A series of reports on information obtained from German notabilities will be published. Reference G.R.G.N.

Report on information obtained from German notabilities on 15th to 18th April, 1945:

The following are the names of the personages referred to in this report:

Herr Franz von Papen - ex-Chancellor Germany Captured at Stockhausen 10 April, 1945.

I. REACTION TO INTERROGATION

Herr von Papen and Hauptmann von Papen were interrogated by Allied Generals on 16th April, 1945. A separate report on these interrogations has been published.

After the interviews were over Herr von Papen stated to a British army officer that he could see that the Allies wanted to end the war quickly but were not quite sure how to do it. In any case that is not a matter to be discussed with Generals as it is not a military but a political question.

So long as the Germans fear that their men will all be deported to Russia they will fight on. There is a great fear in Germany that a secret agreement was made at Yalta whereby the Russians were promised sufficient manpower for what they considered their needs. Herr von Papen personally cannot see how the British and Americans could agree to this as they must realize that it is in the interests of the world to maintain an economically successful Germany. If, on the other hand, no such secret agreement was made, why do not the Western democracies publicly announce this?

Herr von Papen continued that another of Germany's reasons for going on with this hopeless war was the fear that the Russians were to occupy as far as the Elbe, which meant, in effect, the whole of eastern and central Germany. Even if there were no secret agreements at Yalta about German manpower, who was to prevent the Russians from deporting every male in the part occupied by them? In fact, he knew that they were already carrying out this policy.

He then depicted in great detail the Bolshevik "Bogey". He elaborated the possibility of a Communist Germany by stressing the danger of a German General who believed that Germany's future lay with Russia, surrounding himself with like-minded officers and going over with his troops to the Russians.
As a further instance of this danger he quoted a recent remark of Ribbentrop's. Ribbentrop gave a dinner to some diplomats during which he made the statement that Germany had lost the war but still had it in her power to decide to whom she had lost it.

With regard to ending the war Herr von Papen stated he was prepared to do everything in his power to bring this about. He felt he could easily get into contact with the German Government. Unless, however, the German people could receive a definite assurance that they were not to be deported to Russia at the end of hostilities any move would be useless.

He could see the point of our policy of unconditional surrender, but cannot understand how such an assurance could conflict with this policy.

There exists in Germany the belief that the Western Democracies give in all the time to the Russian demands. Whether this is so merely during the period of hostilities and will cease immediately hostilities terminate is, however, in his opinion open to doubt.

Herr von Papen thinks he may be treated as a war criminal because his name was mentioned in a list of war criminals dropped by the R.A.F. He then went on to explain why the Russians might want him on their war criminal list. They wanted Turkey to enter the war so that had she entered on the German side they could have occupied her immediately. If she had entered on the Allied side she would, in any case, have come under Russian control. Von Papen's policy of keeping her neutral was, however, successful and therefore the Russian plans were foiled. The Turks themselves were determined to remain neutral if at all possible as they reckoned that by remaining neutral they would save the lives of one million men; the Russians in the meantime, of course, suffering colossal losses. These million men would be exceedingly useful when at last Turkey did have to defend herself against Russia. Fear of Russia dictates the whole Turkish policy.

His reaction ended with the statement that he could not, of course, speak freely in the presence of Russian officers.

II DIPLOMATIc

1. The "Black Tom" Affair.
   Herr von Papen gave a British army officer the following account of this. He ceased to be German Military Attache in the U.S.A. in 1915. In 1917 a powder factory was blown up and the U.S. authorities claimed that he was at the back of this, which von Papen denied. In the circumstances, through the Mixed Claims Commission, the U.S. authorities demanded 25 million dollars compensation. Many affidavits, in von Papen's opinion faked, were produced and Streseman was persuaded to agree to the payment of this sum by an American promise that relations between the U.S. and Germany would immediately improve. Von Papen, however, got to hear of this and convinced Streseman not to pay.

   After Hitler's accession to power the case was taken up again and a certain Herr von Pfeffer agreed to pay this sum and signed a treaty to this effect with the U.S. authorities. Herr von Pfeffer had, however, no official authority to do this but thought that, by so doing, he would raise the standing of the Nazis in the eyes of the world. Then Herr von Neureth got to know of this he summoned von Papen and once again the whole thing was squashed. Hitler was, of course, furious with Herr von Pfeffer.

