Name: von PAPEN, Franz

Nationality: German

Positions:
Reichskanzler (Reich Chancellor), 2 June 1932 - 17 November 1932
Vize-Kanzler (Vice Chancellor) 30 January 1933 - 26 July 1934
Reichskommissar für das Saargebiet (Reich Commissioner for the Saar Territory), 14 November 1933 - 26 July 1934
Deutscher Botschafter in besonderer Mission in Wien (German Ambassador on Special Mission in Vienna), 26 July 1934 - 4 March 1938
Deutscher Botschafter in Ankara (German Ambassador in Ankara), 29 April 1938 - August 1944

Birth Date and Place: 29 October 1879, Werl in Westphalia, 1/

Military History: After graduation from the Kadettenanstalt (Cadet School) in Berlin-Lichterfelde, he decided on a military career. In 1898 he entered the Fifth Regiment of the Ulanen (cavalry) in Düsseldorf and was commissioned a Lieutenant in the same year. He became a rider and took part in many horse races. In 1908 he was promoted to First Lieutenant. He later transferred to the first Regiment of the Guard-Ulanen, in which he became a Rittmeister (captain). During his military career he attended the Kriegsschule (Military Academy) from which he graduated, securing the right to enter the Prussian General Staff. In 1922 he was appointed Captain in the General Staff and was one of the youngest officers of this grade in that department, 1/ 2/

Papen was sent to Washington as Military Attaché to the German Embassy in 1914. Concurrently he was appointed Military Attaché to the German legation in Mexico.
Military History (cont'd.):

After the outbreak of war in 1914, he is reported to have tried to organize large-scale sabotage of United States industry and shipping which was working for the Allies. He also was in contact with the Mexican bandit, Pancho Villa, in order to create difficulties for the United States from this quarter. He had some initial success until the American authorities became aware of his subversive activities. When it was clearly established that von Papen and his colleague, the Naval Attaché, Roy-Pd, were behind numerous plots against American industrial organizations, the United States Government -- at that time still at peace with Germany -- asked that he be recalled by his government. On his journey home he carried a list of the persons who had worked for him in the United States and the sums he had paid them. This list fell into the hands of the British who searched the ship which von Papen had boarded. Back in Germany, he was sent to the Western front and became a staff officer in the Fourth Infantry Division of the Imperial Guard. He took part in the battles of the Somme and Arras. Later he was transferred to Turkey and appointed chief of staff of the Fourth Ottoman Army, with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. When the offensive launched by the British Army forced him to retreat from his headquarters, which were located in Nazareth at the time, he left behind a box containing highly confidential material. After World War I, Papen was released from the army and retired to his estate, Herfeld, near Detl, Westphalia, 1/3/ 4/9/.

Work and Political History:

A devout Catholic, Papen joined the Catholic Center Party. This party elected him to the Prussian Diet in 1921 and again in 1925. In the 1928 election, however, he was not returned to the Prussian Diet because his own party had listed him only in tenth place for the constituency of Westphalia-North. As a result of the death of one of the deputies, Papen again served in the Prussian Diet from 1930-1932, 1/2/9/.

He belonged to the extreme right wing of the Center Party and was strongly opposed the collaboration of the Center Party with the Social Democrats in the Reich and Prussian governments, 7/ 7/ In 1928, when Wilhem Marx, the leader of the Center Party, used a coalition of Centrists, Democrats, and Social Democrats to form a Prussian government (which at that time had only a small working majority in the Diet), Papen and two other right-wing members of the Center Party voted against this government, almost causing its defeat, 9/. Von Papen's action aroused much bitterness among the members of the Center Party. This bitterness increased a few weeks later when he opposed Marx, his own party chief, and sided with von Hindenburg in the election of a new Reich President after the death of President Ebert. Thereupon the Westphalian provincial congress of the Center Party asked von Papen for an explanation of his rebellious attitude. Many delegates were said to have favored his exclusion from the party. Papen, however, defended himself in an impassioned speech which was a profession of faith in the ideals of the Center Party. He closed his speech with the words: "I have lived as a faithful member of the Center Party, and I intend to die as such. And when I shall have died you will write on my tombstone: 'Here lies a faithful member of the Center Party.'" 9/ Under the spell of this speech, the majority of the delegates abstained from expulsion and voted instead for a motion censuring von Papen because of his lack of party discipline, 7/.

