OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL
FOR THE PROSECUTION OF AXIS CRIMINALITY

INTERROGATION DIVISION SUMMARY

Interrogation of HERMANN GOERING
By: Col. J. H. Amen, 1 September 1945, a.m., Nuremberg

1. HERMANN GOERING

a. Green Plan, 25 August 1938, directive from General Staff (p.1-2)
   (1) Preparations by General Staff to wage aggressive war (p.3-16)
   (2) Strength of German and Allied Air Forces (p.12-15)

GREEN PLAN

The interrogation concerns the "Green Plan" of August 25, 1938, with reference to the conflict with Czechoslovakia, the assistance of France and England, and the date to be fixed as the first day of the European war. (p.1)

A directive from the general staff, which he has never seen. (p.2)

The document assumes that the declaration of war could not take place before the French armed forces had completed their mobilization; i.e., during the period from the 4th to the 18th day. (p.2)

The document is signed by a Captain only, Goering remarks—but was studied by the general staff. (p.16)

Q. "Is it not clear from all these discussions and decisions of the general staff that Germany intended to wage a war of aggression?"

A. "It was the duty of the general staff to prepare plans for all eventualities." (p.8)

Q. "But was it not the intention, during all of this time, that if these problems could not be solved politically or by negotiations, that a war of aggression would be instituted?"

A. "Well, taking the case of the Sudetenland, for an example, in case this problem had not been solved by political or diplomatic—and thus, peaceful—means, I think that there is a possibility that the Fuehrer would have decided to occupy the country, if he had been of the opinion that this could have been done at not too great a risk." (p.9)
Hermann Goering, 1 September 1945, a.m.

STRENGTH OF GERMAN AND ALLIED AIR FORCES

Goering says he had special squadrons of Stukas for technical assistance to the army to be used as a unit for a powerful attack (p.12). The Canadian aircraft industry did hardly exist. United States aircraft industry could not have an effect on the issues of 1939 (p.12). The available French bombers were very small, their new type bomber was no good (p.14). Belgium and the Netherlands would, in German hands, represent an extraordinary advantage in the prosecution of the air war against Great Britain and France (p.15).

Documents signed by the Fuhrer were known as "Weisung", meaning "directed by the Fuhrer." (p.18)