struck our forces, while they were still deploying.

Annex to Russia (VI)

After the accession of Yugoslavia, Hungarian troops, if memory serves, after an independent decision of the Hungarian government, participated in the fighting in the Northern border territories of Yugoslavia and occupied later on a part of these territories which had belonged to Hungary along the Theiss and Save rivers which had belonged to Hungary until 1918/19.

PART VII. RUSSIA

A. In the last days of July 1940, the chief of the Schlachtführung, senior aide, Col. Gen. Jodl, informed the leading officers of his staff at a special conference at REICHSHOLZ of the decision of the Führer to eliminate the threat of Bolshevism which resulted from Germany from the fact that Bolshevism had now become her immediate Original neighbor. The Führer, that had had the intentions to start this campaign in the fall of this year already. But representation by him (Jodl) and the Chief of the GFM (later on I saw those representations in writing) had made him change his mind. Now, however, he was determined to start in the spring of 1941, just as soon as the weather permitted it.

This statement, which caused great anxiety for me and all the others present, was coupled with a few general instructions about the preparations. Written orders were, as far as I remember, forbidden at that time and even much later. The first written orders under the code-word "Barbarossa" were probably weren't released before the late fall.

When the Russian foreign minister, Molotov, visited
I know that the Fuehrer might change his decision. Whether he himself still seriously considered the possibility of a peaceful development, I do not know.

The opening of the campaign was originally intended for May 1941. The necessity to intervene in the Balkans, however, caused a delay of about six weeks until June 21 (?).

The numerous incidents which actually happened around the German-Russian line of demarcation along the SAN and VISTULA - even generally the exchange of goods as agreed in the German-Russian treaty went along smoothly - had to serve as the final cause. There can be no doubt, however, that at the same time Russia armed against Germany. This was known to us not only through remarks made by Russian officers in the border districts, but especially since Russia had immediately started to build defensive positions and fort air bases which I partly saw myself in the summer 1941 in the former Baltic States and Eastern Poland.

B. Any plan prepared plans for the initial assembly against Russia were neither at the OKH nor - as I can assure with certainty - at the OKH.

The OKH had to work out a plan of operation following the directives of the Fuehrer, which were probably given verbatim only and were made known to me only much later, and which aimed at a penetration with massed forces from Southern Poland and Romania into the Ukraine, to draw out the strong Russian forces presumed to be there through an enveloping attack, and then, immediately to push on toward ROSTOV.

(Army Group South, Field Marshal Rundstedt) The next strongest Army Group was to assemble in East Prussia in a co-operatively narrow space and with the mission - to reach LENINGRAD through the BALTIC states and the Isthmus of Karelia in order to join with the Forces there. (Army Group North, Field Marshal LEEB) The weakest army group (Field Marshal von ROP) in the middle was given the mission to take possession of the north-west of KIRISH between the upper Volga and the lower DUNAIA.

A study made by the OKH-Wehrmacht-Geheimgattung on Joell's instruction, gave, after independent deliberation to be a similar
commitment conclusion regarding the distribution of forces. Whether the OKH was of a different opinion at that time I do not know.

The assembly of the German army forces along the German-Russian line of demarcation already began soon after the termination of the campaign in France, camouflaged as security measures and occupation of the newly acquired Polish territories. In East Prussia, too, one succeeded to assemble stronger forces inconspicuously. Since stronger units of the army were tied down, at first in France on account of the "SEELÖWE" plan, later on also on account of the Balkan campaign, and since the German air force with most of its strength was already committed against England to the last moment, it was self-evident that the concentration of our army forces which eventually had to reveal our intentions had to be left in the last moments before the beginning of the campaign.

A part of Army Group South assembled on Romanian soil. The arrangements were made in the fall and winter of 1941 in connection with the actual Romanian request to detail a strong German military mission for the training of the Romanian army and air corps, perhaps also as security against further Russian transgressions (Bessarabia and the Bukovina had already been lost to the Russians). This Army Group consisted mainly of forces which had participated in the Balkan campaign.