CONFIDENTIAL
Papen became one of the leading members of the Horrenklub in Berlin, a gathering place for right-wing aristocrats and businessmen. He became a close friend of Colonel von Hindenburg, who served his father as a kind of adjutant. Papen was also introduced to General von Schleicher, the influential head of the Heeresamt (Army office in the War Ministry). Schleicher saw in Papen a man who could win considerable parts of the Catholic population from the Center Party into the camp of the parties of the right. Then the Brüning government as disliked by Hindenburg, because representatives of the big landowners in eastern Germany had convinced Hindenburg that Brüning's agrarian policy would lead to the "bolshevisation" of German agriculture, Schleicher suggested Papen as Brüning's successor. Hindenburg, who liked the former staff officer and cavalryman, acquiesced immediately. Papen assured him that he would win the support of the Center Party. Although certain of his election to the chancellorship, he still found it necessary to try to allay the suspicions of the Center Party. The very day, he was appointed Chancellor, he told the President of the Center Party, Prelate Kaas, that he would not think of accepting such an offer. Prelate Kaas, therefore, was very much disturbed when he learned of Papen's nomination and, in a now famous declaration, stigmatized him as the "Judas of the Center Party," 9/. So unanimous was the irritation of the Centerists that Papen's efforts to win at least some support from Catholic circles were a complete failure. The members of the Catholic hierarchy rejected von Papen's overtures and considered him a traitor. Even the newspaper Germania, the Berlin organ of the Center Party, which which he owned shares, attacked him in no uncertain terms, 9/. Papen had owned these Germania shares since 1921. Originally this stock had been the property of Matthias Frzberg, leader of the Center Party's left wing, and one-time Reich Minister of Finance, who led the Center Party into a coalition with the Social Democrats. In order not to be known agnostic of the Germania stock, Frzberg had nominally transferred them to a certain Herr Siomer, a wealthy Catholic business man in Berlin. Then Frzberg was assassinated in 1921, Papen, who knew that Siomer was only the nominal owner of the shares, persuaded the latter to sell him the shares and thus he became the owner of the Germania. Source says that Papen clashed continuously with the administrators and the editors of the paper because of their adherence to the official party line, 9/. Papen first established contact with Hitler in the spring of 1932, 6/. In view of the impending overthrow of Chancellor Brüning, Papen met with Hitler on 28 May 1932 to discuss Papen’s plans for forming a government, 6/. In return for the promise that the Reichstag would be dissolved, new elections held, and the ban placed by the Brüning government on Hitler’s Storm Troops (SA), on uniforms, and political demonstrations would be lifted, Hitler agreed to tolerate a Papen government, 6/. On 1 June 1932 Hindenburg appointed Papen Reich Chancellor. Papen set about forming a Präsidentkabinett, that is, a cabinet which did not reflect the composition of the Reichstag, but governed by virtue of the fact that it was backed by the Reich President. Papen failed not only to fulfill Schleicher’s hope that he would win the support of the Center Party or at least large parts of the Catholic population. He also had some difficulties with the Nazis. Thus, on 3 June 1932, Hitler refused the Papen government a written Tolerierungserklärung (declaration of toleration). The Papen government was composed confidential
Work and Political History (cont’d.):

exclusively of old Prussian conservatives, most of the aristocrats, and the economic and social policies which he adopted in the face of the grave economic crisis of 1932 was merely a continuation of the deflationary policies of his predecessor, Brühning, 9/. The Nazis, capitalizing on the disappointment of the broad masses, therefore felt obliged to express their opposition to von Papen.

