OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL
FOR THE PROSECUTION OF AXIS CRIMINALITY

INTERROGATION DIVISION SUMMARY

Interrogation of ERNST KALTENBRUNNER
By: Colonel Brundage, 21 September 1945, p.m., Nuremberg

PERSONS IMPLICATED, AND SUBJECTS

1. KALTENBRUNNER
   a. Treatment of Jews (10, 13).
   b. Concentration camps (14).
   c. SS, Gestapo, SD, SICO (19-21).
   d. Relation to (1): Ribbentrop (2, 5, 9, 10); (2): Himmler (10); (3): Hitler (10, 14).

2. RIBBENTROP
   a. Personal qualities (1).
   b. Position in Government (1).
   c. Aggressive war in various foreign states (5-3, 11, 12).
   d. Treatment of Jews (10, 13).
   e. Leadership principle (11-13).
   f. Responsibility in foreign policy (11-13).
   g. Concentration camps (14).
   h. Relation to: (1): Hitler (1, 2, 4, 5, 10, 13); (2): Kaltenbrunner (2, 5, 9, 10); (3): Howel (3); (4): Himmler (9-10); (5): Luther (5); (6): Veesenmeyer (9-10); (7): Winckelmann (9-10).

3. BORMER
   a. Position in SS (13).
   b. Prisoners of war (13).

4. FROMM
   a. Position in Government (13).

5. GOERING
   a. Aggressive war in Austria

6. HEYDRICH
   a. Gestapo (19).

7. HIMMLER
   a. Treatment of Jews (13).
   b. SS, Gestapo and SD (19-21).
   c. Concentration camps (16-17).

8. HITLER
   a. Aggressive war in Austria (3).
   b. Concentration camps (16).
   c. "Inner Circle": Bormann, Goebbels, Goering, Ribbentrop, Himmler, Todt, Speer (15-16).
Kaltenbrunner states that Ribbentrop was extremely jealous of his position in that he would never permit anyone to share in his work. He always relied on the fact that he held, in terms of rank, the highest ministerial position in the Reich to establish his prestige. (p1) He was quick to anticipate Hitler's opinions and then skillfully adopt those as his own. (p2) He was very reluctant to accept any information which Kaltenbrunner had to offer from his information service within the SD re German foreign policy. (p2) He virtually insisted on relying on his own offices, e.g. the information service of the foreign office. (p3) Howel, Walter was the connecting link between Hitler and Ribbentrop. (p 3)

2. In 1943 there was a period where the war had progressed to such a point that if it was to end at that time it would have to be by diplomatic measures. Kaltenbrunner states that it has never been clear whether such diplomatic measures were never forthcoming because of Ribbentrop's inactivity or because he in fact did not dare proceed against the wish of Hitler. (p 5)

3. In the matter of Austrian policy, Kaltenbrunner believes that Ribbentrop had little influence; the Hitler and Goering were predominant figures in this connection. (p 7)

4. In the choice between war and peace Kaltenbrunner believes that Ribbentrop's concept was not an original one but rather it was the "opinion of Hitler". (p 9)

5. Kaltenbrunner states that after a particular country was invaded the Foreign Office generally had no further connection with the matter. However, this policy differed in the case of France. (pp 8-9)

6. Kaltenbrunner denies the truth of Ribbentrop's statement that "the only trouble he (Ribbentrop) had was with Kaltenbrunner's office", because: (1) the only persons with whom Ribbentrop would have had dealings in occupied territories would have been the military commands; (2) or with the SS police commands for occupied areas which were directly under Himmler; (3) that had Ribbentrop made complaints to Hitler re the matter Kaltenbrunner would have been called in to defend himself. This never happened. (p 9)
Kaltenbrunner states that he and Ribbentrop had repeated discussions on the Jewish question and that they were in complete agreement that the policy followed by the Party was ruinous. (p.10)

8. Kaltenbrunner, in the course of testimony, outlines various possibilities which might have been followed in the matter of foreign policy leading away from war; however, the indicators that there is no evidence available that Ribbentrop consciously followed the policy he did with the intent of carrying Germany into war—but that it was more likely Ribbentrop's policy reflects poor judgment rather than a conscious policy (pp.11-13)

Kaltenbrunner on Hitler's Inner Circle

Kaltenbrunner names the following as constituting the inner circle. Goering, Himmler, Bormann, Goebbels, Ribbentrop and Speer. Bormann and Goebbels were the closest of all his associates. Goering lost his position of prestige two years before the end of the war. (pp.15-16)

Kaltenbrunner on Concentration Camps

Kaltenbrunner states that Himmler is the man primarily responsible for the atrocities which occurred in the concentration camps. (p.17)

Kaltenbrunner on Employment of Foreign Labor

Kaltenbrunner states that he has no knowledge of the mechanisms used by Sfukel for the importation of foreign labor; that such labor was necessary to fill the acute shortage which existed in Germany. He states that only in very few cases were the workers forced to come to Germany (pp.17-18)

Kaltenbrunner on the Gestapo

Mueller for the most part kept the details of Gestapo operations secret. (p.19) The principle of the Gestapo was the security of the State. (p.21) This involved operations against organizations i.e. the Catholic separatists in the Rhineland, which were active against the state. (p.21) Gestapo operations in occupied areas were established by Mueller and Heydrich prior to the time Kaltenbrunner assumed office. Likewise Kaltenbrunner denies all personal responsibility for the Einsatzkommandos which were organized under SSO and the SD (pp.19-21).