OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL
FOR THE PROSECUTION OF AXIS CRIMINALITY
INTERROGATION DIVISION SUMMARY

Interrogation of ENNST KALTENBRUNNER

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EXECUTION OF ALLIED AVIATORS:

Document 735 PS: Kaltenbrunner denied ever having made the report set forth in this document. The report allegedly concerned the discussion between Goering, Ribbentrop and Himmler on the subject of the treatment of enemy "terror aviators". (pp.1-2) Kaltenbrunner stated he did not recall a conference held at the Fuehrer's headquarters 6 June 1944 at Hessheim to discuss this matter. (pp.1-2) He likewise expressed lack of knowledge of the suggestion of the Foreign Secretary that every type of terror attack against the civilian population should be regarded as a criminal act. Kaltenbrunner knew nothing of the alleged agreement which was eventually reached that only strafing committed directly against civilian populations would be regarded as criminal. (pp.1-2)

Regarding a photostatic copy of a secret summary of Warlimont's conference with Kaltenbrunner on the lynching of certain Allied flyers, he had no recollection of such a conference and was certain the Reichsfuehrer S.S. or some other person was involved,— but certainly not Kaltenbrunner. He did, however, admit that he had heard of the subject referred to sometime during the summer 1944. (pp.2-3) He learned of the matter from reports which came from all over the Reich indicating that the population intended to lynch those aviators who had inflicted such "punishment and caused so many victims". Kaltenbrunner vehemently denied that he had ever participated in a plan to encourage such activities. He stated that this was a matter of concern to the highest of the Reich Officials and that he, of course, did not belong to this group. (p.3)

Kaltenbrunner steadfastly denied that the question was ever raised as to whether or not the SD had facilities to investigate and prepare cases against Allied flyers who had allegedly bombed civilian areas. He indicated that it was a common error among members of the Wehrmacht that the SD had executive functions. By the same token Ribbentrop continuously spoke of the SD when he meant the secret police. (pp.4-5) Kaltenbrunner
continued to insist on (pp.5-6) that he never discussed the matter regarding the arrest of Allied flyers with Warlimont. Warlimont could only have discussed this matter with the one man who handled negotiations with the OKW, the Foreign Ministry, and the Reichsfuehrer S.S.— that man was Fegelein (Hitler's Adjutant). (pp.5-6).

**POWER OF ARREST:**

Document L-215 was identified by the interrogator as an order issued by the Gestapo in Prague for the arrest of Peter Weffling for membership in an illegal organization. The order was over the typed signature of Kaltenbrunner and the written signature of Runge. (pp.6-7) Kaltenbrunner denies ever having had authority to arrest any one, that he had ever given anyone authority to sign in his behalf. Kaltenbrunner likewise denied having signed any one of the 25 other arrest documents in the file referred to. (pp.7-8) Kaltenbrunner stated that subordinate officials undoubtedly confused his position as Chief of RSHA with that formerly held by Heydrich in which the latter had the power to sign arrest orders. (p.8)

Referring to documents bearing the name of Kaltenbrunner, dated February 1944, and issued from Prague, Kaltenbrunner stated that here again was evidence of confusion in authority. Heydrich was at one time Deputy Protector for Schlesien and Moravia with offices in Prague; as such he fulfilled his police functions in that area. After Heydrich's death subordinate officials in the Prague area assumed that Kaltenbrunner, who filled Heydrich's former position in title at least, would likewise fill his position in function, which was wrong. The 25 arrest documents in question could only have been signed by officials of the State Police. (pp.8-10) Kaltenbrunner was asked regarding the transmittal documents, bearing his signature, calling for the internment of these prisoners in various concentration camps. These were issued by the Einsatzkommando Sicherheits-Polizei und des SD, Luxembourg. He had no information regarding this matter. He denied that he had ever stated in the course of testimony that no Einsatzkommando units existed after he became Chief of RSHA. What he in fact had stated was that no new Einsatzkommando had been formed while he was in office. (pp.10-11)

**SKORZENY'S ACTIVITIES.**

Kaltenbrunner had no connection with the concentration of American guns and vehicles at Friedenthal; he had no information as to what use Skorzeny made of such equipment. Denies having given Skorzeny any assistance or having furnished him with certain "foreigners" from concentration camps for "special purposes". (p.13)
Kaltenbrunner Ernst, 16. October 45, Pm.

THE RELEASE OF CONCENTRATION CAMP PRISONERS:

Kaltenbrunner had been instrumental in the release of approximately 600 prisoners, although he had received between 800 to 1000 "applications" from various sources, families, etc. He stated that he had no power to act on the matter himself; that he would forward the "application" to Himmler with his personal indorsement that the individual be released. He generally had to discuss the matter with Himmler at a subsequent conference or by correspondence. Some one of his personal adjutants might be able to give information regarding the details. Kaltenbrunner vehemently denies that he ever received any payments for the release of the persons referred to. (pp.16-22)