Papen commuted the death sentence of two Nazi SA men who had been guilty of murdering in cold blood a Polish youth in the village of Potemba, Upper Silesia. Hitler later freed these murderers. On 13 June 1932 Hitler called on Papen and demanded the lifting of the ban against the SA, 6/. Under this pressure, despite the determined opposition of Bavaria, Württemberg, and Baden, Papen issued an emergency decree (Notverordnung gegen politische Ausschreitungen) on 14 June 1932, removing the ban on the SA, uniforms, and political demonstrations, 6/.

Meanwhile Papen planned his great coup d’etat. One of his aims was to overthrow the Weimar coalition government in Prussia and to replace it with a government favorable to the Reichswehr and in sympathy with its rearmament projects. On 20 July 1932 Papen became Reichskommissar für Preußen (Reich Commissioner for Prussia) on the basis of Article 48 of the Republican Constitution, after repeated demands to this effect had been made by Kerrl, Nazi President of the Prussian Diet. Papen promptly deposed the Braun-Severing Prussian government with the support of the military. Then he initiated a sweeping purge of all higher officials loyal to the Republic. The army supported von Papen and the Nazis backed his coup d'etat in Prussia. The republican government abstained from counter-measures, such as the mobilisation of the police forces and organization of a general strike of the workers. The government merely accused Papen of violating the constitution and left his fate entirely in the hands of the Supreme Court. The court ruled that Papen was de jure a violator of the constitution and that the old Prussian government was still in office, but that von Papen should have the right to appoint commissioners to rule the Prussian state de facto. Papen's coup d'etat in Prussia, which had aroused bitter enmity in the ranks of the democratic forces in Germany, as had the betrayal of Brühning, provoked the enmity of the Centrists. The coup thus created another foe for von Papen: the governments of the states in southern Germany who feared for their own security after Papen’s actions in Prussia.

The prime ministers of Bavaria and Württemberg, Held and Bolz, attacked him strongly in a session of the Reichsrat, 1/ 4/ 9/.

Meanwhile the hostility of the Nazis was increasing. On 30 August 1932, the NSDAP negotiated with the Center Party about the formation of a new government, as a means of bringing pressure to bear against Papen, 6/. The Prussian Diet, despite the opposing votes of the nationalist parties, voted for a non-confidence motion for Papen as Reich Commissioner for Prussia, 6/. On 12 September 1932, Göring, Nazi president of the Reichstag, in agreement with Hitler, decided to take energetic measures against von Papen. At the second meeting of the new Reichstag, Göring brought to a vote the Communist motion to lift the Notverordnung zur Belebung der Wirtschaft (Emergency Decree for the Reconstruction of German Economy) (decreed on 4 September 1932), combined with a
Viork and Political History (cont'd.):

non-confidence motion in the Papen government. These motions were accepted by an overwhelming vote (512-42). However, the motion remained without the desired effect because Hindenburg had previously dissolved the Reichstag on the basis of Article 25 of the Reich constitution.

Papen, however, showed no disposition to resign. Hitler then asked for an audience with Hindenburg but was not well received. Although the Deutsch-nationalist parties were able to gain part of the two million votes lost by the Nazis in the ensuing election, the Papen government was still in a hopeless minority.

Hindenburg had just returned from the Lausanne Conference. He pretended to have achieved acceptance in principle of Germany's claim to equal rights in questions of armaments. At that time he thought that he would be able to win the French over to his point of view. As a member of the Franco-German Research Committee organized by the industrialists of both countries, he considered himself a specialist in Franco-German questions. This committee had been created on the initiative of the Luxembourg industrialist, Bayrisch, who as head of the famous Abed concern, took a keen interest in Franco-German cartelization.

On 21 October 1932 Hitler published a letter which he had written to Papen on 16 October 1932. The letter set forth Hitler's negative stand on Papen's domestic and foreign policies and replied to Papen's speech on 12 October in Munich where he had presented his justification of the results of the Lausanne Conference. Less than a month later, on 13 November 1932, Papen invited Hitler to come to Berlin to discuss the formation of a new government. Hitler, however, declined and proposed, instead, a written exchange of views.