In the north, the Finns were won over to a participation on the side of Germany, if not as actual allies Germany's, as the so-called "winter war" which had preceded the campaign had cost the Finns heavy losses in territory to the Russians. All military arrangements concerning their participation were made in Salzburg in May 1941 between Jodl and the Finnish Chief of Staff HEDRICH included in these arrangements were the German plans to take over the security of the middle and northern parts of Finland towards the White Sea and towards NORDLAND with German troops which were to be withdrawn from Norway for that purpose.

The Hungarians and, as far as I know, the Italians were not notified in advance of the German intentions since it was believed that one had to be afraid of a leakage concerning the German plans through these countries. This was later denounced very bitterly by the Hungarians, even though their participation in the campaign did not make much sense to be. Their military ambitions in that regard assume very great.

I cannot remember any special tactical mission for our own air force,
apart from the installations of the Russian air force. Our Navy had, first of all, to protect the Baltic Sea in the direction of the Gulf of Finland.

Almost the entire German army was committed, about 120 divisions (7) strong and the entire air force with the exceptions which were necessary assets for the army on account of the occupation of Norway, Denmark, the territories in the West and of parts of the Balkans and for the air corps because of the need for units for the defense against British air attacks at home and in the occupied countries.

The considerable strengthening of the army was accomplished meanwhile by means of many new activations.

C.

We believe that we achieved an operational surprise while assembling our forces. Considerable parts of the Russian army, even in the frontier districts had apparently not even been alerted.

However, the first part of the operations did not meet our expectations in so far as on the flank of the army group South, where our main effort had been concentrated, was encountered heavy resistance which it could overcome only gradually and not everywhere. The battle at UMAN only relieved the pressure, but even then was the north flank of the army group, the army KIEGEDEL, contained South of the PRIPJET marshes in the area of CHERNOVITZ for a long time. A great operational success was achieved only in the great battle around KIL, KIEGIEN- TSOHUG and further east when it became possible to divert parts of the army group Middle East, with the METAF towards South. This success then increased the speed of the advance of the army group and led it, as winter began to set in, for the first time to ROSTOV.

A disappointment became obvious on the Northern flank, our secondary effort, too, when, after initial rapid advances, we did not succeed in penetrating the difficult terrain of the WOLAI MIES towards the KOMIC-ZEHNA railroad and especially in taking LENINGRAD itself. Then additional forces were brought up from the Northern flank of the army group, only partial successes were achieved on this flank also in that we were able to drive the Northern flank forward to the LAUS BLAG and thereby to cut all land communications to LENINGRAD from the South.

While the Army Group SOUTH, which had originally already been the weakest but which still had made good progress partly after hard fighting (LENINGRAD).
was weakened further still, the idea, contrary to Hitler's orders to assist from the prosecution of the ambitious aims on both flanks of the 200 mile-wide spread front and, instead, to push with strong central forces with the purpose of taking MOSKOW, developed more and more with the OKH. This contrast of opinions at least in the estimation of the FÜHRSER, had led the OKH to transfer troops from the Army Group Center to both flanks only with a great deal of hesitation and, especially to the Army Group North, in gained entirely insufficient numbers. In the exchange of opinions, the OKH made its point in so far as the Army Group Center was given additional forces from the rear with the help of which it succeeded to win, in the early battles of WJASMA were and BRJANSK, what was thought to be decisive mihinian victories.

The ensuing advance was quickly terminated, however, with the sudden and unusually early setting in of winter and led, in the areas around MOSKOW in many places, especially around TULA and KALINING, to a severe crisis which lasted in large sectors throughout the entire winter, even in those positions to the rear which had been occupied under strong Russian pressure. Deep in the south, BOSTOV had been lost again and the Southern flank had been mihinized to the area around MIUS. One of the consequences of this disadvantageous development was a crisis centered around the leading personalities which led to the dismissal of Field Marshal von BRAUSCHITZ, who was also sick, and temporarily of RUPRECHT and BOCH, later on also of Col. Gen. HOFER, who was in charge north-west of MOSKOW.

