Interrogation of JOKL, Alfred


Persons and organizations implicated, and subjects

1. JOKL
   a. Justification of attacks on Belgium and the Netherlands (1-3)
   b. Against Denmark (4)
   c. Plans for attack onolland and Belgium (6)
   d. Orders pertaining to the invasion of Norway and occupation of Denmark (7)
   e. Aggressive war in the Balkans
      (1) Yugoslavia (7-9)
      (2) Greece (7-9)
   f. Aggressive war against Russia
   g. Conversation with the Fuehrer in July 1940 in regard to Russia (10-11)
   h. Plans against Russia (12)
   i. Secret plans for attack against Russia
   j. Preparations of plans against Russia by the OKW (15)
   k. Demands for Finnish cooperation in the event of a Russian campaign (17)
   l. Advanced notice to Italy and Hungary of the impending action against Russia (17-18)

2. HITLER
   a. Aggressive war in the Balkans (7-9)
   b. Intentions against Russia as of July 1940 (11-14)

3. KEITEL
   a. Invasion of Norway and Denmark (7)

4. ARPARDT
   a. Preparations for attack on Russia in 1943 (12)

5. MIRIC (Finnish Chief of Staff)
   a. Cooperation in the German attack on Russia
Alfred Jodl, 30 August 1945 P.M.

AGGRESSIVE WAR - NETHERLANDS; BELGIUM, DENMARK

Jodl expresses his ideas on neutrality in connection with his earlier statements on the subject. Statements during attacks on Belgium and the Netherlands legitimate use of the pressure exerted upon them by England (p. 3). Both countries would have permitted England and France to penetrate their country, whereas Germany would have been refused permission to march through (p. 3).

In the case of Denmark, there was also the fear that, after Germany's occupation of Norway, English pressure would have influenced Denmark's neutrality (p. 4).

Refers to "White Book" from the Foreign Office in which military and political developments in Holland and Belgium are recorded, but has to admit that none of these countries had taken military action against Germany (p. 5).

Plans for attack on Holland and Belgium were only conceived and embodied in the overall plan after the Führer had been convinced that, in case of an attack, neither Holland nor Belgium would remain neutral. "Thus we were of the opinion that the King of Belgium intended to remain neutral but not his Government" (p. 6). Names as an important factor in this case the fact that Belgian troops were concentrating on the German frontier. Discloses that French troops had already made an incursion into Belgium after a false report to the effect that Germany had already attacked (p. 6).

Order signed by Keitel, dated January 1940, pertaining to the invasion of Norway included the occupation of Denmark at the same time (p. 7).

AGGRESSIVE WAR - BALKANS

Tries to justify the attack on Yugoslavia as a necessity arising on view of the anti-German attitude of the new Yugoslav government which would have interfered with the German operations in Greece (p. 7 - 9). Jodl says "that the Italian attack of Greece was much against the desire of the Führer but Hitler was too late to stop it". Germany was then called upon to aid the Italians who "as usual were beaten". This factor, plus the fear of English intervention, motivated the German attack in Greece (p. 7 - 9). It is unable to say definitely whether England intervened in Greece before or after the Germans (p. 9). Reiterates that all the small countries named so far presented no menace as such but "might have been dangerous as tools of England" (p. 9).
AGGRESSIVE WAR - RUSSIA.

Admits that at the end of 1939, the Führer spoke to him and Keitel and to other high staff officers about his general conception in regard to Russia (p.10;11). "The Führer hadn't mentioned these questions, as far as I know, to anybody else, except, perhaps, to Foreign Minister, Ribbentrop (p.11).

Admits that in late summer of 1940 the Führer instructed him to study the possibility of a campaign against Russia in autumn 1940. After studying the problem with Warlimont, Jodl gave the Führer a verbal report accompanied by written notes giving certain figures, etc., to the effect that such a campaign was quite impossible in 1940. The Führer wasn't certain whether to wait for Russia to attack later or not (p.12).

Everybody was apprehensive after the Führer announced his intentions with regard to Russia, since nobody knew the actual strength of Russia (p.13). Jodl admits that he agreed with the Führer in launching a Blitzkrieg "rather than to wait for Russia to attack later on" (p.13).

Plans for the attack on Russia were so secret that written orders were forbidden for a long time (p.14).

Admits that plans carrying plans for the landing of parachutists in France was forced down in Holland, causing plans to fall into enemy hands, after a similar incident occurred in the east, security regulations became more rigorous (p.15).

Godo memo for Russian campaign Barbarossa (p.15). The general plan for the attack was mapped out by the OKW.

Admits that the general directive given by the OKW in this connection called for three army groups to be ready to advance in the South toward Rostov Leningrad, and toward the north-east of Leningrad. Orders of commanding officers were not given in that directive, however (p.16). There were German troops assembling in Bessarabia, Jodl does not recall whether they were commanded by commandant, or by General Antonescu. These troops had participated in the campaign against Yugoslavia and Greece (p.16).

Recalls meeting with Finnish Chief of Staff, Heinrich, in May 1941 in Salzburg, asking Finnish cooperation in the event of a campaign against Russia. Heinrich was not empowered to give a definite promise at that time, but Jodl admits that Finland's cooperation was a result of the conference (p.17).

Everybody was apprehensive after the Führer announced his intentions with Russia and Hungary were informed of the impending action against Russia (p.17). Jodl agreed with the Führer in launching unilaterally rather than to wait for Russia to attack later (p.18).

Plans for the attack on Russia were so secret that written orders were forbidden for a long time (p.19).

Admits that plans carrying plans for the attack on Russia were forbidden for a long time (p.19).
Supplement, 30 August 1945 P.M.

In continuation of the interrogation of the same date (30 August 1945 P.M.), Jodl made the following statements in answer to questions asked for the British War Office:

According to the last reports received in January or February the total number of confirmed military deaths suffered by the German Army during the entire war was 2,300,000. This applies to the entire Wehrmacht and includes suicides, etc. (p.19) but does not include the many hundred thousands missing in Russia, of which at least half must have been killed (p.20).

Jodl thinks that about 90 per cent of the deaths were suffered by the Army. Deaths suffered by the Luftwaffe correspond to the number of deaths occurring among officers in the Army. There were at least some few hundred thousand officers in the Wehrmacht (p.20).

The Germans have no casualty list from the Russians (p.20).

About 12 to 15 per cent of Reich-German soldiers were wounded and were no longer fit for combat (p.20).

Does not know what percentage of soldiers missing in action are believed to be dead (p.21).

According to Jodl's estimate, the total number of mobilized strength in the German Wehrmacht is approximately 9,000,000, with 7,000,000 for the Army, 1,500,000 for the Luftwaffe, and 700,000 or 800,000 for the Navy (p.21).