Finally Papen's erstwhile protector, General Schleicher, had to intervene and convince Hindenburg that this unpopular Chancellor would have to be dismissed. Hindenburg agreed reluctantly and is said to have given his photograph to Papen with the inscription: "Ich hatte einen Kameraden" (I had a comrade), taken from an old soldiers' song. Papen resigned as chancellor and as Reich Commissioner for Prussia on 17 November 1932.

Papen then tried with all means at his disposal to undermine the position of his successor, General Schleicher. Together with his friend, Oskar von Hindenburg, and with Dr. Meiser, Under Secretary of State assigned to the Reich President, it was decided that the time had come to approach the Nazis and to offer them the Government. The necessary steps with President Hindenburg himself were to be taken by his friends and neighbors, the representatives of the Prussian landowner, whom he trusted most. They had to instigate that Schleicher, too, was contaminated by "agrarian bolshevism."

The plans for removing Schleicher were skillfully drawn. The Junkers spoke to Hindenburg and openly opposed the Reich Chancellor. Hindenburg Jr. and Meiser approached the Nazis in Berlin. The decisive event, however, was the meeting on 4 January 1933 of Papen and Hitler at the home of Kurt von Schroeder in Cologne.
Schroeder was a Rhenish banker and industrialist who had been supporting Hitler and his party financially for some time. Papen had arranged for the meeting and had convinced Hitler on the one hand and the leaders of the old reactionary parties—the industrialists, the monarchists, the military, and the great landowners—on the other hand, that the hour had come to bring the Nazis into the government and to abolish the Republic. Papen's biography in Das Deutsche Führerlexikon (1934-1935) correctly asserts that his political activities made possible the rise of Hitler to power, 2/. In Schroeder's home the schedule for the distribution of the portfolios in the proposed Hitler government was agreed upon. On 16 January 1933 Hitler and Papen continued their discussions. Hindenburg was easily convinced. On Hindenburg's behalf Papen carried on "the very difficult negotiations" concerning the formation of a new government. Papen finally succeeded in persuading Hugenberg, leader of the industrialists, to agree to the appointment of Hitler, 6/ 7/. Thus, when the Schleicher Cabinet resigned on 28 January 1933, the chancellorship was offered to Hitler.

Papen became Vice-Chancellor in the Hitler government which took office on 30 January 1933. He held this position until 26 July 1934. On 6 February 1933, Papen was also appointed Reich Commissioner for Prussia, with the authority previously vested in the Staatministerium (State Ministry), 1/ 6/. This latter position, however, he held only until 10 April 1933.

On 5 February 1933 Papen received the Bavarian Staatsrat (State Councilor) Schäffer who presented a memorandum from the Bavarian Prime Minister protesting against the centralization of authority in Berlin. Papen undertook to reassure Schäffer of his (Papen's) belief in the federalistic foundation of the Reich and in the rights of the individual states. Papen further maintained that these fears on the part of the Bavarian government with respect to the newly appointed Reich (Hitler) government were unfounded. Nevertheless, Schäffer returned to Munich completely dissatisfied with Papen's concept of law. The following months were to confirm Schäffer's apprehensions, 7/ (p. 44).

Papen and Labor Minister Soldà reached an agreement with Hugenberg (10 February 1933). The latter two, running for the Reichstag on the German National ticket, decided to use the motto Kampffront Schwarz-Weiss-Rot. Papen supported this group but did not himself run. Instead he was elected to the Reichstag on the Reichswahlvorschlag, that is, he was sent to the Reichstag on the Deutschnationale Volkspartei (German "national People's Party" ticket at large on 6 March 1933. He remained a member of the Reichstag (as a visitor) until 1945, 7/ 3/.

