INTERROGATION DIVISION SUMMARY

Interrogation of: EINSTEIN KALTENBRUNNER
By: Lt.Col. Brookhart, 3 October 1945

PERSONS, ORGANIZATIONS IMPLICATED AND SUBJECTS

1. KALTENBRUNNER
   a. Concentration Camps
      (1) Use of gas (pp.15-17)
      (2) Administration (p.19)
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   b. Persecution of Jews (pp.12-14)
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      (1) Bases for Arrest (pp.20-22)
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   f. Relationship with: Himmler (pp.12, 19); Goering (pp.12, 17-18)
      Funk (p.12); Eichmann (pp.12-14); Schellenberg (pp.6-7); Fuhl
      (p.19); Gluecks (p.19); Eickes (p.19); Kripo (pp.20-21);
      Orpo (pp.29-31); OKW (pp.6-7)
   g. Discussion of Documents, Be Teleprint Message No. 140002, 21
      July 1944, re: Clearance of Prisons (pp.29-31)

2. GODELIN
   a. Concentration Camps (pp.17-18)

3. HIMMLER
   a. Concentration Camps
      (1) Administration (p.19)
      (2) Decree of Arrest (pp.20-22)

CONCENTRATION CAMPS

Kaltenbrunner stated that he had no information regarding the use
of gas as a means of extermination. He admitted having read of the "mobile
gas units" in the foreign press. He sent a photostatic copy of the article
and a letter to Hitler telling him of the terrible consequences of the
use of such methods. Germany's position among the other nations would
be lost. (pp.15-16). On page 17 Kaltenbrunner stated that it is absolutely
impossible that anyone should have believed that he was responsible for
such acts. Kaltenbrunner avoided the question as to why he did not take
more drastic steps in the suppression of these practices. He merely reiterated that he had made representations regarding the matter to Hitler.

Kaltenbrunner stated that, to his knowledge, concentration camps were first conceived by Goering in 1933. These camps were then used for the temporary internment of political enemies of the state. Not until Himmler became Chief of the State Police were such camps as Dachau opened. (pp.17-18)

Orders re the administration of the camps and internment followed a well-defined channel: Hitler to Himmler to Pohl to Gluecks. Nebe was the general supervisor of the Camps. Gluecks was the successor when Nebe died. (p.19)

Kaltenbrunner stated that the following were the bases for internment:

1. Schutzhaft, which provided for individuals who were taken into custody in the interest of the security of the State; in such cases a person might be held "for a few weeks to an indeterminate period; but it was provided that every six months a protective custody check would be made." (p.21)

2. A decree of preventive custody by the Kripo,—generally for habitual criminals,—sentences could be pronounced by the police or the courts;

3. A court decree pronouncing protective detention (Sicherungsverwahrung);

4. A direct order by Hitler or Himmler. (pp.20-22)

Kaltenbrunner stated that he was unable to give information as to the proportion of arrests made in each of the particular categories. Any one of the four grounds cited was readily adaptable to the arrest of Jews. Arrest for concentration camp internments were made by various organizations, i.e. the Gestapo, the Police, judicial authority, military authority, etc. (pp.23-24)

Regarding the use of third-degree methods: Kaltenbrunner stated that he knew nothing of an order issued by one Himmler, commander of the Sipo and SD in Rosem, to the effect that third degree methods could be applied to German Nationals only with permission of the Chief of the SS but that in the case of foreigners such methods could be applied if the prisoner refused to divulge information. (pp.27-28)

Kaltenbrunner denied any knowledge of an order issued by "higher authority" which required that Himmler at Rosem, referred to above, issue a directive calling for the following measures:

1. Summary disposition of all cases handled by the Orpo in such a way as to relieve congestion in prisons; that wherever possible persons arrested should be sent immediately to concentration camps;

2. That measures were to be taken for the clearance of all prisons and concentration camps where it was impossible to evacuate such prisoners in the face of the enemy's advance,—clearance apparently meant that "such prisoners were to be shot and their bodies disposed of by burning, dynamiting the buildings, etc." The liberation of the Jews was to be avoided at all costs. Kaltenbrunner likewise denied that this order was a reflection of policy from a higher level following the 20 July incident. (pp.29-31)
Ernst Kaltenbrunner, 3 October 1945

20 JULY INCIDENT

Regarding the 20 July incident: Kaltenbrunner insisted that his only connection with the incident was the preparation of a report as to public reaction to the policies of the Government in relation to the incident—it did not include the execution of any of the repressive measures imposed. (pp.31-34)

PERSECUTION OF JEWS

Kaltenbrunner then cited four bases for the arrest of Jews:
(1) That they belonged (in many cases) to Marxist organizations;
(2) that in every case of treason against the country, the Jews played an inspiring or leading role;
(3) that they may have been guilty of economic offenses against the national life of the Reich;
(4) the general Party policy which called for the extermination of the Jewish race. (pp.25-26)

Kaltenbrunner conceded that the vast majority of Jews were interned on no other basis than protective custody. Referring to the arrest of Jews, particularly children, Kaltenbrunner stated "the whole action which constituted arresting without any particular reason is no different whether a thief is arrested by a Jew or German,--- but those people were arrested because of their racial peculiarity." (p.26)

Kaltenbrunner stated that he discussed the Jewish question exhaustively with Funk, Goering, Himmler and Hitler in an attempt to change the views of the Party. (p.12) Kaltenbrunner denied any knowledge of a conference which was held in the winter of 1943 regarding the settlement of the Jewish problem. The meeting was presided over by Eichmann. Eichmann, Kaltenbrunner stated, could only have appeared as a representative of Mueller, Gestapo Chief. (pp.12-13)

In reply to the assertion by Dr. Boley that Kaltenbrunner had been a delegate on Jewish questions generally, he denied that he personally held such a position or that Eichmann, who was Mueller's subordinate was ever authorized to act in his behalf. (p.14)

THE RSHA

Kaltenbrunner stated that when he first took over the position as Chief of the RSHA Amt 6 was particularly concerned with foreign information. On the other side there were agencies of the OKW also concerned with political information although OKW did not have the necessary authority for such work. Hitler was dissatisfied with the manner in which Canaris was administering the Abwehr under the OKW. As a result of these and perhaps other factors the military phase of their work was transferred to Amt 6 under Schellenberg. From Amt 6 on Amt 6 consisted of "Foreign Policy" and the "41" section. (p.6-7)

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