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HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP
INTERROGATION CENTER
APO 655

INTERMEDIATE INTERROGATION REPORT (IIR)

PRISONER: O/Gruf KALTENBRUNNER, Ernst
DATE: 28 June 1945

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1. REFERENCES

PIR on KALTENBRUNNER published on 25 May 45 by Interrogation Center, Headquarters 12th Army Group.

2. REASON FOR REPORT

Report contains information believed to be of immediate interest.

3. REPORT

a. Introduction

This is an intermediate report on O/Gruf KALTENBRUNNER, Ernst, Chief of the RSHA, who was apprehended by 80 CIC Det at ALT AUSSEE, Austria, on 12 May 1945 and arrived at Interrogation Center, Headquarters 12th Army Group on 17 May 45.

In the interrogation of KALTENBRUNNER the first effort has naturally been to obtain names, personalia, locations of persons in the GIS; information on RSHA files and offices, and on the plans of the GIS for future activity; the extent of GIS knowledge of Allied services; German post-war resistance intentions; and the intelligence aspects of KALTENBRUNNER’s activities in internal and international politics in recent months.

KALTENBRUNNER has given a considerable amount of information on many of these subjects. However, he feigns ignorance of the future plans of his service and he claims to know little or nothing about plans for resistance within Germany. He has emphasized the political side of his actions, trying hard to present himself as a man who has long been concerned with a sane peace, as an Austrian statesman with far-reaching plans for a Central Europe with Western ties and as a reasonable man offering a reasonable proposition to the Western Allies.

b. Activities as Cds

K. shows little respect for his predecessor HEYDRICH, and appears to wonder a little at the choice of himself, the soft Austrian, for the post of head of the RSHA. The riddle is partially solved by his insistence that he was occupied not with the police functions of his office but with its intelligence (and hence, in a sense, political) aspects. Thus, he emphasized that he knew little of what happened in Ant IV, the Gestapo Ant, whose head, MUELLER, worked directly under HIMMLER; or of Ant V, in which he had little interest since it dealt with the technical problems of criminal work. His basic interest lay in Ant III and IV. Of the smaller offices Ant I, II, VII, and Ant N, he professed to know little.

Within Ant VI, Referat VI-E, which dealt with South-Eastern Europe, was his principal love; and nothing in the interrogation shows that he had extensive knowledge of the other parts of Ant VI, which SCHELLENBERG controlled more directly. Nor does he admit any detailed knowledge of Ant III, which he likes to describe as an information on service only presenting to the Government reports on public opinion in the impersonal manner of a Gallup Poll.

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He knew the top figures in those offices and received frequent reports from them, but he was little acquainted with the heads of individual sections, outside of VI-E, nor with the minor members of Ant III or VI. Of the Ants Chefs in the RSHA, OHLENDORF of Ant III was most frequently with him; between K. and SCHELLENBERG of Ant VI there existed cool but correct relations.

He stood in a rather distant relationship also to HIMMLER, whom he saw only four times during 1945. With HITLER there was a much stronger personal tie, and he not him perhaps a dozen times in 1945, trying especially to give him the RSHA foreign intelligence. Between K. and many members of the Reich Government - above all RIBBENTROP - as well as key figures in the NSDAP, particularly BORMANN, relations were bad. On the whole, K. swung toward the Austrian and South German people, whose feelings favored some measure of local independence even in a Nazi state, against the drastic centralizing of HIMMLER and BORMANN.

K. supplies an outline, doubtless generally correct, of the transmission of information to the RSHA from its sources within Germany and abroad, of the methods of procurement, communication, and evaluation of intelligence, and of the ways in which this material was sent to other government agencies, or was acted upon within the RSHA. It is a picture confused by the inadequacies of German sources of information and by the rivalries within the RSHA, or between it and other organs of government. K. admits that his foreign intelligence work, outside of the Balkans, was poor.

Perhaps the outstanding fact in his discussion of the RSHA is the looseness and ineffectiveness of its organization. Not only were the police activities run separately from the intelligence side, but intelligence itself was divided between himself and SCHELLENBERG; and this in addition to the confusion already existing in the handling of military intelligence by the Mil Ant, and in the rivalry with information services of the Auswärtiges Ant and the Auslands Organisation der NSDAP. The conflict with RIBBENTROP set the seal on this disorganization, but any consistent policy was out of the question as long as either K. or RIBBENTROP might have the ear of the Führer on any given problem. The RSHA was not, contrary to some earlier assumptions, a rigidly constructed pyramid, but a tangle of conflicting personalities and interest, involved in the war of all against all in the Nazi system.

KALTENBRUNNER states that he himself and the GIS generally were poorly informed about the Allied intelligence services. He knows a fair amount about Japanese espionage in Germany and the neutral services (Swiss and Swedish). Of GIS attempts to procure intelligence about, or to penetrate the services of the Western Allies, he has little to say beyond a few names and episodes. He claims that direct reporting from the Western Hemisphere hardly existed after the occupation of Iceland, and that almost all information on that part of the world came via Spain or Portugal.

On the RSHA plans for post-war activity he has so far refused to give any useful material. He states that Ant III had no plans, and no place anyhow in a conquered Germany, since its task was to supply the government with information on the public's attitude; the men of Ant IV, he asserts, would naturally have volunteered for
the Waffen SS and fought on to the end; the members of the Kripo, who were basically technicians, would probably try to continue their professions. But VI had no expectations of continuing his own operations or taking care of its agents abroad, except through the proposal to let the Western Allies use the Balkan network. What K. says may be partly correct, as a reflection of the insufficient preparations of the GIS in the face of swift defeat, but he is obviously following his technique of avoiding even the appearance of knowing unpleasant facts.

For details on RSHA methods and personalities see Annexes 1 - 8.

c. KALTENBRUNNER as Statesman

If K. can be believed, the greater part of his energy for at least the past year must have been devoted to questions of foreign policy. Here, as in intelligence, the Balkans remained his primary interest, and he claims to have fought hard against the unwise policies of RIBBENTROP and such envoys as Wesenberg in Hungary and Lasche in Croatia.

K. insists that he supported as far as possible the moderate anti-Communist groups in the Balkans, and not the extremists. He admits that Horia Sima and the Iron Guard were his best political and information contacts in Roumania, but he claims that he has educated Sima to a sense of political responsibility, and that the Iron Guard is considered politically respectable ("taendnisfehlig") by more moderate leaders like Maniu.

In other countries the same line was followed. In Sep 44 he opposed the RIBBENTROP policy of backing the Arrow Cross extremists in Hungary, and had the satisfaction of seeing that policy fail (see Annex XII). He preferred Maczek to Pavelich in Croatia. But it should be noted that the groups in which he still places his hopes are not the moderates whose favor he courted, but such movements as the Macedonian IMO, the Iron Guard, and the Ljotic anti-Communist bands in Serbia and Croatia. Nevertheless, K. holds that the Balkan solution he sought was an enlightened one, in the great tradition of Maria Theresa, aiming to give each nationality the means of self-development.

d. Plans for Peace

KALTENBRUNNER's account of his efforts for a reasonable peace is somewhat at variance with that of HOETTL, his principal subordinate. According to KALTENBRUNNER, his attempts began in 1943 with the plan to reach President Roosevelt through Dr Doppler of Vienna, a Freemason who had been the President's personal physician. This phantastic notion was dropped when Dr Neubacher offered more promising contacts with the British in Switzerland. Efforts to negotiate with British and American representatives in the Balkans failed.

The final attempt was made through HOETTL and his meetings with American agents in Switzerland. Contact was sought with Dulles. KALTENBRUNNER claims to have viewed these measures from the start as a means to make peace; HOETTL is less definite and states his Swiss excursions appeared to him originally as intelligence gathering mission; and that until near the end KALTENBRUNNER was no more than lukewarm toward the project of an Austrian-negotiated peace with the Western Powers.

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HOETTL’s trips to Switzerland took place in March and April. KALTENBRÜNNER states that he empowered HOETTL to offer the Allies not only terms regarding Austria, but also such connections as those – both political and intelligence in nature – with the Iron Guard and with the Serbian Church through its leaders NIKOLAI and GAVRLIC. NIKOLAI went to Switzerland at the end of April, hoping to meet some American representatives and eventually to get to America. KALTENBRÜNNER seemingly kept in close contact with HOETTL at the time of the negotiations, directly and through GOETTSCH and WANECK. About 26 or 27 April HOETTL reported on the results of his Swiss trips to KALTENBRÜNNER, GLAISE-HORSTENAU, MUEHLMANN, GOETTSCH, and NEUBACHER. Even then KALTENBRÜNNER still had some hope of success for the negotiations. He says that GLAISE and HOETTL would have been at the disposal of American representatives who were supposed to arrive in SALZBURG.

In addition to the HOETTL negotiations, K. refers to the vague peace feelers he put out to BURCKHARDT of the International Red Cross (see Annex XIV). The two met on 12 March 1945, ostensibly on Red Cross business, and K. outlined his Austrian plans and his hopes for peace with the West. He seems to have let this important project lie fallow till his meeting on 23 April with Dr BRACHMANN (or BACHMANN) and MEYER of the Red Cross, when the question was raised again, but obviously too diffidently and too late. There is no indication from K.’s own story that he pursued any serious course of negotiations with these people. For similar half-hearted attempts with Count BERNADOTTE and Count POTOCKI see Annexes XIII and XV.

9. The Austrian Project

K.’s version of his Austrian project is at least consistent. It begins with his disappointment at the violent absorption of Austria into the Reich, after the Anschluss in 1938; it continues with his method of operation in the RSHA, where he maintained in large measure a separate organization for the Austrian sphere of influence, staffed by his Austrian friends; it concludes with his willingness to separate Austria from the Reich, in the interests of a negotiated peace.

He claims to have been preparing the ground for this peace beginning in late 1944. He discussed his plans with WANECK, GOETTSCH, and HOETTL in his immediate circle, and added to them such personages as GLAISE-HORSTENAU, with his long nationalist military and political career; General LOSHR, Ambassador NEUBACHER, and MUEHLMANN. The group drew up a list of possible government members to be submitted to the Western allies for approval, including originally such moderates as Dr ENDER, former Landes Hauptmann of Vorarlberg, whose health prevented further consideration; GLEISSNER, former Landes Hauptmann of Upper Austria; Dr DRAXLER, former Minister and a Christian Socialist; and men like NEUBACHER and GLAISE-HORSTENAU from the old proto-Nazi groups in Austria. In addition, K. nursed his contacts with non-Nazi and anti-Nazi circles through Bishop RÖHRACEK of SALZBURG to clerical groups; through NEUMAYR to Social Democrats in the SALZBURG and GRAZ areas; with bourgeois-democratic circles in Steiermark; and through NEUBACHER with Viennese anti-Bolshevik groups. K. appears to have relied heavily on the personal popularity of GLAISE-HORSTENAU and NEUBACHER. It was through NEUBACHER that probably KESSERLING, and certainly General Leutnant WINTER, were initiated into K.’s Austrian plans late in April.
The role of KALTENBRUNNER and the Austrian Nazis was thought of as a supporting one: If the new government should be accepted, KALTENBRUNNER would guarantee cooperation by the Austrian Nazis; or, if that were not desired, he would assure tolerant neutrality. Because his personal prestige made it possible to give these guarantees, he felt that he should be an asset in the negotiations.