After those crises had been overcome and the units had been reorganized and reinforced, operational plans which had been worked out by Hitler in the smallest detail, were made for the second phase of the Russian campaign. There he adhered to his original idea of concentrating the main effort for the time being, of the entire front on the Southern flank again, whereas he had to neglect the Northern flank and keep the center stationary in stationary positions. For that purpose, the Southern part of the entire front was split up into two army group areas. The northern army group, at first under BOCH, later on under WEICHSLER, had to form a strong operational defensive flank towards N and NE, then to attack towards the DON river at, and South of, WOKONIZZ, then to SE with strong motorized forces over the corridor between the Black and the CASPIAN sea to advance towards the CAUCASUS. The Southern army group, under LIST was, at an operationally suitable moment, to break out of the STALINGRAD region across the MIUS river in the direction of BOSTOV, eventually forcing the right
flank of the attacking forces, leaning to the right on the BLACK SEA.

Even before the start of these major operations which, as a matter of fact did not begin until June 28 1942, the situation on the CRIMEA was to have been cleared up by taking ODESSA and driving the Russians from the eastern part of the peninsula. Both these undertakings succeeded, if in the case of ODESSA with heavy losses, in a relatively short period of time, making it possible to transfer about 6-8 divisions of this army (VON MANSTEIN) during the summer of 1942 to the Army Group North with the intention of taking up again the old operational theme, that is objective, to take LENINGRAD. The Russians forestalled this intention by committing strong forces against the eastern flank of the ring around LENINGRAD. They attacked at SCHLIESSENBURG and further South and the divisions of VON MANSTEIN were brought up which were brought up one after the other were soon bled white. Thereby they failed in their original mission.

Meanwhile the operations on the Southern sector had been on the whole proceeded according to plan. They suffered, however, in over increasing measure from lack of transportation and fuel. In addition, the German forces for their sector proved to be not even remotely sufficient. The army which was enlarged continuously and which finally went from KURAN over the heights of the CAUCASUS as far as the vicinity of STALINGRAD. Increasing worries over possible landings in the West determined Hitler against the judgement of his advisors to pull out several Panzer divisions and especially those which had proven themselves in battle and to transfer them West already in the late summer of that year.

Thus, the lack of mobility and strength was responsible for the fact that the great initial successes could not be utilized to the fullest extent and that Russian resistance and that Russian resistance which meanwhile had again begun to show increasing signs of life at the most important points, i.e. at the passes over the CAUCASUS and at STALINGRAD, could not be broken.

Hitler, however, mainly blamed the lack of understanding and partly even his malevolence of the higher echelons for the unfavorable situation with the result that after ROCK now LIST and HALDER, too, were suddenly dismissed, for a long time and that EICK and KEITEL fell in stregest disgrace because they had spoken up in favor of the measures LIST had taken.
During this summer, the Army Group Center, (by now under Field Marshal Von Kleist) also had to go through exceedingly heavy fighting, centered especially around Rzhev. Here, too, the contrasts between the ideas and orders of Hitler who at first had tried to gain a vantage success through an attack at Bucheniiski, clashed with the sumptuous more accurate realization of the OKH and Army Group that all forces were needed for defense.

Consequently, the achievements of fall 1942 were a far cry from the expectations of the summer campaign of that year. A bad crisis developed which threatened had to become all the more dangerous since the large sectors between the Caspian Sea and the vicinity of Kusnetz could only be filled with allied troops of questionable value (Romanians, Italians, Hungarians) and insufficient equipment.