2. Laval.
   In May, last year, Herr von Papen was in Paris to see his wounded son when he was summoned to Hitler's Headquarters for a conference. Before returning to see Hitler, however, he had to confer with Laval and company. He did not say what subjects were discussed.
3. Political Literature.

Herr von Papen asked what Sir Walford Selby, the British
Minister in Vienna when he was German Ambassador there, was doing
now, and expressed the desire to read the Liberal Party booklet
on the future Germany, in the compiling of which Sir Walford took
part.

He would also like to read Bella Fromm's book "Blood and
Banquets" which deals with diplomatic Berlin in the first years
of the Third Reich.

Von Papen states that he, himself, has never attempted to
write his memoirs as they would probably have caused him to be
shot.

4. Austria.

After the murder of Chancellor Dollfuss, Austro-German
relations were so strained that von Papen was asked to go and try
to straighten things out. He agreed on certain conditions, one
of which was that the Austrian Nazis should not be supported in
their attempt to overthrow the Government by revolution. This
was agreed but, although von Papen began gradually to make
relations smoother, the more violent Nazis considered he was taking
too long and called him a traitor to the Greater German people
and there was even talk of assassinating him. Even when he
succeeded in having an Austro-German agreement signed, this
out-cry against him continued.

The Austrian question was of very great interest to France
and when von Papen went to Paris to visit the 1937 exhibition
he saw Chautemps about it. A meeting was also arranged for him
with Leon Blum, the Socialist leader. This meeting had to be
kept very secret as it would not have done for it to be known
that a German Ambassador had visited a Socialist Jew. Papen
himself, however, considered such an interview necessary as Blum
was such an important Socialist figure. The meeting took place
in Blum's house.

5. Russia.

Herr von Papen stated to a British army officer that the
reason for M. Molotov's famous visit to Berlin before the German
invasion of Russia was Russia's desire to join the four-power
pact. Her conditions were such, however, that Herr von Papen
was forced to work against her, and, according to him, it was due
to his efforts that her adherence to the pact was refused.

Her conditions were: (a) control of the Dardanelles and (b)
control of the Balkans. This would have enabled her to close the
Suez Canal and control the Near East.

Herr von Papen is convinced that her aims are still the
same and that this explains her great activities in North
Persia, Syria and Iraq where, according to Herr von Papen, her
agents abound.

He also states that the Turks share his fears and suspect
that they have been sold to the Russians by us. For this
reason the British are so keen to control Greece and the neighbor-
ing islands, so that they should then have bases to attack the
Dardanelles if they considered it necessary.

III POLITICAL

1. Spain.

Herr von Papen has stated to a British army officer that
he is exceedingly interested in developments in Spain. He
considers that Franco is at present the only one who can prevent
Spain from becoming Communist. If we restore the monarchy Spain
will immediately turn Red. Herr von Papen thinks that Mr.
Churchill shares this opinion and that this explains Mr. Churchill's somewhat complimentary remarks about Franco last year.

2. B.B.C. Propaganda.
Herr von Papen does not think much of Lindley Fraser's broadcasts and even less of "Kurt and Willi". On the other hand he considers Hugh Carlton Green excellent.

3. The Beveridge Plan.
Herr von Papen told a British army officer that he had read this with great interest. He was amused by some of its points as they had already been in operation in Germany for sometime. He does not think that it would be good to carry out the whole of the Beveridge Plan because, from German experience, they have found that such schemes set a country on the road to Dictatorship. If most of an individual's responsibility is removed from him and given to the State, the State's responsibility will eventually become boundless.

4. Post-War Europe.
Herr von Papen feels that peace can only be maintained if international organizations like the Postal Union, the I.L.O., etc., are set up. He is greatly in favor of the setting up of international universities where both students and teachers would come from various nations.

5. President Truman.
Herr von Papen thinks that President Truman, as a Baptist, will rid the American administration and Cabinet of some of the Jews. He certainly hopes so.

6. The Weimar Republic.
Baron vonStockhausen is of the opinion that the Weimar Republic failed because it was not given a chance by the over-exuberant Nazis who wanted to do in one year what would normally take 20. Herr von Stockhausen was a high official under the Weimar Republic and he seems to feel quite genuinely that it was on the right road to establishing peaceful relations with the whole world, and he does not share the common German opinion that everything the Weimar Republic did was wrong.

