

OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL
APO 403, US ARMY
INTERROGATION DIVISION

Nurnberg, Germany.
30 October, 1945.

Brief of
Interrogation of OTTO CHLENDORF.

by Lt Colonel S. W. Brookhart.

29 October 1945 (AM & PM).

CHLENDORF described the growth of Amt III under his leadership and how he built up the SD in spite of the opposition of many of the high officials, i.e. Ley, Goebels, and Bormann. Chlendorf believes there was a strong trend by these men away from true National Socialism soon after the Party came to power and he considered the SD as the only agency competent to observe and combat this trend. He was particularly opposed to centralize control without consideration of the position of the individuals.

Ohlendorf was strongly opposed to attempts by Ley to make the labor front all-powerful. Ley was trying to do away with the Party and control all of German life and activities through the DAF. Chlendorf believes that his opposition was effective in thwarting Ley's ambitions. On the other hand, Ley was continuously active in his efforts to put DAF ahead of everything. Several times Ley quoted statements purportedly made by Hitler which were later proven to be false.

Ohlendorf felt strongly the necessity of adhering to a true national socialistic policy and at all times urged in speeches to his organization that their mission was to protect such a policy. He believes that if the various Reich leaders were each to write on the subject, there would be a different version from each writer. He blames Hitler for the departure from basic principles.

Ohlendorf built up Amt III to eliminate opposition to the Party and believes that he made it the only organization in the Reich which could truly survey and present pertinent questions as to conditions in the country. The SD was constantly opposed by Bormann because its intelligence service was not being handled under the Party organization. It was Bormann's wish to have all of this field done through the Gauleiters. Himmler was not squarely behind the work of the SD and often criticized Chlendorf for being a pessimist and "Intelligence Beast". At other times he referred to him as a "simple minded idealist". This friction between Himmler and Ohlendorf as to the objectives and functions of the SD began in 1937 and continued thereafter. Himmler often gave orders which would have made ineffective the organization of Amt III if they had been carried out. Ohlendorf was strong enough to oppose such orders and apparently his strength and position grew steadily.

In the afternoon session Ohlendorf continued his recital of the activities and history of the SD. He referred in particular to reports compiled by him contrary to orders from Himmler. Such reports being made

to Goering, Lammers, Goebbels and Bormann. These reports were often used or referred to by members of the Defense Counsel, and because they were often critical of some of the individual members of the counsel, they were later reduced in number and scope and finally eliminated by Bormann. All reports forwarded were signed by Heydrich and later by Kaltenbrunner. In the case of reports going to Goebbels and Bormann, Ohlendorf says that their representatives screened out unfavorable material and presented only what they chose. There was a special arrangement with various Reich Ministries whereby the SD were to carry out intelligence in the Reich and the Service Departments of the various Ministries were instructed not to interfere with SD representatives and to furnish anything requested. He cited instances of reports dealing with work of the various Ministries. The first was in the Ministry of Interior as early as 1940. Others were of later dates.

Ohlendorf tried to remove the SD from the influence of the SS and to preserve a neutral position which would give the SD reports more strength. The SD men used in Amt III differed from representatives of other Amts. There were only about ninety SD men in Amt III of the RSHA. By far the larger number of SD representatives in the field were volunteers or persons who had other functions and were not on the SD pay-roll. Amt IV had ten for one as many SD men as Amt III.

Another pressure on the SD came from the SS who contended that both the RSHA and all SS men belonged to their organization and owed their first loyalty to the SS Department.

Ohlendorf cited as examples of the individual work of the SD the reports on Goering, Ley, and Speer, dealing with their misdoings and corruption.

Ohlendorf was shown the following documents as to which he testified:

<u>Document No.</u>	<u>Identification by Ohlendorf.</u>
553-PS	No, but recollected its contents in an order issued by Himmler
498-PS	No. Ohlendorf believes that this was a mistaken reference to SD and should have been to the State Police.
1276-PS	No. Identified the signature as that of Mueller.
531-PS	No.
532-PS	No.
551-PS	No.
537-PS	No.
541-PS	No.

Ohlendorf knows of no cases of Gestapo and SD participating in lynching of Allied fliers. He believes they may have been ordered not to interfere with any assaults by civilians on such fliers.

Document No.

Identification by Ohlendorf.

R-110	Yes.
636-PS	Yes.
745-PS	No, but order is correct as to contents.
736-PS	No.
R 117	No.
078-PS	No, but remembers OKH order.
502-PS)	Not familiar; but knows of the program. Not many PWs in area in which Group D operated. Ohlendorf trained 500 selected PWs for use in the Caucasus to identify factories.
082-PS)	
L-158	No. Believes Eigruber knows more on this.

Identification of further documents will continue in another session.