The ambitious strategical plans which had at one time been directed toward the Persian Gulf lost their every foundation at first at the Caucasus and later on also in Egypt. The Fuehrer in my opinion felt this decisive crisis of the entire war. One could see that his behavior which had changed completely. He tried to seek himself, however, by stubbornly sticking to the lines they had established and by his continued intention to take Stalingrad. On November 25, the very same day on which he expressed this intention publicly in Munich, British and American troops landed in North Africa, a point of the theater of war which still was always been recognized as a highly sensitive, hardly an one of the highest German military leaders paid still paid any attention to. Less than three weeks later, the Fuehrer was at the Berghof, the Russians overran the Romanian positions on both sides of Stalingrad and thereby startet Germany on the way to the first great catastrophe of her army, in this war already.

After the decisions of the highest leaders did not appear to be influenced by the failures, operational failures of the summer campaign of 1942, per Hitler still insisted in his determination to hold Stalingrad, to reestablish the connection there with a task force which was assembled further South and was much too weak and generally to stick to the established lines. The break-through of the 6th Army out of Stalingrad and through the Russians encircling it, as demanded more and more urgently by Zeitzler and Publis was distinctly forbidden by Hitler since he did not give it a chance. The air-corps, however, was to secure the supplying of the army in Stalingrad in spite of the most difficult weather conditions.
While the 6th Army was wiped out at STALINGRAD, FRIEDT THE ROUMANIAN and later on also the Italian and Hungarian sectors broke down and brought the German divisions to destruction. The decision now to pull back the German forces from the CAUCASUS, just as quickly as possible, could not be delayed any longer. The law of action had been lost. There could be no delusion about that even though the German striking force was temporarily increased and was expressed in the renewed taking of CHARKOW in the spring of 1943.

Even the FRIEDT himself had no intentions to start any large-scale offensives during 1943. On the other hand, he could not bring himself to the decision to regain operational freedom by further withdrawing beyond the positions which the Russians had forced upon us. The tactical success which was attempted at KURSK in the early part of the summer of 1943 after at least a greater number, if certainly not all the divisions had been reinforced and re-equipped, ended with a total failure accompanied by extremely heavy losses. The planning of this undertaking was done mainly by ZYNOVEEVA. Even the FRIEDT himself hesitated at the idea but was finally persuaded in it. FRIEDT was faced against many protests from the OKH which tried, because of the tense general situation which resulted from the disaster in CAUCASUS and which might have become even worse through further landings in ITALY and FRANCE, tried rather to form strong reserves in the hands of the supreme command.

In my estimation, the real reason can be given for all occurrences on the Eastern Front until the end of the war: Insufficient forces all over the front, no depth of any kind, continually lowered strength and amount of supplies on the other hand. However, stubborn insistence to hold on to certain sectors and strong-points, be it for military, economic or propaganda reasons, the lack of watch positions, and distrust in the command concerning the strength of the enemy, so that the eventual defeat could only be a question of time.
VIII. JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES ENTER INTO THE WAR

In December 1941 caused special measures of the German high command only as far as the war at sea was concerned in which the operational zones of the submarines which up to that time had been carefully limited in order to give the US no cause to enter the war, were enlarged according to the new situation.

The strategically important question whether the main US forces would concentrate first against Europe or against EAST ASIA was answered by the Americans themselves less or less openly: EUROPE was to be the first goal. However, the American forces could be employed in the European theater was not clear. The in that connection repeatedly expressed opinion of the FUNKHER that ISLANDS as well as the AZORES should be occupied by Germany was revived. In view of the military imposibility to execute this plan, it never went beyond the stage of general discussion.

Practical military discussions were held with Japan only insofar as, after the Japanese penetration into the INDIAN OCEAN a line of demarcation was fixed for the operational zones of submarines. This demarcation line ran, as far as I remember, east of the PERSIAN GULF generally NE.

IV. THE AGEDO-AMERICAN LANDING IN NORTH AFRICA

On Nov. 8, 1942 caught the German supreme command entirely unaware. (The FUNKHER was on that day en route from his HQ in East Prussia to MUNICH.)

