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Report of Interrogation No. 5815 of

11 October 1945
I/O: Capt HALLE

P/W : von Raumer, Hermann
Rank : Lt. Col.
Unit : Attache Gruppe, Luftwaffe
Capt'd : Arrested by CIC, Mauerkrchen, Austria, 9 July 1945

Veracity: Believed reliable.

Report: Collaboration with the Japanese Attaches.

The cooperation between the German military agencies and the foreign attaches was extraordinarily difficult to achieve during the war. It was therefore particularly difficult to draw the line between information which could be passed on without endangering German military interests and information which was of advantage to the enemy, since the countries which had military attaches in Berlin had to be differently classified as to their attitude towards Germany.

There were four groups to be distinguished:

- (a) countries which had interests similar to those of the enemy belligerents;
- (b) neutrals;
- (c) countries friendly to Germany;
- (d) countries allied to Germany.

Discrimination in the passing out of information had led to opposition from various groups, and was therefore impracticable. Since the mutual exchange of information between the attaches of the various countries had to be considered even such a solution would not have guaranteed security. The prerequisite for such treatment would have been to distribute information from a central office. This was not available. Regardless of whether it was that the new Wehrmacht had not been organized long enough to find the proper organizational form for such a special sphere of activity, or that it was the case of "administrative red tape", (which was especially strongly developed in Germany) which stood in the way, liaison with the foreign attaches was not handled in a uniform way.

Except for questions of intelligence, which were handled by the Abwehr Section of the OKW (Supreme Armed Forces Command), information was given to the foreign attaches by the attache groups or attache units of the individual arms of the Wehrmacht.

The attache group of the Air Force was subordinate to the central office in the German Air Ministry up until war broke out. The methods of work of this office were based on this subordination, and the office was organized as follows:

- a. handling of personal relations with the foreign attaches;
- b. handling of personal interests of German attaches abroad;
- c. dissemination of incoming information and requests for information appropriate technical staff heads of the Air Force agencies;
- d. transmittal to the inquiring attaches of the answers to their quest

At the beginning of the war the attache group was subordinated to the A-2 of the Air Forces Command Staff. The reason given for this subordination was that the Attache Group had to be an integral part of that office, and responsible for securing information on the enemy. Actually it was a result of Col. Schmid's desire for power. He was then chief of A-2, and as he had the Blutorden (Party decoration for participation in the 1923 Putsch), his position was especially

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strong both with Goering and with Hitler. No real change in operation resulted from this subordination of the Attache Group.

The original director of the Attache Group was a colonel, but later they were young majors from the General Staff. During peacetime every attempt was made to choose officers who had an exact knowledge of foreign affairs, but during the war this principle was dropped, much to the disadvantage of the operation of the Attache Group. The young General Staff officers, having no experience abroad, failed to recognize the political importance of the attaches and saw only their military importance. The result was that the Attache Group was expected first of all to secure information, whereas information for the attaches was given only in return for information delivered.

This contradicted established custom. Information was secured from abroad by the German attaches present in the various countries, while the accredited air attaches in Germany expected information from the German Air Force.

The organization of the Attache Group was as follows: Subordinate to the director of the Attache Group was a deputy who at the same time was in charge of all matters of administration (payments, personnel, etc.) in "Administration", the offices for the various countries, and the "chief of protocol". The specialists for the various countries had the following assignments:

- a) foreign attaches:
 - general welfare
 - receive questions, route them to the proper officers, and transmit the answers
 - arrange tours of inspection of air corps installations
 - tours of plants connected with the air industry (together with general chief of aircraft)
 - social functions (together with chief of protocol).
- b) German attaches:
 - route attache reports to the proper offices
 - transmit information from other offices to the German air attaches
 - provide film and propaganda materials, journals, books, etc. for the German air attaches.

The Japanese attaches from the very beginning made particularly heavy demands for information, saying that as allies they had to demand preferred treatment. Hitler had ordered that the Japanese were to be provided with information on all technical questions, even on developments which were in the research stage and expected to be completed and in use before the end of the war. There were a great many difficulties which stood in the way of the practical execution of Japanese wishes and the orders from the Fuehrer. First, from the point of view of security, there were grave misgivings as to the advisability of revealing military secrets to such a large extent, as it was feared that in transmitting this information ---almost exclusively by radio after the war with the USSR had begun---it might be decoded and thus fall into the hands of the enemy. Also, some officers feared that security measures might not be strictly enough adhered to by the Japanese. Particularly difficult, however, was the opinion of the young General Staff officers who were responsible for issuing the information that the Japanese attaches, for their part, should reciprocate with information of their own. The Japanese attaches maintained, however, and correctly so, that this was the business of the German air attaches in Tokyo.

Upon Japan's entry into the war in 1941 the Japanese ambassador Oshima called Hitler's attention to the lack of sufficient cooperation with the air force,

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whereupon the order was given that a special liaison officer should be appointed to handle this assignment.

As P/W was well known to the Japanese military as a result of his part in the Anti-Comintern Pact, P/W was chosen for this post. From then on P/W conferred with the Japanese attaches about every other day. A program somewhat like the following was pursued:

1. orientation on the general air situation;
2. data on air penetration (strength, route, tactics, etc.);
3. reports on new information on the enemy obtained by A-2;
4. discussions of desires for lectures, inspection tours, etc.; communication of such wishes to the proper offices (specialist for Japan, G.L.);
5. bi-monthly lectures were arranged, given by specialists concerning special questions, followed by a social get-together with the officers of the General Staff.

This form of cooperation was an improvement in the eyes of the Japanese attaches over the former condition, but it did not completely fulfill their expectations. They had especially expressed a desire to have a representative of their own at Headquarters (Hauptquartier) similar to that which they had had at Attache Group Army for a time. This request was turned down by the chief of the General Staff.

As a special sign of cooperation between the German and Japanese air forces the plan was considered to send an air mission to Tokyo. The appointment to the post of German air attache in Tokyo was a most unfortunate choice. General von Gronau, until that time president of the Aero Club, had been sent to Tokyo even before war began. He was not familiar with the tactical, strategic, and technical developments which the German air force had made during this time. In addition, his staff was much too small for such an important post (he at first had only one engineer officer as aide). For this reason information from the east was extremely meager. Whereas the Japanese attaches with a staff of very fine specialists made themselves acquainted with all the details of the German air force, the German General Staff of the Air Force was only very superficially informed on the organization and development of the Japanese air force. The German air mission with a number of important specialists was sent far too late, and they were captured at the end of the war while on their way to Japan.