OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR PROSECUTION OF AXIS CRIMINIALITY

INTERROGATION DIVISION SUMMARY

Interrogation of: HERMAN GOERING
By: Colonel T.H. Anon, 9 October 1945, p.m., Nuremberg

PERSONS AND ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED AND SUBJECTS

1. GOERING
   a. The Austrian Anschluss
      (1) The Death of Dollfuss (pp 4-5)
         (a) Goering's alleged eulogy of the "martyrs" (pp 6-7)
      (2) The Agreement of 11 July 1936 (pp 10-11)
      (3) The meeting of 12 February 1938 (pp 11-18)
   b. Relationship with: Papen (pp 8, 9, 11, 13, 14, 15); Ribbentrop (17-17); Theo Habicht (pp 17, 12); Dr. Anton Hintalen (p 3); Glaise Horstenaue (p 19); Kessler (p 20); Dr. Reith (pp 5, 7-8)

2. VON PAPEN
   a. Mission to Austria after Death of Dollfuss (p 8)

3. HESS
   a. His insanity (pp 1-2)

4. SETTINQUART
   a. Participation in Austrian Anschluss (pp 20-21)

HESS'S MENTAL CONDITION

Goering stated that he was not convinced that Hess is insane. His condition may be accounted for by reason of his dynamic determinations to perform some act of real significance, which desires were completely frustrated by the out-break of the war. Hess was given little or nothing to do in the war government. The result was he became highly nervous. (pp 1-2)

HABICHT AND THE ANSCHLUSS

At the time it was Hitler's belief that Habicht was a very competent Party man in Austria. Habicht constantly told of his connections with the Standarte Bündistsher, which was allegedly an organization within the Austrian Federal Army working in the interest of the Nazi cause. (p 2) After the Dollfuss affair it was apparently learned that most of Habicht's claims were extravagant and Hitler dropped him.
claiming that Habicht had falsified reports and "cheated". It had apparently been hoped that through Habicht the Anschluss might be effected by means of an internal political coup. After the Anschluss Habicht was finally given some post as a mayor of a town in Prussia. (pp 2-3) Goering stated that he first learned of Dr. Anton Rintelen from Habicht—the latter indicating that Rintelen was a reliable Nazi in Austria and that he would "...be willing to be Federal Chancellor". (p 3)

THE DEATH OF DOLLFUSS

Goering stated that the death of Dollfuss created a very difficult situation and was greatly regretted by Hitler. It was particularly difficult in view of the possibility that might move Mussolini, who was then none too friendly toward the Nazis, to action. (p 4; see also p 5)

Goering stated that the death of Dollfuss was the result of activities of revolutionaries connected with "subordinate organs in Austria". He knew nothing of Reith's (German ambassador) connection with the plot for the assassination of Dollfuss. (p 5-6)

Goering stated that it is possible that he placed a wreath on the graves of the "martyrs" (those responsible for the shooting of Dollfuss), however he does not recall the incident. (p 6) Goering was asked why he, on the one hand stated that the killing of Dollfuss had been so deeply regretted yet on the other hand he eulogized the "martyrs" who perpetrated the act. Goering answered, "...the Austrian Nazi Party had pictured them as martyrs; what sense would there have been to upset this after they had already been martyrs? That did not mean that the act of killing Dollfuss had been approved." (p 7)

After Dollfuss's death Papen was sent to Austria to "calm the situation". He was chosen because (1) he was an ambassador who never belonged to the Party; (2) he was a prominent Catholic; (3) he had been vice-Chancellor. He was not under the German Foreign Office, but directly under Hitler. (p 8)

THE AUSTRIAN AGREEMENTS

11 July 1938 which attested to the integrity of Austria; that Germany contemplated no aggressive action. Goering stated that he does not know whether or not Hitler
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intended to live up to the agreement—he stated that when the English representatives approached him (Goering) at the time he “told them that the policy of Germany regarded the Anschluss of Austria as...an integral part of German policy.”

(p 10) Goering stated that he always disagreed with the policy of the Fuehrer in making these agreements apparently with the intention of breaking them (p 11)

12 February 1929—The meeting at Borchstahorden.

Goering stated that he had no recollection of any plans which were made between the Fuehrer and Papen for this meeting. Goering stated however, that if Papen testifies under oath that the “arrangements” for the meeting were discussed between him (Goering) and Papen then such must in fact have taken place. Goering has no knowledge of awards having been conferred on Papen for his efforts in behalf of the Anschluss, but, “If he (Hitler) gave it to him at this occasion, it was in recognition for his activities.” Goering conceded that the meeting as such was undoubtedly as a result of cooperation between Papen and a group of Austrian Nazis, headed by Seyss-Inquart. However, he was quick to state that he does not believe that Papen favored the threat or use of force; rather he believed that Schuschnigg could be “convinced” of the advisability of the Anschluss by persuasion. (pp 11-14)

Goering admitted that it was perfectly possible that at the time of the meeting Schuschnigg was confronted with the complete (captured) plans of the Austrian Army for the defense of Austria; that, although he did not recall the matter specifically, it was undoubtedly true that Hitler ordered the Wehrmacht troops to assemble for “maneuvers” during the time of the Borchstahorden meeting. (pp 15-18) Goering stated that Ribbentrop was not present at the meeting—he was then in England. (p 16)

SEYSS-INQUART

Goering admitted that Seyss-Inquart cooperated in the development of the new regime, but it is not likely that “...he was in complete harmony with it...he may have had in mind more of a federation...than a complete Anschluss” (pp 20-21)

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