On the occasion of expelling of nationalist student fraternities of Berlin University (21 February 1933), von Papen delivered a significant address. The following pertinent words are quoted: 7/ (p. 66)

"The national movement has seized power. We know that it is more difficult to maintain power than to seize it. And the leaders of the national movement ought not to make the mistake of thinking that power can be maintained by intellectual manipulation. Rather, it is necessary to carry the spirit of future developments within oneself and give it expression. This is possible only if we gain a perspective of the political forms in which the national movement..."
came to power. We have appealed to the masses and have nationalized them. This was necessary and must be carried out completely. But no one denies that the parties standing left of us love their native land and affirm their nationality. But in return, these parties should break with all pacifistic and demoralizing tendencies. Then the road will be clear and we will not be forced to conduct this cleansing process by force.

When the Reichstatthaltergesetz (Reich Governor Law, for the coordination of the German states) was proclaimed (11 April 1933), von Papen resigned as Reich Commissioner because, under the new law, Hitler was empowered to function as Reichstatthalter (Governor) of Prussia and also had the right to appoint a Prussian Prime Minister. Thus he appointed Göring as chief of the Prussian Government. Actually, Papen then had to write an official letter asking that he be released from his position as Reich Commissioner. Hitler thanked Papen for "his great service in removing dualism between the Reich and Prussia and for spreading the idea of a unified political leadership in the Reich and the Länder (states)." 7/ (p.171).

But Papen continued to serve the Nazis as Vice Chancellor and was useful to them in his religious status as a devout Catholic. In July 1933 he was sent to Rome with the Bavarian Nazi leader and Ministerialdirektor Gutmann to negotiate the Reich Concordat with the Holy See. This concordat, extremely favorable to the Church, was therefore greeted with enthusiasm by ecclesiastical circles and by broad masses of the faithful in Germany. But the ink of the signatures was scarcely dry when the Nazis began to violate most of the articles of the agreement, 6/ 7/ 9/.

A national referendum was held on 13 November 1933 to "confirm" Hitler's decision to withdraw from the League of Nations. In the name of the Reich Government, Papen reaffirmed his loyalty to Hitler and expressed admiration of the "genius of Hitler's leadership" which had placed the National Socialist Movement in command of the total state, 7/ (p. 558).

At a session of the Reich cabinet (14 November 1933), Hitler gave Papen a new assignment. Papen became Saarbefehlshaber der Reichsregierung (Reich Plenipotentiary for the Saar), for the purpose of carrying on German propaganda in this, the home district of his wife. It is significant that he employed methods which he had first used when he was German Military Attaché in the United States. His assignment having been carried out, he resigned as Saar Commissioner on 26 July 1934, 1/ 2/ 6/ 7/.

Papen was involved in the purge of 20 June 1934. This purge was directed against the "radical" leaders of the SA (so that Hitler might enjoy the unlimited support of the Reichswehr and the industrialists) and against the "reactionaries" (so that the totalitarian regime might never pass into hands other than those of the Nazi leaders). Papen had a high place on the list of reactionaries. Knowing that Hitler wanted to strike the "radicals", Papen had advocated for some time a certain moderation of the Nazi dictatorial system. In mid-June
1934 he made a speech in Marburg, in which he declared that the Third Reich should cease to be a one-party state, that certain liberties should be given back to the press and other institutions of public opinion, and that the restoration of the monarchy should be considered a possible form of government for Germany. This speech, written by one of Papan's secretaries, the journalist Jung, infuriated the Nazis. Only the intervention of Hindenburg and apparently the feeling of the Nazis that Papan could be useful for diplomatic and related missions rescued him from the list of the intended victims, drawn up for Berlin and Northern Germany by Göring. Papan's personal adversary. His secretary, Jung, however, and another of his secretaries, a von Rose, were killed.