Indeed the possibility of such a landing had often been considered earlier, starting with the assumption that North Africa would be a suitable jumping-off place from which to advance against Italy, the weakest link of the European fortress. The negotiations with France which had been carried on about this subject for some time had had as their aim to influence the French and, at the same time, to enable them to defend the coast of French North Africa with their own forces in case of such a landing. The means for that were put at their disposal, if only an entirely insufficient extent, by releasing prisoners of war who had been professional soldiers, and a few obsolete tanks, anti-tank weapons and anti-aircraft guns. Since these negotiations had not been continued since May 1941 and the political relations with France were such that it was hardly to be expected from the French, it was quite obvious what
French defending forces would take it serious amphibious landing were made on North African soil.

German

The first countermeasure consisted of the occupation of the whole of France as ordered by the Führer after a short consultation with the French government. The reason for that was the fear that the landings in N.A. might soon be followed by landings along the French Mediterranean coast.

The commander in Chief could not be given any additional forces for that task. In addition to having to stretch the coastal defense sectors, improvisations were used in transferring reserve units and other stationary units to France. For these and political reasons a participation in the occupation of South-Eastern France was asked for and carried out.

All these movements went off quickly and, on the whole, smoothly.

In North Africa itself the main problem was, according to Hitler's decision, to gain a foothold in Tunisia in order to get a main basis for any operations to be carried out later on, and especially to prevent an enemy advance into Rommel's rear.

Available for that purpose were at first only those left-over the German Africa Divisions which were still in Italy due to lack of transport. Out of these, a special improvised units were formed who did succeed in gaining a foothold in Northern Tunisia and to defend this bridge-head against the first enemy attacks. With utmost speed additional forces certainly not exceeding two divisions were then dispatched. They succeeded together with numerically much stronger Italian forces to take in possession the largest part of TUNISIA. Gen. von Arnim who received his orders via Field Marshal Kesselring from the German high command, was put in charge. Since the army Rommel on its retreat from ALAUNI meanwhile had to withdraw further and further West, the German forces in TUNISIA were given in Feb. 1943 already the additional job of securing the incorporation of the army Rommel.
Selected for this purpose was the Mareth line into which the forces of the Army.QRect. soon were also withdrawn.

"At the end of February or the beginning of March 1943 on orders of the German supreme command a taskforce was still committed in Southern TUNISIA with the mission to attack from the vicinity of Gabes towards generally to the North-Western, in order to widen the sector of operations and, as the Führer expected, to ease in the Anglo-American front, whose pressure on Northern Tunisia had increased. TUNISIA itself felt more and more strongly, by attacking it from the rear, quickly such plans, however, had to be discarded after short initial successes for it turned out that the German-Italian troops did not have the means to guarantee an even somewhat sufficient amount of supplies for them, in spite of the considerably shorter sea- and air connections with TUNISIA. As a matter of fact, it was impossible for that reason to transfer all the troops which had been destined to go there.

In spite of all this, HITLER, in fullest agreement with MUSсолINI, stuck to his decision to stay in TUNISIA. When it was finally recognized that we would have to succumb shortly to the superiority of the (already enemy, all connections with TUNISIA had been cut so that it was only possible to evacuate a very few persons to the Italian mainland.

The loss of TUNISIA was considered by the entire German army to be the second great catastrophe after STALINGRAD.

Even though, as mentioned before, it had been impossible to ship all part of the units which had been intended for TUNISIA there, the Führer as late as the winter of 1942/43 thought of plans which went far beyond the defences of TUNISIA. His idea was to collect there a selected army of motorized units for the purpose of attacking with far-flung operational objectives and to advance beyond ALGERIA and MOROCCO in order to drive Anglo-American invasion army from African soil. In view of the development of the situation both on the continent of Europe and in North Africa, these plans were actually not even worked out from a military point of view.
The more the possibility of the loss of TUNISIA had to be considered, the more urgent grew the necessity for the German supreme command to counteract an Anglo-American attack on ITALY by committing German troops there. However, the evaluation of the situation and the further Anglo-American intentions was highly uncertain for a long time.

