

OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL
FOR THE PROSECUTION OF AXIS CRIMINALITY

INTERROGATION DIVISION SUMMARY

Interrogation of Jodl, Alfred

By: Lt. Colonel Hinkel, 30 August 1945, a.m.

PERSONS AND ORGANIZATIONS IMPLICATED, AND SUBJECTS

1. JODL

- a. Planning of Polish Campaign (p.3-5)
- b. Planning of French Campaign (p.6-9)
- c. Plan "Green" - Czechoslovakia (p.9-11)

2. KEITEL

- a. Plan for attack against France through Holland and Belgium (p.12)
- b. Occupation of Belgium and the Netherlands (p.11,13)

PLANNING OF POLISH CAMPAIGN

At the time when plans for an attack on Poland were begun, Jodl was in Vienna and Bruenn. In August 1939 he was called to the OKW in Berlin which is an indication that important matters were pending, since in case of war, he was designated as Chief of the Wehrmacht Leadership Staff.

Upon his return, Jodl proceeded with the preparations for the Polish campaign; says that first plans for such a campaign could only have been begun in November 1938. (p.3)

Does not know details as to the date when the campaign was originally ordered but knows that in July 1939 troops from Bruenn had been sent to the Polish frontier. In 1939, Warlimont was Chief of the Section of National Defense, the position Jodl held in 1938. It was in this office that Jodl had worked out the Plan "Green." (p.5)

PLANNING OF FRENCH CAMPAIGN.

The Fuehrer had planned the campaign against France for the winter of 1939 and 40, when all the rivers would be frozen in Holland and Belgium.

Asserts it was not Germany's intention to wage a war of nerves against France. "We simply did not find sufficiently favorable weather to carry on our attack". (p.6)

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Preliminary orders for the attack were issued in January and February 1940, but the decision to attack France in the winter was made as early as October, 1939. (p.7)

Jodl compares the difference between preparations for an attack and the actual orders, with the difference between someone "conceiving the idea of stabbing someone with a knife and actually, then later, carrying it out".

The offensive plan against France was not worked out until the termination of warfare against Poland. (p.8) Jodl asserts that the political reason for the 24-hour postponement of the attack against Poland was due to the 'generous offer of the Fuehrer' asking for a German line of communication through the Polish Corridor". (p.8 and 9)

Admits that Plan "Green", with reference to Czechoslovakia, anticipated action by France in view of the Mutual Assistance Pact between France and Czechoslovakia. (p.9)

Idea of attack against France originated with the Fuehrer in the middle or end of October. Jodl states the attack was motivated by the fear that Franco-British troops, with the consent of Belgium and the Netherlands, might, in a sudden march, attack the Ruhr territory. (p.10 and 11)

Jodl admits he and Keitel wholeheartedly agreed with this policy. The General Staff at first disagreed, hoping the war "might fall asleep" but after a few weeks, they also saw clear. (p.11)

Admits he and Keitel worked on the plan for the attack against France through Holland and Belgium, since an attack on the Maginot Line flanked by countries that were "neutral in name only", seemed too great a risk, to the Fuehrer (p.12).

Admits he absolutely agreed to these views as did Keitel, since, in war, omission of anything that might lessen the danger is a crime. Says he never met an officer who was opposed to the plan. Asked whether it was his attitude that the most feasible military operation should be used regardless of whether this involved an invasion of neutral countries, Jodl states that he does not hold this opinion unreservedly, but that he does hold that a nation fighting for its life, has the right to use any means of warfare it deems fit. (p.13)