OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL
FOR THE PROSECUTION OF AXIS CRIMINALITY

INTERROGATION DIVISION SUMMARY

Interrogation of Jodl, Alfred
By: Lt. Col. Hinkel, 2 October 1945 a.m., Nuremberg.

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IDENTIFIES R-99.

Jodl identifies Keitel's signature on document R-99, dated 13 March 1941. Recalls having seen the document but did not collaborate in the formulation of the directive (2,3).

Denies that the initials on the document are his (3) Identifies initials as those of Lt. Col. Christian (3). After comparing initials on another document decides that those on R-99 are not Christians (13).

Questioned as to the meaning of paragraph 2-B of the document which states that in the operational area of the Army the Reichsfuehrer SS is empowered to act in special matters, Jodl assumes that this concerns political measures against Communists in occupied areas (4).
Several points of friction resulted in connection with the jurisdiction of the SS in occupied areas, but it was not his task to deal with them, since he was concerned with operational questions. Further details regarding the respective powers of the SS and the Army were to be settled directly by the OKH and the Reichsfuehrer SS. The Reichsfuehrer SS must have negotiated with Brauchitsch, then Commander of the Army, and the staff of the RESS must have negotiated with the Quartermaster General of the Army who is "comentent" for all administrative matters. (4) In the German Army the QM has the functions of both supply and administration (5).

Jodl's QM section edited the directives of the Fuehrer, whereas details were fixed by the QM section of the Army. Jodl had only a small group and most of the time they were used by Keitel as a working staff to work out the orders of the Fuehrer (6).

**TREATMENT OF ESCAPED PWS**

Jodl had nothing to do with the Prisoner of War Department. This was under Keitel. The only time when Jodl interfered was when confusion arose in connection with action to be taken against escaped Anglo-American aviators. (6)

Regulations pertaining to that subject were always given to the Inspector of the PW Department or to General Reinecke. It is possible that the QM Staff of the Wehrmacht Leadership Staff was once used to formulate such a directive. (7)

Jodl heard about the 70 English aviators, who had escaped, at a conference between the Fuehrer and Keitel when the latter was severely reprimanded for the inadequate surveillance of these prisoners. Hitler feared that these officers would be the future leaders of a revolutionary movement among the foreign workers in Germany. He ordered that as soon as they were recaptured they were to be turned over to the Reichsfuehrer SS (7,8).

**NEVER HEARD ABOUT "AKTION KUGEL"**

Jodl denies ever having heard about the "Aktion Kugel". (8)

Has not previous knowledge of contents of document L-158 dated 28 March 1944. Reinecke, with whom he shared a room in Mondorf, never told him about it (9).

Keitel insisted upon treatment of PWS in accordance with the Geneva convention. He was severely criticised for this and then had to change all this by direct order (Jodl fails to state who gave this order) (10).

Admits that the treatment as set forth in this document is not in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva convention (10).

**SINKING OF NEUTRAL SHIPS**

The first restriction was imposed on submarine warfare against England and France. Jodl recalls a restriction applying to neutral countries or countries that were neutral at that time (America), in order to avoid war with them. The first restriction was lifted with the beginning of the western campaign. Then all English and French ports could be attacked. (12)
DOCUMENT L-39

Document L-39, dated 16 April 1941, originated from the Leadership Staff of the Wehrmacht. The signature thereon is that of Captain Junge, the naval representative of the OKW in charge of the Operations Department Navy in the Leadership Staff of the Armed Forces. (12) Identifies his own initials on the document, stating that he must have seen the paper on 16 or 17 April 1941 (13).

DOCUMENT L-19

Recognizes Keitel's signature on document L-19, dated 9 December 1941 (14).

Q.: "So the order, by its very terms, took no regard whether or not any Central or South American countries would be at war with Germany, because Germany intended, according to that order, to make acts of war, if necessary by sinking ships within the territorial of those countries; isn't that correct?"

"Yes, that was so, but on the supposition that those states would follow suit in the American attitude against Germany." (15,16)

Jodl cannot remember whether or not he participated in the formulation of that order. "I did not sign it, but must have seen it afterwards." (16)

FOREIGN MINISTER CONSULTED REGARDING OPERATIONS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES.

The directive, L-19, was worked out by the Naval Staff officer in the Leadership Staff of the Wehrmacht which was under Jodl's direction. It originated from a discussion between the Fuehrer and the Foreign Minister. It never could have been issued without prior consultation with the Foreign Minister who was always consulted in matters pertaining to operations against other countries. The only case in which he had not been consulted was in the landing of Norway about which he was not informed until three days before it happened. In the case of Holland, Belgium, Denmark, Russia, Greece, Yugoslavia he was informed and consulted (17).

RIBBENTROP

Jodl was present only when Ribbentrop visited the Fuehrer for a military discussion; as a rule Ribbentrop would see the Fuehrer alone (1d).

RITTER

Ambassador Ritter was the liaison man between the OKW and the Foreign Office; he informed Ribbentrop of the decisions reached in the discussions between himself and Jodl's staff. There was close collaboration between Ritter and the Leadership Staff of the Armed Forces (13).