For a while, HITLER and some of his closest advisers were inclined to believe that the Western coast of GREECE and the DALMATIA coast as far up as SALONI might be the target of the next Anglo-American operation, possibly accompanied by a British advance from EGYPT into the BLACK SEA. They justified this opinion by pointing out the extraordinary weakness of our forces in this part of the BALKANS and the part further North, the great economic importance of the raw-materials there for the German war-machine—especially the Romanian oil, the political influence such a landing would have on the German allies in South-Eastern Europe who, in many instances, were very unreliable; the position of Turkey, and finally the presumed intention to try for a closer operational cooperation with RUSIA while, at the same time, preventing RUSIA from achieving a dominating position in the BALKANS. The following countermeasures were taken: the transfer of a Panzer Division from the West to the PELOPONNESE. (HITLER attacked to this decision even though reconnaissance showed that a Panzer division could be employed in the terrain there only to a limited extent. This commitment meant a further splitting up of strength and that the transport to this area would take about two months.)

The extension of coastal defenses and an increased employment of coast artillery (mostly light Italian calibers which were not suited for the purpose), broadening of command channels through the addition of an army group and the addition of another Army Headquarters, and finally the preparations of march-orders so that when needed, about 12 divisions could be brought up mostly from the East in the shortest possible time, i.e., within 30-60 days. The air-corps had to make the corresponding preparations.

A landing in Southern France, accompanied possibly by an invasion of the coast of BISCEA from England, was considered a lesser probability at that time. The FUEHRER himself believed very strongly that, beyond all that, PORTUGAL and Northern SPAIN might be the target of the next Anglo-American operations. The countermeasures in case that such intentions should show up more clearly were turned over mainly to the air corps which was ordered to get ready.
stronger frosts for use against enemy ports and convoys. Otherwise, the Commander in Chief West had, following closer instruction from the supreme command, to prepare the coastal defenses, for these and some other eventualities.

Contrary to these considerations, the continuation of the Anglo-American push towards the Fortress Europe on Italian soil finally again became more and more probable. But even here many factors remained uncertain. Would the push aim at SICILY or SARDINIA first, or would it be directed toward the Italian mainland and here especially toward the open region of APULIA which was so important for our air-forces? A landing in the heart of Central Italy, too, to be out of the way, in the area between NAPLES and ROME was not considered possible. If there was a great deal of uncertainty concerning the probable direction of an enemy attack, it was heightened still by the question of the will and strength of the Italian defensive. The measures Italy had taken for the defense of the long coastlines of her Islands and the mainland turned out to be negligible. Nothing could be expected of her fleet, especially since it was said to have only very little fuel left. The Italian air force had been more or less wiped out. The hope that the Italian soldiers would prove himself better in the defense of his own frontiers and country than he had in Africa or especially in Russia, was expressed frequently but could not stand up under closer scrutiny of a military character.

In addition to all that, the mutual military and political relations were even then strained to the fullest. In complete agreement with Germany, Italy had withdrawn all her forces from the East after the break-down of the winter of 42/43. However, the defeat was blamed on Germany, a point of view which was spread by word of mouth by the officers and soldiers returning from the East and, sometimes in violent form, by the Italian press. The catastrophe in Tunisia which had been preceded by the loss of the last portions of the Italian colonial empire, also was blamed more on the continual interference by the German commanders and the insufficient support by the German air-force than on the own failure. In those theaters of operation in which we fought together, some extraordinarily strong frictions had occurred which were caused, according to the German point of view, by a special policy of the Italian generals in favor of certain elements unfriendly to Germany, especially of the proaso-slavic Chetniks. This situation brought about a special mission trip of the German Foreign Minister to Rome in Feb. 1943
on which I went with him. But even this visit to Mussolini and Ambrosio did not bring any satisfactory results.