It would seem that plenipotentiary powers for the South bestowed upon him by HIMMLER (on 18 April, according to K.'s story) should have been the signal to set his plan into operation. He himself says that the announcement about 24 April that O/Grup BERGER had received full powers for Southern Germany exclusive of Austria, limiting the original grant to KALTENBRUNNER, appeared to him as the final deliverance from old ties ("die entschuldigte entbindende Erlösung"). But he did not proclaim a new Austrian Government, and he renewed his attempts to negotiate with the West through HOETTL were hesitant and fruitless.

Throughout this account of the Austrian project, the consistent line is that of anti-Bolshevism. KALTENBRUNNER does not admit that he planned any resistance against the West but only some form of collaboration with it against the Soviets.

KALTENBRUNNER as Plenipotentiary for Austria

KALTENBRUNNER's account of how supreme command over the South was delegated to him, while HIMMLER was to remain in command in the North, is one of the least satisfactory parts of his story. He clings to the date of 18 April as being his last meeting with HIMMLER, who then gave him the "Vollmacht". At first he stated that the powers were given only in oral form, later he said they were typed. The text was approximately: "KALTENBRUNNER is acting in my stead; his orders are to be obeyed". In any case, the command was not limited geographically, though he says he chose to interpret it as applying only to Austria.

Yet, he remarks that the news of BERGER's appointment to a corresponding position for Bavaria and the remaining unoccupied regions of Southern Germany, came as a surprise to him, and that the appointment may have been made to reduce the importance of his own position. He rejected BERGER's invitations to come to MUENCHEN, and a suggestion of his for a meeting at SALZBURG had no result.

Precisely what KALTENBRUNNER intended to do with his new-found power is not clear from his statements - beyond the general excuse that the confusion of the times made it impossible to take any coherent action. From other sources, however, it appears that K. did take definite actions during those days to reconstruct the police administration of Austria; that he was involved with BERGER to a higher degree than he admits; and that he was acting at least as if he possessed plenipotentiary powers two weeks before he says he received them.

KALTENBRUNNER's Last Weeks of Freedom

It is important to list KALTENBRUNNER's activities in April and May 1945 in their chronological order. On the completeness and accuracy of this account depends in large measure the credibility of his whole story:

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30 or 31 March

Meeting at KALTENBRUNNER's evacuation quarters at GETHU, nr HOF. Present: O/Colf WOLFF, SCHLLENNBERG, FABRITEN, SCHEUER. Subject: WOLFF's negotiations with JULIUS. KALTENBRUNNER claims that he was pleased to learn that WOLFF felt there was a possibility of continuing negotiations, but that he was vexed that WOLFF undertook his contact on his own.

1st wk in April

In Austria, setting up police cordons to reorganize fleeing troops and to sift refugees. Back to BERLIN-WANNSEE, where he saw SCHLLENNBERG, PANZINGER and OHLENDBRF for the last time.

10 April

At Fuehrer Haupt Quartier.

12 April

Through PRAGUE on trip South (probably saw K.H. FRANK, Stett Minister for the Protectorate on this trip).

12 - 16 April

In Austria.

16 April

Passed through PRAGUE on way North.

18 April

BERLIN. Received full powers from HIMMLER for the South (without limitation to Austria).

19 April

DRESDEN-PRAGUE-RENSKUENSTER-ALT AUSEE-LINZ

19 April, or possibly 12 April

Visited Gauleiter BIGUEER in LINZ, participated shortly in a meeting. Present were leading army and police officials, including possibly SCHÖNEN and WINKELMANN. Subjects of discussion: Re-establishment of a resistance line in the East, refugee questions, food problems, etc.

20 April

STROEL. With his family.

21 April

SALZBURG. Met SCHEEL, GLAISE-HORSTENAU, WAGGEB HORETH.

22 April

Vain effort to get to INSSBRUCK, prevented by air raids.

23 April

INSSBRUCK. Red Cross discussions with BRACHBILL and MEYER, meeting with Gauleiter HOFER. Return to SALZBURG. Met SPACIL there.

24 April

SALZBURG. Learns of BERGER's full powers for Southern Germany. To STROEL.

25 April

SALZBURG. Meeting with GLAISE-HORSTENAU.

26 April

KOENIGSSSEE. Meeting with KESSELRING, WINTER and HOFER. Attempt to send W/T report to HIMMLER via Wachmacht Fuehrungs Stab station, re Red Cross arrangements.
27 April

STROEB. Discussion with HOETTL who reports on his trip to Switzerland.

28 April

ALT AUSSIE with HOETTL. Meeting with NEUBACHER and MUEHLKAIN at FUSCHL. Decision to have NEUBACHER make renewed attempt to reach Western Allies, possibly through the exiled governments in KITZBUEHEL. Sent FEGELIN's adjutant KUELLER to HITLER with report about Austrian situation.

29 April

Meeting with MUEHLKAIN. Move to ALT AUSSIE. Remained till his capture on 12 May.

4. CONCLUSIONS

The following points stand out:

a. Last contact with KUELLER was supposedly 18 April

b. No active negotiations appear to have gone on after 29 April

c. There is no clear account of the mysterious BERGER appointment as plenipotentiary in Bavaria, or of K.'s connection with VIKERSALL'S sudden accession to several highly important posts in the South, or of K.'s intentions in dealing with internal Austrian problems. From other sources there are indications that K. was acting on the basis of full powers in the South at least two weeks before he admits to have received these powers and that discussions, to which K. has not alluded, took place at the end of April and the beginning of May with RSHA personalities who could not be imagined as playing the role of good-hearted Austrians.

From this outline, it appears that K. is concealing the extent of his responsibilities for South Germany and Austria in April, that he is denying any contact with KUELLER after the receipt of full powers, that he is omitting reference to his real plans for action in Austria, which were presumably worked out with VIKERSALL, and a group of RSHA persons including SKOZELNY, HUPFENKOTEN, PANZINGER, and others.

d. KALTENBRUNNER'S Knowledge of Post-War Resistance Plans

On no subject is K. more reticent than on Nazi plans for resistance. He insists that he knew nothing of PRIETZSCHEN'S connection with the Werwolf, and that he constantly opposed that movement as a typical outburst of GOREL'S harmful propaganda methods. He denies knowledge of other resistance plans, in particular of any which might have been sponsored by the RSHA. He holds that no resistance movement can be instituted from above, that none will grow up unless oppression gives birth to it. He offers us his own Austrian group as an organization which makes its sole aim the continued hostility to Bolshevism.

e. So far, K. has been willing to supply useful if superficial information on details of some tactical value. He is obviously withholding his knowledge of resistance plans, of certain activities of RSHA and Wehrmacht leaders in April and May, and of his own part in the decisions of internal policy taken during that crucial time. He is
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working hard to avoid any taint of association with HIMLER, MUELLER, and PRUETZMANN, and to build up his role as the wise and provident statesman who understands the menace of Bolshevism and offers his help in fighting it. In short, for him this is one more trip to jail, and he probably thinks that he can talk himself out of this one too.

K.'s attitude in interrogation is neither arrogant nor submissive; he appears straightforward and not unfriendly, a reasonable and well-spoken man, with a measure of peasant self-assuredness. Thus, he recounts with pride his family background as scythe-makers, the "black nobility" of the Kremstal, his own hard work to get an education, his interest in an enormous vegetable farm nr LINZ. He has tough nerves, and he is probably telling the truth when he says that he has not considered suicide.

5. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: None.

For Colonel PHILP:

Harry K. Lehman
Capt, Inf
2 & E Section

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ANNEX NO I

COMMENTS ON Amt I

PRISONER: O/Graf KALTENBRUNNER, Ernst DATE: 28 June 1945

1. General

K. had relatively little to do with Amt I. The only persons of Amt I whom he saw occasionally were EHRLINGER and WANNINGER.

Early in 1944 Amt I lost 35 of its 50 employees when a bomb struck Amt I headquarters at Hedemann Strasse, BERLIN. Amt I never recovered, and since adequate replacements were not available the organization continued its activities on a greatly reduced scale at HIRSCHGARTEN, about 50 km n of BERLIN. K was never at the new location and does not know whether plans for further evacuation existed when the Russians closed in on BERLIN.

2. Amt I Personalities

a. EHRLINGER

When in the summer of 1944 a new head of Amt I had to be appointed, HIMMLER insisted on selecting a man who had distinguished himself at the front. EHRLINGER was the only candidate who fulfilled the requirement. He had the Iron Cross First and Second Class and had won several other decorations on the Eastern front.

KALTENBRUNNER saw EHRLINGER for the last time at BERLIN - WANNSEE late in Mar 44.

b. OESTREICHER

An insignificant employee of Amt I whom K. remembers merely because he was badly wounded in the air attack. He may have returned to Amt I later.

c. SCHRAEPPEL Standf

SCHRAEPPEL was also severely wounded in the air attack but later resumed his old job. K. remembers talking to him only once, immediately after the air attack, when he visited SCHRAEPPEL in the hospital.
1. General

KALTENBRUNNER claims that the only member of Amt II he ever knew was SPACIL.

2. Evacuation of Amt II

About the middle of April SPACIL told KALTENBRUNNER of plans to move Amt II South to Bavaria but these plans had not taken definite form. Amt II was then still located in its old BERLIN office off Koch Strasse.

3. Amt II Personalities

a. SPACIL Standf

1.75 m medium build brown hair oval face fair complexion about 37 yrs old

Misc: Married. Had previously worked for a business concern or in bank. Bavarian accent.

Career: K.'s. administrative assistant when he was HSSPF in VIENNA. Later went to the Russian front, became sick, returned to Germany in the fall of 1944 as head of Amt II. K. saw him last in SALZBURG about 23 Apr.

b. PRITZEL Standf

Head of Amt II until SPACIL took over; may have been transferred to Norway.

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ANNEX NO II
Comments on Amt II

PRISONER: O/Gruf KALTENBRUNNER, Ernst

DATE: 28 June 1945
PRISONER: O/Graf K. L. T. BRUNNER, Ernst  
DATE: 23 June 1945

1. General

a. The Role of the 3D

K. states that the role of the 3D generally has been over-estimated. During 1944 and early in 1945 there were, according to his claim, not more than 400 full-time 3D workers in all of Germany. In HEYDRICH's time perhaps twice that number were employed. The 3D had given up many of its men to the Army and to the Waffen SS. To make up for this loss of personnel K. cut drastically the number of reports the various 3D Stellen sent to the RSHA.

K. estimates the number of part-time 3D collaborators at about 40,000. In 1942 it was possibly between 200,000 and 300,000. The sharp reduction was made because K. felt the purpose of the 3D should be to point out conditions in the Reich calling for correction. He maintained that most of the other reports sent to Amt III in HEYDRICH's time were no more valuable than an equal number of news paper clippings.

b. Type of Reports Issued by Amt III

According to K's. description, Amt III fulfilled the functions of a Gallup Poll. It gathered information on the state of morale and on economic and cultural developments. It had no executive functions, though it passed to the Gestapo information that could lead to arrests.

During the last six months, Amt III issued several reports on public reactions toward rationing, the transportation problem, the coal shortage, etc. Other reports dealt with the NS Volkswohlfahrt and its head Dr. HILLENKREUTZ, and with a breakdown in the hygiene administration under Dr. CONTI.

Political reports included reactions to the appointment of HIMMLER as Minister of the Interior. These reports stressed the opinions of fairly high officials and were largely favorable to HIMMLER. They expected that he would give the individual states a better opportunity to develop their own administration - a hope that was not fulfilled.

A great deal of attention was given to armament problems. K. cites the example of a long report on the dispersal of plants manufacturing weapons parts. The report pointed out that the system had been successful as long as the transportation facilities were intact but became cumbersome when the Reich was invaded.