Several weeks later, on 26 July 1934, Papan's usefulness was demonstrated. After the assassination of the Austrian Chancellor, Engelbert Dollfuss, by Austrian Nazis and the ill-fated intervention of the German Minister in Vienna in their behalf, the tension between Berlin and Vienna was so great that the position of the German Minister in Vienna, in normal times a sinecure, had become the most difficult task a German diplomat could face. Hitler offered Papan this position—with the title of Deutscher Botschafter in besonderer Mission in Wien (German Ambassador on Special Mission to Vienna)—presuming that Papan would take a good impression on Austrian Catholic circles. Their first revolt at the idea of having to accept the "Judas of the Center Party" (see above) as German Minister in their midst. The new Chancellor, Kurt von Schuschnigg, was prepared to refuse Papan's acceptance. Then the head of the Association of Austrian Catholic Noblemen, the Duke of Schönburg-Hartenstein, intervened and asked the Austrian Chancellor to accept Papan, lest the Nazis assassinate him (Schuschnigg). Schuschnigg thereupon agreed and von Papan proceeded to Vienna. He had to move with great caution; his former activities had provoked too many suspicions to allow him quick action, in view of his goal, namely the realization of the Anschluss (incorporation of Austria with Germany), 3/ 4/ 5/.

On the second anniversary of his appointment to the post in Vienna, Papan was honored by Hitler with the new title of Ausserordentlicher und bevollmächtigter Botschafter in besonderer Mission in Wien (Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary on Special Mission in Vienna), 6//. Papan remained in this position until 4 February 1938, at which time—but a few days before the Anschluss apparently his mission was accomplished, 6/.

The three-and-a-half years that von Papan spent in Vienna apparently were full of intrigue. On the one hand, he did all in his power to satisfy Hitler and the Nazis and to lure the Austrian government into Hitler's power. Thus, after great difficulties had been overcome, he brought about the treaty of friendship and non-aggression signed between Germany and Austria in July 1936, 6//. (This success may well have earned him the title bestowed on him by Hitler a short time later).

The former secretary to the Austrian Federal President, Guido Schmidt, whom Schuschnigg appointed Under-Secretary of State and acting Foreign Minister and who became Foreign Minister after the Berchtesgaden agreement, was Papan's
Austrian partner. Schréd, according to reports, was "one of the most
evil and immoral traitors" in Schuschnigg's personal entourage. On
the other hand, while von Papen conspired against Austria's independence
and tried to find ways and means to accomplish the Anschluss, he was also
conspiring against the Nazis. His secretary, Baron von Ketteler, a scion
of the famous Westphalian family of aristocrats and a sincere anti-Nazi,
brought copies of numerous secret documents and other information to the
Austrian authorities, informing them of most of the important happenings
in Germany and warning the Austrian government of all significant steps
to be taken by the Nazis. Papen was well aware of those activities of
his secretary and encouraged him, only to betray and desert him when,
after the occupation of Austria, the Gestapo learned what had become of the
secrets of the German Legation during the preceding years, 2⁄.

Papen knew that the Nazis were also plotting against him. On the occasion
of a raid on the illegal Nazi center on Teinfaltstrasse, Vienna, the Austrian
police found the R.H. Document (frequently referred to as the Tavs Document).
R.H. (Rudolf Hess) was the author of a plan to find the pretext for invasion
of Austria by German troops. Nazi agents disguised as Austrian patriots were
to murder von Papen and thus give the German government the opportunity to
assure control of Vienna. The Austrian Government informed Papen about the
R.H. project. The result was that Papen r-doubled his efforts to please
Hitler and to make him a gift of his homeland. Armed with the R.H. Document,
Schuschnigg thought it easy to confront Hitler and to accuse him of having
violated the Austria-Germany treaty of July 1936. But Papen and Guido Schmidt
lured him into the trap set at Berchtesgaden, the outcome of which was that
Schuschnigg was confronted with an ultimatum which virtually made it impossible
to continue an independent Austrian government. A few days before the meeting,
Papen was mysteriously recalled to Germany from his position in Vienna, met
with Hitler, and returned to Austria with an invitation for Schuschnigg to go
to Berchtesgaden. The outcome of which was that
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to continue an independent Austrian government. A few days before the meeting,
Papen was mysteriously recalled to Germany from his position in Vienna, met
with Hitler, and returned to Austria with an invitation for Schuschnigg to go
to Berchtesgaden. Papen's mission to Austria had been fulfilled and he resigned
as German Ambassador to Austria on 4 March 1938, one week before the Anschluss
was proclaimed, 2⁄. He retired temporarily to his wife's estate in Hallerfangen,
Saar District. A few weeks later, the body of his secretary, Baron von Ketteler,
was found floating in the Danube, 3⁄ 6⁄ 9⁄.

