APPERTAINING TO WAR HISTORY

(pencil note)

S.O. Only

"FALL GRÜN"

CZECHOSLOVAKIA.
ITEM 1

--- ? of the Fuehrer: (semi-illegible)

1). Does MUSSOLINI regard his work as completed or not.
   a). If so, close future boundary of Czechoslovakia West then wait
      and see. "Return with the bag empty."
   b). If not, then the "Empire" of Africa. Impossible without German
      help. Czechoslovakia is a preliminary condition. "Return with
      Czechoslovakia in the bag."

2). MUSSOLINI, who is no illusionist, can definitely assess Germany's
   military potentialities. Therefore he will suit timing of his aims
   with that.

3). Against France and England problem of Czechoslovakia can be settled
   only if still allied with Italy. France and England will not inter-
   vene. (Only to overcome the four-week re-grouping period.)

4). Living under a common fate. (Example, 1805 and 1806)

5). State of Armament: comparisons relative but in our favor:
   a). Deliveries of ores: France -- 600,000 tons
      Germany -- 2 million tons.
   b). Britain has been arming for 9 months. Launching
      not for 2 years.
   c). Out of date air force equipment.

6). No general staff conferences of the various branches of the Armed
   Forces. Would have to retract permission to the Army. Only through
   Supreme Command. Very important that actual intentions be kept
   secret.

7). Arming progressing too slowly: Guns not only for constituted units,
   but also in reserve for replacement. Fortifications. Range of guns.

8). Replacement of officers doubtful.

---

Schn (M. Schumdt's writing
and initialed by him)
Summary of discussion between Fuehrer and General Keitel of 21 April:

**A. Political Aspect**

1. Strategic surprise attack out of a clear sky without any cause or possibility of justification has been turned down. As result would be: hostile world opinion which can lead to a critical situation. Such a measure is justified only for the elimination of the last opponent on the mainland.

2. Action after a time of diplomatic clashes, which gradually come to a crisis and lead to war.

3. Lightning-swift action as the result of an incident (e.g., assassination of German ambassador in connection with an anti-German demonstration).

**B. Military Conclusions**

1. The preparations are to be made for the political possibilities 2) and 3). Case 2) is the undesired one since "Gruen" will have taken security measures.

2. The loss of time caused by transporting the bulk of the divisions by rail - which is unavoidable but should be cut down as far as possible - must not impede a lightning-swift blow at the time of the action.

3. "Separate thrusts" are to be carried out immediately with a view to penetrating the enemy fortification lines at numerous points and in a strategically favorable direction. The thrusts are to be worked out to the smallest detail (knowledge of roads, of targets, composition of the columns according to their individual tasks). Simultaneous attacks by the Army and Air Force.

   The Air Force is to support the individual columns. (e.g., divebombers: sealing off installations at penetration points, hampering the bringing up of reserves, destroying signal communications traffic, thereby isolating the garrisons.)

4. Politically, the first 4 days of military action are the decisive ones. If there are no effective military successes, a European crisis will certainly arise. Accomplished facts must prove the senselessness of foreign military intervention, draw Allies into the scheme (division of spoils!) and demoralize "Gruen".

   Therefore: bridging the time gap between first penetration and employment of the forces to be brought up, by a determined and ruthless thrust by a motorized army (e.g. via Pl pest Fr) (Pilsen, Prague).

5. If possible, separation of transport movement "Rot" from "Gruen". A simultaneous strategic concentration "Rot" can lead "Rot" to undesired measures. On the other hand it must be possible to put "Fell Rot" into operation at any time.
C. Propaganda

1). Leaflets on the conduct of Germans in Czechoslovakia (Gruenland).
2). Leaflets with threats for intimidation of the Czechs (Gruenen).

Schm

(initialled by Sehmunit)

Written by an officer
TRJ. N.S.

A). POLITICAL POSSIBILITIES

1). Sudden surprise attack out of clear sky not possible. World opinion can produce critical situation. Would be thinkable only for ultimate conflict without the threat of other opponents.

2). Action after a period of tension and constant aggravation of the situation.

3). Action as the result of an incident. (example)

B). MILITARY NECESSITIES

Cases 2 and 3 can be considered. In case 2 "security measures" will be taken. Duration of transporting by rail to be looked into.

1). Invasion by columns ready to march at points which lie in/direction, strategically important. (Permanent fortifications must be known, columns assembled to suit particular situations, roads reconnoitred.) Simultaneous attack by Luftwaffe, cooperation with Luftwaffe, isolation of garrisons of the fortifications, cutting of communications.)

2). "Dead Space" in first 4 days prior to actual operation must be avoided under all circumstances. Must be bridged through motorized army. Penetrating via HILSEN. Hemper mobilization.

3). Separation of transport movement "Rot" and "Gruen",

a). in order not to aggravate "Rot",

b). but also as not to arrive late, if necessary.

Basic Principle: Create accomplished facts so that

c). help comes too late - other powers do not intervene

b). Allies take part (like wolves also went something out of it)

c). State collapses from within.

Propaganda: Directions to Germans
Threats to others

Submit: 1). Fortifications (strength in detail)

2). Distribution of nationalities within Wehrmacht.
ITEM 3

MOS 1 16/5 0925 -
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

ZEITZLER

Most Secret - 1) Which divisions on the "Gruen" frontiers ready to march within 12 hours, in the case of mobilization?

2) What is the final day of mobilization?

SCHMUNDT

MOS 1 1930 MELDAU MBZ

(the same also in Schmundt's handwriting)

MOS No. 2 1115 -
MBZ 02 16/5 1114 -
Major Schmundt, Armed Forces Adjutant to the Fuehrer -

Most Secret to Question 1

12 of them - in garrisons

to Question 2

Third day - Please state time of receipt. Teleprint left my room at 1110 - NN

ZEITZLER Oberstleutnant on the General Staff

MOS 03 16/5 1155

OKW for Oberstleutnant Zeitler - Most Secret

1) Teleprint received 1115

2) Please send the numbers of the divisions.

Schmundt

(the same also in Schmundt's handwriting)

1159 MOS 03 Wagner?

MBZ 04 16/5 1302 -

Major Schmundt Armed Forces Adjutant to the Fuehrer -

Most Secret to message 1155 7, 17, 10, 24, 4, 14, 3, 18, 26, 8,
armored and mountain.

Zeitzler Oberstleutnant on the General Staff.

- 4 -
ITEM 4

MBZ 05 17/5 1505

TO MAJOR SCHMUNDT ARMED FORCES ADJUTANT TO THE FUEHRER - MOST SECRET
IN ANSWER TO OBERST LEUTNANT ZEITZLER AND WITH REGARD TO MAP OF FORTIFICATION:

FORTIFIED CONSTRUCTION CONSISTS OF FAIRLY LARGE NUMBER OF STEEL AND CONCRETE FORTIFICATIONS AS WELL AS LIGHT, MEDIUM AND HEAVY MG EMPLACEMENTS TO CLOSE GAPS BETWEEN FORTIFICATIONS. NUMBER OF STEEL AND CONCRETE FORTIFICATIONS VARIES FROM ONE TO NINE PER KILOMETER. POSITIONS CONSTRUCTED CONSIST OF LIGHT, MEDIUM AND HEAVY MG EMPLACEMENTS AND AN OCCASIONAL STEEL AND CONCRETE FORTIFICATION IN BETWEEN. NUMBER OF MG EMPLACEMENTS VARIES FROM TWO TO NINE PER KILOMETER. BLOCK CONSTRUCTION CONSISTS OF LIGHT, SOMETIMES MEDIUM AND HEAVY MG EMPLACEMENTS AT MAIN ROADS AND THOROUGHFARES. DEFENSIVE POTENTIALITIES: STEEL AND CONCRETE FORTIFICATIONS BULLET PROOF AGAINST ALL KNOWN CALIBRES. LIGHT MG EMPLACEMENTS BULLET PROOF AGAINST ALL CALIBRES UP TO 10.5 CM.; MEDIUM MG EMPLACEMENTS BULLET PROOF AGAINST CALIBRES UP TO 10.5 CM.; HEAVY MG EMPLACEMENT BULLET PROOF AGAINST CALIBRES UP TO 21.00 CM.; SOMETIMES AGAINST THE LARGEST CALIBRES.

ZEITZLER OBERSTLEUTNANT ON THE GENERAL STAFF
My Fuehrer!

Effective 1 October 1938 (beginning of the new mobilization year for the army) new strategic directives must be issued, whose political bases and stipulations you, my Fuehrer, yourself intend to make.

For the meantime, however, it is necessary that the "Gruen" section of the strategic directives be replaced by a new version that takes into account the situation which has arisen as a result of the incorporation of Austria into the Reich and the newly-suspected intentions of the Czech General Staff.

A draft of this kind is attached. It has not yet been discussed with the Commanders in Chief. I intend to do this only after this draft in its fundamental ideas has been approved by you my Fuehrer, so that it can then be resubmitted to be signed.

Heil, my Fuehrer

(signed) Keitel
Berlin, 20 May 1938

THE NEW DIRECTIVE "GRÜEN"

1. Political Prerequisites:

It is not my intention to smash Czechoslovakia without provocation, in the near future through military action. Therefore inevitable political developments within Czechoslovakia must force the issue, or political events in Europe create an especially favorable opportunity and one which may never come again.

2. Political Possibilities for the Commencement of the Action:

An invasion without suitable obvious cause and without sufficient political justification cannot be considered with reference to the possible consequences of such an action in the present situation.

Rather will the action be initiated either:

a). after a period of increasing diplomatic clashes and tension, which is coupled with military preparations and is made use of to push the war-guilt onto the enemy. Even such a period of tension preceding the war however will terminate in sudden military action on our part, which must come with all possible surprise as to time and extent, or

b). by lightning-swift action as a result of a serious incident, through which Germany is provoked in an unbecoming way and for which at least part of the world opinion will grant the moral justification of military action.

b). is militarily and politically the more favorable.

3. Conclusions for the Preparations of "Fall Grün";

which must take into account the possibilities mentioned in 2 a). and 2 b).

c) For Armed War it is essential to create—already in the first 4 days—a military situation which plainly proves to hostile nations eager to intervene, the hopelessness of the Czechoslovakian military situation, and gives the nations with territorial claims on Czechoslovakia an incentive to immediate intervention against Czechoslovakia. In such a case the intervention of Poland and Hungary against Czechoslovakia can be expected, especially if France, due to Italy's clearly pro-German attitude fears, or at least hesitates, to unleash a European war by her intervention against Germany.

If is very probable that attempts by Russia to give military support to Czechoslovakia are to be expected. If concrete successes are not achieved as a result of the ground operations during the first few days, a European crisis will certainly arise.

b). The Propaganda War must, on one hand, intimidate Czechoslovakia by threats and reduce her power of resistance, on the other hand,
give instructions to the national minorities for supporting the Armed War and influence the neutrals into our way of thinking.

c). The Economic War has the task of employing all means at the disposal of economy to hasten the final collapse of Czechoslovakia.

The opening of the Economic and Propaganda war can precede the Armed War. I myself will determine the date.

Z (initialled at end by Zeitzler)

For paragraphs 4), 5), and 6). see under ITEM II
Questions on "Gruen"

1. Peace-time strength of divisions prepared for march readiness.
2. Strength of mobile divisions.
3. Composition of 2nd Armored Division in the case of mobilization.
4. Strength, possibilities and composition of a motorized unit (motorized divisions) to be used for independent thrust.
5. When can the field units be equipped with 15 cm. mortars?
6. What calibres and how large a number of artillery pieces are available for combatting fortifications such as fortresses?
ITEM 6

Berlin, 23 May

L In

MOST SECRET

Questionnaire of 23 May

1). Peace-time strength of divisions prepared for march readiness.

Strength of a peace-time division: 14,000 men
Strength of a division made ready to march: 14,000 men

(but composition is different from that of a peace-time division, i.e. some men are left out and others included).

2). Strength of mobile divisions.

Strength of a mobile division: 17,000 men

3). Composition of the 2nd Armored Division in the case of Mobilization.

In the case of mobilization the 2nd Armored Division is composed of 1 rifle brigade, one tank brigade and divisional troops.

The rifle brigade has one Infantry regiment motorized of 2 battalions and one motorcycle rifle battalion.

The tank brigade has two tank regiments of two battalions.

The Divisional Troops will include 1 Artillery Regiment motorized of 2 light battalions, 1 Reconnaissance Battalion motorized, 1 Anti-Tank Battalion, 1 Engineer Battalion motorized, and 1 Signal Battalion motorized.

Altogether the 2nd Armored Division (mobile) has 607 light machine guns, 250 heavy machine guns, 18 light mortars, 12 heavy mortars, 8 light Infantry howitzers, 48 Anti-Tank guns, 122 2 cm. guns, 16 37 cm. guns, 16 7.5 cm. guns and 24 light field howitzers.

4). Strength, possibilities and composition of a motorized unit (motorized divisions) for independent thrust.

In the case of mobilization, C-in-C Army is in command of the motorized units. C-in-C Army must therefore be questioned as regards any new employment.

Altogether the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Armored Divisions (rapid march readiness is intended) 4 motorized divisions and the light division (for the moment not yet intended for rapid march readiness; presumably from 1 October).

5). When can the field units be equipped with 15 cm. mortars?

Mobilization of the infantry guns (= 15 cm. mortars) planned only for the fall, as ammunition for them will only then be available. For training purposes nearly all corps except the 3 corps have the heavy infantry guns at the moment without live ammunition, however.

6). What calibres and how large a number of artillery pieces are available for combating fortifications such as fortresses?