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K. explains that it had been his aim to change the role of the SD from a negative, and criticizing one to that of a positive, and constructive organization. In line with this policy was the interest of Amt III in technical advance, especially when it touched the war effort. GOMESRÖGE, the minister in charge of the Reich Postal Service, had been directing the improvements of already existing equipment. He was supported by Amt III where SEIBERT and SPIEGLER handled questions of technical developments. One of the inventions GOMESRÖGE's scientists had made was an infra-red light which enabled vehicles to move about during blackout. Another one concerned radar equipment.

The last report issued by Amt III dealt with the Luftwaffe. This report had been prepared by SEIBERT and SPIEGLER. It was about 40 pages long, and was subdivided into three parts. The first dealt with the over organization of the Luftwaffe which had retained the number of different commands it had at the time of its greatest expansion, e.g., separate organizations for reinforcements, flak, supplies, etc. The report recommended that these organizations be broken down and that infantry units be formed from the surplus personnel. The second part of the report concerned technical matters. It criticized the mistaken use of the ME 262 as a bomber instead of a fighter. It pointed out that in many instances the Luftwaffe had continued to build obsolete aircraft types and it discussed in detail the Luftwaffe's armament reserves. The third part of the report contained proposals for improvements.

Before the report was shown to HITLER, K. removed the criticisms of GOERING. He felt that HITLER was already more than familiar with them. K. also took the report to GOERING who was grateful for being consulted and for the omissions.

The Luftwaffe report was based on information which had, for the larger part, come from sources outside the SD. K. explains in this connection that the attitude of the public towards the SD had undergone a decisive change in the last two years. While in the early part of the war nobody outside of the SD would have thought of contacting Amt III to report criticisms of the government, lately a great number of people had felt that the SD was the only agency willing to listen. And since the state of the Luftwaffe was an open scandal, pilots, inventors, and production men, came to report their observations.

The report on the Luftwaffe was unique and normally Amt III did not touch matters concerning the German armed forces, so as not to encroach on Amt I and the Wehrmachtstrained. Stabef.

2. Amt III and the Old Abwehr - 20 July 1944

K. insists that Amt III had no agents in the Abwehr, in keeping with an unwritten law according to which the SD never spied on Wehrmacht personnel. K. admits that the Abwehr always suspected the SD of having planted agents among its personnel - a suspicion that the Abwehr thought was confirmed by the many arrests of its members after 20 Jul. K. counters this argument with the assertion that the SD had known for a long time that the personnel of the Abwehr was reactionary and "rotten", but it was unable to do anything about it. If the ASA had been in a position to take action the Abwehr officials who figured prominently in the 20 July events would have been eliminated long before.
The inability of the RSHA to take independent steps is further illustrated according to K., by the fact that the 20 July arrests of Abwehr personnel had to be countersigned by Keitel since the RSHA still had no power to deal with military personnel.

d. Activities of Amt III Abroad

K. states that he has no details on Amt III agents operating abroad, but he admits that such agents must have operated among German Volksgruppen outside the Reich. As far as Italy and Hungary are concerned, he remembers, however, that he issued instructions prohibiting the use of Amt III agents in Italy and Hungary to give Amt VI a better chance to develop.

Amt III got a certain amount of information through the "Volksgruppen Fuehrer" Landes Leiter of the German minorities abroad, but both the Auslands organisation and Amt VI made greater use of them than Amt III.

2. Evacuation of Amt III and Plans for the Future

To K's knowledge there were no plans to evacuate Amt III nor to continue its work during the Allied occupation. He assures us that since the function of this Amt was to furnish information to the government, it had to remain in Berlin with the government. Once the government ceased to exist, there was no reason to continue its information agency.

3. Amt III Personalities

a. Ohlendorf

Of all the Amtsleiter of the RSHA K. was closest to Ohlendorf in whom he had full confidence. He was highly satisfied with the reports Ohlendorf wrote. When K. was absent from Berlin, Ohlendorf had permission to sign reports and to forward them to higher authorities.

K. always regretted that Ohlendorf had to divide his time between the RSHA and the Economics Ministry of which he was a Staatssekretaer. Ohlendorf used to spend the entire morning at the Economics Ministry and arrived at the RSHA about 1300 hrs, and twice a week he would join the luncheon table at which K's adjutants met regularly.

Because of his connection with the Economics Ministry Ohlendorf devoted much of his time in Amt III to economic matters, but he also saw the reports of the other Gruppen.

Hitler disliked Ohlendorf and called him a gloomy theorist ("einfinester Theoretiker") lacking a sense of humor.

K's. last contact with Ohlendorf was in connection with the Luftwaffe reports. He has not seen him since early April.
SECRET

d. **BUCHHART**  Reg Rat  Hptm  headed a subsection of III-B dealing with eastern questions (Oct Volks Wagen)

*Misc.* Married; four or more children From one of the Baltic States. Speaks Russian. His family lived near POZNAN until early 1945.

c. **EHLICH**

1.75 m  slender  blond hair  brown eyes  long nose

*Misc.* Married; three or four children. K. saw EHLICH last early in March, when EHLICH reported on the need of police control over the camps of eastern workers and on troubles between VLASSOV and his Ukrainian supporters.

d. **GENGENBAUER**  O/Stabf (deceased)

Head of III-C until his death in a motor accident in the fall of 1944. Liaison officer of Ant III to the Nazi Party. A capable man. Succeeded by an SD man from either POZNAN or BRESLAU.

e. **KIelpinski**

1.6 m  slender  blond hair  blue eyes  35 - 40 yrs

*Misc.* Former school teacher or newspaper man; frequently signed the reports of the Press, Radio and Propaganda Section of Ant III. K. did not see him in 1945.

f. **KROGER**  Min Rat (?)

1.75 m  very slender  brown greying hair  yellow sickly complexion  about 40 yrs  wears pince-nez

*Misc.* Comes from one of the Baltic States.

g. **LOEW**  H/Stuf (?)

1.65 m  black hair  pale complexion  about 35 yrs

*Misc.* Either Referent or Sachbearbeiter.

K. believes that LOEW worked under EHLICH, and that he saw a report of LOEW on Belgium in the fall of 1944.

h. **SEIBERT**  Stabf

1.70 m  stocky  blond hair  healthy complexion  blue eyes  about 33 yrs

*Misc.* Headed Ant III-D. He and SPENGLER prepared the Luftwaffe report. SEIBERT had good connections with the banking world and may formerly have worked in a bank. Married.

SECRET
I. SIEMER  Stubaf

1.76 m  gray hair  brown eyes  long face  mustache  about 35 yrs

Miss: Married. May have been a university teacher of chemistry or physics. Very nervous. Headed the Armament Section (Rüstungs Wirtschaft), which was independent or perhaps under Abt III-D. He was chiefly concerned with new developments and maintained close liaison with the Heeres Waffenamt. He saw SIEBEIN twice in RILSBERG late in Apr 45.
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ANNEX IV
Comments on Amt IV

PRISONER: O/Gruf KALTENBRUNNER, Ernst

1. General

a. 20 July

K. claims that the close association between MUELLER and HELMLING limited his insight into the workings of Amt IV. The only major exception was the investigation following the 20 July putsch, in which K. took an active interest.

All the important officials of Amt IV were engaged in these investigations. HUPPENKOTHEN handled the major cases, among them FROMM and probably CANARIS. MUELLER took care of some of the main cases, and particularly matters of political interest were brought to K. attention regularly. HUPPENKOTHEN, for instance kept in close touch with K. in the investigation of FROMM since that case involved the most delicate relations with the Wehrmacht. Amt III was able to furnish Amt IV considerable information about the 20 July affair.

K. states he insisted that the circle of people to be tried should be kept as small as possible. He felt that this was desirable in order to minimize the effect on morale, both at the front and at home.

b. Economic and Political Corruption

A subsection of Amt IV investigated cases of corruption with political implications and was headed by NURTEL. K. cites two examples. One concerned Reichsbank Direktor Lange's wife who had violated the foreign exchange regulations. Since this was considered as affecting the prestige of the Reich it was treated by Amt IV instead of Amt V. (A similar procedure was adopted in the investigation of Goring's agents who purchased pictures in Holland).

The other case was that of a Dr. SCHILLER who had been the head of the chemical branch of the REICH ministry and who had made a major contribution in the field of developing textile substitutes. SCHILLER was accused of having worked for his own profit and of having submitted reports which exaggerated the achievements of the new textile factories. HITLER heard about the case, but did not take a grave view of it. Because of HITLER's views and the pettiness of the offense compared with SCHILLER's accomplishments, K. made an effort to prevent a trial.
IV-N was a comparatively young Stapo section known as the Gegner Nachrichten Dienst and headed by Rez Rat GOTTTHAUSDER, a man of limited abilities. Its task was the political supervision of factories employing foreign workers. K. received regular reports from IV-N containing information of communist or other resistance groups among foreign slave labor. Most of the reports concerned Ost Arbeiter and it is possible that IV-N specialized exclusively in problems of Eastern slave labor.

IV-N employed foreign agents in the factories and K. was often dissatisfied with the results. He felt that it was a mistake to narrow down the task to factory supervision, and that a more aggressive man than GOTTTHAUSDER could have built IV-N into one of the important sections of Amt IV.

2. **Evacuation of Amt IV and Plans for the Future**

Amt IV was to move to a barracks in HOF formerly occupied by an Abwehr censorship office. K. assumes that Amt IV left HOF when the Allied armies approached. He also believes that MUELLER did not move south with Amt IV but remained with HURLER. GOTTTHAUSDER was probably in charge of evacuation plans.

K. does not think that Amt IV had any plans for resistance under Allied occupation. He assumes that MUELLER's men volunteered for the Waffen SS or the Wehrmacht when their regular office work became impossible.

3. **Amt IV Personalities**

a. MUELLER

1.70 m broad shoulders dark graying hair dark eyes about 48 yrs old

Krug: Married; two or three children, one in the Wehrmacht. MUELLER was said to have had an affair with his secretary. From MUNCHEN, but does not speak with a Bavarian accent. Had been with the Gestapo Amt from the start. Was particularly close to HIMMLER, to whom he reported regularly. K.'s relations with MUELLER were always rather cool since both HURLER and MUELLER seemed to want "to shut me off hermetically from any Gestapo matters". K. never talked to MUELLER about his peace moves because he did not consider him competent to understand his political plans. K. last saw MUELLER in HURLER's office in BERLIN early in March. He assumes that MUELLER remained in BERLIN after Amt IV left for HOF.

b. GOTTTHAUSDER  Rez Rat (?)

