PERSONS AND ORGANIZATIONS Involved AND SUBJECTS

1. GOERING
   a. External Measures — Austria
      (1) Loehr — source of information re the Austrian Air Force (pp. 1-3; 3-10; 12)
      (2) Goering's approval of the Anschluss (pp. 1-5)
      (3) Goering's speech threatening Anschluss (pp. 13-14)
      (4) Goering's participation in the events of 11 March 1938 prior to the Anschluss (pp. 17-22)
      (5) Goering as the "driving force" of the Anschluss (p. 23)
   b. Relationship with Schuschnigg (p. 14, 16, 18);

2. SAYSS INJUAR
   a. External Measures — Austria
      (1) Participation in the Anschluss (p. 15, 18-22)

NEGOTIATIONS CONDUCTED BY GOERING PRELIMINARY TO THE ANSCHLUSS

Goering denied that prior to the Anschluss he had had any contact with the Austrian officer Major Loehr (later General Loehr). After the Anschluss Goering received information from him concerning Austria's Air Force and its combat fitness (pp. 1-2). Goering denied the allegation that he had any knowledge of 5 million marks having been given Loehr through the German Aero Club for "use in Austria". Goering stated that the Club had never possessed any such large amount of money. He stated that had it been suggested that a sum of even 20 million marks be given in the interest of furthering the Anschluss he would have been highly in favor of it, but he denied knowing anything of this particular "deal" (pp. 1-5). As a matter of conjecture, Goering stated that such a sum might have been used for payments to Austrian aviators who had resigned their positions because of their activities in behalf of the Anschluss — (at least half the Austrian officer group favored the anenschluss). Furthermore Goering stated that it would have been unnecessary to have paid for information concerning Austria — close liaison between German and Austrian officers gave a clear picture of all developments in that country. Likewise the Austrian air-force was so "insignificant" (one squadron at the time) — why would such a sum be paid for information concerning its potentialities? (pp. 3-10). However, Goering concedes that if the fact of the payment is definitely established by Von Papon he (Goering) would not deny it— since many of the matters regarding details were never referred to him (pp. 9-10).
RELATIONSHIP WITH LOEHR

Goering stated that he did not know Loehr until after the Anschluss; that the principal reason for his having been used was to place an Austrian in command of the Austrian air force in order to avoid possible friction which might arise if a German were to assume control. Loehr rose rapidly in rank in order that he could hold the rank fitting to his station (pp. 8 - 9).

GOERING'S SPEECH OF JULY 1937

Goering readily admitted having made a speech at a dinner attended by Austrian business representatives who were meeting on the occasion of a treaty between Germany and Austria calling for the exchange of economic representatives (p. 13). Goering recalled that "he frightened the gentleman" by his references to the early effectuation of the Anschluss; that they should be "ashamed of themselves for not making Austria part of Germany." (p. 13).

Goering refused to apologize as was demanded by Schuschnigg. The German foreign office may have apologized later - Goering does not know (p. 14).

ACTS OF 11 MARCH 1938 IN PREPARING THE ANSCHLUSS

(1) Telephone conversation with Seyss-Inquart and Glaise Horstenau (charged with German diplomatic mission in Austria), in which Goering ordered that plans for the Austrian elections were to be immediately halted. Elaise Horstenau was to cooperate with Seyss-Inquart and force additional compromises from Schuschnigg (or else Austria would be invaded) (pp. 16 - 17). Both Goering and Hitler saw in the situation an opportunity to effectuate the Anschluss without paying too high a price (p. 17).

(2) There was then a second telephone conversation in which it was stated from Berlin that the situation in Austria "... could be saved only if Schuschnigg resigns within two hours from now" ... when you (Seyss-Inquart) don't give me any reply by phone within these two hours, I know that you are hindered by forces". Goering admitted that such was the substance of his statement (pp. 18 - 19).

(3) Another phone called ordered Seyss-Inquart to telegraph Berlin demanding assistance from German troops to preserve internal order. Goering stated that the real purpose in the desire to have German troops in Austria at that particular moment" ... was the fear that some outside influence, say, the Little Entente, would make an occupation of their own ..." (p. 19-20).

In addition to the above one Rappler (used for high diplomatic missions) was dispatched to Austria and was present in Vienna at the time of the above
conversations. His mission was to "keep an eye" on Seyss-Inquart to make certain that he and "his entourage" did not overstep their bounds in the matter of assuming control at the time of the Anschluss (pp. 20 - 22).

All of the above negotiations were witnessed by Hitler -- however, Goering is insistent that he was the "driving force", that during the eventful day, "Goering was the busiest man in Berlin".