7. The Future of Germany and Austria.
In conversation with a British army officer Herr von Papen said that he once thought that it might be better for Germany if the four great powers, the U.S.A., Great Britain, Russia and France, occupied jointly and did not have separate zones of occupation. This would prevent excesses on the part of the French and the Russians. He realizes, however, how difficult this would be technically and supposes Germany will have to put up with the separate zones.

If the Rhineland is handed over to the control of the French, the same troubles will arise as after the last war. If the Allies decide to set up an autonomous State there they should give it a German Government, even if Allied control is exercised over this government.

With regard to the independence of Austria promised at the Teheran Conference, Herr von Papen cannot believe that the Allies intend to make Austria independent within her old pre-1938 frontiers as she cannot exist in this form. His solution would be to leave Austria united with whatever remains of Germany and make Vienna the Capital of the new German State. Prussia would have no say in the matter for she will be exceedingly weak as an outcome of the war.

Herr von Papen would like to see Germany made a constitutional monarchy after the war and is of the opinion that this form of
government would be welcomed by the majority of the German people. The allies can do with Germany what they like after the war and he thinks they should set a clever, democratic German Prince of their choice on the throne, by no means necessarily a Hohenzollern.

If Germany were a constitutional monarchy he feels that this would help her to a rapprochement with England which, in his opinion, is the only thing that can save her and prevent chaos in Europe. A rapprochement with France would be useless as France, herself, is so divided; the U.S. is not interested enough and the only other possibility is Russia.

In Herr von Papen's opinion the Russians are already working hard to draw Germany into their orbit and he cannot understand why Mr. Churchill makes no move from our side. The only explanation he can see is that Mr. Churchill does not wish to annoy the Russians as long as the war is on.

Herr von Papen has thought a great deal about these questions for some time and hoped that he might be sent to Madrid where he would have had opportunities of getting into touch with people with whom he could discuss them.

3. The Saar Territory.

Herr von Papen has read in the French newspapers demands for the incorporation of the Saar territory into France. He has stated to a British army officer that he cannot see how the Allies can allow this. The Saar plebiscite clearly showed that the great majority of the population was German and surely it would be against all Allied declarations to hand the Saar territory over to France.

IV MILITARY

1. General Rabenau.

Herr von Papen told a British army officer that this man was shot after the 20th of July. The Nazis had always wanted to get rid of him because they disagreed with his book on Seeckt. In their opinion, Hitler, not Seeckt, was the founder of the modern German army.

2. The S.S.

All the original S.S., according to Herr von Papen, are criminals. In order to cover themselves now, however, they are conscripting innocent people into the S.S. He even knows of cases where priests were forced in.

3. N.S.F.O.'s.

Herr von Papen has stated that these are a menace to the army and a danger to every General.

4. German Hatred of the Allies.

Herr von Papen told a British army officer that the British and Americans were not generally hated by the mass of the German people until the big bombing raids started. Now, however, there is a great hatred.

5. Field Marshal Model.

When Herr von Papen saw the report in the "Continental Daily Mail" of the 16th April that Model had committed suicide in the Ruhr pocket he said that this was the only thing he, as a Field Marshal, could do in the circumstances.


Hauptmann von Papen stated in reply to a question by his father that General von Hauenschildt was now commander of Berlin. He did not think he was particularly Nazi. He was wounded at Stalingrad and later became Commandant of various schools.
He is a Bavarian and became a Knight of the Max-Josef's order in the last war.

7. General Wagner.

Herr von Stockhausen told a British army officer that General der Artillerie Wagner, Generalquartiermeister at the O.K.H. and Zeitzler's representative, shot himself after the 20th of July affair in which he was implicated.

V PERSONAL


A British army officer asked Herr von Papen what he thought was to be done with him and the reply was that as he seemed to have been held on the Continent merely for a military interrogation he assumed that he would be sent to London or Washington for further questioning, perhaps of a political nature, so that we could obtain evidence from him about Hitler's mis-deeds.


Herr von Papen was annoyed and upset by an article in "Le Populaire" of the 17th April, 1945, by M. Salomon Grumbach, in which he had accused von Papen of turning his party coat and demanded him as a war criminal. He cannot see why a so-called democrat should object to him having supported Hitler who, in his opinion, originally came to power by a democratic election. Even if he did change his party, has not Mr. Churchill also changed his several times?