One of MUELLER's protégés, had no SS rank; came from either the MUNCHEN police or the Bavarian State Police. K. never met him.

c. GROßAJL  O/Rez Rat

1.85 m slender light brown hair blue eyes glasses protruding upper teeth nervous 40 - 45 yrs

Career: Krause's deputy in the Referat dealing with passports and exchange of Pows. K.'s representative on the KONSTANTZ Committee referred to above. Had been in the Kripo before joining Amt IV.
d. HUPPLINGOTHEN

Gruppenleiter in Amt IV, handled the major cases in the 20 July investigation. K. saw him last in BERLIN in Dec 44 or in Jan 45 and possibly again late in April in SALZBURG to discuss GOERING's final escapade.

e. KRAUSE Min Dir

1.76 m short gray hair full face clean-shaven about 62 yrs old

Misc: Head of the passport and FW exchange Referat. Nick-named "Papa KRAUSE" and originally from the Wurttemberg State Police. K's only contact with KRAUSE was in connection with an attempt to bring order out of the chaos caused by KRAUSE's innumerable passport regulations

f. QUEURING

about 47 yrs old

Misc: Handled economic and political corruption matters. He usually reported directly to MUeller, and, where important economic questions were involved, to OHLENDEORF in his capacity as Staatssekretär in the Economics Ministry.

g. SOMANN C/Fu

1.85 m heavy build broad shoulders dark hair about 50 yrs old

Misc: A North German, possibly from HAMBURG. Effected the transfer of the Zoll Grenz Schutz (Customs Guard) from the Finance Ministry to Amt IV in the fall of 1944.
Comments on Amt V

PRISONER: O/Gruf KALTENBRUNNER, Ernst

DATE: 28 June 1945

1. General

K. states that his contacts with Amt V were more satisfactory than those with Amt IV. NEBEN, and later PANZINGER reported regularly to him and he felt that no information was kept from him.

Late in November 1944 a meeting of all Kripo Stollenleiter was held at WÜRZBURG. The main purpose for calling the meeting was to explain the "dismissal" of NEBEN and to introduce PANZINGER to the leading Kripo men. K. attended the meeting and delivered a speech.

2. Evacuation of Amt V and Plans for the Future

In Apr 45 Amt V moved to REGENSBURG, and the plan was to evacuate further to AUGSBURG and, if necessary, to MÜNCHEN. K. also remembers that he had been offered a room in an unidentified castle near SALZBURG which he himself did not take. He suggested that Amt V might have been interested in this castle, but does not know whether the move was made.

Asked about the plans of Amt V, K. described the Kripo as a non-political organization, which felt it would be permitted to continue operations during the Allied occupation.

3. Amt V Personalities

a. NEBEN (deceased)

K. saw NEBEN last on 22 or 23 Jul 44 before he went into hiding. The Gestapo found NEBEN in BERLIN on 5 Dec 44. He was handed over to the Volks Gerichtshof and was executed in Jan or Feb 45.

b. PANZINGER

K. assumes that PANZINGER, whom he last saw in BERLIN-WANNSEE early in April, went to REGENSBURG with Amt V. K. seems to recall having seen PANZINGER again for a very short time in SALZBURG about 22 or 23 Apr.

PANZINGER is an expert criminologist who had handled the investigation of the BUERGERBAU explosion. He was usually called in on all big cases. HIMMLER valued his judgment.

c. DR. WERNER

Not selected to succeed NEBEN because HIMMLER felt that his experience in the Youth protection Referat had been too limited.
Comments on Amt VI and Mil Amt

PRISONER: O/Gruf KALTENERSCHYER, Ernst  
DATE: 28 June 1945

1. General

a. KALTENERSCHYER's Interest in Amt VI

Political questions had always attracted K. and he found scope in Amt VI to pursue his main interests. Although relations with SCHELLENBERG were not of the best (for details see para 3 below), and although SCHELLENBERG had the privilege of reporting direct to HIMMLER, K. feels that he had not lost control of the activities of the Amt. Amt VI was by no means independent of the RSHA. K., the Austrian, was particularly concerned with the Balkans in contrast to SCHELLENBERG whose main interest lay in Sweden and Switzerland. K. says that his interest in Amt VI did not extend to Mil Amt and he claims almost total ignorance.

b. Types of Reports Issued by Amt VI

Amt VI published large-scale reports on foreign affairs containing a summary of all information received. Specific reports were issued on individual countries, e.g., when Dr. NEUBACHER contacted MIH.ILOVITCH a special report was prepared on Serbia. A similar detailed study of Hungary was made at the time of the crisis in Sep 1944. RIBENTROP occasionally requested special reports.

2. Evacuation of Amt VI and Mil Amt

The main sections of Amt VI and Mil Amt were still in BERLIN early in Apr 45 but moved South shortly thereafter. K. believes that Amt VI went to BAD SULZA, while Mil Amt went to BAD BERKA.

VI-E had been located in VIENNA since 1943. Early in Mar 45 it moved to KREMSEAUSER. One major reason being that the Slovak government had set up its offices there. Late in Apr VI-E moved on to ALT AUSSEE.

3. Amt VI and Mil Amt Personalities

(See also Annex No VIII for RSHA Contacts Abroad)

a. SCHELLENBERG

SCHELLENBERG represented the HEYDRICH tradition and HIMMLER valued his political advice. K.'s relations with SCHELLENBERG, on the other hand, were cool but correct. He was inestimably ambitious and jealous of K., into whose shoes he undoubtedly hoped to step. This did not worry K. as he considered SCHELLENBERG a poor politician. SCHELLENBERG's jealousy and suspicion were best illustrated when K. tried to appoint KNÖCHE inspector of the KdSa under Amt VI, an attempt which SCHELLENBERG opposed so violently that it had to be dropped.

SCHELLENBERG admired the British Secret Service and wanted to copy it. K. was impressed with his ability to procure information abroad. He was not interested in the Balkan countries, and all reports addressed to SCHELLENBERG went directly to K.
K. saw SCHELLENBERG last at BERLIN-WAUSE about 3 Apr. He remained in BERLIN on HITLER's orders when Ant VI moved south.

b. SADEBERG

K. had few dealings with SADEBERG. He saw him last in BERLIN about 26 Feb 45.

c. AUPER

Worked for Ant VI in Roumania. A leader of the Landesleitung German minority organization in Siebenbuerger headed by SCHMIDT. AUPER came to VIENNA ten days after the Russians had occupied Roumania, where they had captured his wife and two children.

d. BUTTROCK

1.74 m well proportioned light brown gravine hair military bearing

Kieg: Wears Iron Cross and possibly the German Cross in Gold.

Career: Came to l.l. Ant F. from the Heeres Personal Ant. K. saw him for the first time in Jan 45 when BUTROCK complained that Ant VI was limit the scope of the Front Aufkleerung. K. left it to SCHELLENBERG to settle the dispute. On 26 Apr 45 K. met BUTROCK at KOMBOSSEE and suggested that he join a field unit.

e. GOBEN

1.80 m 75 - 80 kg round face ruddy complexion dark hair dignified appearance

Kieg: Wears Iron Cross and possibly the German Cross in Gold.

Career: Came to l.l. Ant F. from the Heeres Personal Ant. K. saw GOBEN last in BERLIN in the fall of 1944 when he reported on negotiations for returning a German plane that had landed on Swiss territory. May have had the status of an attaché.

f. GAJOTTA

about 30 yrs

Kieg: He was married—recently in VIENNA. GAJOTTA was working in Ant VI when K. joined the RSHA. At a meeting in SALZBURG in the summer of 1944 GAJOTTA introduced a man who planned to found a Persian National Committee. GAJOTTA had had an adventurous trip lasting five weeks during which he was caught twice by a pro-Bolshevist tribe of Kurds. He escaped both times and made his way into Turkey. Upon his return to Germany K. presented him with the Iron Cross. Later GAJOTTA was on trial for a breach of the currency regulations, but was cleared of the charge.

GAJOTTA's reports were objective and clear. His sources were natives, such as Persian artisans, who had received their technical training from Germans and felt they owed a debt to Germany.
a. HOFFMANN (deceased)

Police attaché in SOFIA. Killed by bandits on the Yugoslav-Bulgarian border shortly after the Russians crossed the Danube. K. saw HOFFMANN only once, at a meeting of the police attachés in BERLIN in May 43. HOFFMANN’s reports were very good, often including copies of reports from Bulgarian attaches to their government.

b. HEISINGER Obst d Schupo (?)

Police attaché in T. YO where he had been stationed about four years without returning to Germany. K. does not remember seeing any reports from HEISINGER, who had the reputation of being lazy. HEISINGER had been close to HEYDRICH, and because of this, his reports may have gone directly to HEYDRICH. Came from the Bavarian Landes Polizei.

i. OHLERZ

OHLERZ worked in the Luftwaffe section of Hl. Amt C. He was interested in procuring details from the Japanese on their planes and on the performance of American planes in the Pacific theater. K. saw OHLERZ only once, at a party which he gave for the Japanese about New Year 45.

j. PFEFFER

Head of VI-D. Of his assistants K. remembers only GROSS and Dr. LAGER.

k. FLOETZ (deceased)

Chef d attachégruppe when K. joined the RSHA. He left in the summer of 1943 and was killed while on duty with the Waffen SS. FLOETZ had been very close to HEYDRICH, and K. was glad to see him leave.

l. RAPP O/Stuabef

1.76 m light brown hair light eyes well built about 33 yrs old from Central Germany

Misc: GRAF and TSCHERSKY as head of VI-C

m. SKORZENY, Otto *

K. claims that he had practically no contact with SKORZENY. During the entire period of SKORZENY’s work for the RSHA, K. saw him only half a dozen times, usually on social occasions. He does not recall that SKORZENY ever came to his office in the RSHA, nor did K. ever visit SKORZENY. SKORZENY received his instructions either from SCHELLEBERG or, as in the case of the HUSSOLINI rescue, from the Führer. K. claims that he heard of the HUSSOLINI mission only after SKORZENY had left for Italy. SKORZENY being in direct contact with the Wehrmacht Fuhrungs Stabes caused a certain amount of friction in the RSHA.

K. denies any knowledge of the Schutzkorps Alverland or of SKORZENY’s connection with a resistance organization. K. stated at first that he saw SKORZENY in late 45 for the last time, but added later that it is possible that SKORZENY headed the ZIERER meeting in LIVZ on 12 or 19 Apr.
PROBABLY THE LAST KII. OF VIENNA. K. SAW HIM FOR THE LAST TIME AT THE SALZBURG MEETING OF AMT VI AND NIL AMT IN MAY 44.

SUCCEEDED FLO. 72 AS CHEF DER ATTACHEGRUPPE IN THE SUMMER OF 1943. ON 27 AUG 44 HE WAS INJURED IN AN AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT, AND K. WAS UNWILLING TO EMPLOY HIM AGAIN IN EAR 45 WHEN HE RETURNED FROM THE HOSPITAL. WARTHA HAD SHOWN INDICATIONS OF MENTAL UNBALANCE.

* IN CUSTODY AT THIS CENTER.
1. **Barsikov, Siegfried or Siegmund** | O/Staf

**1.80 m** very slender long nose dark eyes brown hair

Married; four daughters.

**Career:** Came from the Attache Gruppe; K.'s aide from late 43 to Feb 45. K. describes him as a man of limited abilities. Barsikov left the RSHA to gain more experience by working in lower echelon SD offices. He developed TB and when last heard of had moved with his family to Saxony on the Sudetengau. LALZ, K.'s more trusted aide, whose home is in PIRPA (Saxony), tried to find quarters for Barsikov in that area. Although Barsikov was seriously ill he made a number of trips to Berlin where K. saw him last about Mar 15.

2. **Sansomi** | Standf

**1.75 m** sturdily built stout blond hair healthy complexion

**Career:** Had been in Amt II but since he was a Standf it was felt that he should be an Amtchef and Amt N was created, though it was little more than a Referat. Sansomi had been recommended by Sachs (or Sachse), the head of the Communication Section of the SS Hauptamt. There were only four or five officers working under Sansomi. His job was purely technical, looking after communications and making arrangements for use of Wehrmacht or Luftwaffe telephone lines in case of need. K. saw Sansomi last towards the end of March 1945 in Berlin-WARSEB. He assumes that Sansomi remained in the North.
1. General

K. stated repeatedly that he considered the basic mistake that GIS had to put too great a trust in agents of doubtful reliability. In his opinion 85 to 90 percent of the work with agents was wasted. He would have liked to have organized a circle of about 200 personalities of the best social and business standing. This would have formed a much more dependable group of informants than the small fry with which Wnt VI worked. K. thinks that SCHELLENBERG may have had similar ideas.

