SPECIAL DETENTION CENTER "ASHCAN"

Detailed Interrogation Report

GERMAN PREPARATIONS FOR WAR

Method of Planning - Method of Training to Carry out these Plans

AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES ON THE MILITARY CAREER AND POLITICAL VIEWS of
GEN. D. ART. WARLIMONT

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SECRET
GERMAN PREPARATIONS FOR WAR

MILITARY CAREER AND POLITICAL VIEWS OF GENERAL WARLIMONT

I. SOURCE

Name: WARLIMONT, Walter
Rank: General der Artillerie
Interned: 23 May 45, Gmund am Tegernsee
Interrogated: 24 Jun 45

II. PREAMBLE

Source is 51 years of age and has been a professional soldier since 1913. In 1927 he married the daughter of PAULA ANHEUSER BUSCH one of the famous American Brewing Co. family. His wife was raised and educated in the U.S.A. Consequently he has many acquaintances in the U.S. He also states that he is acquainted with Gen. W. DONOVAN. Source has been very cooperative and has offered his services in our behalf. He insists that he has not been in favor of Nazi policies, and cites instances in his career as witness to this fact. He attributes his rise to his present rank to General Field Marshall KEITEL's estimation of his (source's) ability. The I.O. making this report can vouch for the fact that KEITEL considered Source one of the ablest officers in his command, having learned this fact through previous personal conversation with KEITEL.

Source suffered a brain concussion in the 20 Jul attempt on Hitler's life, which did not manifest itself until the 6 Sept 44, at which time he retired from duty and never returned. He maintained that he used his injury as an excuse not to return to duty, as he was sick of the entire program, and he offers Prof. BUMKE as witness to the truth of this statement.

It is believed that the information contained in this report is a fair account of Source's knowledge and convictions and may be considered reliable.

III. OUTLINE OF CAREER

Born: 3 Oct 1894 at Osnabrueck.
Schooling: 4 years Volkschule.  
9 years Gymnasium. 
3-4 semesters University in MUNSTER and MUNICH studying Political Science.
17 Feb 1913: Joined Army as officer candidate.
Jun 1914: Commissioned as and Lt after completing a nine months course in Danzig.
1914-1918: Lt (Artillery) - ending the war as lst Lt.
1919: With FRITZKOPF AMERICKER. In TORGOA and WAUMBURG.
Jan 1921: To the "100,000" as 1st Lt ABTEILUNG ADJUTANT, Artillery Regt 6, at MINDEN.

1922: Battery executive, Artillery Regt 6, at MUNSTER.

1923: Inspection officer at Infantry School at MUNICH. Through competitive examinations was selected for the General Staff School, WEHRMACHTKOMMANDO VI at MUNSTER.

Autumn 1924: With artillery Regt 6, in HANNOVER.

Jun 1925: Promoted to Captain.

Autumn 1925: Final period of study in BERLIN at the REICHESWEHRMINISTERIUM.

Summer 1926: Appointment to General Staff as second adjutant of the THUPPENAMT under the chief of the THUPPENAMT in the REICHESWEHRMINISTERIUM.

Spring 1927: Transferred to HEERESWAFFENAMT, WAFFENSHAFTSSSTAB, REICHESWEHRMINISTERIUM. Study of combined Military and Industrial production with special attention to raw materials.

March 1927: Married to ANITA, Baroness KLEYLORFF, daughter of Baron KLEYLORFF and BARONESS KNEUSER BUSCH.

Apr 1929: Ordered to U.S.A. to study Military and Industrial mobilization.

Apr-May 1930: To BERLIN to REICHESWEHRMINISTERIUM, writing reports on studies in U.S.A. Articles sent to Dept. T 3, THUPPENAMT. One article appeared in "Army Ordnance" in summer of 1930.

Oct 1930: Battery executive - Artillery Regt 1 - ALLENSTEIN.

1 Feb 1933: Promoted to Major.

1 Apr 1933: To REICHESWEHRMINISTERIUM, in the WAFFENAMT, as GRUPPENLEITER, for Army Industrial Planning.

Summer 1934: Made chief of above bureau (WAFFENAMT).

Summer 1935: Bureau placed under O.K.W.

1 Aug 1935: Promoted to Lt. Col.

Aug 1936: Sent by von BLOMBERG as Military Envoy to General FRANCO.

