OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL
FOR PROSECUTION OF WAR CRIMES
INTERROGATION DIVISION SUMMARY

Interrogation of Joachim Ribbentrop
By: Colonel H.A. Brundage, 10 October 1945, p.m. Nuremberg

PERSONS AND ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED AND SUBJECTS

1. RIBBENTROP
   a. Preparations for aggressive war (pp.1-20).

2. FRITZ WILDEMANN
   a. Preparations for aggressive war
      (1) Participation in negotiations with England (pp.20-24).

Ribbentrop fails to see the incongruity of his statements that Hitler
always sought peaceful arrangements with England (p.11) while he in 1938,
completely cut short Henderson's very first attempt to make proposals on former
German colonies (p.2,3,4,11,12,) and continued during the entire appeasement
phase (p.1-9) to base his policy fundamentally on a purely sentimental asp-ct:
"that all these vital German questions (Sudeten, Corridor, Danzig)
were of no concern to England --- and that England really had no business
to interfere---" (p.10, also 9). All this in the face of Hitler's apparent
consciousness that England was not too weak to make war (p.12,11,) and would
actually march in case he attacked Poland (p.13,11,20). Ribbentrop finally
conceded "that there are some things in the Fuehrer which we all never got
quite behind. He told me once ...that he (Hitler) suddenly feels ...a
sonambulist feeling ...and then he must do a certain thing ..." (p.11) Knowing
this, and conscious of the complete disregard for his own reports as ambassador
to England (p.15,16) as well as for information by Dirkson (p.17,18,19,20) in
Hitler's and even in his own policy, it allegedly never entered Ribbentrop's
mind that he cooperated with a leader of state so irresponsible as to be
willing to plunge into war, without even getting all possible information
(p.20). Ribbentrop cannot disclaim that after the informing of Italy (p.20,21,22)
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and the pact with Russia (p. 22, 23) no bona fide attempt was made to settle the differences over Poland with the English (p. 24).

FRITZ WIEDEMANN

Ribbentrop continues to maintain that the thought of war was never on his mind (p. 28, 29, 31), although it may have been on Hitler's (p. 29, 31). He excitedly denies that demands were presented in ultimatum form to the British in Berchtesgaden but in the same breath concedes that Hitler and he were very "stern" (p. 31, 32). - Follows a description of the Godesberg meeting (p. 33-:

Ribbentrop has never heard before, and considers it a lie, that Wiedemann was removed after a secret mission to England in 1938, on account of a report to Hitler that the Chamberlain cabinet wished to come to terms with Germany (p. 24, 25, 26). He is very positive about this but cannot state the real reason of Wiedemann's dismissal (p. 27).

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