STAFF EVIDENCE ANALYSIS

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT (Under following headings).

Title and Nature: Photostat of Jodl's Diary in his own handwriting.

Date: 4 January 37 to Original ( ) Copy (x) Language: German 22 August 39

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of 24 October 1945: Unknown; copy in OCC Files Nürnberg.

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: 31-Z

PERSONS IMPLICATED: JODL, Alfred; HITLER, Adolf; KEITEL, Wilhelm, and other listed in document.

REFERENCES TO INDEX HEADINGS (Key to Par. nos. of Summary below):

See attached list of index headings.

NECESSARY PROCESSING TO PUT IN EVIDENTIARY FORM; LEADS:

Admiral Canaris; Gen. Sperrle; and others listed in document.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

I. In 1937, Germany supported the Franco-rising by an expeditionary force headed by General Sperrle and by deliveries of arms and ammunition. A secret service organization headed by Admiral Canaris was also formed in Spain. The following references deal with this subject.

1. Order is given to branches of Wehrmacht to speed deliveries of materials, arms, and ammunition. Fleet sends in addition to cruiser "Karlsruhe", cruiser "Köln" to the Spanish north coast. (4 January)

2. Admiral Canaris (Chief "Abwehr") goes to Spain to organize intelligence corps; he carries written decisions about further support as well as letter stating full confidence of war ministry and Gen Sperrle in his person. (5 January)

3. In a telegram to General Sperrle the further dispatch of German troops to North Africa is stopped. (12 January) Up to this date, 27 casualties are reported from Spain (13 January).
4. Scheller reports by phone the result of conversations with Mussolini to the Chief of the "Wehrmacht Amt": ... no more military personnel is to be dispatched. A last effort has to be made, for which we have to give our share in war materials. (14 Jan). A further conference will be held about this and Goering will then state, what can be sent. Scheller is informed by phone, that list of deliveries will be transmitted to Rome in code during the night. (14 Jan)

5. The three branches of the Wehrmacht are directed to prepare deliveries. (18 Jan) Order follows.

6. More demands are made by Franco, which can be partially fulfilled. (25 Jan)

7. Franco writes a letter to Hitler, in which he asked for rifles, machine-guns, mine-throwers, etc. A survey is to be made until the 30 January of what can be sent. General V. Blomberg holds discussion with Franco. General Thomas proposes to use Panama steamers as transports.

8. 30,000 rifles and 4,000,000 cartridges are delivered for foreign currency. (30 March)


II. In 1938, the aim of German policy was the elimination of Austria and Czechoslovakia. Will of resistance in both countries was undermined by pressure on the government as well as propaganda and fifth column, while at the same time German military preparations for the attack were worked out. "Case Otto", code name of the Austrian campaign; "Case Green" battle plan against Czechoslovakia.

A. Against Austria:

1. Generals Keitel, Reichenau, Sperrle in Obersalzburg at conference; Schuschnigg Austrian Chancellor and Guido Schmidt Austrian Foreign Minister are put under heaviest political and military pressure. Schuschnigg signs memorandum (11-12 Feb).

2. Generals Keitel and Jodl and Admiral Canaris are informed about Hitler's orders to keep up the military pressure against Austria by pretending military measures until the 15th of the month. Propositions for this deceptive action are prepared and transmitted by phone to Hitler for approval. (13 Feb)

3. The impression of serious German military preparations is created in Austria. 14/2 Changes are made in Austrian Government and large scale political amnesty is announced. (16 Feb)

4. General Keitel reports to Hitler about the "Planned Thrust." (22 Feb)
5. Austrian situation is regarded as critical. 100 officers are to be ordered there; Hitler wants to talk to them personally. They should take care that the Austrian Army does not fight. (3 March)

6. Schuschnigg announces plebiscite for the 13 March. Hitler is determined not to take this. Goering, General Reichenau and Minister Gleise v. Horsttheon are called to Hitler. "Case Otto" is to be prepared. Mobilization of army units and airforces is ordered. (10 March)

7. March into Austria takes place. (11 March)

B. Against Czechoslovakia:

1. Fuehrer approves of military propositions discussed on the 5 November with the Chiefs of the Wehrmacht and the three Chiefs of Staff and the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Subject Redrafting of "Case Green."