Only 21 cm. howitzers. Altogether 23 (of which 8 are in East Prussia)
with 16,000 rounds (of which 4,000 in East Prussia).

(In Schmude writing): In general, single experimental artillery piece (guns).

Z (initialled by Zeitzler)

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On next page the questions are put again plus, the following additional questions:

7). What do the individual types of Czechoslovakian permanent frontier fortifications look like? Profile?

8). Is cooperation between infantry and bombers assured for attacks against enemy strongpoints etc.?

9). Can the construction of fortifications in the West, in the form of MG strong points and road blocks, be hastened by the employment of works columns of the Inspector of Road Construction?

10). What progress has been made in the howitzer (Mörser) programme? What progress has been made in the conversion of heavy naval guns?

***

(Next three pages contain the first 6 questions above and answers to them in a teleprint message, beginning: "I am answering several questions which the Führer put to me during conferences. I request that you report the answers to the Führer."

- 11 -
ITEM 6

1). INFORM GENERAL KEITEL: THE FUEHRER IS GOING INTO "GRUEN" IN DETAIL. BASIC IDEAS NOT CHANGED. SURPRISE ELEMENT TO BE EMPHASIZED MORE. CONFERENCE WITH PARTICIPANTS WILL TAKE PLACE AFTER RETURN, AT THE LATEST. CONFERENCE HERE NOT OUT OF THE QUESTION. RETURN PROBABLY BEGINNING NEXT WEEK.

2). INFORM COLONEL GENERAL VON BRAUCHITSCH AND GENERAL KEITEL:

A). THE FUEHRER, IN CONNECTION WITH HIS CONSIDERATIONS ON 1), HIMSELF SUGGESTED THE HOLDING OF MANEUVERS TO PRACTICE TAKING FORTIFICATIONS BY SURPRISE ATTACK. I THEN REPORTED THAT C-IN-C ARMY WAS PLANNING A CORRESPONDING TRAINING EXERCISE FOR SEPTEMBER. THE FUEHRER THINKS THAT MOMENT TOO LATE. HE HIMSELF WILL DISCUSS THIS WITH C-IN-C ARMY.

B). THE FUEHRER REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED THE NECESSITY OF PRESSING FORWARD CHEMICAL THE FORTIFICATION WORK IN THE WEST

(NOTE FOR K KPT V PUTTKAMER: PLEASE DESTROY TEXT OF 1). AND 2) AFTER USE)
ITEM 9

REICH WAR MINISTRY/NAVAL SIGNAL SERVICE

MOST SECRET

C.W.K.HIS REPORTS ON EVENTS OF THE NIGHT: NO SPECIAL OCCURRENCES. THE
MOBILIZATION MEASURES ORDERED IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA CONTINUE. THE FOLLOWING
HAVE BEEN DRAFTED: CLASSES 1913 AND 1914 COMPLETE AND SPECIALISTS ONLY
FROM CLASSES 1894 TO 1911 LEAVING OUT CLASSES 04, 06, 09. I SHALL KEEP
YOU FURTHER CONTINUALLY INFORMED. I CONSIDER IT NECESSARY THAT THE
FUEHRER INFORM HIS C’S-IN-C OF HIS INTENTIONS SOON. HAVE YOU ANY
FURTHER QUESTIONS?
ITEM 11

Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
OKW No. 42/38 Most Secret S.O. Only
Berlin, 30 May 1938
Copy of the 4th Copy

Written by an Officer

By order of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Part 2, Section II of the directive on the unified preparations for war of the Armed Forces dated 24 June 1937 (Ob.d.W. No. 55/37 g.kks Chefseche L Ie) ("Two-Front-War with main effort in the South-East - strategic concentration 'Grunen'") is to be replaced by the attached version. Its execution must be assured as from 1 October 38 at the latest.

Alterations in the other parts of the directive must be expected during the next few weeks.

by order

Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
sgd. Keitel

1 Appendix

To: C-in-C Army
C-in-C Navy
C-in-C Air Force
OKW Section L

Copy 1
Copy 2
Copy 3
Copy 4 - 5

Certified a true copy
Zeitzler
Oberstleutnant on the General Staff
II. Two front war with main effort in the South East
(strategic concentration "Gruen")

1). Political Prerequisites.

It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future. It is the job of the political leaders to wait or bring about the politically and militarily suitable moment of an inevitable development/conditions inside Czechoslovakia or other political events in Europe creating a surprisingly favorable opportunity and one which may never come again/cause me to take early action.

The proper choice and determined and full utilization of a favorable moment is the surest guarantee of success. Accordingly the preparations are to be made at once.

2). Political Possibilities for the Commencement of the Action.

The following are necessary prerequisites for the intended invasion:

a). suitable obvious cause and, with it
b). sufficient political justification,
c). action unexpected by the enemy, which will find him prepared to the least possible degree.

From a military as well as a political standpoint the most favorable course is a lightning-swift action as the result of an incident through which Germany is provoked in an unbearable way for which at least part of world opinion will grant the moral justification of military action.

But even a period of tension, more or less preceding a war, must terminate in sudden action on our part - which must have the elements of surprise as regards time and extent - before the enemy is so advanced in military preparedness that he cannot be surprised.

3). Conclusions for the Preparation of "Fall Gruen".

a). For the Armed War it is essential that the surprise element as the most important factor contributing to success be made full use of by appropriate preparatory measures, already in peace-time and by an unexpectedly rapid course of the action. Thus it is essential to create a situation within the first four days which plainly demonstrates, to hostile nations eager to intervene, the hopelessness of the Czechoslovakian military situation and which at the same time will give nations with territorial claims on Czechoslovakia an incentive to intervene immediately against Czechoslovakia. In such a case, intervention by Poland
ITEM 11

end Hungary against Czechoslovakia may be expected, especially in France, due to the obvious pro-German attitude of Italy, or at least hesitates, to unleash a European war by intervening against Germany. Attempts by Russia to give military support to Czechoslovakia mainly by the Air Force are to be expected. If concrete successes are not achieved by the land operations within the first few days, a European crisis will certainly result. This knowledge must give commanders of all ranks the impetus to decided and bold action.

b). The Propaganda War must on one hand intimidate Czechoslovakia by threats and soften her power of resistance, on the other hand issue directions to national groups for support in the Armed War and influence the neutrals into our way of thinking. I reserve further directions and determination of the date.

4). Tasks of the Armed Forces.

Armed Forces Preparations are to be made on the following basis:

a). The mass of all forces must be employed against Czechoslovakia.

b). For the West, a minimum of forces are to be provided as rear cover which may be required, the other frontiers in the East against Poland and Lithuania are merely to be protected, the Southern frontiers to be watched.

c). The sections of the army which can be rapidly employed must force the frontier fortifications with speed and decision and must break into Czechoslovakia with the greatest daring in the certainty that the bulk of the mobile army will follow them with the utmost speed. Preparations for this are to be made and timed in such a way that the sections of the army which can be rapidly employed cross the frontier at the appointed time at the same time as the penetration by the Air Force before the enemy can become aware of our mobilization.*

*For this, a timetable between Army and Air Force is to be worked out in conjunction with OKW and submitted to me for approval.*

5). Missions for the branches of the Armed Forces

c). Army: The basic principle of the surprise attack against Czechoslovakia must not be endangered by the inevitable time required for transporting the bulk of the field forces by rail nor the initiative of the Air Force be wasted. Therefore it is first of all essential to the army that as many assault columns as possible be employed at the same time as the surprise attack by the Air Force. These assault columns - the composition of each, according to their tasks at that time - must be formed with troops which can be employed rapidly coming to their proximity to the frontier or to motorization and to special measures of readiness. It must be the purpose of these thrusts to break into the Czechoslovakian fortification lines at numerous points and in a strategically favorable direction, to achieve a breakthrough or to break them down from the rear. For the success of this operation, cooperation with the Sudeten German frontier population, with deserters from the Czechoslovakian army, with parachutists or

(* - * passages between asterisks occur only in this version not in Item 5)
ITEM 11 (cont.)

Airborne troops and with units of the sabotage service will be of importance. The bulk of the army has the task of "frustrating the Czechoslovakian plan of defense, of preventing the Czechoslovakian army from escaping into Slovakia, of forcing a battle," of berting the Czechoslovakian army end of occupying Bohemia and Moravia speedily. To this end a thrust into the heart of Czechoslovakia must be made with the strongest possible motorized end armored units using to the full the first successes of the Assault columns end the effects of the Air Force operations.

The rear cover provided for the West must be limited in numbers and quality to the extent which suits the present state of fortifications. Whether the units assigned this will be transported to the Western frontier immediately or held back for the time being will be decided in my special order. Preparations must however, be made to enable security detachments to be brought up to the Western frontier even during the strategic concentration "Gruen." *Independent of this, a first security garrison must be improvised from the engineers at present employed in constructing fortifications end from formations of the Labor Corps. The remaining frontiers as well as East Prussia are likely to be Heinchly weekly protected. But, alway depending on the political situation, the transfers by sec, of a part or even the bulk of the active forces of East Prussia, into the Reich must be taken into account.

b). Air Force. While leaving a minimum of defensive forces in the West, the Air Force is to be employed in bulk in a surprise attack against Czechoslovakia. The frontier is to be flown over at the same time as it is crossed by the first section of the army. (see so) The most important task of the Air Force is the destruction of the Czechoslovakian Air Force and their supply bases within the shortest possible time, in order to eliminate the possibility of its employment as well as that of Russian and French air forces, should the occasion arise, against the strategic concentration and penetration of the German army end against the German "Lebensraum." Next to this the crippling of enemy mobilization, of the government and Armed Forces, as well as the delaying of the strategic concentration of the Czech Army by attacks on communication installations, mobilization and government centers can be of considerable importance to the initial successes of the army. At points in the frontier area where stronger sections of the Czechoslovakian Army or the depth of the defensive system might make the success of the sudden breakthrough of the German Land-attack questionable, the employment of adequate bomber forces must be assured. Czechoslovakian industrial installations are to be spared as far as the course of operations permits. Retaliatory attacks against the population will be carried out only with my permission. Centers of air defense are to be created throughout BERLIN, the central German industrial area end the RUHR,ures, and gradually prepared even now in an inconspicuous fashion.*

c). Navy. The Navy will assist the army operations by employing the DANUBE-flotilla. For this purpose the flotilla will be under the orders of C-in-C Army. As regards the conduct of naval warfare at first only those measures are to be taken which appear to be necessary for the careful protection of the North Sea and the Baltic against a sudden intervention in the conflict by other states. These measures must be confined to the absolutely necessary extent. Their inconspicuousness must be guaranteed. It

(* - * Passages between asterisks represent additions to the version in ITEM 5)
ITEM 11 (cont.)

is of decisive importance that all actions, which might in-
fluence the political attitude of the European Great Powers
unfavorably, be avoided.

6). Tasks of the War Economy:

In war economy it is essential that in the field of the armament
industry e. maximum-deployment of forces is made possible through
increased supplies. In the course of operations, it is of value to
contribute to the reinforcement of the total war-economic strength-
by rapidly reconnoitring and restarting important factories. For
this reason the sparing of Czechoslovakian industrial and works in-
stallations - insofar as military operations permit - can be of
decisive importance to us.

7). "All preparations for sabotage and insurrection will be made by OKW.
They will be made in agreement with and according to the require-
ment of the branches of the Armed Forces, so that their effects
accord with the operations of the Army and Air Force."

signed ADOLF HITLER

Certified copy

signed Zeitzler

Oberstleutnant on the General Staff

(* - * Passages between asterisks represent additions to the version in
ITEM 5)
Berlin, 9 June 1938.

SHORT SURVEY OF ARMAMENT OF THE CZECH ARMY

1. SMALL ARMS

Armed uniformly with Hauser Rifle, model 24, calibre 7.92 mm (similar to German Rifle 98). Also grenade launcher for rifle grenades is attached to the rifle.

2. MACHINE GUNS

Light MG Z.B. 26, weight 9 Kg, 20 round magazine.

Heavy MG, temporarily the MG "Schwarzlose" which has been improved in range. Super-heavy MG, 20 mm MG, Oerlikon system has been introduced (especially for active air defence), other models are being tested.

3. MORTARS

8.1cm Stokes-Brandt, range 3000 m.

9cm light Skoda mortar, model 17, range 1200 m.

14cm medium mortar, model 18, range 2500 m.

26cm heavy mortar, model 17, range 2700 m.

4. INFANTRY GUNS FOR ANTI-AIRCRAFT AND ANTI-TANK DEFENSE

Several models are being tested, some of them twin barrel guns. Calibre 37 - 40 mm and/or 66 - 70 mm.

5. ARTILLERY PIECES

a. Light and Mountain artillery:

8cm field gun, model 17, range 10 km

8cm field gun, model 30, range 13.5 km (can also be used as an AA gun)

10cm light field howitzer, model 14/19, range 10 km.

7.5cm Mountain gun, model 15, range 7 km.

10cm Mountain howitzer, model 16/19, range 10 km.

b. Heavy artillery:

10.5cm gun, model 35, range 18 km.

15cm howitzer, model 14/16, range 8 km.
15cm howitzer, model 25, range 12 km.
15cm gun, model 15/16, range 20 km.
24cm gun, model 16, range 36 km.
21cm howitzer (Morsor) gun, model 18, range 10 km.
30.5cm howitzer (Morsor) gun, model 16, range 12.4 km.
Also in use are French 15.5cm howitzers.

c. AA Artillery
9cm AA-gun, model 12/20 (Stationary), range 12 km.
6.35 cm AA-gun, model 22/24 horizontal range 18 km, vertical range 12 km.
7.65cm AA-gun, model 35, horizontal range 16 km, vertical range 11 km.
6.6cm AA-gun, model is being tested.