This tension, however, extended at that time to the relations between Hitler and Mussolini themselves. The reason for that was, I think, that Mussolini had to be afraid to lose the more authority the more he put himself at the disposal of German influence. That was probably the reason why all further attempts Hitler's to arrange for another meeting on German soil after the one of April 1943 failed, and in view of the continued unfavorable development of the over-all situation. At time, Hitler actually waited at the Berghof Mussolini's visit for a long time, refused, however, to meet him in Italy, presumably because he feared for his safety. Only when the Anglo-American landing in Sicily brought about a new crisis, a meeting was arranged surprisingly quickly at TREVISO on July 21, 1943 at which I was present.

But even there, they failed to reach a decision on one of the most important military questions, namely how to arrange clear-out assignments of commands in Italy and the Balkans. As a matter of fact, that point wasn't even brought up. The main topic of the discussion was rather repeated urgent warnings to Mussolini concerning the Italian inability to maintain in the long run the new modern German which the Italians lacked and which they had asked for demand for weapons which more and more urgently since the campaign in Africa had been on the down-grade: aircraft, tanks, anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns. German anti-aircraft artillery had been committed in Italy on a large scale and was currently being taken over by Italian troops.

The Italians wanted to take over the other weapons in number which by far surpassed the German capacity and, as a matter of principle without having them service by German troops only for the equipment of their own troops. This demand had no practical foundations, it led to the suspicion that it was made purposely to prepare a reason to get out of the war if it were denied. This suspicion was increased by the fact that Mussolini and the Italian military high command with the possible exception of RACZKA had, on the other hand, accepted the German offer to transfer a large number of German army contingents to Italy in spite of the unfavorable situation with an extraordinarily cool and sometimes even rejecting manner.

Already immediately after the defeat in TUNISIA the Germans endeavored to keep at least three to four German divisions in Italy as support for the
Italian defense. One of these four divisions was to go to SARDINIA and one to SICILY. Hard though it was for the German high command to spare these units, it proved all the harder, and sometimes even possible only through use of camouflage and tricks to force these troops on the Italians. At the same time we fully realized that even these small forces could, especially on the islands, do nothing but bear the initial brunt. They had to lose whatever little importance they had if the Italians themselves should fail. Consequently there arose the need, while the German troops, consisting mainly of the rest of the which African divisions were alerted in Italy proper, stream more and more into the Italian high command in Rome as well as down into the staffs of the army in order to gain as decisive an influence as possible.

The German realization that only considerable strength with forces would be able to meet a serious attack on Italy did not lead to the steps necessary for the over-all German strategy. On the contrary, it was at that time that the Chief of the General Staff succeeded to carry out his offensive at KURSK and thereby to use up in the shortest possible time all major reserves during of the army, collected after the hard winter. When on July 10 the Anglo-Americans started their landing in SICILY, there were besides the six to eight (?) Italian divisions the large German units, including the Hermann Goering Panzer division which had joined them shortly before. In addition, so-called which were presumed, Fortress Hamel on 85 had been emplaced in them a pots most likely to be endangered by landing. The FUEHRER had taken special care to equip these 85s with heavy weapons.

The German air-force had the mission to strike at the enemy landing installations and at convoys, if possible already in the ports along the North African coast. Field Marshak von RIGHTOFEN was against this idea and expected better results and especially fewer anti-aircraft defenses if the boats were attacked while nearing the coast and during the process of unloading.

The commitment of the German units in SICILY went according to plan in so far as they were in a position to be massed for a counterattack after the early collapse of the Italian coastal defenses. According to the reports received by the German supreme command at that time, this counterattack very nearly succeeded, especially in the Southern coastal sector of SICILY. When it became clear that SICILY could not be held, the command was more and more turned over to the German Gen. HUBS who succeeded in transferring the majority of
the German troops to Calabria, supported by numerous measures of the Supreme Command to secure the passage across the Strait of Messina. Regrouping on the Southern part of the Italian mainland, a reorganization of forces was carried out with the main forces around Naples and Salerno while If I am not mistaken other units remained to secure CALABRIA and APULIA. The German division on SARDINIA were withdrawn to the mainland at that time already, contrary to the Italian demand to increase the German garrison there.
German Collaboration with Japan:

