Interrogation of Von RIBBENTROP

By: Colonel Brundage, 20 September, 1945, p.m., Nuremberg

PERSONS IMPLICATED AND SUBJECTS

1. Von RIBBENTROP
   a. Russia
      (1) Anti-Corintor: Pact of 1936 (pp. 4-6, 9-10, 14-15)
      (2) Policy towards Russia (pp. 12-13, 20, 23-24)
      (3) Pact with Russia in 1939 (pp. 18, 22)
   b. Poland (p. 27)
   c. Austria
      (1) Recallling of von Pappen (p. 26)
      (2) Hitler's role in Austrian matters (p. 30)
   d. England
      (1) Solution with Germany (pp. 30-32, 34, 40)
      (2) Nonintervention committee of Spain (pp. 30-32)
      (3) Dirksen (p. 37-38)
      (4) Negotiations on Colonies (p. 43)

RUSSIA.

Ribbentrop said the Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936, signed by himself, was made for reasons of anti-Communist Weltanschauung, not as a political instrument against the Soviet Union, but to establish a general anti-Communist front (p. 4-6). He admitted there was "no doubt a political element of a kind" in the Pact, which was "anti-Russian" (p. 9-10). The break in Germany's policy towards Russia and China dated from the coming to power of National Socialism, and negotiations leading to the Pact were "to a certain extent handled directly by the Führer and myself," outside the Foreign Office (p. 12-13, 20). The Bureau Ribbentrop was "a part of the National Socialist Party", financed by both the Party and State, with a function to "get good relations" with various foreign countries in Europe, especially Britain and France, but occupied itself also with Japanese questions and assisted in negotiating the Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan (p. 14-15). There was not always 100 percent agreement between him and Neurath, Ribbentrop said, stressing he did tell Neurath in 1936 about the forthcoming Pact (p. 18).

The Pact with Russia in 1936 was sincerely intended, not as a matter of convenience for the moment, but as an attempt to bridge two Weltanschauungen (p. 22). In 1940 the Führer had the impression the Russians tended to move too far west, got reports on the development of the Russian war potential, the question of the Weltanschauung played in again, finally the trip of Sir Stafford Cripps to Moscow—all this, primarily military reasons, made the Führer change his attitude toward the Soviet Union (p. 23-24).

POLAND.

On Poland Ribbentrop said "It was a great misfortune Pilsudski died, because the Führer felt he could have worked out with him a solution of German-Polish problems, and there would have been no war in 1939" (p. 27).

AUSTRIA.

On Austria Ribbentrop said he didn't remember having recalled von Papen a day or two before the German troops moved into that country, or the motivation for recalling him (p. 29). The signing of documents, the entire Austrian matter was handled by the Führer, "and we only got these points weeks later" (p. 30).
On England, Ribbentrop said he wanted an alliance with that country; "We had quite a number of friends there. There was King Edward, and so on." He said his mission was complicated by the fact that in the "nonintervention committee of Spain" the British often sided with France, Russia, and "Red Spain" while the Führer the Italians, and himself always stood with Franco (p. 30 - 32). Blames the failure of his mission in London on the fact that, already in 1936, a number of prominent Englishmen, among them Vansittart, declined to listen to his and the Führer's proposal for an Anglo-German agreement, because they feared that one day National Socialist Germany would get too strong (34). He didn't remember having declined to see his man Dirksen, Ambassador to London, who returned to Berlin two weeks before the outbreak of the war (p. 37 - 38), although friendship with England was a priority with him (p. 40). He didn't remember that Chamberlain offered to negotiate on colonies in 1938 or ever (p. 43).