ITEM 13

Z (Initialled by Zeitler)

15cm howitzer, model 26, range 12 km.
15cm gun, model 15/16, range 30 km.
24cm gun, model 16, range 36 km.
21cm howitzer (Morsor) gun, model 18, range 10 km.
30.5cm howitzer (Morsor) gun, model 16, range 12.4 km.
Also in use are French 15.5cm howitzers.

c. AA Artillery
9cm AA-gun, model 12/20 (Stationary), range 12 km.
6.35 cm AA-gun, model 22/24 horizontal range 18 km, vertical range 12 km.
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ITEM 13

Z (Initialled by Zeitler)

15cm howitzer, model 26, range 12 km.
15cm gun, model 15/16, range 30 km.
24cm gun, model 16, range 36 km.
21cm howitzer (Morsor) gun, model 21-26, range 10 km.
30.5cm howitzer (Morsor) gun, model 15, range 10.6 km.
Also in use are French 15.5cm howitzers.
ITEM 13

L I a

Berlin, 9 June 1938

MOST SECRET

FUEHRER'S QUESTIONS ON 9 JUNE 1938
Berlin, 9 June 1938

MOST SECRET

2 copies
1st copy

Question 1: Armament of the Czech Army?

Answer:

Arming and equipping of the Army with new means of war is progressing, thanks to the excellent production capacity of the Czech armament industry.

The armament was built up from the weapons of the old Austrian Army. It is slowly and steadily being modernized.

In Detail:

Artillery: Light field artillery. At present the old armament from the Austrian Army predominates.

Mountain Artillery: the same.

Medium artillery. New armament predominates.

Heavy artillery, old armament predominates.

Infantry Weapons: The following are available:

a uniform new infantry rifle; a uniform new light MG;
a uniform old improved heavy MG.

Equipment of heavy infantry weapons (AA-guns, Infantry Howitzers, Mortars) and tanks is modern, but still incomplete.

A new modern AA-gun has been introduced, but is not yet available in sufficient numbers.

Reserves of weapons and ammunition seem to be guaranteed.

SUMMARY: The Czech Army must be considered up to date as far as armament and equipment are concerned.

Z (Initialled by Zeitzler)
ITEM 13

Berlin, 9 June 1938

MOST SECRET

2 copies
1st copy

Question 2: How many battalions, etc. are employed in the West for the construction of emplacements?

Up to now the following have been employed on fortifications:

The 39th Infantry Battalion
The 10th Infantry Howitzer Company
The 13th Anti-Tank Company
The 10th Battery
The 30th 1/3 Engineer Battalions

In addition:

The 78th German Labor Service Battalion, and later the 190th German Labour Corps battalion.

In addition, the Commander of Army Group 2 (General Adam) has the authority to draw still further troops from his 4th Corps for the construction of emplacements if he deems it necessary.

Z (Initialled by Zeitzler)

(Pencilled note by Schmidt):

Number of troops

Production possibilities
Question 3: Are the fortifications of Czecho-Slovakia still occupied in unreduced strength?

Answer:

The troops have been withdrawn to some extent from the fortifications and are housed in local billets. The fortifications themselves are guarded. The barriers at the frontiers are opened.

Z (Initialled by Zeitzler)
ITEM 13

Berlin, 9 June 1938

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Question 4: Frontier protection in the West?

Answer:

In the West as at the other frontiers, the first frontier protection is undertaken by the VGaD, then the Frontier Guard. This protection by the Frontier Guard is directly at the frontier. At the same time as the Frontier Guard at the frontier, the fortification installations, which lie further back, receive security garrisons (reserve personnel).

Strength of the Frontier Guard on the Western Frontier:
15,200 men with 1,250 light MG's.

For further details on the frontier guard see appendix.

Z (Initialled by Zeitzler)
Berlin, 18 June 1938

S. O. Only
Access only through Officer

1. **DRAFT FOR THE NEW DIRECTIVE**

   (1st copy)

In three parts.
ITEM 14

MOST SECRET

4 copies
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Written by an officer.

S. O. Only

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Part 1

GENERAL GUIDING PRINCIPLES

1. There is no danger of a preventive war by foreign states against Germany.

Germany has not committed herself to any military alliances which would automatically force Germany into a warlike conflict of foreign powers.

The immediate aim is a solution of the Czech problem by my own, free decision; this stands in the foreground of my political intentions. I am determined to use to the full every favorable political opportunity to realize this aim.

Thereby, friends, interested parties and enemies can be called upon to take part in this scheme and other powers can remain indifferent even though they could not be previously placed with absolute certainty in one of these categories.

However, I will decide to take action against Czechoslovakia only if I am firmly convinced as in the case of the occupation of the demilitarized zone and the entry into Austria that France will not march and therefore England will not intervene.

2. The preparations of the Armed Forces must cover:

a) Thorough preparation of the action against Czechoslovakia ("Fall Gruen"). See Part 2.

b) Maintenance of the previous "Fall Rot" (strategic concentration with the main effort against the West.) See Part 2.

c) Special preparations, mainly in the form of studies and deliberations within the Supreme Command. See part 3.

d) Preparatory measures, in case German territory is suddenly and abruptly violated with hostile intent by a foreign power. See number 3.

- 28-
ITEM 14

3. If in the midst of peace, German territory is suddenly and abruptly violated with hostile intent by a foreign power, armed resistance will be offered without any special order.

Therefore, the branches of the armed forces must empower their competent commanders on the frontier or on the coast to take on their own authority, all measures necessary to repulse the enemy attack should such a case occur. (See Reich Defense Law (RVG) para. 2).

In no event, however, may the German Reich frontier be crossed by troops or aircraft, nor any foreign territory violated, without my order.

It will not be considered a violation of German territory (see 1st sentence of this number) if single sentries or patrols cross the frontier unintentionally and accidentally or through the overeagerness of a subordinate commander, or if aircraft fly over the frontier due to faulty navigation, or warships sail in our German territorial waters with obviously no hostile intentions.

4. This directive concerns the uniform preparation for war and the general strategic considerations applying to the outbreak of the war. It will be augmented as necessitated by the various strategic concentrations by regulations dealing with matters of Special Administration and War Economy.

The directives necessary for the prosecution of the war itself will be issued by me from time to time.

K (Initialled by Keitel)

Z (Initialled by Zeitzler)
ITEM 14
Written by an officer MOST SECRET 4 copies
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Part 2

STRATEGIC CONCENTRATIONS

1. Action against Czecho-Slovakia ("Fall Gruen")

The directive, issued as OKW Nr 42/38 Most Secret S. O. only L I dated 30 May 1938, remains in force. Regulations dealing with special matters, administration and War Economy relative to "Fall Gruen" are still to be issued.

2. Two Front War with the main effort in the West ("Fall Rot")

Since even a war against us started by the Western Nations must, in view of the situation today, begin with the destruction of Czecho-Slovakia, the preparation of strategic concentration for a war with the main effort by the Army and Air Force against the West, is no longer of primary importance.

The preparations made to date for the event ("Rot"), however, remain in effect. They contribute, as far as the Army is concerned, towards camouflaging and screening the other strategic concentration and serve, in the case of the Luftwaffe, as a preparation for the shifting of the main effort from the East to the West, which may, under certain circumstances, suddenly become necessary. They also serve as preliminary work for future possibilities of war in the West.

It is left to C in C Army to decide how far the Army strategic concentration "Rot", prepared by OKH for the beginning of the new mobilization year 38/39, will be issued to subordinates.

The tasks which arise for the Navy in "Fall Rot" will be the same as those should "Fall Gruen" be extended to include the Western European nations. The naval preparations are therefore to be continued with the previous objective.

J X (Initialled by Keitel and Jodl)
ITEM 14

Written by an officer

2. DRAFT

MOST SECRET

Berlin, 7 July 38

2 copies
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Part 3

CONSIDERATIONS

I. In connection with "Gruen".

How the political situation will develop during the execution or after the conclusion of "Gruen" cannot be predicted. Therefore the Armed Forces will confine themselves to the preparation of the measures given in Part I, Number 3, to "Fall Gruen" and "Fall Rot". However, it seems expedient to make at least theoretical considerations and calculations for several possible eventualities, to avoid being mentally unprepared. These considerations would have to cover:

a) What would have to be done if other nations intervened against us during the execution of "Gruen" - contrary to our expectations.

b) What should be done after the conclusion of "Gruen".

To a)

If, during the execution of "Gruen", France intervenes against us, the measures provided in "Fall Gruen" come into force. The primary essential in this connection is to hold the Western fortifications, until the execution of the action "Gruen" permits forces to be freed. Should France be supported by England, in this it will have small effect at first on the land-war. It is the duty of the Air Force, the Navy, and the OKW (War Economy Staff, Defense, armed Forces Communications), however, to carry out farsighted deliberations in their sphere.

Among the Eastern powers, Russia is the most likely to intervene. This, in the beginning at any rate, will probably consist of reinforcement of the Czech Air Force and Armament. However, the decision must not be neglected concerning what measures are to be taken if Russia were to come to the point of starting a Naval and Air war against us or even wish to penetrate into East Prussia, through the border states.

In the case of a penetration by Poland, we must hold the Eastern fortifications and East Prussia, using the Frontier Guard and other formations, until the conclusion of the action "Gruen" once more gives us freedom of movement.
ITEM 14

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 388-PS
(Cont'd)

To b) If the action "Gruen" takes place still during this Mobilisation year, we must be in the position after the conclusion of "Gruen" to put a provisional strategic concentration quickly into force.

In connection with the latter, further to what was said in part 1, number 3, it is of primary importance to safeguard the German frontiers, including the new addition by the Armed Forces, and still have the bulk of the Field Forces and the Air Force at our disposal. It would have to be possible to put such a future strategic concentration, "Frontier Protection," into force separately for the various frontiers.

II. Independent of "Fall Gruen"

Germany will not refrain from occupying the Memel-territory by a lightning blow in the case of a Polish-Lithuanian conflict occurring. The deliberations on this eventuality must cancel the directive issued 18 March 1938 (OKW Nr 472/38 g. Rdts L Ia).

III. General

The branches of the Armed Forces are still allowed to deliberate further on the matter contained in Section I) and II). These however, may be carried out only as theoretical studies within the Supreme Commands without the participation of subordinate authorities.

Z

K (Initialled by Keitel and Zeitzler)
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces  
Berlin, 22 July 1938  
No. 1233/38 Most Secret L Is  

To: 
Major Schmundt or deputy  

I enclose a conference report. Your attention is requested, (e.g., the remark of Chief OKW).  

Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces  
by order  
signed Zeitzler  

Submitted to the Fuehrer on 1.8.  

Schm (pencil note by Schmundt)  

Stamp:  
Adjutants' Office of the Armed Forces to the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor  
Head, 265 July 1938 App. 1  
No. 82/38 Most Secret
ITEM 16

pencil note: Maj. Schmundt
1 copy 3rd
report to
Fuehrer

Berlin, 12 July, 1938

Conference Notes


Details:

1. Of the previously intended training manoeuvres, the following remain:

   a). Fall exercise for the I Army Corps
   b). Training exercise for the XI Army Corps
   c). Fortress warfare exercise for the 1st Army Group Command

2. New training manoeuvres:

   a). Fighting for fortifications
   b). Coordination with the Air Force
   c). Cooperation: between ground attack, airplanes and field units commencing 1 August in the exercise area
   d). Mobilization exercises for the Staffs
   e). Supply and communications control
   f). Chemical defense and cleansing of contaminated areas

3. Training Manoeuvres for armored divisions:

   1st armored Division up to 24 October at GRAFENWOHR, Corps HQ of the XVI Army Corps will also be there

   2nd Armored Division remains in Austria

   3rd Armored Division up to 24 September in KOENIGSBRUEK, from 25 September near BRESLAU West of the ODER

4. Training Manoeuvres for motorized divisions ready to march:

   2nd motorized Division in area A, from 28 September, in NEUHLAMMER

   29th motorized Division in exercise area B

   20th motorized Division in exercise area C

   13th motorized Division in exercise area D

   1st light Division in exercise area E
ITEM 16 (cont'd)

Commencement of the exercises not before 12 September, the end 24 November.

5). Terrain exercises for units ready to march:

These take place in the following Wehrkreise:

II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, XIII, XVII,

Commencement of Terrain exercises: 20 September

6). Training manoeuvres for the mountain divisions composed as on mobilisation:

2nd Mountain Division in area STEYR - PICH - WEBER
3rd Mountain Division in area SEEBACKING - BRUCK
Commencement of exercises: 26 September, End: 24 November

7). Training Manoeuvres for Training Divisions (Reserve Divisions):

c). 15 August to 13 September:
   Training Division VII Army Corps (69th Division) Field units
   Exercise Area NERJUMM
   Training Division IX Army Corps (52nd Division) Field units
   Exercise Area GROSSBORN
   Training Division III Army Corps (68th Division) Field units
   Exercise Area JUETERBOG

b). 9 September to 24 November:
   Training Division IV Army Corps (56th Division) Field units
   Exercise Area OHRDRUF
   Training Division VIII Army Corps (62nd Division) Field units
   Exercise Area SENNE
   Training Division XIII Army Corps (73rd Division) Field units
   Exercise Area MUENDEHGEN
   Training Division XII Army Corps (79th Division) Field units
   Exercise Area WANN

From about 24 September these 4 divisions will train West of the RHINE.

