Office of the U. S. Chief of Counsel
For the Prosecution of Axis Criminality
Interrogation Division Summary

Interrogation of: Joachim von Ribbentrop
By: Colonel Brundage 10 September 1945, a.m. Nuremberg

Persons Involved and Subjects

1. Joachim von Ribbentrop
   a. Dealings with Japan (p. 4-5, 9-10)
   b. British in Pacific War (p.5-8)
   c. Plan Barbarossa (p.5-9)
   d. Position regarding attack on Poland (p.13)

2. Hitler
   a. War in the Pacific (1-8)
   b. Denial of policy of aggression (p.10)
   c. Polish Question (p. 11, 12, 13)
   d. Lebensraum (p. 11-12)

Ribbentrop said "Pearl Harbor came as a complete surprise to us" (p.1, 8). At first Hitler was glad to have a new ally against Britain, but in a talk with him, Ribbentrop, he thought that "it had a bad side too" (p.1). The Fuehrer "had been worried" that the negotiations between the U.S.A. and Japan at the time of Pearl Harbor might succeed to the extent that the Pacific coast would be free of trouble, and the U.S... could turn all attention to the Atlantic (p.3). There were then discussions to "keep them (the Japanese) in line - a long time before Pearl Harbor", but Ribbentrop did not remember "we had ever counselled Japan to attack the U.S." (p.4). "our dealings with Japan were against Russia primarily", and then "to keep the U.S.A. neutral" (p.4-5, 9-10), "and to keep the British busy in the far East" (p. 4-5, 6-8). He did not remember (a) Koitel Order of 5 March 1941 regarding collaboration with Japan; (b) the advice contained therein that "the main effort of the U.S.A. be diverted to the Pacific"; (c) mention therein and meaning of plan "Barbarossa" (p.5-9).

Policy of Aggression

Denied there was a program of aggression (p.10). The Fuehrer once said to him, Ribbentrop: "The enemy forces me to go everywhere in Europe" (p.11). The Fuehrer know that the Polish question - that is Danzig and the corridor - "had to be settled", and, in addition, he had "the vague notion that Germany must have some more territory somewhere in the East" (p.11-12). His concept of a Greater Germanic Reich first developed in the course of the war and was not a pre-conceived idea (p.12). Ribbentrop said he told the Fuehrer that an attack on Poland meant war with England, and Hitler first agreed but after the failure to agree with British Ambassador Henderson, he ordered military operations (p.13).