OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL
FOR THE PROSECUTION OF AXIS CRIMINALITY
INTERROGATION DIVISION SUMMARY

Interrogation of JODL, Alfred
By: Lt. Colonel Hinkel, 28 October 1945, a.m.

Persons and organizations implicated, and subjects

1. JODL

a. Germany's rearmament aims
   (1) Army believed Germany unprepared in 1938 - 1939 (3)
   (2) Germany's armament superseded neighboring countries (4, 5)
   (3) Anticipation of conflict between France and Italy (6-8)

b. Plans against Czechoslovakia (9-12)
   (1) Document known as "Secret Command Matter" dated 20 May 1934 (12)
   (2) "Plan Green" (13)
   (3) Anticipation of conflict with Czechoslovakia prior to October 1938 (15)
   (4) Provocation of incident for war against Czechoslovakia (17)

Jodl maintains that Blomberg could not have told him in 1937 of any intentions of the Fuehrer to resort to violence, else he would not have planned to go to Vienna in 1938. Concedes that it is possible that the Fuehrer may have made such remarks to Blomberg at a conference (p.2 - 3).

GERMANY'S RE-ARMAMENTS AIMS

Asked whether the peak of German re-armament was expected to be reached until some time between 1943 and 1945, Jodl answers that the military persons told Hitler, "My Fuehrer, you may do all you like, but we can't contemplate any war for six or seven years" (p.3).

Denies that, compared to her neighbors and other countries, Germany was more advanced militarily in 1937 or 1938 (p.4), but admits that after completion of her armament program, Germany's armament potential was superior to that of other countries (p.5).

Dismisses the idea that Germany considered a conflict between France and Italy, thus keeping the French Army engaged in such a manner that it would not interfere with operations the Germany Army might undertake (p.6-8).
Jodl knew Fritsch since 1934. Concedes that the Fuehrer may have made a study during the winter of 1937 and 1938 regarding possible action against Czechoslovakia, as at that time it was contemplated to take certain measures or action against war with regard to Czechoslovakia (p.9).

In his province no preparations for action against Czechoslovakia were made before the summer of 1938. Says, however, it is possible that this was done in the Army General Staff. The latter carefully guarded its secrets from the Leadership Staff of the "Wartime Union" was new and not integrated with the General Staff (p.10).

In 1937 Jodl worked under Keitel and until February 1938 was Chief of Blumberg's General Staff. After Blumberg's resignation, the OKW was formed, headed by Keitel. The OKW was, what Jodl calls, "the staff of the Fuehrer himself". Jodl remained, Keitel's assistant (p.10,11).

Admits that he was informed about anything in the way of military preparations made by the OKW (p.11).

Brauchitsch replaced Fritsch as Supreme Commander of the army as different from the OKW (p.11).

Identifies document classified as "secret command matter", dated 20 May 1938 addressed to the Chief of the OKW in Berlin, as emanating from his department (National Defense Section). He admits that it deals with the "possibility of an attack on Czechoslovakia" (p.12). Admits preparing outline for plan "Green" conceived by the Fuehrer and relayed to him by Keitel (p.13). Maintains that directive prepared by him pertains merely to military preparations since "we had to contemplate from autumn 1938 on that things might reach a climax where a conflict with Czechoslovakia would be inevitable"(p.14). Admits that the eventuality of a conflict with Czechoslovakia was anticipated prior to October 1938 (p.15).

Admits that in accordance with "instructions and plans of the Fuehrer" we would have, in taking action against Czechoslovakia, provoked an incident (p.17).