OFFICE OF U. S. CHEF OF COUNSEL
FOR THE PROSECUTION OF AXIS CRIMINALITY

INTERROGATION DIVISION SUMMARY

Interrogation of JOACHIM von RIBBENTROP
By: Co. Brundage 31 August, 1945, p. in. Nuremberg

PERSONS AND SUBJECTS IMPLICATED

1. RIBBENTROP
   a. Importance of good relations with U.S.
   b. Appraisal of activities in U.S of
      1) German Bund (4)
      2) Foreign Office (4-5)
      3) Auslandorganisation of Bohle created by Hess (16)
   c. German activities in South America, (5-6), (16-18)

2. HITLER
   a. Attitude toward war with U.S. (11, 12, 16)
   b. Knowledge of Pearl Harbor (20)
      1) Actions against U.S. after Pearl Harbor
   c. Idea of 'Living Space' (Lebensraum) (13)
      (1) Russia (14)

GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS

Thru various press reports and documents found in Warsaw, the Führer got the impression that there were important circles in Washington driving towards war with Germany (p.1-2). Since 1938, when he became Foreign Minister, Ribbentrop said he stressed the importance of good relations with the U.S. (p.3). Did not think there were subversive elements in the U.S. The several German "Bunds" and Kuhn were admittedly "influencing the German elements" there (p.4). However, the Foreign Office, represented by Ambassador Dickhoff, had the principle of not meddling in American affairs (p.4-5), but if there were such activities, the AO (Auslands-Organisation) of Bohle (and created by Hess) (p.16), would be in charge, as it was, for instance in South America (p.5-6, 16-16). Wanted to send Schacht on a goodwill tour to the U.S., but that did not come off (p.6). The Führer said the U.S. had already decided to back Britain and was actually helping her with volunteers and supplies. From 1938 until Pearl Harbor, "no provocation whatever" was committed by Germany against the U.S. (p.7-8). The Führer wanted no war with the U.S. and had no territorial ambitions in the western hemisphere (p.11), because
(a) he knew the American war potential; (b) and there "was no necessity for it". (p.12, 16).

PEARL HARBOR

Pearl Harbor "was a surprise for us. We knew nothing about it (p.20). Ribbentrop said his "main view" of the 3-Power Pact was to keep the U.S. out of the war. Of course, he had seen that relations between the U.S. and Japan were not the best, but felt there was going to be some adjustment of differences (p.21, 23). With Pearl Harbor news at hand, he told the Fuehrer that according to the stipulations of the 3-Power Pact and since Japan had attacked, "we did not have to declare war on the U.S., formally", to which the Fuehrer replied: (a) The U.S. "is already shooting against our ships"; (b) "The 3-Power Pact would be politically dead if Germany did not stand with Japan;" (c) "Give the passports to the U.S. representatives" (p.25-26), Hitler's growing fanaticism (p.29), population policy (p.29) radicalism and racialism (p.30) as factors prolonging the war.

LEbensraum DOCTRINE

The idea of "living space" (Lebensraum) no doubt played a role in the Fuehrer's political thinking. To him, Ribbentrop, however, he never specified anything but stressed the importance of "getting the German minority countries into the Reich" (p.13). There was no program for the conquest of Europe, and then of other countries, at least it was never the subject of discussion between the Fuehrer and himself.

RUSIA

Undoubtedly, "somewhere in the Party", in literature and even in Hitler's book "Mein Kampf" the thought was expressed that Germany could find living space only in the east. After the outbreak of the war against Russia, that thought took definite shape (p.14 Ribbentrop believed Hitler would have been satisfied if the Polish question had been settled "satisfactorily", but he could not say how much he would have been satisfied as he did not know his ultimate ideas. (15).