8). New dispositions:

a). Truck Regiment 616, 20 September to 24 October disposition by
   III Army Corps.

b). Army Artillery:

   5 battalions: 15 August to 3 September disposition and training
   11 battalions: 9 September to 24 October disposition and training.

Of these, beginning 24 September:

   5 battalions to Reserve divisions West of the RHINE
   6 battalions to Terrain exercises of troops "ready to march"

c). Engineer Battalions:

   3 Engineer Battalions, 9 September to 24 October, disposition and training.
ITEM 16 (cont'd)

of these 2 battalions, 20 September, to terrain training of
1 battalion, from 20 September to Reserve Division
West of the Rhine.

d). Artillery Intelligence Regiments:

4 battalions and 2 Telephone communications companies (motorized)
9 September to 24 November.

Disposition and training; from 26 September,
the battalions will be situated in the
neighborhood of BRESLAU, GRAFENWOERH, NEWHAUSER,
ingoldstadt.

9). Employment of Engineer Battalions on the Western fortifications:

Employment of Engineer Battalions extended for no longer than 3 weeks,
also 7 Engineer battalions will be added.

10). Reich Party Rally and Harvest Festival:

Participation remains as intended.

11). Foreign Military Delegations:

The foreign Military Delegations as well as foreign military attaches
will be invited to attend the fall exercises of the I Army Corps.

Z (initialled by
ZEITZLER)
ITEM 17

Chief Section L Written by General Staff Officer

MOST SECRET

S.O. Only Berlin, 24 August 1938
access only through Officer

1 Copy

TIMING OF THE X-ORDER AND THE QUESTION OF ADVANCE MEASURES

The Luftwaffe's endeavor to take the enemy air forces by surprise at their peace-time airports justifiably leads them to oppose measures taken in advance of the X-order and to the demand that the X-order itself be given sufficiently late on X minus 1 to prevent the fact of Germany's mobilization becoming known to Czechoslovakia on that day.

The army's efforts are tending in the opposite direction. It intends to let OKW initiate all advance measures between X minus 3 and X minus 1, which will contribute to the smooth and rapid working of the mobilization. With this in mind OKW even demands that the X order be given not later than 1400 on X minus 1.

To this the following must be said:

Operation (aktion) Gruen will be set in motion by means of an "incident" in Czechoslovakia which will give Germany provocation for military intervention. The fixing of the exact time for this incident is of the utmost importance.

It must come at a time when weather conditions are favorable for our superior air forces to go into action and at a hour which will enable authentic news of it to reach us on the afternoon of X minus 1.

It can then be spontaneously answered by the giving of the X order at 1400 on X minus 1.

On X minus 2 the Navy, Army and Air Force will merely receive an advance warning.

If the Fuehrer intends to follow this plan of action, all further discussion is superfluous.

For then no advance measures may be taken before X minus 1 for which there is not an innocent explanation as we shall otherwise appear to have manufactured the incident. Orders for absolutely essential advance measures must be given in good time and camouflaged with the help of the numerous manoeuvres and exercises.

Also, the question raised by the Foreign Office as to whether all Germans should be called back in time from prospective enemy territories must in no way lead to the conspicuous departure from Czechoslovakia of any German subjects before the incident.

Even a warning of the diplomatic representatives in PRAGUE before the first air attack, although the consequences could be very grave in the event of their becoming victims of such an attack (e.g. death of representatives of friendly or confirmed neutral powers.)
ITEM 17 (cont'd)

If, for technical reasons, the evening hours should be considered desirable for the incident, then the following day cannot be X day, but it must be the day after that.

In any case we must act on the principle that nothing must be done before the incident which might point to mobilization, and that the swiftest possible action must be taken after the incident. (X-Fell)

It is the purpose of these notes to point out what a great interest the Wehrmacht has in the incident and that it must be informed of the Fuehrer's intentions in good time - insofar as the Abwehr Section is not also charged with the organization of the incident.

I request that the Fuehrer's decision be obtained on these points.

J 26/8

Notes:
Submitted on 30.8
The Fuehrer will act on these lines.
On 31.8 Col. v. S. Jodl notified. Schm 31.8 Col. Jodl
(initialled by Jodl)
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 388-P3

ITEM 18

CONFERENCE

on 3 September 38
at the BERGHOF

Present: The Fuhrer
Generaloberst v. Brauchitsch
General of Artillery Keitel
Major Schumont

I.

Gen. Ob. v. Brauchitsch Reports on the exact time of the transfer of the troops to "exercise areas" for "Gruen". Field units to be transferred on 28 Sept. From here will then be ready for action. When X Day becomes known, field units carry out exercises in opposite directions.

Fuhrer Has objection. Troops assemble field units a 2-day march away. Carry out camouflage exercises everywhere.

OKH must know when X-day is by 1200 noon, 27 September.

II.

The Fuhrer Expresses different opinion on employment of troops for "Gruen". Aspects for the 2nd Army (O) are smallest. Strongest Cz. fortifications there. Waste of troops thrust in the 10th Army area, however, is promising. Roadblocks prepared everywhere in addition also in 2nd Army area. No reason for hindrance. The Czechs will stop opposite 2nd army and keep assault army ready east of PRAGUE. A thrust against it into the heart of Cz. is to be made. Thrust in the 14th army area will fail because of means of transport. Therefore assemble all mot. and arm'd divisions with 10th army and employ in the thrust. Once we are through there, the South front, which is built up opposite our 12th army in 3 defense lines, will collapse. An army in the heart of BOHEMIA will bring about the decision. Possible repetition of VERDUN in case of 2nd army. An attack there would mean bleeding to death for a task which cannot be accomplished.

v. Brauchitsch Has objections because of the state of the mot. divisions, supply end untrained leaders.
ITEM 18

The Fuhrer:

The course now planned corresponds to Cz. expectations. Opposite the 10th Army the enemy is not always in concrete emplacements. Possibility here of drawing in the Henlein people (uniforms). The line here is very far back. Cooperation between 10th and 12th armies. We must add motorized units to army. As formerly the "Prussian Cavalry." How else can we gather experiences? Decisive is the coordination of equal speeds. Breakthrough in sector of 2nd army not so rapid, so that a tactical success can be turned into a strategic one. The Fuhrer gives orders for the development of the Western fortifications: improvement of advance positions around AACHEN and SAARBRUCKEN. Construction of 300 to 400 battery positions (1600 artillery pieces). He emphasizes flanking action.

Certified.

SCHMUNDT, Major on the General Staff
BERGHOF, 4 Sept 1938

* * *

(In Schmundt's writing)
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 388-PS

ITEM 19

S. 0. Only

MOST SECRET

DISCUSSION

Nuremberg, 9 Sept to 10 Sept, 2200 to 0330.

Present: Fuhrer
General oberst v. Brauchitsch
General Halder
General Keitel
Major Schmundt
Hauptmann Engel
Hauptmann v. Below (?)

General Halder states reasons for operational plan "Gruen". Mission: to prevent retreat of Cz. Army from Moravia - Bohemia area. To beat army. To bring about rapid decision. Mission can be accomplished by pincer attack in the direction of OLMUTZ and BRUNN to be undertaken by 2nd and 14th Armies. Difficult transport situation in Austria. Therefore main effort in 2nd Army area. Cz. frontier can only be lightly held. Withdrawal certain on part of Cz forces. Several defensive lines favorable by terrain will delay second thrusts and allow time to be gained for a Cz retreat, and to retain a rear position. This is to be avoided. The Bohemian Moravian heights which will confront the attacker in the last phase will favor probable Cz line of action. The pincer attack makes a "rear attack" from behind these heights possible. This operation will definitely succeed. Reserves at first mainly local. Further reserves near and south of Prague. Opponent won't have time to form further reserves. Opponent does not possess closed armoured forces. They are distributed and consist of light units.

2nd Army. Weaknesses opposite its sector recognized. Installations only partly completed. Mostly lack armoured cupolas. There are great gaps. OLMUTZ will be reached on the second day. OPPA is no obstacle, can be crossed by tanks as well as Inf. No armoured forces opposing. PRESENTIAL only 35 men garrison? So-called light motorized forces on right flank are no danger. Consist partly of Mounted units and will be engaged by adjoining Army. Were the attack, against expectations, to fail, then under no circumstances "bled to death" before the position. Strategic concentration to be flexible. Rear sections will then be brought up to the points where success has been achieved. Cz fears the GIZE mountain area. Only demonstrations to be staged in this area; there will be a tie up of Cz forces. To provide cover eastwards tanks will be valuable.

On the rest of the mountain front: 4th (9?) Corps, and in the frontier sector demonstrations must be staged to tie up forces.

12th and 14th Armies will work together. Their columns must necessarily support one another during the thrust and cause the front to collapse. Bohemia only weakly occupied at frontier; 1 Division to 120 kms. Operation therefore promising. After the thrust in a northerly direction 12 Army forces east and "race" for BRUNN. The enemy will not be able to employ reserves according to plan.

10th Army faces PILSEN RIEDEL which is strongly fortified. Bad roads. Tanks must break through here and establish bridgeheads for following up forces. Forces of the next wave will be brought up by truck units. After the 3rd and 4th Mobilization day 5 further divisions will be brought up to the 2nd and 3rd line and can be employed where success is in the balance.
The Fuhrer: We should not plan the action on the operations as we desire them, but take into consideration the probable course of action pursued by the enemy. With regard to his course of action two factors are decisive:

1. At the time of our rearmament between 1934 and 1938 our opponent must have endeavored to secure himself against a tearing of the East-West Communication, in his case probably between TRAPPENAU and NIKOLSBOURG. Against us this would imply the building of fortifications on the Upper Silesian frontier. In the South an agreement with Austria would achieve a defense north of the Danube, or an advance to the DANUBE to protect the Southern flank.

2. The latter is no longer possible. Therefore, as a result of the situation created in March 1938, it is all the more probable that they have increased their fortifications opposite our 2nd army. The enemy must hold there - otherwise there is no sense in holding the remaining front. Hence here the best regiments and fortifications are to be expected. Holding of the front facing the 2nd Army will decide the "To be or Not to be" of Oz. There is no doubt that the planned pincer movement is the most desirable solution and should take place. But its success is nevertheless too uncertain for it to be depended on. Especially as a rapid success is necessary from a political point of view. The first 8 days are politically decisive, within that week a far-reaching territorial gain must be achieved. Our artillery (210cm Howitzers) not adequate against fortifications. Where an attack is expected the element of surprise is ruled out. Besides from experience difficult to refrain from an action that achieves only part-success. More and more units are thrown into breaks and bleeding-to-death which one wanted to avoid, sets in (VERDUN!!) Tanks are used up and are not available for the subsequent territory-gaining operation. The consequence is that motorized divisions have to advance without tanks. ("Tables Turned")

Also the objectives of the motorized units are not too far-removed and can be gained without fighting, so that they could be equally well gained by infantry troops. The motorized divisions will not be able to influence a decision to any extent. It is the task of motorized forces to bridge areas free of the enemy. Where an attack opens up a large, free space the commitment of motorized forces is justified. Compare with the use of army cavalry at the beginning of the 1914 war. It is catastrophic for tanks to have to stop and wait for infantry. This contradicts all laws of logic. In the 14th army sector fortifications can only have been begun since March. Hence, thrust toward BHUNN will be easier. 2nd Pz Div can therefore be left there. However, this division should operate with the 29th motorized division. Therefore the 29th must not arrive on the evening of the 2nd day. The 2nd Pz must constitute the advance column of the 29th Div (Mot.) Are the road conditions suitable for the 29th? The 13th Division, which has no prospects of success as a Mot. division with the 12th Army, is to be transferred to the HEICHELAU Army together with 2nd Motorized Div. Thus 8 chances for victory will be created.

If pincer movement has no success, 10th Army will open way for 12th Army, bringing strong forces into the heart of the country. If both operations are successful, this means the end of Oz. In place of the two motorized divisions it is preferable to mobilize two further divisions which are to be brought up in trucks and busses. For the 10th Army the turn Northeast toward PRAGUE may become necessary.

General Oberst v. BRAUCHITSCH; Employment of motorized divisions was based on the difficult rail situation in Austria and the difficulties in getting other divs. (ready to march) into the area at the right time. In the West vehicles will have to leave on the 20th of Sept., if X-Day remains as planned. Workmen leave on the 22nd, by relay. Specialist workers remain according to decision by Army Command 2.
ITEM 19.

The Fuhrer: Doesn't see why workers have to return home as early as X-11. Other workers and people are also on the way on mobilization day. Also the RR cars, they will stand around unnecessarily later on.

General Keitel: Workers are not under the jurisdiction of district commands (Bezirks Kdos.) in the West. Trains must be assembled.

v. Brauchitsch: 235,000 men RAD (Labour Service) will be drafted. 96 Construction Bns will be distributed (also in the east). 40,000 trained laborers stay in the West.

Fuhrer: Trained men should be distributed among newly formed divisions on 2nd line.

BRAUCHITSCH: Will be investigated. Implicit change of mobilization orders if war orders already in the hands of the people.

General Construction Inspector Dr. Todt (late brought into the conference): Delays in unloading of material through slow changeover in timetable of RRs only from 15 September. Transports must be in their appointed positions by X minus 11. Air zone to take 2nd place to the Infantry zone. Build battery positions.