For one year, Papen's retirement was complete. He is not known to have taken
part in the crisis over Czechoslovakia. On 29 April 1939, as the war clouds
were gathering, he was appointed German Ambassador to Turkey and remained in
this post until Turkey severed diplomatic relations with Germany in August
1944, 8⁄ 10⁄. His mission in Ankara was also clear. He had to win Turkey
over to the Axis or at least to prevent her from entering the war on the side of
the Allies. He was, furthermore, said to have been the head of the large
network of German spies and agents scattered throughout the Middle East, 11⁄.
The same source credits Papen in large part for the arrangement of the Russo-
German pact of non-aggression in August 1939 which enabled Hitler to undertake
the war against Poland. This source tells of secret meetings between Papen
and the Russian Ambassador to Turkey on a fishing boat on the Bosporus. This
report, however, is as yet without confirmation. In Ankara Papen was extremely
active but in retrospect does not appear to have been really successful. He
could not win Turkey over to the Axis and prevented her from joining the United
Nations only so long as Germany had a chance to win the war, 9⁄.
Work and Political History (cont'd.):

On 25 February 1942 an attempt was made on Papen’s life in Ankara, 12/4. But the premature explosion of the bomb saved his life. Papen demanded an investigation. The plot was attributed to several "Yugoslav Communists" who were arrested and imprisoned until Turkey severed diplomatic relations with Germany in 1944.

On 25 July 1944, five days after the abortive anti-Nazi putsch, Papen sent Hitler a telegram from Ankara, in which he reaffirmed his loyalty to the Führer, 13/4. After his return to Germany, Papen received the Ritterkreuz (Knight’s Cross) from Hitler (16 August 1944) in recognition of his services to the German government, 14/4.

In recent years there have been countless rumors about Papen’s activities. He was said to be trying to negotiate peace with the Allies. He was often reported to be in disgrace with the Führer and at other times was said to be the most influential man in Hitler’s councils. On numerous occasions it was said that Papen would be ready on short notice to remove Hitler, form a government, and make peace with the Allies. Again, he was mentioned as about to leave Ankara for a post in Lisbon or Madrid. On 8 February 1946 it was even reported that Hitler planned to relinquish the chancellorship to Papen with a view to getting Germany out of the war, 15/4. Most of these rumors, no doubt, were greatly exaggerated although they give an indication of the vast intrigues in which Papen was engaged.

After his return from Turkey, Papen retired. Nothing more was heard about his activities—if any—thereafter. He was captured by U.S. troops at a hunting lodge near Stockhausen, Ruhr District, 16 April 1945, 16/4. As of 15 June 1945, Papen was listed among the high-ranking personalities in custody at the Allied detention camp, ASCAN, 17/4.

Summary:

Franz von Papen has had a long career in the service of the German government. Under the Empire he served as Military Attache to the German Embassy in Washington. Under the Republic he was a member of the Prussian Diet, and, in 1932, Reich Chancellor. He was the prime figure in the events which led to Hitler’s assumption of power. Under Hitler he was Vice Chancellor for a time. In 1934 he became German Ambassador to Austria and in this capacity aided substantially in undermining the independence of Austria. He became German Ambassador to Turkey in March 1938 and held this position until Turkey severed diplomatic relations with Germany in August 1944.

Papen has thus been a political opportunist throughout his career. He has represented reactionary policies in Germany and has engaged in widespread intrigue and espionage abroad. Above all, his connivance did much to bring Hitler to power. Although von Papen was never formally affiliated with the Nazi Party, evidence indicates that he has been a Nazi collaborationist of the highest order and an instigator of Nazi aggression.
von Papen, Franz

Sources:

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4/ Current Biography, 1941
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11/ Koves, Tibor: The Devil in Top Hat, New York 1941
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