K. claims to have no knowledge of any plans for the future employment of any agents still at large.

2. Reports on the Western Hemisphere

Information concerning North and South America came mostly from Spain or Portugal, occasionally also from Sweden and Switzerland. These reports were rather poor. RIESENFROP claimed that they were nothing but a rehash of the foreign press. K. is unable to judge whether RIESENFROP's own information was any better since RIESENFROP, contrary to all agreements, never permitted KALTENBRUNNER to see Foreign Office Intelligence reports.

As long as France was occupied, some reports came in on the Americas through French diplomatic sources, largely via Spain and Portugal, but actually very little intelligence was received from the Western Hemisphere ever since the occupation of Iceland.

SCHELLENBERG tried to improve the system and so did Diet HAMBURG, but K. remembers only two sets of agents sent to the US by U-boat, both of which were picked up.

The only important report KALTENBRUNNER recalls was the one predicting the rupture of relations by Brazil.

3. Switzerland

a. Obst MASSON

SCHELLENBERG's main contact in Switzerland was Col MASSON who furnished general intelligence and from whom SCHELLENBERG also hoped to obtain political material. MASSON's reports were given orally to SCHELLENBERG. K. did not trust MASSON and feared that he did better work for the Western Allies than for Germany. SCHELLENBERG, apparently, had a good deal of faith in MASSON, although K. explained to him that the Swiss by necessity had to cooperate with the winning side.

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ANNEX NO. VIII

RSHA Contacts Abroad

PRISONER: O/Stur KALTENBRUNNER, Ernst

DATE: 26 June 1945
b. Agent T-100

This agent worked for SCHELLINGBERG for a long time, and despite no results SCHELLINGBERG continued to reward him with the highest pay of any agent at about 3,000 to 4,000 Swiss francs per month. T-100 reported on political developments only, not on military or technical matters. The reports had a definite pro-Russian, anti-British and anti-US tendency. KALTERNBURGER thought it possible that T-100 worked also for the Japanese or the Russians and SCHELLINGBERG did not deny this possibility as far as the Japanese were concerned.

KALTERNBURGER believes that T-100 was a South American. T-100 worked in a South American legation in Switzerland, and often gave as his source the names of members of the Spanish nobility. One name which KALTERNBURGER believes to remember in this connection was ARANUA or ARANJUA.

T-100 was lazy. KALTERNBURGER saw only four short reports from him during the last 12 months. It is, however, possible that SCHELLINGBERG took some reports directly to HIMMLER without ever showing them to KALTERNBURGER.

c. Exchange of Agents

Twice there was an exchange of agents between Germany and Switzerland. KALTERNBURGER claims that the Germans involved had not sent intelligence reports to the RSHA but had belonged to the Auslands Organisation and had merely made reports on the behavior of Germans in Switzerland, including espionage suspects.

One of the two exchanges took place in early 1944. Switzerland turned over five or six German agents while Germany had to release eight or nine Swiss agents.

4. Sweden

FINKE (or FINK) was SCHELLINGBERG's best agent in Sweden and he continued to furnish good material up to the last few months. Kalternbrumer does not know who worked under Finke.

The Swedish Government had threatened to deport Finke's group of eight or nine men if they did not leave voluntarily. Since this would have ruined the SVI network, attempts were made to have Ribbentrop intercede with the Swedish Government.

The Germans were able to offer an exchange; they had picked up the chief Swedish agent after he had left his briefcase with a large number of reports in the Propaganda Ministry. He had these reports photostated and translated and found that they contained excellent material on the Luftwaffe and on atom-splitting experiments.

The deal with Sweden failed, but the Germans allowed the Swedish network to continue operation, in the hopes that ultimately it might be working for Russia and that by holding off a larger catch could be made.
5. Spain and Portugal

These countries were good observation posts and RSHA reports on British air activities came from there. Amt VI claimed that the reports originated in the American legation in MADRID, but K. thinks that Spanish diplomats picked up the information from various sources and then reported it to the Germans.

Prinz HOHENLOHE, not an Amt VI agent but believed to have been a Foreign Office observer, had good connections in Spain and Portugal.

According to K.'s recollection, his report dealt mainly with matters of foreign policy and the odd bit about Britain and the United States.

6. Turkey

Photostated British embassy documents were the best source of intelligence in Turkey before the VEREHEPAT affair. K. believes that the documents were genuine and they were procured through an embassy servant, probably a Turk.

7. Hungary

HOTTL's chief agent in Hungary was URSAI in BUDAPEST who ran the only Amt VI network there.

8. Romania

The main contact in Romania was Horia SBlA who had been trained by K. politically, and who had spent some time in Amt VI-E in VIENNA.

9. Serbia

KALTENBRUNNER states that he regarded the new Chetnik groups which had formed around LUCIC as more important than the contact with NIHAILOVITCH. LUCIC was killed on 20 Apr 45 when he drove over a collapsing bridge. His troops (about 20,000) presumably fled West to escape TITO and may now be in Northern Italy. K. calls them "the most reliable anti-Bolshevik group".

10. Bulgaria

Most reports about Bulgaria had come from HOFFMANN, the Police attaché in SOFLA, and when HOFFMANN was killed the intelligence network was disrupted badly. K. had also obtained some information through his own contacts with O/Stats Arzt POSSKEF and a certain ATACHEV who owned a business in VIENNA.

11. Greece

In the fall and early winter of 1944 there were still intelligence contacts in Greece, and reports were received from FAKs and from Amt VI personnel through LOBHR who had remained in Northern Greece.

K. was also in touch with NIHAILOV of the INR, the head of the Macedonian National Movement whom he had met twice, once in BERLIN in Oct 43 and once in VIENNA in Jan 44.
1. **von dem BACH-ZELENSKI**

1.80 m dark hair round face normally wears glasses for reading

**Misc:** Married; several children. Speaks Polish. Lived in Silesia.

**Career:** Formerly HSSPF, later in charge of anti-partisan warfare (Chef der Sender Kampf Verbaende). In the latter position he was solely responsible to HIMMLER. K. distrusted v d BACH because he had made misleading reports about his successes in the hope of obtaining a decoration. v d BACH was close to FBCTZMAN at the time when both served in the Ukraine, but K. lost sight of their relationship later. He saw v d BACH for the last time early in 1944 at the HQ in RASTENBURG.

2. **BECKER** Standf Himmler's representative at discussions about the release of Jews

3. **BERGER** C/Gruf

1.80 m greying black hair broad face suffers from wounds received in World War I

**Misc:** Married; four children. One son was killed in World War II. A daughter, who died recently, was married to the German Volksgruppen Fuehrer in Roumania, Andreas SCHMIDT. BERGER's family had lived in BERLIN and moved to his farm 100 km E when their house was bombed out.

**Career:** Chef des SS Hauptamts and charged particularly with prisoner of war matters. He represented HIMMLER on ceremonial trips to Croatia and Roumania. In the winter of 1944/45 he was the GC operations against the Communist uprising in Slovakia. K. had little contact with BERGER, except once in connection with VLAŠKOV. He saw BERGER for the last time in VIENNA in the fall of 1944.

BERGER received commend for Southern Germany from HIMMLER about 20 April and arrived in MUNCHEN on 23 April. Later he moved his HQ to BAD TOELZ. Despite several requests on BERGER's part, K. did not meet him. K. suggested a meeting in SALZBURG, but this time BERGER refused. K. feels that BERGER was much too old and easy-going for the times and he did not command the respect of either the civilians or the army.
4. BOEHM

1.80 m slender looks slightly Japanese comes from Saxony

Career: BOEHM's last position was IDS KÖNIGSBERG after previous service in Rumania and in either BRESANZ or POZNAH. BOEHM had been a very close friend of HEDRICH's and had accompanied him on many trips.

5. BRANDT, Rudolf Standf

1.7.; a pale-yellow complexion wears glasses

Kiss: Married; two children.

Career: HUMLER's private secretary and later his adjutant in the Ministry of the Interior where he held the title of Chef der Ministerialkanzlei. He had long been with HUMLER, was industrious and ambitious, but not of outstanding intellect. K.'s dealings with HUMLER often went through BRANDT.

6. BALUGE

BALUGE, formerly Chef der Orpc, was pensioned in the fall of 1943 because of mental imbalance. He did not recover and was given a farm near POZNAH. On trips to BERLIN he often stayed with K.

7. VON EBERSTEIN HSSpf MÜNCHEN

Was not popular among Party men. HUMLER tried several times to have EBERSTEIN dismissed. However, EBERSTEIN had many friends outside the Party in MÜNCHEN and he had succeeded in establishing excellent relations with the Wehrkreis Kommando. Another factor that saved EBERSTEIN from dismissal was that HITLER had always been pleased with EBERSTEIN's services on state occasions, such as visits of the Fuhrer.

K. describes EBERSTEIN as passive, tired and suffering from a heart ailment. He should have been relieved years ago.

8. EIGLER

On 12 or 19 April K. visited EIGLER in LINZ. He found a meeting in process at which the following were present: PIFRADER, IEKO SKI (Gen Propaganda Leiter who also handled refugee questions), a colonial commanding the air field, KÖHRSCHING, an HSS man, and probably SKÖRKEY and a WIENMAN.

K. remained about half an hour. The topics of discussion were: Measures to establish an MLR in the East, refugees and food problems.

Asked whether problems rising out of a collapse of the front were discussed at the meeting, K. answered: EIGLER was such a stubborn optimist. He would not have tolerated any such discussion." EIGLER was very close to BORCHARDT and followed his orders blindly. K. did not see EIGLER again.

SECRET
9. **FEIGELIN**  
Gen d Waffen SS  
1.76 m athletic build  
Blond hair  
Blue eyes  

**Kiss:** Married. Lived with HITLER leaving his family elsewhere. From Southern Germany, probably Bavaria. One of the best German horse men.  

**Career:** HITLER's principal adjutant. He had distinguished himself in the field where he had last led a cavalry division in a battle E of WARSAW early in 1944, and where he had been severely wounded. He knew little about politics, but his personal influence on HITLER especially in matters of appointments was great. He was also close to BORMANN and acted as liaison officer for HITLER with the Waffen SS. For instance when HIMMLER needed reinforcements for the Vistula front, his request went via FEIGELIN.

10. **FIRTHUM**  
(deceased)  

Vice President of the VIENNA Police; later commanded Waffen SS unit in Albania. Killed in an automobile accident in the winter of 1944/45. An old austrian officer and a close friend of KALCHBRUNNER's who became the guardian of his children.

11. **GEHRARD**  

Professor. Specialist in infantile paralysis and leg muscle operations. Coming from a poor Bavarian family, GEHRARD was a school-mate of HIMMLER's and remained one of his very closest friends. HIMMLER spent a great deal of time in ROHERLYCHEN where GEHRARD headed a large hospital for wounded SS.

He operated on the King of Belgium and had flown to Crete and STALINGRAD to perform operations.

On occasional visits to the RSHA to obtain cigarettes, cognac, etc., GEHRARD always tried to pick up the latest inside stories and asked about the state of morale. KALCHBRUNNER always avoided talking to him about political matters. He felt that GEHRARD's information would be passed on in an exaggerated form to HITLER, over whom GEHRARD exercised considerable influence.

