Report on Franz Von Papen

VON PAPEN ANSWERS SOME POLITICAL AND INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONS

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REPORT ON FRANZ VON PAPEN

VON PAPEN ANSWERS SOME POLITICAL AND INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONS

I. PREAMBLE

The following Report covers Von PAPEN's answers to eleven questions, which were submitted to him at the request of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F.

The answers to these questions were obtained in conversation with Von PAPEN and not through direct interrogation. It is realized, that some of the answers given are incomplete and do not represent Von PAPEN's complete knowledge, but they represent as much information as the man would volunteer during the conversations. It is believed that what is included in this Report may be considered truthful.

Von PAPEN has a clear mind, but he often hides behind the excuse that so much has happened to him that he has forgotten many things (which would be of interest to the Allies). He is very careful of what he says, and gives the impression that he anticipates some sort of a trial or court in the future.

For general convenience, the questions as submitted to this Hq are repeated below, and are followed in each case by the answers as given by Von PAPEN.

II. VON PAPEN ANSWERS SOME POLITICAL AND INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONS

(NOTE: Where the words "Foreign Mission(s)" are used below, they refer to Embassies and Consulates, i.e. regular channels).

1. a) QUESTION: In general, what (in PAPEN's opinion) were the best sources of political intelligence in the German Foreign Office?

b) ANSWER: Sources of political intelligence for the Foreign Office were exclusively the Foreign Missions, (i.e. Embassies, Consulates, etc). To what extent they were able to furnish useful political information depended upon the insight and ability of the individual head of the Mission, and the quality of his contacts with foreign representatives, neutral and otherwise. Thus, for instance, to keep abreast of the political developments in ENGLAND, and later in the USA also, responsibility was shifted to the Missions in PORTUGAL and SWEDEN. PORTUGAL, especially, afforded permanent contacts with travellers from LONDON and WASHINGTON. The press and the reporters (especially U.S. and British) located in these countries were an additional important source. The task of following up political developments in the Near East was assigned to the Embassy in ANKARA.
2. a) **QUESTION:** Can PAPEN name any of the principal agents of the SICHERHEITSDIENST within the German Foreign Office?

b) **ANSWER:** As far as Von PAPEN is informed, up to the Spring of 1944, there were no "SICHERHEITSDIENST" agents in the German Foreign Office, who were used to collect political intelligence. Stern orders had been issued to the Missions to consider only such political information as could be obtained through normal channels. The acquiring of information through other methods such as espionage, agents, counterespionage, etc., was exclusively a military domain. Such methods were employed by the SICHERHEITSDIENST, which, however, (Von PAPEN stated), had nothing to do with the Foreign Office.

There existed in every country an arm of the ABWEHR, which passed all intelligence directly to their Central Office rather than through the head of the Embassy. Wherever it was deemed expedient, such information received by the ABWEHR Central Office, was passed back to the Embassy concerned so that it in turn could check the veracity.

This ABWEHR organization, directed and organized along military lines, was subordinated to the R.S.H.A. in the Spring of 1944. Until then, there existed in the Foreign Office, so far as PAPEN knows, only an SS organization for the surveillance of the interior services of the Foreign Office.

Von PAPEN claims that he has no detailed knowledge of the organization since early 1944.

3. a) **QUESTION:** What is PAPEN's opinion of the quality of political intelligence received by the German Foreign Office from the SICHERHEITSDIENST AMT VI? Can he cite any instances of its success?

b) **ANSWER:** During many years of diplomatic service, it has been PAPEN's experience that really useful information can, in most cases, be furnished only by the Missions, and then only when they are headed by competent people with good judgment and excellent connections.

PAPEN claims that he has never had a high opinion of the success of the SD because undercover agents, as a rule, do not command the society contacts, nor do they have a clear judgment or knowledge of the over-all picture. They are very anxious to report only fantastic things in order to create favorable impressions at the Home Office. In any case, PAPEN claims that he has often had the opportunity to correct this type of information when it was sent to him for verification as is explained in Paragraph 2, above.

4. a) **QUESTION:** What does PAPEN know of the functions and political sympathies of LEGATIONSRAT GROTE of the German Foreign Office?

b) **ANSWER:** Von PAPEN claims that he does not know GROTE, and, therefore, could give no information concerning him.
5. a) QUESTION: What does PAPEN know of the activities of GRUPPENFUEHRER Dr. SIX of the German Foreign Office? Is Dr. SIX still head of AMT VII? What are Dr. SIX'S relations with HIMMLER?

b) ANSWER: SS GRUPPENFUEHRER Dr. SIX was appointed leader of the Section for Culture in the Foreign Office by the Secretary of State, and was charged with the reorganization of that segment of the foreign service until it fully conformed with the philosophical standards of National Socialism. In consequence, this policy has been pursued since his appointment.

The so called "KULTURREFERENTEN" with the Foreign Missions have had to work in accordance with SIX'S directives, and have had to submit suggestions for the purpose of propaganda. It is understood that it was up to the head of a Mission to assert himself, and to protest, whenever he could predict injurious effects of a political nature caused by the propagation of the National Socialist ideas (i.e., the treatment of the Jewish question, or the church problems). However, on the whole, this was only possible in the case of those Mission heads, who were not too closely tied up with the Party and whose personal position was strong enough for them to take a stand. (Von PAPEN considers himself to be one of the latter).

As far as PAPEN knows, Dr. SIX entertained very close and confidential relations with HIMMLER.

