Report of Interrogation No. 5812 of 9 October 1945

P/W: von Baumer, Hermann
Rank: Lt. Col.
Unit: Attache Gruppe, Luftwaffe
Capt'd: Arrested by CIC, Mauerkirchen, Austria, 9 July 1945.

Veracity: Believed reliable.


In the fall of 1935 Hitler ordered von Ribbentrop to seek closer cooperation with Japan. Von Ribbentrop thereupon made suggestions to Hitler. To carry out this mission von Ribbentrop brought P/W into his service as head of his Eastern Section.

The occasion for bringing P/W into the office was the publication of a series of articles about the Far East which he had written in the periodical Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft (German National Economy). In these articles P/W had developed the following ideas: (1) Three basic types of people were to be distinguished on the land mass of Europe and Asia: (a) the settled peoples, who live in the border areas of the continents and are identified by using the natural boundaries as the basis of their thinking along psychological, political, and economic lines (China, India, and Central Europe); (b) the pirates, the inhabitants of the islands off the coast of the continents, and coastal inhabitants (the Vikings, the Normans, the Dutch, the Spanish, the Portuguese, the Genoese, the Venetians, the Malays, the Japanese); (c) the nomads, the inhabitants of the inner parts of Eurasia. These have no boundaries for a stretch of about 10,000 km, and for them the "border" and the "enemy" are the same thing. They are not tied to the soil and its history either economically or in any other war of thinking and acting, but rebel against such ties. The entire history of Eurasia reflects itself in the conflict between its settled population and the movement of the nomads from Central Asia into their areas. (2) This development can be followed throughout history: (a) third and fourth centuries: collapse of the Roman Empire in the West, collapse of the Sui Dynasty in the East, the invasions of Hung Yu in the East, of the Huns in the West (Attila, the Battle of the Catalanian Fields); (b) eighth and ninth centuries: in the West, the collapse of the Carolingian Empire, the fall of the Tang Dynasty in the East, the invasions of the Kitan and the Tungus in China, of the Magyars in Europe (the battle of the Lech); (c) twelfth and thirteenth centuries: in the East, the collapse of the Sung Dynasty; in the West, the collapse of the Sienestauft Dynasty and the Crusades (the battle of Aleppo); Mongolian invasions of China and Europe; (d) 16th and 17th centuries: in the East, the collapse of the Ming dynasty; in the West, the division of Europe by the religious wars of the Reformation. The Manchu invasion of China, the Turkish invasion of Europe, (e) 19th and 20th centuries, in the East, the collapse of the Manchu dynasty; in the West, the change of structure of the social and economic system (the crisis of capitalism, the rise of socialism). The moving force, from the interior of Eurasia, the bolshevism of Russia. From these periodic recurrences the following conclusions were drawn by P/W: (a) this influence coming from central Asia is determined by a natural recurrence of expansion; (b) defense against this pressure cannot take place through offensive operations (because of the great size of the area concerned), but must be by a stabilization and a consolidation of the border areas, so that the ring of the states of the settled people can resist the pressure of the nomads.
This historical and political interpretation was known to Herr von Ribbentrop through P/W's publications. P/W particularly prized the understanding of this conception which he found in English circles.

When P/W received the mission of working for cooperation with Japan he used this conception as a basis. World events presented the following picture: (a) China found itself in a position of weakness and disunity. The conflicts which took place there between the war lords (Changtse Lin, Chang Hsiu-Liang, Heng Yehsian) were already struggles between the border areas (Japan and China) and the power bloc of central Asia (Russian bolshevism); (b) the disintegration of Europe had already originated in the center of Asia (through the subversive work of the Comintern); (c) political pressure from the East was increasing. Since 1935 there had been a considerable increase in the size of the Russian Army and Air Force. In 1935 Russia concluded a pact of friendship with Czechoslovakia, and in 1935/36 one with France. At the Comintern Congress in Moscow in 1934 speakers took very extreme views of the non-socialist countries, which ended with open statements of enmity toward these countries.

Washington considered this step a breach of the existing treaties between the United States and Russia, and sent a note of protest to Moscow. The deputy Commissioner for Foreign Affairs (Markomindel) Karachan, replied that his government did not understand the reproach contained in the note, stating that Russia was meddling in the internal affairs of the United States, and that the reference was made to the trial balloons sent by the Comintern, the Russian government was obliged to explain that it had not been responsible for the activity of the Comintern in the past and would not be responsible for it in the future.