12. **GROTHMANN**  

HIMMLER's military adjutant. KALCHBRUNNER used to see him at the Reichskanzlei, but never at the field headquarters.

13. **HEISSMEYER**  
O/Gruf  
1.74 m  
Very slender  
Gray eyes  
Graying brown hair  
About 50 yrs  
Badly wounded in World War I where he was a well-known flyer  

**Kiss:** Married about two years ago to Frau SCHOLTZ-KLINCK, head of the Nazi Women's Organization. Each brought seven or eight children into the marriage.
Career: "Chef der Heimschulen", under the jurisdiction of RUST's Education Ministry. Also Fuehrer SS Gau BERLIN. In 1934/35 he may have been Chef des SS Hauptamtes. Little was heard of H. in recent years. KALTENBRUNNER describes him as an excellent educator, a friendly, honest person, a dreamer, not a military leader.

14. **Dr. HUBER**

Last BdS of VIENNA. Belonged to the SCHIMAÄA group. Left VIENNA very late, first went to KREMS and then to GRAZ where his family lived. He was suffering from engine pectoris and planned to go to a hospital either in GRAZ or BAD ISCHL.

15. **KALTEMRUNNER** HSSf Steiermark

KALTENBRUNNER has not seen him for more than a year and last heard of him at ZAGREB. KALTEMRUNNER was opposed to KASCHER's policies and an ardent Steiermark patriot. Dissatisfied in the SS because he wanted to see an independent Austria.

16. **KERSTEN**

1.85 m very slender black hair healthy appearance about 30 yrs

Misc: "Wore the Verwundeten Abzeichen in silver.

Career: Hitler's assistant adjutant under FRÖLEN. Had been in the Leibstandarte and joined Hitler's staff at the end of 1943. Quiet and reliable, following no special political line. KALTENBRUNNER last saw him in BER IN on 18 April when receiving command of Austria.

17. **KLUCKHORN**

Formerly one of KALTENBRUNNER's adjutants. In the summer of 1944 joined the Waffen SS, probably the Prinz Eugen Division.

18. **KNOCHEN**

Head of the Sipo and SD in PARIS, where he dealt with political questions as well as police matters. He had many discussions with Laval and other members of the VICHY Government. After the liberation of PARIS he was posted to a training unit of the Waffen SS and was to become inspector of the KfVs under Act VI. KALTEMRUNNER hoped that KNOCHEN would be acceptable to SCHIHELBERG and that through KNOCHEN he would be able to obtain a better insight into SCHIHELBERG's work. However, SCHIHELBERG refused to accept the appointment and KNOCHEN, after a short time at Act I, became WINTERLASS's liaison officer at the headquarters of Army Group HUNGULIC in Hungary.
19. **KÜHLER**

1.80 m well built dark brown hair about 35 yrs

Mie: Married.

Kds Oberdonau, after PLEIDER was killed in an air raid late in April, KALLENBRUNNER states that there was no particular reason for choosing KÜHLER except that nobody else was available at the time. KALLENBRUNNER assumes that KÜHLER remained in LINZ.

20. **PRÜTZMANN**

HSSPf in HAMBURG, where KALLENBRUNNER met him during his own training period in the Waffen SS; later HSSPf in KOBLENZBERG. In Dec 44 or Jan 45 PRÜTZMANN was sent to Croatia as General Plenipotentiary. KALLENBRUNNER had a talk with him, advising him to see GAUSE-BÖRSTEMAU and also to become acquainted with the views of the VI-E group in VIENNA on Croatia. Little was heard of PRÜTZMANN's activities and KALLENBRUNNER not PRÜTZMANN only once after the latter's return, for a few minutes, at the end of Feb or early in Mar. KALLENBRUNNER denies having talked with PRÜTZMANN about Verwolf, and insists that he had never heard that PRÜTZMANN was connected with Verwolf, until his first interrogation.

KALLENBRUNNER describes PRÜTZMANN as a lazy person, fond of travelling but with little aptitude for continued serious work. He was, however, skillful at assembling a good staff to whom he would leave the entire work. He considers PRÜTZMANN especially ill-fitted for heading a resistance organization because he does not set a good example.

21. **SACHS (or SACHSE)**

Headed the communication section (Fernmelde Wesen) of the SS Hauptamt, which included communications for the Waffen SS. Old and sick, retired early in 1945. SACHS recommended SAMES as the head of Ant N of the RSHA.

22. **SCHIEEL** Gauleiter of SALZBURG

Had some knowledge of KALLENBRUNNER's attempts of peace negotiations. KALLENBRUNNER saw him last in SALZBURG on 20 or 21 April and later SCHIEEL called KALLENBRUNNER several times on the telephone. SCHIEEL remained in SALZBURG and refused to allow a last-ditch defense of the city, even though military preparations had been made.

23. **SCHIMANA**

HSSPf in VIENNA until shortly before the city fell. WINKELMANN took over his functions in the remaining part of his sector. KALLENBRUNNER felt that SCHIMANA was narrow-minded and without political interests or perspective. Believing that he would not fit into the austrian plan, KALLENBRUNNER was glad to be rid of S. He sent him home to his family in the Salzkarmergut to rest up from the excitement of the VIENNA fighting and to cheer him up he promised him the command of a new Führer Haupt Quartier to be set up in AUSTRIA.
24. WINKELMANN

1.86 m slender graying brown hair oval face healthy complexion
blue eyes military bearing high pitched voice about 54 yrs

Misc: Married. Only son killed (?) during World War II; two adopted
children. A very well educated man, which is a rare fact among police
generals.

Cerberus: 'Chef des Kommando Aantes in the Hauptamt der Ordnungs Polizei
in BERLIN until the fall of 1944, when he was appointed HSSPf in
Hungary. When he had to retreat into Austria he found SCHULHa cut
off in VIENNA and assumed SCHILHAa's functions. KALTENBRUNNER does
not know whether any formal transfer of control was ever made. He
was pleased to find WINKELMANN in command since he thought highly of
the latter's abilities. He never talked to WINKELMANN about his austrian
plans but thinks it possible that HORTTL or ULANCK may have spoken to
him about them.

KALTENBRUNNER claims that he was not aware that WINKELMANN was
to take over KREUSCH's functions in MUENCHEN. He believes that
WINKELMANN was much too busy in Austria to take on additional duties
in Upper Bavaria. Transportation difficulties alone would have made
it almost impossible to assume important functions both in Bavaria
and Austria. Later KALTENBRUNNER thought it possible that WUSCHEL-
BERG, who remained in the North, may have wanted someone in charge of
the Orpo in the South and that WINKELMANN was selected.

KALTENBRUNNER met WINKELMANN last in LINZ on 19 or 20 Apr 45.
He sent one message to WINKELMANN later but is certain that he did not
receive any messages from WINKELMANN after their last meeting.

25. WOLFF 3/Graf

Chef des personlichen Stabes of HITLER; later HSSPf in Italy.
Standfi RAUBER took over WOLFF's function on HITLER's staff, when
the latter became angry with WOLFF. WOLFF had divorced his wife in
order to marry Countess BERNSCHOFF, the mother of his child. WOLFF
had been very influential in the matter of SS appointments and even
after he went to Italy was able to promote the interest of his large
circle of friends. His relations with HITLER eventually improved,
due largely to the efforts of Prof GEHART.

WOLFF started working with HITLER about 1931. He had friends
among the HSSPf, including such men as von WALDECK. Members of the
nobility had always had a great deal of attraction for WOLFF. KAI-
TENBRUNNER says that WOLFF was always hostile to him.

KALTENBRUNNER met WOLFF on 30 or 31 Mar 45 in the evacuation
camp near HOF where WOLFF reported his conversation with DULLES in
Switzerland. 'CLFF had tried to have th Allier stop backing the
Communist Italian partisans. KALTENBRUNNER felt it had been a mis-
take for WOLFF to approach DULLES on his own. He feared that DULLES
would lose interest when he saw various groups trying to establish
contact without knowing what the others were doing.

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SECRET

HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP
INTERROGATION CENTER
AFC 655

miscellaneous Personalities

PRISONER: O/Gruf ALTENRUNNER, Ernst

DATE: 28 June 1945

1. Dr. RAIFER

Head of the Parte: Verbindungs Stelle and a member of BERLIT's staff. Most of the criticism of GOERING which Amt III obtained for the report on the Luftwaffe came from Dr. RAIFER.

2. BERBER

K. heard late in April that RIBBENTROP had sent BERBER, a member of the German Foreign Office to BURCHARDT in Switzerland in an attempt to contact the Western Allies.

3. CAFARIS

Admiral

Arrested in BERLIN in the fall of 1944 on suspicion of complicity in the 20 July assassination attempt. No proof of his participation was found until his diary was discovered in Dec 44 or Jan 45. According to K., CAFARIS had not been sentenced. He was removed from BERLIN, along with other important prisoners after the heavy air raid of 3 Feb 45 and K. heard that he had been injured in a raid.

4. FRANK, Heinrich

1.78 m, oval face, dark hair, dark eyes, protruding upper teeth

Part owner of Heinrich FRANK u Soehne, manufacturer of coffee substitute, with branches throughout Europe. Probably lives in ZURICH. FRANK had known K. in LIVZ, but the two have not met since.

K. got in contact with FRANK through an Amt VI agent in Switzerland. He informed him of the projected meeting with BURCHARDT. FRANK then approached BURCHARDT, whom he knew well, and acquainted him with K.'s ideas.

5. GLAESE-HURSTHAU

Formerly chief of the Army archives in VIETIJA. In 1941 plenipotentiary in Croatia. Here he clashed with NASCHE, the German minister to Croatia, who succeeded in having him recalled.

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GLAISZ was popular with both leftist and rightist elements in Austria. K. considered him an ideal man for his A strian plans. He was fully informed of K.'s intentions and volunteered to contact Bishop RÖHRACH in SALZBURG. He obtained a promise of the Bishop's personal support which K. felt, would have led to general support by the Catholic Church.

6. RÖHRACH

RÖHRACH belonged to HITLER's closest circle and was one of his main advisers on questions of foreign policy. K. always tried to give important reports to RÖHRACH since he was certain that they would thus reach HITLER. He also used RÖHRACH to obtain information about what was going on in the German Foreign Office.

7. HOFER

HOFER 1.85 m 100 kg, full face about 43 yrs
Lived: Married: five or six children. Probably not an SS member. From South Tyrol.

Gaulisier in I.N.S.BAUCK since 1936. A very early member of the Party in Austria. He fled to Germany in 1934. K. last saw him in I.N.S.BAUCK, 28 Apr 45.

8. KASCHE

German minister to Croatia. He accepted the idea of a Croatian state under Italian leadership. His views were thus diametrically opposed to those of "ALTENBURG, BACHER and GLAISZ. KASCH visited K. in BERLIN in the fall of 1944, when he complained bitterly about the unfavorable reports Amt VI-I had made about the Croatian situation.

K. heard that KASCHE recently tried to obtain a Swiss visor.

9. BACHER

A close friend of K. Like GLAISZ he enjoyed great popularity in Austria. BACHER had always been anti-Russian. He knew Russia well, having been there on several trade missions before the war. BACHER conducted negotiations for K. with anti-Bolshevist circles in VIENNA and was active in winning his many friends for K.'s ideas.

BACHER was an expert on Balkan countries where he had many anti-Russian contacts. It was he who came to terms with MAILOVITCH. Like K., BACHER felt that the Serbs (and not the Bulgarians, as RIBBENTROP thought) would make the best anti-Bolshevist group in the Balkans.