6. a) QUESTION: Did HITLER receive or act upon intelligence on foreign affairs from any persons or organization independent of the German Foreign Office and AMT VI of the R.S.H.A.?

b) ANSWER: Before the war, RIBBENTROP'S personal (Foreign) office supplied HITLER with the then current intelligence on foreign affairs, and also invited foreign personalities to come and visit HITLER. Their opinions were usually valued higher than those of persons employed by the foreign office. Exactly what happened in this field after RIBBENTROP'S elevation to the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs for the REICH, PAPEN claims not to know. PAPEN believes that the Foreign Office of the NSDAP had a most harmful effect on foreign affairs, not only because it employed people of ill repute in important Party positions, but because GAULEITER BOHLE of the AUSLANDSORGANIZATION organized his intelligence service from people of this same class.

The BOHLE organization had the task of labelling the opinions of the representatives of the Foreign Office as being too weak, and harmful to the State. All reports covering events in foreign countries submitted by the regular Missions were evaluated by BOHLE'S people, and, as a result, were colored with the narrow viewpoint of Party politics. In PAPEN'S opinion, this intelligence service of GAULEITER BOHLE had the worst consequences.

The Foreign Office attempted to get the AUSLANDSORGANIZATION under its control by appointing BOHLE, STAATSSERKETAER in the Foreign Office. However, neither NEUBRUCH nor RIBBENTROP succeeded, and RIBBENTROP finally removed BOHLE from office.

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7. a) QUESTION: Did RIBBENTROP have his own intelligence service? If so, who ran it for him?

b) ANSWER: Until 4 Feb 1938, RIBBENTROP's office had its own intelligence service, but PAPEN claims not to know who was in charge of it. During the war, from about 1942 on, RIBBENTROP organized his own personal intelligence service.

RIBBENTROP had made certain that the intelligence received from the ABWEHR and the SD had reached HITLER before the reports of the REICH Foreign Office, which he always presented to HITLER personally. This was used as proof that the missions were too slow in acquiring news. Consequently, certain persons in the various Embassies and Consulates were selected and charged with the task of dispatching interesting messages, by the quickest means, to a branch of the Foreign Office, irrespective of the fact of whether the intelligence could be verified or not. Only the head of the Embassy was permitted to be informed about these orders, but according to PAPEN, the head of the Mission was informed about each message only after it had been dispatched.

As far as PAPEN can recall, the head of this branch of the Foreign Office changed several times. Occasionally UNTERSTAATSSEKRETÄR HENKE headed the branch.

8. a) QUESTION: What does PAPEN know of HIMMLER's personal staff? Who were his advisors on foreign affairs?

b) ANSWER: PAPEN claims to know nothing about HIMMLER's personal staff. He believes that SCHELLENBERG has recently been in control of the foreign affairs of the R.S.H.A.

9. a) QUESTION: Who are SCHELLENBERG's most important advisors? Did SCHELLENBERG ever visit TURKEY?

b) ANSWER: SCHELLENBERG's most important advisors are unknown to PAPEN. As far as he can recall, SCHELLENBERG was in TURKEY once or twice. In any case, SCHELLENBERG visited Von PAPEN in THERAPIA in about the Summer of 1943. SCHELLENBERG came to Von PAPEN only to get acquainted generally with conditions and to seek connections.

10. a) QUESTION: What is the distinctive policy of Minister NEUBACHER in the BALKANS? To what political group does he belong?

b) ANSWER: NEUBACHER was Special Envoy of the Foreign Office to the BALKANS (Sonderbevollmächtigter des Auswärtigen Amtes für den Balkan). His assignments were primarily of an economic nature, such as:

- **In RUMANIA**: Preparation of trade agreements, and the exchange of oil and agricultural products.

- **In GREECE**: Supporting the currency by means of the importation of gold, and the fighting of the Black Market.

- **In SERBIA**: Working on the exchange of merchandise and the support of the NEDITSCH Government by means of concessions to Greater Serbian aspirations.

- **In ALBANIA**: Activities the same as those carried on in GREECE.
NEUBACHER was an Austrian National Socialist, and, during the SCHUSCHNIGG Regime, was kept in an Austrian Concentration Camp.

11. a) QUESTION: What does PAPEN know of the activities of LUDWIG MOYSISCH and BRUNO WOLF in TURKEY? Did they produce any good intelligence? What happened to them after they left TURKEY?

b) ANSWER: Ludwig MOYSISCH was attached to the Embassy in ANKARA as representative of the R.S.S.A. His task was to collect intelligence as well as to supervise, officially, the Embassy, the Consulate, and the German Colony. While in ANKARA, MOYSISCH had two people at his disposal, namely the linguist, Attache FAST, and B. WOLF, who spent most of his time in ISTANBUL. Other men were also at his disposal, but PAPEN can not recall their names.

Bruno WOLF was a very ardent Party and SS man. He was young, ambitious, and unscrupulous, and was responsible for many Nazi tactics. For instance, he brought about the recall and arrest of Herr FLÜSGL and Herr UNZ, the latter the representative of I.G.FARBEN in ISTANBUL. They both ended up in a concentration camp.

PAPEN considers MOYSISCH to be a very liberal and reasonable man. He collaborated in the removal of the impossible LANDESGRUPPENLEITER of TURKEY, Herr FRIEDE of BOHLE's organization, and at PAPEN's request MOYSISCH had the courage to present his liberal views on the Jewish problem to his superiors.

The Jewish problem arose when several German scientists emigrated to TURKEY and were about to lose their German citizenship. This, of course, meant that they would be forced to attempt to take out Turkish citizenship, which is known to be practically impossible.

As far as PAPEN knows, MOYSISCH remained in ANKARA with other members of the Embassy. PAPEN has no information regarding WOLF's return to GERMANY.

HLS, ACR, (Ed: REB)

THOMAS C. VAN CLEVE, LT COL
Commanding 6824 DIC (HIS)

15 May 45

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