Certified

/s/ SCHMIDT

Major on Gen. Staff
ITEM 20

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces

Schm (initialled by Schmundt)

Nuremberg, 10 September 1938

Stamp

Office of the Armed Forces

Adjutant attached to the Fuehrer Reich Chancellor

Received 19 September 1938

TOP SECRET

1. The whole R&M organization comes under the command of the Supreme Command of the Army effective 15 September.

2. The Chief of GGW decides on the first commitments of this organization in conjunction with the Reich Labor Leader (Reichsarbeitsfuehrer) and on assignment from time to time to the Supreme Commands of the Navy, Army and Air Force. Where questions arise with regard to competency he will make a final decision in accordance with my instructions.

3. For the time being this order is to be made known only to the departments and personnel immediately concerned.

(signed) ADOLF HITLER

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 2038/38 Most Secret WFA/L 2.1a

Distribution:

C-in-C of the Army
Reich Minister for Air and C-in-C of the Air Force
C-in-C of the Navy
Reich Minister of the Interior
for the attention of Ministerial Director Dr. Döncherts
Head of Reich Labor Service through Adwin Office (VOA)

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ITEM 21

Effective 15 September the following units will be under command of the C-in-C of the Army

1). The RD forces of the light road construction battalions.

2). Those parent units of construction troops which are to be formed from personnel from 2 Gau Command, 21 RD Group Command, and 21 RD Battalions of Wehrkreis Vgs VII, IX and XII, and set up at Army Group Hq 2 (Heeresgruppenkommando) for the purpose of carrying out exercises within the areas of Wehrkreis Hgs V and XII.

3). a). The staff of Labor Gau W (Arbeitsgeusste) and the section and group staffs of the RD employed on the construction of the Western fortifications and also RD Battalions with the exception of those branches of the RD attached to the Reich Minister for Air and the C-in-C of the Air Force (compare Section 6).

b). Labor Gau XXI. XXIV, XXV, XXVI, XXVII, and XXXII come under the Supreme Command of the Army only in matters affecting the defense of the country. Those RD units from these Labor Gaus employed at the moment for purposes of the Country's Health etc. will remain these tasks for the time being, Labor Service for Girls (AW) is excepted from coming under the control of the Supreme Command of the Army.

c). It must be borne in mind, when allotting military tasks to those sections of the RD named in a), and b), above, that in accordance with Appendix 7 to the Army Mobilization Plan for Deputy Gau Command, Deputy Group Commands and Guard Units will remain with the RD if and when mobilization takes place.

4). The C-in-C of the Army and Reichs Labor Leader are requested to discuss all details under 1) and 3 direct.

II). 5). Light road construction battalions are training-units of the Army. Their members are regarded as having been drafted into the Armed Forces for manoeuvre purposes and are soldiers.

6). The members of remaining formations as per 2 and 3 who have been taken exclusively from the RD will remain RD leaders or men until mobilization.

But it is possible that they will have to be attached to the Army for administration or that the Army must furnish money if difficulties are encountered in prompt payment of the men.

The C-in-C of the Army and the Reich Labor Leader are requested to settle details by direct agreement.
ITEM 21 (cont'd)

7). In case of mobilization the regulations laid down in Appendix 7 of the plan for the mobilization of the army come into effect automatically and apply also to those exercise formations for which there have up to now been restrictive regulations with regard to their coming fully under the command of the army.

III). 8). Those R&D staffs and Battalions made over to the Luftwaffe, in the Lines crew will be under command of the Reich Minister for Air and the C-in-C of the Air Force beginning September 15. The same regulations apply in essence to them.

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

By Order

Signed: Keitel

Distribution:

C-in-C of the Army
Reich Minister for Air and C-in-C of the Air Forces
Head of Reich Labor Service
L Ia, II, IV
Draft (VOa)

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HOFMAIN

Oberst (Rm. No. 1)},
Berlin, 16 September 1938

Subject: Preparations on part of Reichsbahn etc.

The Reichsbahn must provide trains of empty trucks in largest numbers by September 28 for the carrying out of mobilization exercises. This task now takes precedence over all others.

Therefore the train-loads for the LIMES-job will have to be cut down after September 17 and those goods loaded previous to this date unloaded by September 20.

The Supreme Command of the Army (5th Division of the Army General Staff) must issue further orders after consultation with the authorities concerned.

However, in accordance with the Fuehrer's directive, every effort should be made to continue to supply the materials in as large quantities as possible even after 20th September 1938, and this for reasons of camouflage as well as in order to continue the important work on the Limes.

Reports should be submitted on what can be done in this direction.

Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

signed Keitel

Distribution:

Supreme Command of the Army 1 (Copy 1) Certified
Chief of the Air Force (Katzinger's staff) 1 (Copy 2) Zeitzier
General Inspector for Roads 1 (Copy 3) Oberest on the General Staff

Major Schmundt 5
ITEM 24

Berlin, September 16, 1939

MOST SECRET

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 322/38 Most Secret WFA/ L IIa

Subject: Employment of the Reich Labor Service (Rd)

1. The following Rd forces will receive military training; in accordance with the instructions of the C-in-C of the Army:

From the area of the IIInd Army Korps (Jibes) 7 Battalions

IIIrd 2 Battalions
IVth 31 Battalions
Vth 1 Battalion
VIth 78 Battalions
VIIth 1 Battalion
IXth 65 Battalions
Xth 84 Battalions
XIth 33 Battalions

For the time being these battalions are still part of the Rd in matters regarding personnel, administration, and discipline.

2. The C-in-C of the Army and Reich Labor Leader are requested to settle all details by direct agreement.

For the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

By Order

Distribution:

Supreme Command of the Army
Reich Minister for Air and C-in-C of the Air Force
Head of Reich Labor Service
Wf, WH, WR,
Armed Forces Ops Division
L Le, Ib, Ic, IV, Vc
Armed Forces Communications Dept.
Office of Mil/Abwehr
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ITEM 25

(Handwritten note) MOST SECRET S. O. ONLY

LAST NIGHT CONFERENCE TOOK PLACE BETWEEN FUHRER AND OBERSTLEUTNANT KOECHLING. DURATION OF CONFERENCE 7 MINUTES. LT. COL KOECHLING REMAINS DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE TO OKW. HE WILL BE ASSIGNED TO KONRAD HENLEIN IN AN ADVISORY CAPACITY. HE RECEIVED FAR-REACHING MILITARY PLENARY POWERS FROM THE FUHRER. THE SUDETEN GERMAN FREE CORPS REMAINS RESPONSIBLE TO KONRAD HENLEIN ALONE. PURPOSE: PROTECTION OF THE SUDETEN GERMANS AND MAINTENANCE OF DISTURBANCES AND CLASHES. THE FREE CORPS WILL BE ESTABLISHED IN GERMANY. ARMAMENT ONLY WITH AUSTRIAN WEAPONS. ACTIVITIES OF FREE CORPS TO BEGIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

(Pencil Note) 1045, 18 Sept 38

Reduced to Capt.
Engel, Berlin.
ITEM 26

(In ink)
18.9
38
1030

vb

GERMAN 2nd ARMY - COSEL - 7 Inf. Div's, 1 Arm Div, 1 Inf Div on trucks, 1 Light Div, of these the following arrive on 1st X day: Two-thirds of one Inf Div, 1 Arm Div, and 1 Inf Div on trucks.

On 2nd X Day: one-third of one Inf Div.
On 3rd X Day: 1 Inf Div
On 4th X Day: 1 Inf Div
On 5th X Day: 2 Inf Divs from 7th day on 1 Inf Div and one light Div.

8th Army: - FREIBURG - 4 Inf Divs. The following is the timetable for arrival:
On 2nd X Day: two-thirds of one Inf Div
On 3rd X Day: one-third of one Inf Div
On 4th and 5th X-Day: One Inf Div each day.
4th Army Corps - Herrenkut, 2 Inf Divs of which one will arrive on the 1st day, the other on the 3rd day.

10th Army: - SCHWANDORF - 3 Inf Div's, 1 Arm Div, 1 Light Div, 3 Mot Inf Divs. They will arrive as follows:
On 1st X Day: 1 Inf Div and 1 Arm Div. 1 Light Div, 2 Mot Inf Divs.
On 2nd X Day: 1 Inf Div., 1 Mot Inf Div.
On 4th X Day: 1 Inf Div.

13th Army: - PASSAU - 7 Inf Div's, 1 Mountain Div, 1 Inf Div on trucks, Regt. They arrive as follows:
On 1st X Day: 1 Inf Div, 1 Mountain Div.
On 2nd X-Day: 2 Inf Div, 1 Inf Div on trucks
On 4th X Day: 2 Inf Div's.
On 7th X Day: 1 Inf Div.
On 8th X Day: 1 Inf Div.

14th Army: - VIENNA - 1 Inf Div, 2 Mountain Div's, 1 Arm Div, 1 Light Div, 1 Mot Inf Div. N N Mot (?) They will arrive as follows:
On 1st X Day: one-third of one Inf Div, 1 Arm Div, 1 Mot. Div.
On 2nd X Day: 2/3 of one Inf Div, 1 Light Div.
On 3rd X Day: 2 Mountain Divs.

Reich War Ministry / Naval Communication Service

MOST SECRET 18.9

Renewed attention is called to strictest observance of secrecy regarding following message. Noted. Message begins -
(There follows a repetition of the above telegram in its exact form.)

Any questions?

- 50 -
## Army Appointments Held

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ITEM 29

Chief, OKW

If the Czech Government accepts terms:

a. Cession of Sudeten German territory
b. Plebiscite in Czech-German territories.

The following military measures are to be considered:

1. The withdrawal by the Czechs from this territory of troops, police and Gendarmerie and other military units.
2. The immediate surrender of arms in these territories.
3. The immediate surrender of all fortifications in the areas with all arms and equipment.
4. The immediate evacuation of fortifications by the military outside the above territories.
5. The withdrawal of all military power behind a security line, which will include the fortifications under (4).
6. The right of the German Wehrmacht to use all public transportation and communications, especially the railroads, for military purposes.
7. The right to fly over the above territories and to maintain Air security up to the security line.
8. The occupation of territories to be ceded including the adjoining railroad junctions, communications installations, towns, airfields, etc. inland beyond the last fortification line.
9. Pacification and security of the Plebiscite Areas by:
   a. German Police (originally)
   b. International Police (later for plebiscite)
10. Demobilization of the entire Czech armed forces in the remaining area of the country, discharge of all reserves, etc.
11. Immediate discharge of all Sudeten-Germans in the armed forces from the whole of Czechooslavakia to be sent home into Sudeten-Germany.
12. Closing down of entire armament industry until after the end of all negotiations.
13. a. Prohibition of any new fortifications and field fortifications opposite the security line.
   b. Destruction of all existing fortifications which are situated beyond the future German borders.

14. Demand further cession of territory on military grounds, namely the Pressburg bridgehead, the area northwest of Pilsen, the Eger sector west of the Elbe to Leun.

15. Security line must be 25 km from the territory being ceded to Germany or the territory being put to the vote. (See number 5).

16. Cessation, immediately, of all military Intelligence work against Germany. Violation will be considered breach of neutrality.

17. Immediate pardon and release of all Germans and Sudeten-Germans, convicted of espionage.

18. Transfer of all Czech Air Force personnel to their peace time garrisons and prohibiting all military flying operations.

19. Prohibition of destruction or sabotage of any military installations, including ground installations of the Air Force, in the territories to be ceded.

20. The closing down and handing over to the German armed forces of all radio transmitters of a military, official or private nature in the areas to be ceded.

21. The handing over of all Railroad networks including rolling stock, undamaged.

22. The handing over of all Public Utilities (power houses, gas works, etc.) undamaged.

23. No materials of any kind to be transferred (such as raw materials, provisions, livestock, etc.)

24. Prohibition of import of war equipment of any kind.

25. Demobilization of Danube patrol and security vessels.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 338-PS
(CONT'D)

Bayreuth 134

ITEM 30

Pencil Note: Written by Schmundt: Not sent off. Sehm

HEADQUARTERS OF THE SUDETEN-GERMAN FREE CORPS

Herr Benech has dissolved the Sudeten-German Party and believes that he will thus be able to destroy the unity of the Sudeten-German radical group and to deal the death blow to the Sudeten-Germans. Konrad Henlein knew the answer to this. He issued a call on 17.9.38 for the formation of a Sudeten-German Free Corps. Within a few hours, thousands of Sudeten-Germans had already rallied to the colors all along the border. Thousands who were burning to fight for their tortured homeland were forced, to their great disappointment, to remain at their places of work, because it was impossible, in such a short period of time, to induct, equip and arm the masses of enthusiastic volunteers. For even in the first few hours after the appeal, (probably the first instance in the History of the Free Corps) shock troops of the Free Corps began, in extremely daring operations, to secure the escape of their countrymen who had been hounded out of their homeland by their torturers.

Since 19 Sept. - in more than 300 missions - the Free Corps has executed its task with an amazing spirit of attack and with a willingness often reaching a degree of unqualified self-sacrifice. The result of the first phase of its activities: more than 1500 prisoners, 25 MG's and a large amount of other weapons and equipment, aside from serious losses in (The Czech Terrorists)*

death and wounded suffered by the enemy.

Thousands of members of the Sudeten-German Free Corps stand shoulder to shoulder on the frontiers of Germany. They are inspired by but one desire: The freedom of the homeland within Adolf Hitler's Greater Germany.

For Konrad Henlein

The Chief of Staff

*The superimposed corrections represent actual ink corrections on the original manuscript.
The Fuhrer has approved the mobilization without warning of the five regular west divisions (26th, 34th, 36th, 32, and 35th). The Fuhrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has expressly reserved the right to issue the order for employment in the fortification zone and the evacuation of this zone by workers of the TODE organization.

It is left to the OKH -- to assemble as far as possible first of all the sections ready to march and subsequently the remaining sections of the divisions in marshalling areas behind the western fortifications.