Dec 1936: Returned to GERMANY and ordered to TRIER as commander of Abt. III, Artillery Regt 34. First meeting with HITLER on the question of sending more divisions to SPAIN. Advised against it and was supported by FRITZCH and BLOMBERG.
Oct 1937: Commander Arty Regt 26, DÜSSELDORF.

1 Feb 1938: Promoted to Colonel as of 1 Oct 37, in consideration of four months' service in SPAIN.

Apr 1938: Sent to VIENNA to represent the Chief of the O.K.W. Duties were nil, so returned in 2-3 weeks to DÜSSELDORF.

May-Jun 1938: Worked on a series of problems at DÜSSELDORF for the General Staff.

Aug 1938: With the General Staff in BERLIN to assume the duties of Chief of Home Defense (LANDESVERTEIDIGUNG) in O.K.W.

Oct 1938: Represented the O.K.W. at the conference in BERLIN to decide on Czecho-Slovak occupation.

Nov-Dec 1938: Chief of LANDESVERTEIDIGUNG. Made a study of possible consolidation of various branches, including a section for civilian defense.

1 Sep 1939: JODL returned as Chief of the OKW-FÜHRUNGSSSTAB. Source named JODL's Deputy (STELLVERTRETER).

1 Aug 1940: Promoted to GENERAL-MAJOR.

Dec 1941: Included in daily "War Room" conferences.

1 Apr 1942: Promoted to GENERALLEUTNANT.

Summer 1943: Lectured in the "War Room" on the situation in FINLAND and the BALKANS.

Apr 1944: Promoted to GENERAL DER ARTILLERIE.

20 Jul 1944: Attempt on HITLER's life.

6 Sep 1944: Withdrew from FÜHRER-HAUPT-ARTILLERIE.

23 May 1945: Interned.

Note: For additional details on the principal events of source's career see Part II of this report.
PART ONE

GERMAN PREPARATIONS FOR WAR

Method of Planning - Method of Training to Carry out those Plans

A. Introductory Note

1. Subjects Discussed

The following subjects will be treated under the general heading of "German Preparations for war":

i. Preparations for mobilization within the WEHRMACHT, and for general or civilian defense; i.e., the organizational preparations.

ii. Preparations for strategic troop concentrations, and for the first commitment of these troops; i.e., strategic (operational) preparations.

2. Subjects not Discussed

The following will not be discussed:

i. General preparations, inherent in the functions of the Armed Forces of any nation, and which are constantly in progress; e.g., training, development of weapons, fortifications, etc.

ii. The progressive build-up of the WEHRMACHT following the break-down of the Disarmament Conference in Geneva, and Germany's return to military self-determination (REICHSTAG).

iii. Preparations in the field of so-called military-economic mobilization (WIRTSCHAFTLICHE MOBILISATION), which was in its initial stages when Germany began to rearm, and was soon surpassed in most sectors by the rearmament program. Military-economic mobilization methods did not differ essentially from those in other countries.

3. Limitations

Source's knowledge of facts and events bearing on the problem at issue is limited in some respects, and this for the following reasons:

i. In his official work, up to autumn 1938, he had only a partial view of the whole situation.

ii. Preparations for mobilization within the WEHRMACHT was almost exclusively, and training entirely, in the hands of the OKW of the three branches of the armed Forces. The OKw dealt with these problems only in their broad outlines.

B. ORGANIZATIONAL PREPARATIONS

The WEHRMACHT

1. Organizations Department

Preparations for the mobilization of the Army were directed by the Organizations Department of the Army General Staff,
acting under orders of the Commander in Chief of the army. Source was never employed for this specialized work of the Army General Staff, and can therefore give no significant information on the plans and the system used, which were changed every year to conform with changing conditions. In this connection he refers to GENERAL DER INFANTERIE STAPF and GENERAL DER INFANTERIE BUHLE, both of them former chiefs in the Organizations Department of the army.


After Nov 38, OKW directives concerning mobilization were issued only in so far as the FUEHRER ordered preparations for a state of "accelerated march readiness" (AKSCHLEUNIGTE MARSCHBEREITSCHAFT), to exist side by side with regular mobilization plans (PLANMAESSIGE MOBILISIERUNG). The point of this was to be able to commit certain elements of the army and Air Force at shortest notice, - that is, within a few hours, - for mobile operations of limited scope. It was to be so organized that regular mobilization could be effected immediately afterwards, if need be, without having to draw from troops in a state of "accelerated march readiness".