In Hungary he knew Prince ROHAN and through him probably the APPOKYIS. He also knew RHOHN-SCHERFELLE well. In Greece he was close to anti-Russian circles, but K. cannot recall any names. In Albania the most important contact was SCHDEVVA (phonetic), a man locally well known. BACHER also helped a group of ten Albanian noblemen to leave Germany in March 1945 on their way to Albania via Italy.
He had thoroughly indoctrinated these men in anti-Soviet ideology.

HEUBACHER at various times attempted to contact American and British circles. At K.'s last meeting with him on 27 or 28 April it was agreed that these efforts should be pursued. HEUBACHER decided to go to KITZBÜHEL where several exiled governments were located, hoping to use them to reach the Western Allies.

10. RIBBENTROP

K.'s dealings with RIBBENTROP were always clouded by RIBBENTROP's suspicion that the RSHA was encroaching upon the territory of the Foreign Office. To dispel this suspicion K. repeatedly offered to route all Amt VI reports through the Foreign Office, provided the latter would make its own reports available to the RSHA. An agreement was reached several times, but promptly broken by RIBBENTROP's failure to fulfill his part of the bargain.

During 1944 K. was called before RIBBENTROP some ten times, usually regarding complaints about Amt VI reports. Several times the BURCKH. FIT negotiations were discussed. K. obtained RIBBENTROP's agreement to the plans, but it was obvious that RIBBENTROP was angry that the Foreign Office was not handling the negotiations. There was also the danger of overlapping, since RIBBENTROP had sent WIDEGGER to KOSTAFTZ to negotiate with the Swiss about and exchange of prisoners.

RIBBENTROP warned K. specifically not to touch any subjects with Backhardt except those relating to the Red Cross and K. was careful never to drop any hints about his own plans. Later, after he had gone to Austria, K. heard that RIBBENTROP had sent Backhardt to Schloss ART in an attempt to reach the Americans or the British.

11. SCHERIAU

1.74 m slender brown hair brown eyes about 50 yrs reserved

K. claims to know nothing about SCHERIAU's activities in resistance preparations. He met SCHERIAU only twice, in July 1944 and about 11 Apr 45 when their cars met near ETHS. SCHERIAU was then with Army Group K/F/D/16.

12. SUCHNEK Schupo

1.80 m light brown hair full face good appearance 35 - 40 yrs

Married; one son and one daughter.

Career: Held no SS rank. He handled HIMMLER's police reports and other police matters, but not actually an adviser in police subjects, as he was too accurate and exact and had little imagination. He had been with HIMMLER for a long time.

K. last saw SUCHNEK in SALZBURG early in April. He thinks that SUCHNEK was then connected with HIMMLER's headquarters near the THEPSALE:

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13. **TRISCA**

1.75 m well built, athletic appearance, healthy complexion, about 32 yrs.

**Himself:** Speaks French, English and probably Hungarian. From Lower Austria. Was "like a Son" to Dr. JURY.

**Career:** Political adviser of Dr. JURY, Gauleiter of Niederdonau from 1942 to the fall of 1943. He had also been in the Foreign Office for a very short period. He fell out of favor with RHEINSTRUP since he had belonged to the young anti-RHEINSTRUP group around LYTHER. After serving with the Waffen SS, TRISCA managed to get back to the Foreign Office and was sent to BUDAPEST as a Kultur attaché. Later he was supposed to go to Italy.
1. W/T Station STEYERING

Maibek of Ant VI-E maintained radio contact with the stay-behind agents in Rumania through a W/T station previously located at KEKES-KUNSTST, but later moved to STEYERING. HEUNTESTE was one of the W/T operators there.

2. W/T Station BAD SULZA

Ant VI maintained a W/T station at its new location in BAD SULZA. K. expected to use this station for sending messages from his evacuation camp at GEFELL nr KOF. The station was supposed to be in contact with Ant VI in BERLIN, Fuehrer Haupt Quartier, the Foreign Office and the Wehrmacht Fuehrungs Staeb. Since KALTEBERGER was never at BAD SULZA and spent only one day at GEFELL he does not know any details of the W/T station.

3. W/T Station ALT AUSSER

GOETTSCH maintained a W/T station in the villa KERRY which was used to contact HOBZEL during the latter's negotiations in Switzerland.

4. W/T Station Feldkirch

HOEBTL also used direct W/T communications from Feldkirch and a special code was arranged with GOETTSCH and MAIBEK for this purpose. However, K. knows nothing about the technical part of the communications.

5. Efforts to Contact HUHLER and HITLER Late in April 1945

a. A W/T message concerning K.'s setting up police barriers in Austria was sent to HIHLER shortly after K. returned to Austria for the last time. K. went to barracks near KLEINMUNCHEN, SW of LINZ. There he sent his message by regular Orpc W/T channels to HUHLER either at BERLIN or KLEINMUNCHEN.

b. A W/T message was sent to HITLER on 26 or 27 April from the Wehrmacht Fuehrungs Stab station at KOSCHESEB. It dealt with Red Cross shipments of food and medicine to concentration camps.

c. About 28 April HUEBLER, FEGEBL's adjutant, carried a message by plane from SALZBURG. It was addressed to HITLER in care of FEGEBL, and contained a report on the Austrian situation. K. sent the message this way since no answer to his two W/T messages had been received. In fact he did not receive any W/T messages from the North after his arrival in Austria on 19 Apr 45.

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ANNEX II XI
Communications

PRISONER: O/Gruf KALTEBERGER, Ernst
DATE: 28 June 1945
When it was learned that Horthy was negotiating with Russia, Hitler, influenced by Ribbentrop and Verssemeyer, decided to occupy Hungary at once. Kaltenbrunner was in Vienna at the time and immediately summoned his VII-B people, Horthy, Wawersik and Amon, to Salzburg. He ordered them to prepare a report for Hitler showing that a political and not a military operation was desirable. Kaltenbrunner felt very strongly that a military coup was not called for and that a reforming of the Hungarian Government on a broad democratic basis would be the best solution in the German interest. Kaltenbrunner's report was transmitted to Hitler via Hemel. The military operation was called off and Horthy was invited to visit the Führer.

The first part of the Horthy talks with Hitler was very stormy, but later an agreement was reached. Kaltenbrunner was not kept informed about the progress of the meeting but at the last moment was told to travel to Budapest on Horthy's train, in order to carry out the plans suggested in his report.

In Budapest Kaltenbrunner met with representatives from all parties. Verssemeyer, however, relied mainly on Horthy's group and the new government was constituted only about thirty percent in accordance with Kaltenbrunner's ideas.

In view of Germany's interest in the arms and food production of Hungary, Kaltenbrunner suggested that a special envoy for these matters be appointed. He proposed Hasslacher, President of the Wiener Kredit Anstalt, an expert on Hungarian affairs who spoke Hungarian and had a wide circle of friends in Hungary. Kaltenbrunner was able to obtain the agreement of Funk, Backe and Speer for this plan; but Ribbentrop succeeded in convincing Hitler that it would reduce Verssemeyer's influence in Hungary and the appointment fell through.
Visits of Count BERLADOTTE to BERLIN

PRISONER: O/Graf KALTENBRUNNER, Ernst
DATE: 28 June 1945

1. First Visit (February 1945)

Late in Feb 45 SCHELLEBERGB received word that Count BERLADOTTE, President of the Swedish Red Cross, planned to visit BERLIN. He reported this to K. and K. invited him for lunch at BERLIN-WANNSEE about 25 Feb. BERLADOTTE, KALTENBRUNNER, SCHELLEBERGB, and possibly PASZGER were present.

BERLADOTTE wanted to meet HULLER and asked K. whether this could be arranged. K. promised to do so and asked what topics BERLADOTTE planned to discuss with HULLER. BERLADOTTE explained those in detail:

a. The establishment of a single camp for Scandinavian prisoners. This would make it easier for the Swedish Red Cross to send supplies.

b. Permission for Swedish doctors and nurses to work at the camp.

c. Permission for certain persons to emigrate to Sweden, e.g. widows of former Swedish nationality, who had lost Swedish citizenship through marriage to Germans.

d. Improvement of the extremely strained German-Swedish relations. BERLADOTTE said that HULLER had always been particularly interested in Sweden and that he had always favored good relations.

KALTENBRUNNER said that it should not be difficult to agree on the first three points and promised to transmit them to HULLER. He did not comment on the fourth point which he felt was outside his jurisdiction.

During the conversation BERLADOTTE remarked: "Isn't it strange two weeks ago I had breakfast with General RISETHNER and today I am waiting to see HULLER." K. felt that this might be a hint at mediation and tried hard to sound BERLADOTTE out. However, BERLADOTTE refused to commit himself, but made a number of anti-Russian remarks.

KALTENBRUNNER's final impression was that BERLADOTTE would have liked for the Germans to use him for peace negotiations. He regretted that he could not talk to BERLADOTTE at this meeting about his own ideas and his plans for Austria. However, SCHELLEBERGB's presence and the fact that BERLADOTTE was to see HULLER made it quite impossible.
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The following day, after seeing RIBBENSTROP, BERIADOTTE drove with SCHELLENBERG to HOHENLYCHEN, where he spent about five hours with HIMMLER. SCHELLENBERG, who was not present during the main part of the conversation, reported that the talk had been very cordial. When he tried to find out what had been discussed, BERIADOTTE stopped him by saying: 'I'd like you to give me a half hour's time to think over my conversation with HIMMLER. I was very much impressed and should like to reconstruct all its phases in my mind. I should not want to forget any part of it.' Later he added: 'I am very glad I met HIMMLER. It is always good to hear both sides.'

K. was unable to find out what HIMMLER and BERIADOTTE had discussed in the political field. As far as Red Cross matters were concerned, HIMMLER accepted all the suggestions and, encouraged by his success, BERIADOTTE added other requests, which were also granted.

2. Second Visit (March 1945)

About two weeks after his first visit, BERIADOTTE returned to BERLIN and invited K. and SCHELLENBERG to lunch. He thanked them for their help in carrying out his requests and discussed details of the BERGEN-SELEN camp for Scandinavian prisoners. K.'s attempt to learn more about the HIMMLER-BERIADOTTE conversation failed again. He only found out that a second meeting was to be held. Afterwards HIMMLER mentioned to ZOLOTENBRUNNER that BERIADOTTE had shown a clearly anti-Russian attitude and had said that Sweden would like to see an understanding between Germany and the Western Allies.

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SECRET
1. Events leading to KALTENBRUNNER's meeting with BURCKHARDT

Late in Feb 45 BURCKHARDT, the President of the Swiss Red Cross, requested a meeting with HIMMLER. When K. heard of this he realized that it was an opportunity for him to contact diplomatic circles abroad. At the time HIMMLER was at the Vistula front. Since BURCKHARDT was not permitted to visit HIMMLER at the front, by the Fuehrer's specific orders, K. suggested that he meet BURCKHARDT in place of HIMMLER. His suggestion was accepted and an official answer sent to BURCKHARDT. This letter was drafted by K., but he is not sure who signed it. A few days later K. wrote a personal letter to BURCKHARDT suggesting FELDKIRCH as a meeting place. He chose this Austrian border town because it gave him a chance to meet some of his Austrian friends at the same time.

On the way to FELDKIRCH K. met either KÖTTLE or GOETTSCH at INNSBRUCK, while SCHIEDLER, K.'s adjutant went ahead to FELDKIRCH to make the necessary preparations.

