PERSONS AND ORGANIZATIONS IMPLICATED, AND SUBJECTS

1. RIBBENTROP
   a. Relationship with Hitler (p.1-5)
      (1) Party affiliation (p.44)
   b. Negotiations for peace treaty with France (p.6-7)
   c. Reasons for attack on Belgium and Holland (p.9-10)
   d. Knowledge of plans for attack on Denmark and Norway (p.10)
      (1) Relationship with Quisling Government (p.11-12)
   e. Knowledge of plans for attack on Yugoslavia and Greece
      (p.13-14)
   f. Attitude toward rearmament (p.20,21,32)
   g. Attitude toward internal control of Germany by the
      police (p.32,33)
   h. Knowledge of concentration camps (p.34)
   i. Knowledge of persecution of Jews (p.34-35)
   j. Attitude toward and negotiations with Russia (p.22-23,26,
      27,37)

2. HITLER
   a. Theory of Germanic race (p.5-6,15)
   b. Preparation for war against Russia (p.25-26,37,39,41-23)
   c. Effect of Three Power Pact on U.S.A. (p.29)

RELATIONS TO HITLER

Ribbentrop said he had been a loyal supporter of the Fuehrer
to the end, although he disagreed with Hitler's policy in many
respects (p.1). The Foreign Office was generally referred to
as "the house of difficulties", and therefore Ribbentrop, on the
Fuehrer's order, had to take "a very strict and severe views"
regarding difficulties (p.2-5). Hence "I am convinced I have
hundreds of enemies" (p.1,8). Ribbentrop said he dismissed "only
three chiefs of missions", and 150 higher officials at the Fuehrer'
ner's order. 90% of his time he spent "standing up against people
who wanted to engage themselves in foreign policy" and tried to
"mix up interior policy with foreign policy". (p.3)
Joachim von Ribbentrop, 30 Aug. 1945, a.m.

POLITICAL AND MILITARY MEASURES

Ribbentrop said there was no definite plan of program, nor did Hitler have any desire to dominate Europe, the "idea of a Germanic race" having developed during "the latter part of the war" (p.5-6,15). Ribbentrop tried to conclude a peace treaty with France, but Hitler did not want it because he would have to wage war in case of an invasion (p.6-7). Did not remember any orders to alert army units on 12 November 1938, because "I never participated in these military matters" (p.6).

BELGIUM AND HOLLAND

Ribbentrop's part in connection with the attack on Belgium and Holland was to send notes to those countries after he had seen documents showing there had been connections between the Anglo-French and Belgian-Dutch general staffs, telling them it was necessary for military reasons to occupy their countries (p.7-10).

DENMARK AND NORWAY

Did not remember the date when the decision to occupy Denmark and Norway was made. It was "just about 30 hours" before it was done, and the Foreign Office was kept in the dark (p.10). There had been no previous diplomatic negotiations with those countries, although he remembers vaguely "there had been something with Norway" about the Fuehrer having asked him "to make representations to Norway regarding British mines laid in Norwegian home waters" (p.11-12,15). He knew very little about Quisling since this matter was run by the Party, not the Foreign Office, and only after the establishment of the Quisling government did he hear of Quisling (p.12).

YUGOSLAVIA AND GREECE

The decision to attack Yugoslavia was made because of the Cimovitch putsch, financed by the British. The Fuehrer at the same time decided "very unwillingly" to help the Italians against Greece. Ribbentrop remembered that well because at the time he and Hitler were visiting in France and meeting with France (p.13-14). The Fuehrer thought the Italians, instead of invading Greece from the north, should have occupied Crete so as to have a bridgehead in North Africa (p.14).

It was the Fuehrer's idea to have all wars outside the border of Germany (p.15). The Fuehrer had no plan for aggression, but, as he said once to Ribbentrop: "military necessity forced him from one step to another in Europe" in anticipation of the moves of his enemies (p.16-16).
Joachim von Ribbentrop, 30 Aug. 1945, a.m.

PREPARATIONS FOR AGGRESSIVE WAR

Ribbentrop did not think it was a mistake for Germany to rearm in the first place, as from 1918 - 1933, with "absolutely no power, no army, nothing, it was terrible" (p.20). If the Fuhrer had not come to power, "we would not have been able to perform this patriotic function and would have had civil war" (p.20).

Ribbentrop did not know where Germany might have stopped "politically and militarily" to prevent the disaster of a world war; perhaps she should have "renounced the solution of the Danzig and corridor problem" (p.21).

RUSSIA

Ribbentrop said there was no decision made in July of 1940 to attack the Soviet Union (p.22). In 1939 it had been his idea: (a) to find a bridge between National Socialism and Bolshevism; (b) to make sure there would be no hostilities because "of the difficulty with Poland" (p.22-23). The break with Russia came when during the last part of the French campaign, Ribbentrop received "a telegram from our Herr Schunburger in Moscow" that the Russians would occupy Bessarabia over night. That and the occupation of the Baltic was a surprise to the Fuhrer, and "the Fuhrer spoke already of Russia's expansion measures towards the west" (p.25).