3. Occupation of Western CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

The OKH's task of developing this "accelerated" plan. It was applied for the first time in Mar 39, when the Fuehrer ordered the occupation of Western CZECHOSLOVAKIA by German troops. The OKH received this order on 14 (?!) Mar 39, between 1600 and 1800 hours. Preparations had so far advanced that troops of the frontier Wehrkreise were able to cross the border by next morning at dawn. Since meantime, that same night, the Czech President had already yielded to German demands, there was no need of regular mobilization in support of the operations.

4. Poland. - Drawbacks of "Accelerated March Readiness".

The method having proved practicable on that occasion, under simple circumstances, some time after this the Fuehrer asked that plans for the strategic concentration of troops against Poland should be organized on the same basis. When, however, the plan was actually put into effect against Poland, end of Aug 1939, the weak spots in it became evident.

i. From the very start the OKH had submitted unwillingly to the Fuehrer's order. The forces made available through the "accelerated march readiness" plan, - in spite of additional measures, such as the employment of whole divisions, disguised as work crews, to dig field fortifications, - were not considered sufficient by the OKH to break through against anticipated Polish resistance. When the time limit set for crossing the Polish border was postponed from 25 Aug to 1 Sep 39 (for political reasons, source presumes), the OKH asked for and obtained permission, in those few days, to partially mobilize the rear echelon services according to standard plan.

ii. The subsequent, complete, regular mobilization, as source remembers, gave rise to a great deal of friction. Besides, the legal status (RECHTSZUSTAND) was not clear, since a state of war had not been declared, - perhaps for political reasons, - and the sphere of military organization was not on a full war footing. Instead, the idea of a "special operation" (BESONDERER EINSATZ) was put forward for the purpose.
For the same reasons, preparations for civilian defense were undertaken only to the extent that the "special operation" made them necessary. For instance, the conversion of industry on a war production basis was not completed, with the result that, against the intentions of the mobilization plans, considerable man-power was drawn away from industrial concerns into military service.

5. Coordination of Highest Defense Authorities.

In the years following 1933, by order of the Fuehrer, and after the example of other European powers, the highest civilian authorities in the REICH (the Ministries) were combined into one organization with the highest military authorities. The purpose was to make ready the defense of the REICH in all spheres, not just those affected by the WEHRMACHT's special jurisdiction. Head of this organization during its first phase (1935/36) was the Minister of National Defense (REICHSMINISTER), who was at the same time Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces representing the Fuehrer. At that time, its main task was still to define and delimit the work of the individual departments, and to coordinate them with the mobilization of the WEHRMACHT.

The first "war game", for instance, early in 1936, was meant to clarify this task. Its results clearly showed the need of making the boundaries of the WEHRMACHT and the boundaries of civil administration districts (Postal Service, Railroads, etc.) coincide as closely as possible. This goal was never reached.

When source returned to the OKW in autumn 1938, the organization had expanded, while the influence of the OKW, and in general of the WEHRMACHT, had greatly decreased in it.

6. Principal Coordinating Agencies.

The principal agencies in the field of overall, civilian-military coordination were:

i. The REICHSTAGUNGSRAT (Council for National Defense), a body comprising the REICH Ministers, the Commanders in Chief of the branches of the Armed Forces, and a few other leading personalities, such as the REICHSARBEITSPFUEHRER, under the presidency of REICHSARBEITSPFUEHRER GOERING as permanent representative of the Fuehrer. GOERING had also at his disposal a Secretariat (SEKRETARIAT) composed of two members of the Staff of the OKW. However, before official papers submitted by this Secretariat came up for discussion in the Council, GOERING allowed them to be checked, and not infrequently changed, by the department heads of his Four Years' Plan. The REICHSTAGUNGSRAT convened no more than twice during the period from Nov 38 to Sep 39. The sessions were essentially discussions, without concrete results.

ii. The REICHSTAGUNGSRAT, (Board for National Defense), which comprised officials representing all the highest REICH authorities included in the REICHSTAGUNGSRAT, under the chairmanship of the Commander in Chief of the OKW. This was an advisory body on the execution of defense
works. It advised on these, and where need be turned them over to special sub-committees. It was expressly understood that the C in C of the OKW was "primo inter parum", and had no right to make individual decisions.