CHIEF OF THE SUPREME COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES.

Signed. Keitel

Distribution: II.
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 2288/38 Most Secret /MA/L II

Subject: Mobilization Measures:

To: The Deputy Führer via Administrative Offices (J)
The Reichsführer SS and Chief of German Police Express
attn: S.O. Oberführer.

Berlin 27 Sept 1938

Most Secret

As a result of the political situation the Führer and Chancellor has ordered mobilization measures for the Armed Forces, without the political situation being aggravated by issuing the mobilization (X) order or corresponding code-words.

Within the framework of these mobilization measures it is necessary for the Armed Forces authorities to issue demands to the various Party authorities and their organizations, which are connected with the previous issuing of the mobilization order, the advance measures or special code names.

The special situation makes it necessary that these demands be met (even if the code word has not been previously issued) immediately and without being referred to higher authorities.

OKW requests that subordinate offices be given immediate instructions to this effect so that the mobilization of the Armed Forces can be carried out according to plan.

Following are several examples of cases where previous mobilization measures were delayed and a recurrence of which might seriously endanger the mobilization of the Armed Forces:

1) The SA in Wohrkreis XI refused to give up equipment requisitioned by the Armed Forces in accordance with mobilization regulations, because mobilization has not yet taken place.

2) Billets which were prepared for troops under mobilization regulations were not evacuated because mobilization has not taken place. (NSKK-School KREISCHITZ - SILESIA).

3) Police authorities refused to give up Police Radio Stations for the A/C reporting network, although the A/C reporting service had already been called up.

The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces further requests that all measures not provided for in the plans which are undertaken by Party Organizations or Police units as a result of the political situation, be reported in every case and in plenty of time to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Only then can it be guaranteed that these measures can be carried out in practice.

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

Further:
Distribution II - 56 - KRIETZ
TRANSLATION OF CODE NO. 568-PS
Continued

23.9.38

Item 33

MEMORANDUM

At 1300 September 27 the Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces ordered the movement of the assault units from their exercise areas to their jumping-off points.

The assault units (about 21 reinforced regiments, or 7 divisions,) must be ready to begin the action against "Grün" on September 30, the decision having been made one day previously by 1200 noon.

This order was conveyed to General Keitel at 1320 through Major Schmundt. (pencil note by Schmundt)
To define spheres of responsibility on the Cz-German frontier, the following orders are issued:

Through mobilization of the frontier guard (Grenzwacht) responsibility has shifted entirely onto the army, that is onto the competent general staff corps. All the units operating on the frontier are subordinate to them.

No new units of police, customs or party may be shifted into the immediate frontier area without the knowledge of the army headquarters concerned, nor may units already in the area be reinforced without such knowledge. In addition no one may cross the frontier without the knowledge of the army headquarters.

For the Henlein Free Corps and units subordinate to this the principle remains valid, that they receive instructions direct from the Fuhrer and that they carry out their operations only in conjunction with the competent general staff corps. The advance units of the Free Corps will have to report to the local commander of the frontier guard immediately before crossing the frontier.

Those units remaining forward of the frontier should -- in their own interests -- get into communication with the frontier guard as often as possible.

As soon as the army crosses the Cz border the Henlein Free Corps will be subordinate to the OKH. Thus it will be expedient to assign a sector to the Free Corps even now which can be fitted into the scheme of army boundaries later.
The frontier guard has orders only to protect the German frontier, and not to take part in operations on the other side of the border. Any support to the Free Corps by the frontier guards anywhere over the frontier is prohibited.

Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Keitel

Distribution II

plus:
Reich Minister of the Interior
Reich Finance Minister
Deputy of the Fuhrer
S.A. Hqg.
Reichsfuhrer SS
Reich Labour Service

Volunteer Corps Henlein (Oberstlt Kochling)

(The following 2 pages are an exact duplicate: Copy 33)
Stamp: Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant
Attached to the Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor

Reed: 3 October 1938
(pencil noted: Adjutant to the Fuhrer)

Req. No: 262/39 Most Secret

Item 35

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 2315/38 Most Secret RFA/L II

Berlin, Sept 28, 1938

MOST SECRET.

Re: Advance Measures Pertaining to Mobilization Plan (Army) Special Appendix 5

Following advance measures may be carried out:
On the Franco-German border (WEHRKREIS V and XII)

1. Special Group Siegfried, Kz9148 -- preparation of
    organization for the reception of refugees.

2. Special Group Siegfried, Kz9145 -- Preparation of employment
    of district offices and staffs of collecting areas for
    the discharging of reservists.

Chief of the Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces

(Signed) Keitel

Distribution II
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Berlin, Sept 28, 1938

No. 2335/38 Most Secret WFA/L II

Subject: 4 SS-Totenkopf Battalions subordinate to the C in C Army.

To : Reichsfuhrer SS and Chief of the German Police. (SS Central Office) (36 copies)

By order of the Supreme Command of the armed forces the following Bn's of the SS Deaths Head organization will be under the command of the C in C Army with immediate effect.

II and III Bn. of the 2nd SS-Totenkopf Regiment Brandenburg at present in Breslau (Upper Silesia)

I and II Bn. of the 3rd SS-Totenkopf Regiment Thuringia at present in Radebeul and Kottenbroda near Dresden.

C in C Army is requested to deploy these Bn's for the West, (Upper Rhine) according to the Fuhrer's instructions.

These SS-Totenkopf units now operating in the Asch promontory (I and II Bn of Oberbayern Regiment) will come under the C in C Army only when they return to German Reich territory, or when the Army crosses the German-Cz. frontier.

It is requested that all further arrangements be made between C in C Army and Reichsfuhrer-SS. (SS Central Office)

For the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

Jodl

Further:

Distribution II
MEMORANDUM

SA-General Herzog answers question of Adjutant’s Office, Chief of Staff of the SA, 1600:

Reichsführer SS, on the 26th of Sept., issued order to Chief of Staff of Sudeten German Free Corps Ref. Diary 38/Most Secret according to which the Volunteer Corps would come under the command of the Reichsführer SS in case of German invasion of the Sudeten German territory.

The order was signed by Berger, SS-Colonel.

J. (initialled by Jodl)
ITEM 38

Stamp - as usual

Reed 3 Oct 1938

Req No. 263/38 MOST SECRET

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

No. 2385/38. Most Secret. L.T.a

Berlin 30.9.38

1000 hrs

Adjutant to the Fuhrer

232 Copies

16th copy

MOST SECRET

Subject: Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces No. 2271/38 Most Secret.

OKW/WFA L I a dated 30.9.38

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS NUMBER 3 TO DIRECTIVE NO. 1.

1. Attachment of Henlein Free Corps:

The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has just ordered that the Henlein Free Corps in its present composition be placed under command of Reichsfuhrer-SS and Chief of German Police.

It is therefore at the immediate disposal of OKH as field unit for the invasion, but is to be later drawn in like the rest of the police forces for police duties in agreement with the Reichsfuhrer SS.

The instructions OKW No. 2310/38 Most Secret of the 26th Sept (last paragraph but one) and OKW No. 2371/38 Most Secret of Sept 30 are amended accordingly.

2. Rate of Exchange for the Cz. Kronen:

The following rate of exchange will apply for all transactions and payments: 100 Cz. Kronen - 10.00 Marks (1 Cz. Krone - 10 Rpfg)

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Distribution III

and Special Distribution

(including Henlein Volunteer Corps and Reichsfuhrer SS through OKW/L II)

Keitel
ITEM 39

stamp:
recd 3 oct 1938
req no 265/38 most secret

adj. to the fuhrer

berlin, 30 sept 1938

the fuhrer and supreme
commander of the armed forces

OKW no. 2367/38 most secret
Wfa/L I A

most secret
60 copies
16th copy

DIRECTIVE #1

subject: occupation of territory separated from czechoslovakia.

1. the sectors separated from cz will be occupied by the armed forces as follows:

the sector marked I to be occupied on the 1st and 2nd of Oct, the
sector marked II on Oct 2 and 3rd, the sector marked III on Oct. 3, 4 and 5,
the sector marked IV on Oct. 6 and 7th. the remaining area up to Oct 10.

the extent of the area I-IV is shown on the attached map. the
extent of the remaining areas will be announced later.

2. the armed forces will have the following tasks:

the present degree of mobilized preparedness is to be maintained
completely, for the present also in the west. order for the rescinding of
measures taken is held over.

the entry is to be planned in such a way that it can easily be
converted into operation "Grun".

the depth of the territories to be occupied daily depends on the
details of the evacuation, which are being settled by the international
committee.

a. army: first of all the following units are available for
the invasion:

troop's
motorized and armoured units
Adolf Hitler 35 bodyguard regiment
I and II En's of SS Deaths Head regiment (oberbayen)
Hunlein free corps
all combat action on the part of the volunteer corps
must cease as from 1st October.

b. air force:

those ground installations (including supply and
signal installations) situated in the separated areas
are to be occupied immediately and prepared for the
use of our own units. flying units can be transferred
if this becomes necessary for the air defense of the
territory yielded or for the possible switch to "Fall
Grun" in accordance with fig. 2. flights over
territory not yet cleared for occupation by german
troops must be avoided at all costs. flak must be
assigned to those objectives which cannot be protected
by flak under the command of the army.
3. Those units of the Armed Forces intended for the occupation of sector I must cross the former Czech-German frontier by 1200 noon Oct 1st.

4. Armed resistance in the area cleared for occupation must be broken. Czech soldiers and other armed personnel found within the sector are to be disarmed and taken prisoner. The boundary of the sector against the Czechs is not to be crossed under any circumstances. Hostile action against the Czechs on or beyond this boundary is to be avoided.

5. The conduct of the field units must be based on the realization that they are occupying a territory whose population, after being harrassed for years, looks upon the German Armed Forces as Liberators.

6. The German frontier guard will remain on the former German-Czech frontier, as before.

7. The securing of the boundaries of the sectors against the area still in Czech hands is sole responsibility of the army.

For the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

KlEItEL

Distribution: III
ITEM 40

Stamp: Reed 8 Oct 1938
Req No 264/38 Most Secret

The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
OKW No. 2371/38, Most Secret, WA/3 I a

Most Secret

Adj. to the Fuhrer

Berlin, 30 Sept 1938

Special Orders No. 1 to Directive No. 1

Subject: Occupation of territory ceded by Cz.

1. Operational Area of the Army:

The area to be newly occupied will be at first an operational area of the Army. In it the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces will have full powers and authority to delegate these powers to the C-in-C’s of the armies. The Commanders exercising these full powers can publish laws, institute special courts and issue directives to offices valid for the operational area with the exception of the highest Reich authorities, the highest offices of the State of Prussia, and the executive board of the NSDAP. This authority to issue regulations has priority over regulations issued by other Superior authorities.

2. Units under Command of Army:

a. The units of the military SS and SS Totenkopf Regiment intended for the occupation of the sector remain under OKH control.

b. The Sudeten German Volunteer Corps comes under the control of OKH. The En’s of the Volunteer Corps are to be employed in the direction of their native territory wherever possible. They retain their present armament. Provisioning to be guaranteed through army Hqs. Members of the Free Corps do not come under the military penal code. The Hqs of the Free Corps after occupation of territory III, is to be transferred from Bayreuth to Eger.

c. The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, in cooperation with Rethoführer SS and at the request of Army Hqs will direct Police Forces and Gestapo forces for the support of Secret Field Police forces in the occupied areas. As required for Military Police duties, the Special Police (SDP) will be drawn in as much as possible.

3. Taking over of Military Accommodation and RR Installations:

a. All military installations, barracks and property will be turned over in the occupied Sudeten German territories by OKH in so far as they were up to now the property of the Cz. army. By OKH, if they were property of the Cz. Air Force (including civil aviation.)

b. The Chief of Transport System will make arrangements with the Reich RR’s regarding the taking over of rail installations.

4. Signal Communications:

a. The Army will be at liberty to use the postal communication facilities within the area to be occupied. Requirements of the Luftwaffe are to be assured through the Field Signal Units under the command of the OKH attached to the Army Hqs. Depending on the situation, the most important communication installations are to be put into operation as soon as possible, secured and screened against Cz.
Special emphasis must be laid on the effective silencing and confiscation of all transmitting installations. Official, private and permanent radio installations of the Cz army are to be secured through OKH, those of the Cz Air Force through OKL.

5. Customs Frontier Guard

After the crossing of the Reich frontier by the troops, the securing of the old frontier is the responsibility of the Customs Frontier Guard (Zollgrenzschutz); the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces will put the necessary personnel from the Frontier Guard at their disposal. The customs regulation of the forward line of the area to be occupied, will be determined by the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces in conjunction with the Inspector General of Customs. Liaison officials are still at the disposal of Corps Headquarters acc. to §16 of the regulations governing the VGAD. Shipments to Wehrmacht offices as well as members of the Wehrmacht are not subject to customs regulations.
6. Application of Laws:
   a. Compensation laws are to be employed on both sides of the border. Public buildings are to be used mainly for billets. Requisitioned articles do not become the property of the armed forces. Compensation for services rendered in cash (German currency)  
   b. Special regulations will be issued with regard to the introduction of the German Penal Code in the occupied areas.