Since further examination showed that the customary forms of treaty (such as pacts of consultation, non-aggression pacts, friendship pacts, and so forth) were not suitable instruments of agreement, P/W got the idea from the exchange of notes between Washington and Moscow of building up a system of treaties for defense against the openly stated war goals of the Comintern. All nations who felt themselves threatened by these attacks could join. These thoughts were the basis for the Anti-Comintern Pact which von Ribbentrop laid before the Fuehrer and which received the Fuehrer's approval. P/W thereupon received the mission of entering into negotiations with Oshima, at that time the Japanese Military Attache, who was much interested in bringing about closer collaboration with Germany. P/W found in the very first conversations with this man that he was much in accord with this form of collaboration.

In Japan at that time there were two trends of thought: (a) the Navy, and behind it the economic leaders, whose desire was to come to terms with England. The cancelling of the treaty of 1903 by England had removed their political influence. (b) the Army, which, due to its reorganization (after 1870) by Prussian Germany, had had particular leanings towards that country, saw a special threat in the development of Russia, which in Vladivostok was very close to their island kingdom; it therefore believed that it would have to take a stronger defensive position against Russia. After the discrediting of the policy of the Navy, the Army pursued the policy of creating a new alignment to another of the great powers, and used Oshima to express its wish.

Oshima openly stated that a treaty of friendship or the like would at that time not receive the support of the political circles standing behind the Navy. He therefore considered the form of the Anti-Comintern Pact to be a particularly
Fortunate solution.

From the start the plan was to draw other states into the Anti-Comintern Pact. This was originally based on the idea of creating a common defense against the Comintern, supported by mutual assistance. In addition it was planned to economically unite the members of the anti-Comintern Pact.

'One cannot be rid of a plague of mosquitoes by killing them, but only by removing and draining the places where the mosquitoes breed.' This sentence was applied to Bolshevism: 'Bolshevism can not be fought with cannon but must be stamped out by removing its causes, that is, the poor social conditions of the lower classes.' A closer economic collaboration would be an improvement of the general social conditions and thereby raise the standard of living for the lower classes. It seemed possible to carry out these ideas at that time only if one could succeed in bringing England into the Pact. This view was supported not only by the interest which individual Englishmen had in these ideas, but was also based on the consideration that the Indian problem and the position of England in the Middle East would assume new aspects within the frame of an anti-Comintern Pact. When von Ribbentrop went to England Hitler asked him to pay particular attention to these views.

Unfortunately, when von Ribbentrop arrived in London he ruined all possibility of realizing these plans. When newspapermen questioned him at the railroad station as to his mission as the new ambassador, he stated that he had come to convert England to Anti-Comintern ideas. All political circles regarded this statement as a meddling in England's internal affairs; it was not merely the first step to breaking down his whole mission, but it made all further conversation on the subject with those English politicians who were interested impossible.

After the Anti-Comintern Pact had been signed with Japan in November 1936 P/W received the mission of inducing other countries to join in it. Italy was the first nation involved, its anti-communist internal policies seeming to be especially suited. In the very first discussions the foreign minister representing Mussolini asked whether the pact represented a military threat to Russia. P/W set forth for him the basic ideas as explained above, with the remark that he would put an official question to Ribbentrop on the subject. P/W was then told to say that his interpretation coincided with the official one. At the same time General Scarpa, one of Mussolini's representatives, emphasized to him that Italy was ready to take defensive measures against the Comintern, which had come out especially strongly against Fascist Italy, but that Mussolini believed that Germany would try to come to an understanding with Russia.

In the early part of 1937 Ribbentrop gave P/W the assignment of probing in Poland and the border states to find whether there were signs of collaboration against the Comintern which could be utilized. P/W visited Count Alfred Potocky (the brother of ambassador Jerzy Potocky), who invited various friends to a discussion (among them, Prince Lubomirski and the then ambassador of Poland to Bucharest). There was interest in the question in all its aspects, but no further discussions were held. In Riga P/W visited Foreign Minister Munters of Lithuania whom he had met before, but in talking with him got the impression that he strongly favored Russia, so that further attempts were not to be made with him. During this time an order was given out by Hitler, that P/W was not to investigate any other states regarding the Anti-Comintern Pact, for the following reasons:

Rosenberg, the head of the Aussenpolitisches Amt (Foreign Affairs Office) of the
Party, was opposed to employing on this work such Germans as had had personal acquaintance with Russia, on the ground that they had been infected with Bolshevikism or had been deceived by "Potemkinish" villages. Rosenberg regarded the East as his own sphere and demanded that questions about the East be reserved for members of his staff. Up to the time of the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact, even P/W was exposed to his continuing persecution. After the Pact had been concluded Rosenberg demanded that P/W be transferred to his staff, but P/W refused to go through with this step. Therefore the order came that P/W was not to be sent to any new countries for investigative purposes.

Nevertheless, in October 1937 P/W was sent to make further negotiations in Rome. In November the Italian Foreign Minister signed the documents bringing Italy into the Anti-Comintern Pact.