Interrogation of OTTO SKORZENY
By Lt. Col. Brookhart
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Skorzeny met Kaltenbrunner first in 1929 in Linz socially. They next met in 1933 and did not meet again until 1938 when Kaltenbrunner moved to Vienna. Until the war started the families of Kaltenbrunner and Skorzeny often met. During the war Skorzeny met Kaltenbrunner only in 1943 after Kaltenbrunner had taken over RSHA and Skorzeny reported for duty as chief of a special training school under AMT VI S. The school was situated at Oranienburg and it was his mission to train a special group for commando actions.

At their meeting in 1943, Skorzeny congratulated Kaltenbrunner on his appointment and was answered "I have inherited a very difficult legacy" which gave the impression that a great deal of Kaltenbrunner's difficulties in RSHA originated from the fact that during the period between Heydrich's death in 1942 and Kaltenbrunner's appointment in 1943 the AKT's chiefs had acted independently and obtained direct contacts with Himmler. These direct contacts continued in part after Kaltenbrunner had taken over and especially in the case of Schellenberg who sometimes bypassed Kaltenbrunner to deal directly with Himmler.

As an example, Skorzeny mentioned that when Ausland Abwehr was reorganized in August - September 1944 into Ausland Mil., he was astonished to see how little Kaltenbrunner knew about what was going on in the Department.

According to Skorzeny, the standard operating procedure in the department should have been Schellenberg reporting to Kaltenbrunner and either Kaltenbrunner himself or Schellenberg as his representative to take proposals up with Himmler for decision, but, Skorzeny said, if Kaltenbrunner learned anything about Schellenberg's activities it would have been after decisions were already made.

Skorzeny next saw Kaltenbrunner in the spring of 1944, for about 20 minutes when he discussed with him the possibility of opening up new training school for agents in the Southeast as the training school in the Hague was inconveniently located for many students. Skorzeny wanted Kaltenbrunner's personal permission as he thought it would be easier to organize a school and obtain greater means when the chief himself had given his approval.

Skorzeny said he had no contact with Kaltenbrunner about counter-sabotage in Denmark in 1944. Skorzeny was ordered by Schellenberg to send 5 or 6 people to Denmark at the disposal of the BdS Bofensiepen. This was about all the assistance he gave in those operations except for a visit to Denmark in June 1944 when he was informed that a kind of armistice existed at that time between the Denmark resistance movement and the counter-saboteurs. Skorzeny requested his men to be recalled from Denmark and orders were repeated by him at two week intervals until they were returned. He gave three reasons for wanting his men back; (1st) lack of good officers in his battalion; (2nd) the work belonged under Abwehr and not for active soldiers; (3rd) Skorzeny did not want to supply men to a mission which he did not control.
Furthermore, Skorzeny said he did not know conditions in Denmark and that he in no way had participated in the planning or the execution of the counter-sabotage campaign.

Skorzeny stated he had not known Naujocks until the spring of 1944, when Naujocks was introduced to him as a Major from Belgium. So far as Skorzeny knew Naujocks visited Denmark about three times and remained there each time 8 to 10 days whereafter he returned to Belgium. Naujocks was not obligated to report to Skorzeny about the actions in Denmark but once told him that everything was in a mess up there and that the BIS did not understand what was going on nor how to conduct the campaign. When Naujocks needed a car or supplies he had to get part of them from Berlin. In general all these actions were kept top secret on Hitler's special order and only people closely connected with the actions were supposed to be informed. The action in Denmark, Skorzeny believed, was on a special Hitler order for use of terror actions against terror. In Denmark the plan seemed to be to create a parallel resistance movement to the general Danish movement. Skorzeny felt that action against the Danish resistance movement only would be successful through use of Danes who were to be infiltrated into the resistance movement to create confusion.

In June 1944, after Skorzeny had emphasized to Schellenberg that the job in Denmark was not for soldiers but for AMT IV or Abwehr III, ten men from AMT IV, half of whom were officers and all members of SD, were sent to his school in Friedenthal where he trained them in the use of explosives for about 8 to 10 days. They were then sent to Denmark to replace Skorzeny's men. One of Skorzeny's officers from his command unit was sent up as military expert. During the first half year Skorzeny estimated the counter saboteurs arranged 20 to 25 explosions. These explosions occurred in factories which worked solely for Danish purposes as an answer to the actions committed by the Danish resistance movement which blew up factories working for the Germans. The explosives which were used were mostly obtained from parachutes which had been dropped by Allied planes for the use of the Danish resistance movements. Once or twice AMT VI F delivered explosives and other supplies to the action group. When shown figures about these activities in Denmark, Skorzeny said that it was very difficult for him to judge if they were right or not as the reports he received for use in his schools only had the sum of actions in all occupied countries. However, he felt that the relationship between the figures was right. Skorzeny identified some names of his men who had been in Denmark.

Op 12 April 1945, Kaltenbrunner as the representative of the Reichsführer SS, in Austria, ordered by telephone that Skorzeny move his Headquarters, then in Bavaria, to Linz in Austria and report to Eigruber, the Gauleiter there. Skorzeny did so at once. Eigruber ordered him to organize a patrol service in and around Linz and on 13 April, Skorzeny established this with the help of 5 officers and 8 NCO's from his Headquarters. Orders were signed by Eigruber and countersigned by Skorzeny. Skorzeny left with his men on 20 April and says that during the week he remained in Linz, he saw no signs of evacuation of concentration camps.
When Skorzeny reported to General Winter he met Kaltenbrunner there who handed him the Oak Leaf to the Knights Cross which had been granted him by the Fuhrer.

Kaltenbrunner said that it would be possible to develop the inner redoubt. Kaltenbrunner said that it was necessary to follow his orders in this respect and that everything would have to be made to strengthen the positions. However, Kaltenbrunner said in case Austria would be fully occupied he had decided to hide in the mountains in order to await developments and then later on give himself up to the Western Allies.