7. Mobilization Measures among Civilian Population:
   Mobilization measures will not be taken among civilian personnel. But all authorities have been asked to carry out quickly demands made by armed force authorities. The following measures are especially requested in order to guarantee the tasks of the armed forces.
   a. Reichs Postal Ministry  
      Securing of direct tele-communications in the areas BRESLAU, DRESDEN, AUSZBURG, NURMBERG, MUNCHEN, VIENNA, BERLIN. Establishing of Special Emergency networks. Furnishing of items to the armed forces to whatever degree they may be required. (Compare, Mobilization Book (Z) Section IX No. 3501, 3503, 3532). Fulfilling staff requirements as regards the restoring of signal networks in occupied areas.
   b. Ministry of Propaganda:
      Dispatch of commissioners to the chiefs of civil administration in the operational area. Prohibition of the publication of military news of any kind in the press (compare Mobilization Book (Z) Part V No. 1758 - and 1600)

8. Organisations of the Party:
   The Führer's Deputy has been asked to inform the party organisations that OKH must furnish permission if party units are to be brought into the Sudeten area.

9. Economic Directives:
   Any confiscation of values or balances at credit institutions (Kredit instituten) in the Sudeten German area is prohibited. Requisitioning is also prohibited. Supplying of the armed forces with food, forage and fuel is to be carried out from the Reich. The following rate of exchange applies for all transactions and payments: 100 cz. kronen = 9.00 RM (1 Cz. Kr = 9 Rpfg)  
   (pencil note: will be published this afternoon)

10. Payment of the armed forces:
    For the parts of the armed forces operating, pay as applicable in accordance with the peacetime regulations for large-scale maneuvers will go into effect after leaving garrisons or assembly areas. All additional costs arising through the operation are to be deleted under chapter VIII E 20 (OKW Treasury)

11. Administrative Directives:
    The army has will administer the occupied areas on their own responsibility. The C D Z with their special staffs are at their disposal in an advisory capacity (compare H. Dv. 90, No. 20 etc.)
12. Supply Installations:
For the maintenance and putting into operation of supply installations OKW Admin.Staff will attach the following to the Army/H.Q.'s

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<td>13</td>
<td>LANDAU/ISAR</td>
<td>10.1 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>PLAUEN</td>
<td>10.2 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>GORLITZ</td>
<td>10.1 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>LAMGSDORF(SW/OPFELN)</td>
<td>10.5 2000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13. Propaganda Companies:
Propaganda companies are to be used. Amendments as regards attachment made necessary through the peaceful entry will be conveyed verbally.

Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
KEITEL

DISTRIBUTION: III
and Special Distribution
Subject: OCCUPATION OF SUDETEN-GERMAN TERRITORY

1. The Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor has ordered that Sections of the Armed Forces march into the Sudeten-German territory, beginning 1 October, 1938. There will be no general mobilization of the Armed Forces (OR case "X"). Units already mobilized, will, for the timebeing, remain at their present posts.

2. Coincident with the crossing of the Reich frontier, the Commander in Chief of the Army will assume full powers in the territory to be occupied together with authority to transfer this power to the C's in C of the Armies.

The Commander in Chief can, exercise these powers, and pass laws, install special courts, and give directives to the appropriate departments and offices functioning in the area of operations, valid for the operational area with the exception of the highest Reich authorities or officers of the State of Prussia and the Executive Board of the NSDAP. In all other cases, the right of issuing directives has priority over directives from higher superior authorities. The area of operations will be extended forward according to the area to be occupied. The shifting of the rear frontier of the operational area will be ordered separately.

Mobilization measures will not be enforced in the civil sphere. However, all authorities are requested to carry out immediately the demands of the armed force authorities. To guarantee completion of the tasks of the armed forces the following measures are especially desired:
Item 41

a. Reich Postal Ministry

Securing of direct tele-communications in the districts of the Communications Hqs, Breslau, Dresden, Nuernberg, Muenchen, Vienna and Berlin.

Establishing of Special Communications networks. Furnishing of equipment to armed forces in whatever degree may be required (see Mob. Book (Z) Part IX, No. 3501-03-32).

Furthermore it is requested that staff requirements as regards restoring communication networks in the occupied area, be met.

b. Propaganda Ministry:

Dispatch of commissioners to the Chiefs of Civil on the administration operational area. Prohibition of the publication of military news of any kind in the press. (Compare Mob Book (Z) part V, 1758 & 1600)

c. Reichsbank:

Issue of Mobilization money supplies without fiduciary monetary tender is authorized. (Compare Mob Book (Z) part XVIII, Nr 8031)

Application of Laws:

a. There will be a special directive as to the introduction of the German Criminal Code into the occupied territory.

b. The Army Compensation Law (Wehrleistungsgesetz) will be in force on both sides of the frontier. Public buildings will be used as billets primarily. Requisitioned articles will not become property of the armed forces. Payment for services rendered will be made in cash (German currency)

e. Economic Directives:

Any confiscation of valuables or balances at Credit Institutions (Kredit Instituten) is prohibited in the Sudeten-German area. Requisitioning is also prohibited. Supplies of food, forage and fuel for the armed forces will be drawn from the Reich. The following rate of exchange is effective for all transactions and payments:

100 Czech kronen - 10,00 RM (1 Czech krone -- 10 Pfg)
6. Payment of the Armed Forces:

For parts of the armed forces operating, pay as applicable in accordance with the peace-time regulations for large-scale maneuvers, effective from time of departure from areas or garrisons.

7. Customs Frontier Guard

After the crossing of the Reich Frontier by the troops, the security of the old frontier will be taken over by the Customs-Frontier Guard at whose disposal the supreme commander of the armed forces will put the necessary personnel.

The supreme command of the armed forces will arrange the guarding of the front lines of the area to be occupied (as to collection of duties) with the Inspector General of Customs. The Liaison officials according to Nr 15 of the regulations pertaining to the VGAD will continue to be at the disposal of the Corps Hqs.

Shipments to armed forces authorities as well as members of the armed forces are not subject to customs inspection.

3. Administrative Directives:

The armed Hqs will administer the occupied areas on their own responsibilities. The CdZ with their staff of experts are at their disposal in an advisory capacity (see H. Dv 90, Nr 20 etc). In all matters of a police nature, the Reichsfuehrer SS is to be consulted.

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

(signed) Keitel

Distribution: Overleaf
ITEM 41

DISTRIBUTION

The Fuhrer's deputy
for the attention of SS-Oberfuhrer Knoblauch 1st copy

Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery
for the attention of Reich Minister Dr. Lammers 2nd copy

Foreign Office
for the attention of Leg. Rat. Freiherr v. d. Heyden-Rynsch 3rd copy

Reich Minister of the Interior
for the attention of Min. Div. Dr. Danckwerts 4th copy

Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police -
Reich Defence (RV) Section - for the attention
of SS-Brigadefuehrer Petri 5th copy

Reich Minister for Enlightenment and Propaganda
for the attention of Major (Reserve) Wentischer 6th copy

Reich Minister of Justice
for the attention of Min. Rat Haastert 7th copy

Reich Minister of Finance
for the attention of Min. Rat. Geh. Rat. Dr. Bender 8th copy

Reich Minister of Communications - Motor Transport
Service, Shipping, Hydraulic Structure -
for the attention of Min. Rat. Pigge 9th copy

Reich Minister of Transport - Railroad Dept. -
for the attention of Div. Dr. Ebeling 10th copy

Reich Minister for Science, Education - National
Culture for the attention of Min. Div. Prof.
Dr. Krummel 11th copy

Reich Postal Minister
for the attention of Min. Rat Honold 12th copy

General Inspector for German Roadways
for the attention of Reg. Saurat Schaffler 13th copy

Minister President General Fieldmarshall Göring
Director of the Four Year Plan and the Prussian
State Ministry for the attention of Min. Rat.
Bergbohm 14th copy

Operational Staff G B
for the attention of Ministerial Director Sarnow 15th & 16th copy

Reich Minister of Economics
for the attention of Ob. Reg. Rat. Dr. Burandt 17th & 18th copies

Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture
for the attention of Min. Rat. Dr. Dietrich 19th copy

20th copy

- 73 -
ITEM 41

Reich Labour Minister
for the attention of Min. Rat. Schroeder

Directorate of the Reichsbank
for the attention of the Reichsbank dir.
Dr. Müller

Reich Conservator of Forests
for the attention of Oberlandforstmeister
Hausmann

Reich Office for long range regional planning
(Rannovreburg) for the attention of Reg. Rat.
Dr. Schepers

President of the Secret Cabinet Council
Reich Minister Freiherr von Neurath

Reich Minister Frank
for the attention of Oberstaatsanwalt Dr. Buhler

Head of Reich Labour Service
for the attention of Oberarbeitsfuhrer Richter

OKH (2nd Div. Army General Staff) (GX)

Reich Minister for Air and C-in-C Air Force
(2nd Div. Air Force General Staff) (GX)

OKM (A II) (15 x)

Adjutant to the Führer

OKW: Chief of OKW

WZ

Anal/Abwehr
(with NA for Foreign Abwehr I, II & III) (6 X)

General Armed Forces Office
(with NA for J. Presser, Vers.) (4X)

Armed Forces Staff
(with NA for WWI, Who, WHü) (4X)

Armed Forces Communications (WNV) (2X)

L
(Chief, Ia, Ib, Ic, II, IVa, IVb, IVc, IVd, K)

WH

WR

Special Staff W

Stock kept at LIV

21st copy

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23rd copy

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182nd copy

183rd copy

184th - 200th copy
By order of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, the occupation of the Sudeten-German areas by the Armed Forces will be executed in a manner which will allow a changeover to military operations at any time.

For the advance of the troops to coincide with the withdrawal of the Czechs, particularly in the fortified zones, and on account of the possibility of local resistance, it is necessary for the march in to be arranged in a way suited to the conduct of military operations.

The military occupation also necessitates the settling of economic conditions in the Sudeten-German area. Assimilation can only be brought about gradually. For this transition period the rate of exchange has been fixed at 100 Czech crowns to 10.00 Reichsmarks so as to enable the retail trade to function. It is a pre-condition of this temporary settlement, however, that, until a final settlement is made with regard to economics and currency, and in order to avoid placing the Sudeten-German population at a disadvantage, only those things are bought in the open market which come in the category of goods which fill the immediate needs of life. Any exploitation of the present economic situation is a serious offense.

For the above stated reasons, travel into the Sudetenland from the old Reich will be confined to those officials and authorities who have been given specific tasks in the Sudeten-German area. It is requested that all civil authorities and all organizations of the Party be instructed without delay that it is essential to obtain the previous approval of the military authorities charged with the exercise of executive power (C-in-C of the Army, Army Hq.) for the transfer of departments and units of any kind into the Sudeten-German area which is under military authorities.

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Keitel

(Distribution for Item 42 identical to that of Item 41)

Item 43 is handwritten notes too illegible to translate.
TRANSLATION OF DOC. NO. 388 PS
cont.

Berlin, 1st October 1938

150 copies
18th copy

Top Secret

Office of the armed Forces Adjutant attached to the Führer & Reich Chancellor.
Rec. Oct.3rd 1938, Encl.2-30
Reg.No. 265338 Secret
Dispatched -
Check -

MOST SECRET

SPECIAL ORDERS NO.3 to DIRECTIVE No.1

Parts of the Army Employed.

In addition to the Sections of the Army whose employment has been approved (see Directive 1, Section 2a), the following units will also be used for the occupation:

Command (Generalkommando) III

10th Inf Regiment (4th Inf Div)

The Chief of Supreme Command of the Army
By direction
Jodl

Distribution: III

and special distribution

Item 45

Received
from HDZG Pass to Date Time Re.No. by
Teleprint
Office
Notes

by Jod. (?)

Delay notes:

Telegram HDZG 12 9110 1304 Priority notes:

TO LT. COL. SCHMUNDT * FUHRER'S TRAIN * (FUHRER'S)

1. IF THE OCCUPATION OF ZONE 5 IS CARRIED OUT TODAY ACCORDING TO PLAN AND WITHOUT INCIDENT OKW INTENDS TO DISSOLVE V.O.A.D. IN THE WEST AS FROM 10.10 AND TO BRING THE 5 SERVING DIVISIONS BACK TO THEIR HOME STATIONS...

2. ACCORDING TO TELEGRAM RECEIVED HERE POPULATION OF IGLAU VERY WORRIED AND EXCITED. COMMUNISTS THERE ARE ARMED. FOREIGN OFFICE HAS BEEN INFORMED. OKW JUGENDS EMPLOYMENT OF ENGLISH LEGION,

IF IT IS BROUGHT UP IN THIS AREA FOR PROTECTION OF THE GERMANS...

FUHRER'S CONSENT REQUESTED FOR 1 AND 2 ....

signed KEITEL

(Ink Notes:-) Telephoned this from Opera House in Saarbrucken at 8100 10.9 to Capt. Veyle. Fuhrer agreed to points 1 and 2. In connection with 2: if the lives of Germans threatened, troops to march in after short warning.

- 76 -

SCHMUNDT
Lt.Col.
My Fuhrer!

I have to report that the troops will reach the demarcation line as ordered, by this evening. In so far as further military operations are not required, the order for the occupation of the country which was given to me will thus have been fulfilled. The guarding of the new frontier line will be taken over by the reinforced frontier supervision service (Grenzaufschutzdienst) in the next few days.

It is thus no longer a military necessity to combine the administration of the Sudetenland with the command of the troops of the army under the control of one person.

I therefore ask you, my Fuhrer, to relieve me with effect from October 15, 1938, of the charge assigned to me—that of exercising executive powers in Sudeten German territory.