1. The form of collaboration, between the two, described between Germany and her allies in the war 1939-45, was even generally speaking, very loose. If the political French, or German, review of history presented the allies to be influamed about Germany in London in June, the allies, for their war, unaligned in the campaign of Russia, development to make their participation in the different campaigns, depended on for reaching the objectives had consisted mainly of demand for shipments of air-planes, raw materials of all kinds, or to withdraw entirely from any further participation. In spite of the acknowledged preponderance Germany's Hitler, never demanded the establishment of a unified high-command. Rather, one had gotten used to express the desire of the German military leaders by means of letters to the heads of State and prime-ministers of the allied countries, written in the most important cases by Hitler himself, otherwise by Keitel. In the most difficult situations even, such as in North Africa in 1942 and in Italy in 1943, the question of a unified command had not been solved. Only in the Eastern theater of operations were the allied armies, which were committed there at times, subordinated to the local higher German command echelons, at which times, however, all usual difficulties of a war of coalitions made their appearance.

2. The re-embellishment of the German army, the extent of machinery, was first of all by the Führers dislike for the yellow race which he felt strongly and which he had often mentioned, and secondly by the great distances between the theaters of war. There was, in addition, the continental point of view of the highest German leaders—other than those of the Navy—who had hardly any realization of the strategical connections.

Concerning the Japanese as far as military matters were concerned was, so far as I know, already before Japan entered the war, the military commission of the three-power pact, which had its representatives in Berlin were Adm. Gross foreign affairs, the Japanese special plenipotentiary Adm. Nomura, and the Italian military attaché, Gen. Mattias, who was "better kept away from the conferences". At the same time, the Japanese kept a very large number of attachés of the three components of the armed forces, as far as I know about 20 army officers alone, based until about fall 1942 by Gen. Banzai, A.

After Japan's entry into the war, daily conferences took place, to my knowledge, at the Office of the Commander in Chief of the navy, in or near Berlin. The OKW, however, was not informed by particulars.
The liaison "par-le-haut" was especially kept by ambassador Oshima who, on special occasions was received by the Fuehrer himself for that purpose, and by visits to the HQ of the leading members of the Japanese military representation in Berlin, which became gradually more frequent. These talks took place until about Sept. 1944, on two occasions, once every three months and were carried on by Keitel and Jodl in the presence of Vice ADM. Buerkner. I, myself, never participated in these talks, contrary to the usual costumes which governed our relations with our allies. However, I had to be the host at the dinners which followed the talks. I do know through verbal reports and written notes the main topics were the evaluation of the situation in both theaters, and the exchange of experiences gained while fighting the common enemy. Both sides showed especially in the first phases, only limited frankness.

3. An actual collaboration existed between Germany and Japan existed, at least until Sept 1944, only in a very few fields. Already soon after the Japanese advance into the South Sea and the Indian Ocean, a line of demarcation was agreed upon which ran, as mentioned before and as far as I remember, East of the "Persian Gulf", appr. in north-southerly direction. In addition to that, the use and cargo of blockade-runners which ran, in the first part of the winter of the first war-year-between Japan and the ports of the occupied French Atlantic coast, were agreed on. Later on, as far as I know, transport submarines were used for that purpose.

The exchange of experiences consisted mainly of tactics of amphibious landings, and defenses against them and were asked for by either side depending on the situation.
Appendix to the Conclusion:

The most decisive development politically took place— as far as I can see— during the period of the first half of 1938. Up to Feb and summer 1938, leading soldiers of truly German characteristics and good will, felt themselves bound to support, although with growing discomfort, a political party movement which, in spite of everything, seemed to promise to renew the exterior "national"—and interior "socialist"—German dignity and power. As soon as the party had disposed of these men of the OKW and OKH it started at once to realize its power-political aims, trusting thereby, against any responsible thinking from a soldier's viewpoint— note in the weakness