2. Revision of "Case Green" is ordered, because of the changed strategical position due to the incorporation of Austria. (11 March)

3. Hitler signs directive "Green," which constitutes the fast dismembering of Czechoslovakia; detailed operations plans are hinted at. (30 May)

4. Differences of opinion between Hitler and General Staff on the problem are noted. The General Staff is not entirely in favor of striking, as the military preparations are not yet completed and there is the threat of the Western powers. (30 May)

5. Horthy and Hungarian Ministers visit Germany to discuss Hungarian claims after the dismembering of Czechoslovakia. (21-26 July)

6. Chief of the General Staff, General of Art. Halder, confers with Hungarian Chief of General Staff Fischer. Halder is informed by Jodl about Hitler's order not to talk about the fixed date. The same applies to Gen. Stulpnagel. (6 Sept)

7. Gen. v. Stulpnagel asks for written insurance that the OKH will be informed five days in advance about the proposed action. Jodl consents but adds that the overall weather report can be made only two days in advance (x - 2). (8 Sept)

8. Discussion between Chief OKW and Chief of General Staff Airforce. Present Generals of the Airforce Jeschonnek, Kammhuber Sternburg and Jodl. Agreement about the announcement of zero hour (x-order); y-time for the airforce has to be tested. Formations needed partly one hour to approach. Military plans are then considered which have to be approved by Hitler. (8 Sept)
9. Discussion with Secretary of Propaganda Ministry about common tasks which consist in the refutation of our violations of international law and the exploitation of those of the enemy. (11 Sept)

10. Discussion Chief OKW with Chief of General Staff, Army and Airforce. Result: 28 Sept. chosen as date, because of change in time table of the Reichsbahn and in order to continue the fortification work in the West as long as possible. Detailed military preparations are then outlined. (15 Sept)

11. Hitler orders the incorporation of the military trained Sudeten Germans into the German Army Reserves and the formation of Sudeten German Free-corps (17 Sept). The OKH is ordered to supply the Free-corps. (19 Sept)

12. Activities of the Free-corps are increasing and may have harmful consequences for the intentions of the army. Czech units are moving to the border. Fuehrer charges Jodl with the task of organizing these activities with the help of groups of not more than 12 men each. (20 Sept.)

13. After agreement with the Czech, the preparation for "Case Green" are to continue, but should not have the aspect of a peaceful penetration. (21 Sept)

14. OKW stops intended penetration of the advanced units, as Hitler does not want to march in before the 30th Sept. It is sufficient if the order is given on the 27th Sept. (26 Sept.)

15. Breslau and Dresden radio stations are put at the disposal of the Propaganda Ministry for the purpose of jamming Czech propaganda transmissions. (26 Sept)


17. Order is given to first line units to take up positions. (27 Sept.)

18. In 1939, Jodl is ordered to Berlin by the OKW; he is given the post of Chief of the OKW, as such he gives the fixed date of the attack against Poland.

1. X-time (zero hour) fixed for 4:30 AM on the 26 August.

19. Various references in the diary show the economical and military preparations of Germany for War by the marshalling of raw materials and reorganizations of the leadership in the high command as well as maneuvers. A few are quoted.

1. The three branches of the Wehrmacht should furnish priority list of their needs. No more orders are to be given to industry until old ones are taken care of. (4 Feb 37)
2. Maneuvers of the Wehrmacht are ordered (army). In two years time, two maneuvers should be held featuring two front war. (31 March 37)

3. Two hour discussion with General V. Manstein re: Chief organization and leadership of the Wehrmacht. (28-30 April 37)

4. Jodl's proposition for further development of the Wehrmacht handed to Chief of "Wehrmachtsamt." (14 May 37)

5. Talks between Hitler and Goering. The necessity for Chiefs of the Armed Forces in war time is recognized. During peace, this has to be considered. (15 July 37)

6. Reorganization of the Luftwaffe. (19 Jan 38)

7. On the occasion of the fall of Bliomberg, Hitler states that he believes in the undivided leadership of the Army and he decided to take it over himself with Keitel's assistance. He also believes changes in leadership necessary in the near future. (27 Jan 38)

8. Gen. Beck regards the army as the decisive factor for waging war; the Luftwaffe section could be coordinated with the Chief of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht. (28 Jan 38)

9. Hitler: The organization must remain. It is our biggest strength. As Goering follows me and is in his turn followed by somebody else, everyone finds the same apparatus to play on - the Wehrmacht. (29 Jan 38)

REFERENCES TO INDEX HEADINGS

AGGRESSIVE WAR, STATEMENTS AND PLANS

FOREIGN PENETRATION: Controlled governments; Economic: Fifth Column; Propaganda

IDEOLOGY, N.A.Z.I: Volk

INVASION, ACTS OF

POLICE: SD

PREPARATION FOR WAR: Diplomatic: Economic measures; Domestic: Military

G.E.R.M.A.N.GOVERNMENT AGENCIES: Those mentioned in document

G.S.


analyst: Schonfeld

Doc. No. 1780 FS