

Jodl

OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL
FOR THE PROSECUTION OF AXIS CRIMINALITY

INTERROGATION DIVISION SUMMARY

Interrogation of: JODL, Alfred.

By: Lt.Col. Hinkel,

29 August 1945, A.M. , Nurnberg.

PERSONS IMPLICATED AND SUBJECTS

1. JODL, KEITEL, WARLIMONT
 - a. Plans for aggressive war
 - (1) Against Poland. Meeting at Obersalzburg, 22 August 1939. (p.2,4)
 - (2) Against Czechoslovakia, Plan "Green" (p.7,8).
 - (3) Against Russia (p.12 - 14).
2. SPEER
 - a. Economic mobilization for war - production plans for Wehrmacht (p.19).
3. GENERAL THOMAS
 - a. Production of armaments (p.19).
 - b. Kriegspeiler maneuver (p.20).

PLANS FOR AGGRESSIVE WAR AGAINST POLAND

When asked what Keitel told him concerning the meeting on 22 August 1939 at Obersalzburg, Jodl stated that the first intimation he had about the meeting was a few weeks ago at Mondorf when Keitel and Warlimont mentioned it to him (p.2). He did not know what was being discussed there, but "I take it for granted that the gathering which took place on the 22d of August which would be three days before Poland was being attacked, that that meeting would only be about the forthcoming military movement and military "situation" (p.4).

PLANS FOR AGGRESSIVE WAR AGAINST CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Confronted with a copy of the plan "Green" and asked about the significance of a note written in ink under his own typed signature, the witness explained that, it meant that the plan submitted in this sketch was approved by the Fuehrer, adding, however, that this did not apply to all the documents which were shown him but only to the letter dated 24 August (p.7 - 8). Asked whether he and his staff were the only people working on a plan "Green", he replied that the Czechoslovakia action was the general frame within which the Army, the Navy, and the Luftwaffe were working out each one of their own plans (p.8). Did not know Wolter (p.9).

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PLANS FOR AGGRESSIVE WAR AGAINST RUSSIA

When asked how the estimates were made by the Wehrmacht to determine the supplies needed by the troops for some definite action, he replied that the demand for supplies was determined greatly by the operations planned; cites Russian campaign in which: "we could depend to find on the spot a certain volume of foodstuff" (p.12). Admits that in a large operation such as the Russian campaign a number of months would be needed for the supplies to be accumulated to conduct such a campaign. Admits that he engaged in the planning of operations for the Russian campaign. The operational plans in such a campaign precede the plans of supply since they are often secret. (p.13). The planning of this campaign began in November and December 1940. At that time he issued the first directives to the Army, Navy and the Luftwaffe. The supply planning did not commence at the same time, since those directives were kept rather secret. The Quartermaster did not receive any intimation on the subject before January 1941. "No doubt at that time there must have been great changes in view of a war coming."
"After the conclusion of the warfare in France, there was no longer any great objective for a warfare on land, and we were on the point of rearming, especially to increase the armament of the Luftwaffe. Of course when the Fuehrer was obliged to make a decision of a war on Russia, then there was a change in the armament which was then increased for the Army". (p.14).

ECONOMIC PREPARATIONS FOR WAR

The distribution of supplies and materiel among the various branches of the Wehrmacht demanded each individual branch requirement to be carefully scrutinized, but despite the control exercised there were incidents of hoarding, especially with the Luftwaffe (p.16). Himmler and Goering used their own influence to improve equipment and clothing of their particular troops. Hitler himself ordered that the SS and certain other sections of the Luftwaffe be provided with better arms (p.17). Minister Speer was in charge of the full execution of all production plans for the Wehrmacht and saw to it that the necessary workers, raw materials, and industrial capacity were fully utilized for this. The duty of General Thomas was with production of armaments (p.19).

KRIEGSPEILER MANEUVER

The operation of the Kriegspeiler maneuver was a military exercise initiated in peacetime with the objective of preparing the troops for the eventuality of a crippled production, the witness states that to the best of his belief such a maneuver was actually organized by General

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Thomas (p.20). Decisions as to the priority rights of the various branches of the Wehrmacht in regard to supplies and ammunition rested with the Fuehrer himself (p.20).

Raw materials from conquered areas were welcome but had never been a decisive factor in shaping out operational plans. The German aims in the Caucasus campaign were not so much to conquer the oil fields in that area as to deprive the enemy of these sources of supply (p.21).