During the first part of the meeting, which lasted from 1400 to 1700 hours, Dr. BACHMANN (or BACHLATT), General Secretary of the Red Cross, and SCHIEDLER, K.'s adjutant, were present, but did not actively participate in the discussion. It was obvious that BURCKHARDT had prepared himself well for the talk. He had brought detailed suggestions and plans concerning the exchange of civilian internees and the sending of food and other supplies to prison camps in Germany. He mentioned that he would soon be appointed Swiss Minister in PARIS. He seemed particularly anxious to obtain concessions for French civilian internees, since this would give him a very good start in his new post in France. He also talked about an exchange of military prisoners. K. agreed to most of BURCKHARDT's suggestions, but pointed out that HIMMLER's approval would have to be obtained before they could be carried out.

During the second part of the conversation BURCKHARDT and K. were alone. This talk lasted from 1700 to 1900 hours. K. claims that it was BURCKHARDT who began to speak about the war in general, expressing Swiss fears concerning the rapid Russian advance into Central Europe. K. outlined his own views about the chances of coming to an agreement with the Western Allies against Russia. He also spoke of his Austrian plans. He mentioned DULLES in this connection, but did not tell BURCKHARDT how the contact with DULLES had been established.
BURCKHARDT next spoke bitterly of RIBBENTROP's stubborn "Prussian" type of diplomacy, which he blamed for the disastrous developments. He said a "Western" diplomat would have found much smoother methods and would have been able to come to terms with Britain and the United States. He added, much to K.'s joy, that when he spoke of "Western diplomacy" he included Austria.

These remarks gave K. hope that BURCKHARDT would do something to promote his Austrian plan. He definitely felt that excellent personal connections had been established, and found this confirmed by BURCKHARDT's final words, "I do hope that I shall meet you often." Nothing definite was said, however, but an early meeting between K. and Dr BRACHLÄUFER was agreed upon.

During the second part of the talks BURCKHARDT also brought up two personal requests. One concerned the release of a close relative of Gen. De GAULLE, Genevieve (?) de GAULLE, the other the release of a personal friend of BURCKHARDT's, the Polish Countess LANCHEWSKA.

3. Developments between 12 March and 23 April

Upon his return to BERLIN, K. reported the results of his talks to RIBBENTROP and sent his adjutant NaIZ to HINBLER to inform the latter of BURCKHARDT's requests. All BURCKHARDT's suggestions, with the exception of the exchange of prisoners of war, were approved. The latter subject, BURCKHARDT was informed, was left under discussion between the German Foreign Office and Switzerland as the protecting power.

During the second half of March and early April a number of letters were exchanged between K. and BURCKHARDT concerning details of the exchange plan. Matters of political nature were, however, not touched upon in this correspondence. There was also set up in KONSTANZ a small committee which dealt with the technical details of the BURCKHARDT exchange plan. The German representative on this committee was Oberregierungsrat GROSSING of Amt IV.

K. later heard from SCHLLENBERG (who had received a letter from his contact man FRANK in Switzerland) that BURCKHARDT had spoken to DULLES about the meeting and had expressed himself very favorably about K.'s personality and ideas. K. was very happy to learn about this positive reaction on BURCKHARDT's part. However, since SCHLLENBERG was not supposed to know anything about the DULLES affair, K. was not too pleased to get the story from him. K. suspects that FRANK's letter was actually addressed to him, and that SCHLLENBERG failed to give it to him because he wanted to keep it as evidence against K.

About 19 April K. asked BURCKHARDT for another meeting with representatives of the Red Cross.

4. Meeting with Drs BRACHLÄUFER and LEYER on 23 April 1945

On 23 April K. met BURCKHARDT's two representatives in INNSBRUCK. He knew BRACHLÄUFER already from the FELDKIRCH meeting and he had, in the meantime (about 30 March) met LEYER in BERLIN. The talks lasted from 1600 to 2200 hours, the first 3½ hours being devoted to Red Cross matters. K. promised to continue his efforts to carry out the arrangements made at the FELDKIRCH meeting. He offered to contact KESSELRING to obtain permission for the passage of internees through the lines and he actually radioed KESSELRING about this.
The second part of the meeting was spent in the discussion of political matters. K. repeated the statements he had made to BURCKHARDT and asked BRACHLANN and LEYER to report to BURCKHARDT that he had not changed his opinions in any way since the meeting of 12 March. He added that he had been very pleased to hear that BURCKHARDT had spoken to DULLES about their talks.

Both BRACHLANN and LEYER expressed the same fear concerning Russia which BURCKHARDT had voiced in the earlier meeting. LEYER seemed to agree with all of K.'s ideas, while BRACHLANN had some reservations on questions of "social philosophy".

This political discussion did not bring any tangible results but K. felt that he had won new friends, and that BURCKHARDT would now be even more convinced of the sincerity of his Austrian plans than before.

A Swiss request to permit the children of the Belgian King to proceed to Switzerland was also discussed at this meeting. K. acceded immediately and on the following day went to STROBL, where he contacted LIEZER, the German caretaker of the castle in which King LEOPOLE was living. The King, however, replied that he preferred to have his children stay with him.

His request was to fall into the hands of the Western Allies and not into the hands of the Russians. K. transmitted the King's reaction to Dr. BRACHLANN.

There was no further contact between K. and Red Cross representatives after 23 April.
KALTENBRUNNER's Contact with Count POTOCKI

PRISONER: O/Gruf KALTENBRUNNER, Ernst
DATE: 28 June 1945

In February 1945 KALTENBRUNNER heard from GOETTSCH and WANECK that Count POTOCKI, a Polish nobleman with excellent contacts abroad, had asked for a permit to go to Switzerland. KALTENBRUNNER saw another chance of getting in touch with the Allies and issued the exit permit arranging a meeting with POTOCKI before his departure.

This took place in SALZBURG early in March. Shortly after K. and POTOCKI had begun their conversation, NEUBACHER happened to call. K. was very happy to have NEUBACHER join in the talk. K. describes POTOCKI as a Polish "chauvinist", far more anti-Russian than anti-German. Basing his remarks on the common fear of Russia, K. spoke of his Austrian plans. He believes that his realistic presentation impressed POTOCKI. The latter agreed that RIBBENTROP's inactivity was disastrous and that, in the absence of any efforts of the German Foreign Office, other ways had to be found to establish contact with the Western Allies. POTOCKI promised to report K.'s views to his diplomatic friends abroad. POTOCKI named some of those friends, but K. cannot recall their names. Except for POTOCKI's rather vague promise the conversation had no tangible results.
KALTENBRUNNER says that the Japanese gave very little intelligence information to the Germans. Occasionally they would give SCHELLHUBER a report on the United States, but generally speaking they appeared very poorly informed about both Britain and the United States. They asked the Germans very naive questions about the two countries, and KALTENBRUNNER believes that this ignorance was genuine. Information about themselves was always optimistic. Reports about their own air strength especially were obviously exaggerated.

K. claims that the Germans were more willing to impart information. Exactly no much was furnished to the Japanese, K. is unable to state since the exchange of information was handled by the Wehrmacht Führungs Stabs. He heard that there was a Führer Befehl according to which everything was to be shown to the Japanese, including new weapons. He is sure that this applied to the Navy and the Air Force, but does not know whether it included Army information.

In all their talks with leading Germans the Japanese tried to promote their idea of a Russo-German re-approachment. On the other hand they were apparently concerned over the possibility of German negotiations with the Western Allies.

When it became known that HESSE had attempted to contact the British and Americans, Ambassador OSHIMA expressed his surprise to RIBBENTROP at the letter's sending HESSE to Sweden without informing the Japanese. Upon the Germans' denial that HESSE had been acting officially, OSHIMA asked whether HESSE was still alive, since such behavior by a subordinate in Japan would have led to his immediate execution. Later OSHIMA tried to contact MOSCOW, but told the Germans that there was no sign that the Russians were interested in a German offer.

Early in Jan 45 KALTENBRUNNER gave a party for the Japanese diplomats in BERLIN. As far as exchange of intelligence was concerned, this party was a failure. SCHELLHUBER blamed this on the fact that much of the Japanese intelligence personnel, including SATO (?), the most important intelligence man, had moved to Switzerland in Nov 44. At that time about 30 members of the BERLIN embassy, out of a total of 80, left Germany and went to Switzerland.

K. remembers the following Japanese personalities:

a. Admiral KOSHIMA, probably Naval Attache in BERLIN

b. Gen KOKATSU (or KOKASU), probably Military Attache in BERLIN
c. Admiral ABE, was said to be the "guerritor of the anti-Gemintern pact". K. thinks he was an important man in the Japanese intelligence set-up. ABE pretended not to understand German, but actually spoke it very well.

d. Col OKINAWA (or OKAHAMA), worked under KOMATSU. He usually gave the official report on the situation in the Far East when joint German-Japanese meetings were held. A very active, very cordial (Jap style) individual.

e. SAKO (exact name not known to K.), military attache in Sweden. K. never met him, but heard of him in connection with the HESS visit.

f. SATO (exact name not known to K.), held ambassador rank. Was Chief of the Japanese Intelligence Service in Europe. Was with BERLIN embassy until Nov 44, then moved to Switzerland. K. believes that Sato went to Switzerland primarily to find out from there whether the Nazis were starting peace negotiations.

g. JAMAILE was Consul General at VIENNA when K. was HSSPf there. K. and JAMAILE's families became quite friendly. Later JAMAILE became Japanese Minister at SOPHIA, but left his family in STELOL (Austria) where K.'s family lived. Early Feb 45 JAMAILE's family went to live in Switzerland (near a lake in NW Switzerland). JAMAILE himself was last heard of in Turkey.
KALTENBRUNNER gives the following account of a half-hearted attempt by RIBBENTROP to enter into negotiations with the Russians:

A former member of the German Foreign Office, Dr KLEIST, was working with the Red Cross on the transportation of Latvian and Lithuanian refugees to Sweden. In this work Dr KLEIST met a Latvian, CLAUS (or KLAUS), at the end of 1943 or early in 1944 who, in turn, introduced him to two other Latvians at his hotel in STOCKHOLM. These men had a discussion on Russian affairs during which Dr KLEIST found that the others were surprisingly well informed on Russia. Dr KLEIST felt that they were sounding him out. Another meeting was arranged between Dr KLEIST and CLAUS to which the latter brought two (?) other persons who were probably Russians. These persons requested Dr KLEIST to inform them in about two weeks as to whether he had powers to negotiate for the Germans. If so, a Russian representative would continue the conversation. KALTENBRUNNER cannot remember the name of this Russian representative but believes that it started with the letter A.

Dr KLEIST reported his contact to RIBBENTROP who was interested but, fearing to act on his own initiative, told HITLER about the matter. HITLER refused to allow anything to be done.

KALTENBRUNNER heard about the contact from SCHELLENBERG who had been interested in the intelligence side of the affair. About six months later Dr KLEIST paid a visit to KALTENBRUNNER. He was a Russophile and rather emotional and spoke very bitterly about RIBBENTROP who had prevented him from seeing the Russian representatives again. He also reported that the Russians had apparently made a second attempt to get in touch with the Germans and had sent representatives to STOCKHOLM. They had waited there a week for the Germans, and when nobody came, had left. In connection with the second attempt, about which SCHELLENBERG was also informed though he had no part in it, KALTENBRUNNER remembers the name DEKANASOV who, he thinks, was a secretary in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

A report on one of the attempts appeared in the press and was followed, KALTENBRUNNER believes, by a Russian denial.

Description of Dr KLEIST: 1.77 m slender graying black hair occasionally wears pince-nez about 41 yrs