Heil my Fuhrer,

VON BRAUCHITSCH

(Handwritten Note:) Submitted to Fuhrer 11 Nov. Agreed.
TRANSLATION OF DOC. NO. 388 PS

Army Telegraph Network

Pass to Dept. Schm. Tel.No. of Sender

Schm. 10.10 1940

Delay notes

Item 47

Telegram

SECRET

TELEGRAM TO FUHRER'S TRAIN, Lt.COL. SCHMUNDT

10.10 1930

If evening report shows that occupation of zone five has been completed without incident OKW intends to order further demobilization.

Principle:

1) To suspend operation "Grun" but maintain a sufficient state of preparedness on part of army and Luftwaffe to make intervention possible if necessary.

2) All units not needed to be withdrawn from the occupied area and reduced to Peace Time status, as population of occupied area is heavily burdened by the massing of troops.

3) To dissolve truck regiments as a matter of urgency, in the interests of economy.

4) In the West - gradual reversal of all mobilization measures without prejudice to the work on the lines.

5) Intention of the C-in-C of the Army to relinquish his executive powers on 10.15

FUHRER'S CONSENT REQUESTED

OKW

Item 47

Fuhrer's decision:

1--agreed

2--Suggestion to be made on the 13th Oct in Jegen by Gun Armstrong. Decision will then be reached.

3--agreed

4--agreed

5--agreed

NB. Notice of 5 to be sent by 6th Division

Relayed to Lt. Colonel Weitzler at 2300, 10.11

SCHMUNDT

Lt.COL.

(in Schmundt's writing)

(Next page contains illegible notes)
10.10.38
What is in the Zone?

5 1 (motorized)
   1 (light)
   1 armoured
   1 mountain
   1 div.

4 3 motorized div
   1 light
   1 armoured
   2 div
   Liebstandarte

1 1 armoured
   3 div

For special duties 1 mountain
   3 div
   1 truck transport regt.

2. 4 div
   Germania

13 div
   4 div (motorized)
   3 armoured
   2 mountain
   2 light

24 divisions

(notes in Schmundt's writing)
TO THE ARMED FORCES ADJUTANT ATTACHED TO THE FUHRER AND SUPREME COMMANDER OF ARMED FORCES. THE C-IN-C THE ARMY REGARDS HIS DUTIES AS POSSESSOR OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN THE SUDESTEIN GERMAN AREA AS FINISHED AS FROM 10.15. AND SUGGESTS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION BE TAKEN OVER ON THAT DATE BY REICH COMMISSAR HEINLEIN, PROVIDING THAT FURTHER MILITARY OPERATIONS ARE NO LONGER NECESSARY. PERSONAL LETTER OF THE C-IN-C TO THE FUHRER HAS BEEN DESPATCHED.

OKH 6th Div. (Five)
General Staff of the German Army
11.37/38
Item 48

(Ink note)

1. If advance orders, times can be shortened. Regrouping of armies.

2. If Hungary, small degree of preparedness. 2 brigades between Pressburg and Budapest. 1 brigade east of Friedl.

(Rest of note impossible to decipher completely)
Notes of the) army Telegraph Network

Received Pass to Date Time R.No. by 1)4 Mot.
from HE23 Lt.Col. 11.10 2030 Joe Div, 1 B'n ready to
11.10.1935. Schmudt march (?) 1 Arm-
by Schm. 24 39 (Uncipherable

Notes re delay note)

Item 48 TOP SECRET
HE 13 1930.11.10
Lt. Col. Schmudt

Question 1: WHAT REINFORCEMENTS ARE NECESSARY IN THE PRESENT SITUATION TO BREAK ALL CZECH RESISTANCE IN BOHEMIA AND MORAVIA?

Answer: ARMY SUGGESTS: ARMY GROUP 5: Nothing

ARMY GROUP FOR SPECIAL DUTIES: 1 Arm'd
Brig., 2 Mob. Div.

ARMY GROUP 4: Nothing

ARMY GROUP 3: 1 Mobile Division

ARMY GROUP 1: 1 Division ready to march

and 1 Mobile Division

B) LUFTWAFFE: EMPLOYMENT NECESSARY OF ALL FORCES PROVIDED TO DATE OKW BELIEVES THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS WITHOUT THESE REINFORCEMENTS IN VIEW OF THE PRESENT SIGNS OF WEAKNESS IN CZECH RESISTANCE.

Question 2: HOW MUCH TIME IS REQUIRED FOR THE REGROUPING OR MOVING UP OF NEW FORCES?

Answer: A) Army: FOR REGROUPING: 2 days. FOR MOVING UP OF NEW FORCES FROM THE REICH 4 to 5 DAYS (INCLUDING MOBILIZATION)

B) Luftwaffe: OPERATIONAL DUTY POSSIBLE ANY TIME

Question 3: HOW MUCH TIME WILL BE REQUIRED FOR THE SAME PURPOSE IF IT IS EXECUTED AFTER THE INTENDED DEMOBILIZATION AND RETURN MEASURES?

Answer A) Army: IN THE SOUTHEAST ABOUT 10 to 11 DAYS.—IN THE EAST 9 to 10 DAYS.

B) Luftwaffe: AFTER RETURN OF FLYING UNITS TO PEACE TIME AIRFIELDS AND THEIR DEMOBILIZATION — THE AIR GUNS WHICH ARE READY FOR ACTIVITY AND THE GROUND ORGANIZATION BEING LEFT AS THEY ARE — LENGTH OF TIME IN SOUTHEASTERN AREA 12 HOURS IF ATHER FAVORABLE. AFTER DEMOBILIZATION TO COMPLETE SEVERAL DAYS, IN ANY CASE LESS THAN IN THE CASE OF THE ARMY.
Question 4: HOW MUCH TIME WOULD BE REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE THE STATE OF READINESS OF OCT. 1st?

Answer: Army: 6 days. If the reserves are called up by radio, 3 days at least.

Luftwaffe: AIR DEFENSE WEST, BEFORE COMMENCEMENT OF REORGANIZATION, WILL BE READY FOR OPERATIONS IN 24 hours

(signed) KEITEL
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 388 PS
(Con'd)

Berlin, Oct 12th, 1938

Item 49
LI a

3 copies
1st copy

REFLECTIONS

Of the Supreme Command of the Army on the withdrawal of Forces from the Sudeten-German Area

PRESENT STRENGTH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARMY GROUP</th>
<th>NO. OF DIV.</th>
<th>DIV NO. EARMARKED FOR WITHDRAWAL</th>
<th>NO OF DIV. TO BE WITHDRAWN AFTER</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army Group Command 5</td>
<td>5 1/3</td>
<td>1/3 44, 2 Mtn, 3 Mtn, 28th Mot, 4 Light, 2nd Armoured</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2 1/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Group Command 4 (plus 1 SS Regt)</td>
<td>4 1/3 plus 4th, 3rd, 18th</td>
<td>1/3 5th, 7th, 9th, 45th, 1st Mtn</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1/3 3 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Group Command 3 (plus 1 SS Regt)</td>
<td>7 (plus 1 SS Regt)</td>
<td>10th, 24th, 2nd (Mot), 13th (Mot), 20th (Mot), 1st Light, 1st Arm'd.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Group Command 3 (plus 1 SS Regt)</td>
<td>3 (plus 1 SS Regt)</td>
<td>4th, 3rd, 18th</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Group Command 4 (plus 3 SS Regts)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8th, 28th, 30th, 3rd Arm'd.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL (Plus 3 SS Regts) | 22 2/3 | 8 1/3 14 2/3 (Plus 3 SS Regts)

Namely: 11 2/3 Inf Div, 3 Mtn Divs, 3 Mot Divs, 3 Light Divs, 3 Arm'd Divs. 3 1/3 Inf Divs, 2 Mtn Divs, 1 Mot Div, 1 Light Div, 1 Arm'd Div

Namely: 8 2/3 Inf Div, 1 Mtn Div, 2 Mot Divs, 1 Light Div, 2 Arm'd Divs

Namely: 7 1/3
OKW suggests that by 20 October about half of the Army forces still remaining in Sudeten-German Territory (14 1/3 Divs and 3 SS Regiments) should be moved out, as otherwise the orderly discharging of the old age group at the end of October - this is necessary for the building up of the Army - and the reassignment of the recruits will not be possible by 10/11. (Involved are the: 2nd Arm'd Div, 1st Mountain Div., 7th Div, 13th Motorized Div, 20th Motorized Div, 18th Div and 3rd Arm'd Div) Fuhrer's decision requested to-day.

Signed Keitel

(Note at bottom in Schmundt's handwriting:)

The Fuhrer has given his consent 17 Oct.

By telephone, 1905 hours, 17 Oct. to Capt. Vogel,

Section L, OKW.

Schmundt, Lt. Col.
ITEM 51

The Fuehrer and Supreme Comdr of the Armed Forces

Berchtesgaden, 18 Oct. 1938

Despatched 19 X 38 M

TO THE C-IN-C OF THE ARMY

GENERAL VON BRAUCHITSCH, BERLIN

The occupation of the Sudeten-German territory has been completed, the operation being carried out by sections of the Army, the Air Forces, the Police, the military SS (SS Verfugungstruppe), the SS and SA.

Placed under protection of the armed forces, 3½ millions of German compatriots have returned to the Reich once and for all.

The Civil Administration is taking over charge of them on 21 Oct 1938. Simultaneously I believe you of your right to exercise executive power, while acknowledging the understanding cooperation of all departments.

Along with our Sudeten German compatriots, the entire German people express their gratitude to those who participated in the liberation of the Sudeten-Land.

(signed) Adolf Hitler

Berchtesgaden, 18 Oct 1938

(signed) Schmundt,
Lieutenant Colonel, G. S. C.

The Armed Forces Adjutant attached to the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor.

After Delivery:

To the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

I request that publication in the press be initiated from there.

-86 -
Item 51.

1st Draft

To

The C - in - C of the Army

The occupation of the Sudeten - German territory had been completed according to plan, the operation being carried out by sections of the Army, Air Force, and police. Thus 3½ million German compatriots have returned to the Reich once and for all, and have been placed under the protection of the Armed Forces.

You have borne the responsibility for the occupation of the country and the care of the population from the day when the army marched in, and now I approve your proposal to release you from your authority to exercise executive power in the Sudeten-German area, date of expiry being October 20th 1938.

My thanks to all those who participated in the liberation of the Sudetenland, for the order and discipline, the social understanding and devoted readiness to help with which they have done their duty.

J.

(Handwritten note)

The military SS (SS VERFÜGUNGSTRUPPE), the SS and SA

2nd Draft

(Exact repeat of Item 51 followed by handwritten note)

Signed Adolf Hitler (unknown hand)
Berlin, Oct. 18th, 1938
1300 hours

Memo

Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant
attached to the Fuhrer & Reich Chancellor
Recd. 20 Oct. 1938
Req. No. 297/38 Most Secret
Despatch Clerk W

MOST SECRET

Directive No. 4

The Fuhrer has ordered:

1. That about half of the forces of the Army still remaining in Sudeten-
   German territory be shipped back to their peace time bases.

2. That those parts of the Luftwaffe which are under the command of the
   Army be shipped back and returned to the C-in-C of the Air Force.

   The withdrawal of other parts of the Luftwaffe operating in Sudeten
   Germany will be effected by the C-in-C of the Air Force.

Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
Keitel

Distribution: III
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 338-PS
(Cont'd)

ITEM 53

REICH WAR MINISTRY/NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

MOST SECRET

Received at 1040 by (Indecipherable) Initials Space for Receipt Stamp
Notes re delay
MBZ 066
Telegram from MBZ 056 21/10 1030

LIEUTENANT COLONEL SCHMUNDT:

(SECRET) - OKW REQUESTS THE FUEHRER'S APPROVAL TO THE FOLLOWING DECREE:

ON THE 20TH OF OCTOBER THE REICH LABOUR SERVICE CEASES TO BE UNDER THE
COMMAND OF THE SUPREME COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF
THE RAD FORCES OPERATING IN THE AREA OF THE WESTERN FORTIFICATIONS. THE
CHIEF OF THE SUPREME COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES REGULATES THE CONDITIONS
OF EMPLOYMENT FOR THESE SECTIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH MY DIRECTIVES, &
AGREEMENT WITH THE REICHS LABOR LEADER. OKW NR 2690/38 Secret WFA/L

Handwritten: Consent given, 21 Oct 38.

Passed to Colonel Jodl's

Ante-Room at 1400

Sch 22/10

- 89 -
COORDINATED TIME OF ATTACK BY ARMY AND AIR FORCES ON X DAY

As a matter of principle, every effort should be made for a coordinated attack by Army and Air Forces on X Day.

The Army wishes to attack at dawn, i.e. about 0615, it also wishes to conduct some limited operations in the previous night, which however, would not alarm the entire Czech front.

Air Force's time of attack depends on weather conditions. These could change the time of attack and also limit the area of operations. The weather of the last few days, for instance, would have delayed the start until between 0800 and 1100 due to low ceiling in Bavaria.

If the Luftwaffe were to attack at the time desired by the Army no tactical surprise of the enemy's air force would be achieved and it would necessitate certain changes in the method of attack (height of flight level). Consequently, from the outset the Luftwaffe has desired a later hour of attack on the part of the Army. Even so, there would be no definite guarantee of a well-timed coordinated attack of both Forces, as bad weather conditions on the day of attack might postpone the commitment of the Air Force on X Day in part or altogether.

If an early hour of attack on the part of the Army is regarded as indispensable, a simultaneous attack by the Air Force, - desirable as it may be, may possibly have to be dispensed with.
Thus it is Proposed:

Attack by the Army – independent of the attack by the air force – at the time desired by the Army (0615) and permission for limited operations to take place before then, however, only to an extent that will not alarm the entire Czech front.

The Luftwaffe will attack at a time most suitable to them.