In a first conversation, the Fuhrer told Ribbentrop that he did not want to do anything but observe further Russian policy. In a second conversation, the Fuhrer was: (a) agitated by "reports he had received of further concentrations of Russian troops"; (b) aroused by reports of communist propaganda in German factories. He determined "not to be overrun by Russia and to take military measures against them" (p.25-26). Ribbentrop said he counselled the Fuhrer against such "preventive action", but Hitler would not listen (p.26). He demanded of Ribbentrop "a very clear line about this Russian policy", and "of course, I told him that I would stand behind him" (p.27). Then "for a long time there was really no talk anymore about the Russian attitude" and in 1940, after the French war, Ribbentrop wrote to Stalin "in order to try and sort of clarify the situation in the diplomatic field" (p.27), the idea being also: (a) "bringing Russia nearer to our 3-power pact"; and (b) "to keep the U.S. A. out of war" (p.28). Point (a) proved "very difficult" and "was not possible" (p.30). Molotov came but the talk with the Fuhrer did not go well because Molotov was so "insistent on a number of points" (p.35-36). Then came the Cimovich putsch in Belgrade and Stalin closed a friendship treaty with Cimovich a few days later, which "struck the Fuhrer very much as a sign that his fears regarding Russia were justified" (p.37). Ribbentrop said he tried again to mediate, but the Fuhrer said he had complete information that Russia was prepared to attack Germany, and one day in June he decided "he could not wait until the Russians had finished their preparations".
for attack" (p.37). The military people would know what sort of preparations were being carried out by the Russians. (p.37-38). So "the Fuehrer went into Russia", and the "tremendous victory carried one along" until the winter of 1941-1942, when the German army got stuck before Moscow (p.36). During the war, Ribbentrop said he wanted to come to an agreement with Russia, but Hitler would not have it. The German military people said that if Hitler had not struck first the Russians would have invaded Germany (p.39). Hitler told Ribbentrop several times he "did not know what powers lay behind the Russians" (p.39). Ribbentrop said "I may perhaps add I do not know what really made the Fuehrer change his Russian policy" (p.39). He said he did not know that the Fuehrer had already early in 1940 given orders to prepare for a Russian war, but thought "it is possible", and he had heard from the Fuehrer that he would take "military precaution measures" (p.40). "Of course, it was the habit of the Fuehrer to take all precautionary (military) measures, and at the same time to try to make the policy he wanted to follow up" (p.41). He said the question of Bolshevism was really a minor one. It was the Russian war potential that mattered to Hitler (p.23).

**U.S.A.**

The Fuehrer thought that a result of the 3-power pact would be the strengthening of the "isolationist" and "what we called, the reasonable forces in the U.S.A." (p.39).

**BRITAIN**

Ribbentrop said Hitler was willing to make peace with Britain after Dunkirk (p.30). There was "never" any talk about "any territorial solution" during the whole war when everything went according to the timetable of the general staff (p.31).

**REARMAMENT**

Ribbentrop said he considered the German armament was for "defensive purposes", but since it was the will of the general staff to keep the war outside the borders of Germany, "so, necessarily, all the armaments were of an offensive character" (p.32).

**INTERNAL CONTROL**

Ribbentrop thought the way internal control was exercised was wrong, "and that applied especially to the whole development of the police system" (p.32). He thought the National Socialist idea was "still much too young", and "not such as was right for the German people" (p.33). He had nothing to do with domestic political questions as "I worked 14 - 16 and 18 hours daily on
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foreign policy” (p.33). Only when during the latter months of the war "a sister-in-law of mine was put in a concentration camp, I suddenly got a glimpse of these police measures and things that were going on" (p.34).

CONCENTRATION CAMPS

Claimed he had "not the slightest idea" of what was going on in the concentration camps, saying: "It is extraordinary, but it is the absolute truth" (p.34).

PERSECUTION OF JEWS

He said the first time he heard of "the bad treatment of the Jews" was after the Russian occupation of L"setterling, Poland, thru reports written "from my legations in foreign countries" (p.34). The Fuehrer said he would discuss it with Himmler, but made it clear it was "an internal political matter" (p.35).

PARTY AFFILIATION

Ribbentrop said he held no office in the S.S., but held "the honorary rank" of Obergruppenfuehrer in that outfit, and "most of the ministers and prominent people had an honorary rank in the S.S. or same formation" (p.44).

AGGRESSIVE PLANS

It was neither in 1937 nor later that Hitler had the intention to start war. He always wanted to be strong in case he had to fight. Ribbentrop did not know whether Hitler coined the word "Blitzkrieg" in 1936. In fact "not once in his life did I hear the Fuehrer use the word 'Blitzkrieg'" (p.45). Ribbentrop said Hitler had no intention to attack the western powers in Oct. 1938, "because the western powers, England and France, attacked us thru Poland" (p.47).