As far as source remembers, this body, too, met not more than two or three times in the period foresaid (Nov 38 - Sep 39).

iii. The SEKRETARIAT (Secretariat) for National Defense, in the Department for National Defense of the OKW. Head of the Secretariat was GAUSE, later promoted to general. The Master Register for Mobilization (Mobilisations-Hauptbuch) was kept here. All measures, emanating from and approved by the highest state authorities, were recorded in this register, time and place data of actions to be taken were inter-related, and the whole was coordinated with the mobilization plans of the WEHRMACHT. Every state department kept a similar "Register for Mobilization", covering its own sphere of responsibility.

This system extended to the intermediate and lower state authorities, so that action could be taken on a proposed measure by simply communicating the right code letters to the proper offices. If special preparations had to precede the execution of the measure, for instance, for printing food ration cards, orders had to be given that much earlier, and the exact date for this, too, was to be found in the Register.

On the eve of the Polish campaign, only a few of all the actions planned and worked out as above went into effect, for reasons already noted (see para B, 4). As far as source knows, no difficulties were met due to inherent weaknesses in the system.

However, end of Aug 39, just before the outbreak of the war, the system itself was entirely thrown out of gear, when the Fuehrer asked the Chief of the Bureau of the Chancellery (CHEF DER REICHSKANZLEI) to create a Ministerial Council for National Defense (MINISTERRAT FUER DIE REICHSVERTEIDIGUNG). This entirely new official body, as far as source can remember, included only the Fuehrer's Deputy, the Chief of the Bureau of the Chancellery, the Minister of the Interior, the Minister of Economics, and the C-in-C of the OKW. GOERING again presided.

This meant that the control of civilian National Defense had passed decisively from military into political hands. From then on the OKW could do no more than represent the particular interests of the WEHRMACHT in the new Council. The Secretariat and the Register for mobilization sank into oblivion.

As the new organization developed, the WEHRMACHT's influence in it was progressively curtailed. The GAULEITERS, as National Defense Commissioners (REICHSVERTEIDIGUNGS-KOMMISSARE), were put directly under the Ministerial Council for National Defense. This will also explain the fact that during the last phase of the war the GAULEITERS and REICHSVERTEIDIGUNGS-KOMMISSARE took over the control of tasks which should have
remained the prerogative of the Wehrmacht (for instance, the fortification of the national boundaries).

C. STRATEGIC PREPARATIONS

1. Lack of Strategic Plans. War Games and "Practice Tours".

All campaigns undertaken by Germany in the recent war have one significant trait in common: plans for strategic concentration of troops, after the fashion of those drawn up by the Great General Staff (GROSSER GENERALSTAB) - such as the SCHLIEFFEN Plan - were nowhere present. They all had to be improvised at short order. In particular, as far as source knows, the OKW, - since the time of its existence (1935) as supreme command of the three branches of the armed forces until the outbreak of the war, - had not even made theoretical studies of the strategic problems it would have to face in case of war. The war games mentioned in para B, 5, and the only war maneuver (WEHRMACHTMANEUVER) otherwise performed in the fall of 1937, were conceived on a very general, strategic basis, with no relation to European state boundaries. Their only purpose was to clear up problems of the Supreme Command, including civilian defense problems, and the problem of cooperation among the branches of the armed forces. The "Practice Tours" of the WEHRMACHT (WEHRMACHTÜBUNGENREISEN), which the OKW undertook, following a tradition of the army General Staff, in the years before the war, served similar purposes on a smaller scale. The Practice Tour of spring 1939 was solely for the purpose of inspecting the west wall.

The OKH, too, had no plans for strategic troop concentrations against the neighboring states. In the matter of army preparedness source knows, from personal participation, that studies were made on the defenses of Eastern Prussia and other territories bordering on Poland. These studies were in the form of tours (REISEN), war games and maneuvers, which, in part, constituted regular military training, and in part were an effort to familiarize the army with the terrain bordering the frontier.

2. "Practice Tour" of Army General Staff, 1938.

On the other hand, the "Tour" of the army General Staff in 1938, presupposing an offensive attack against Czechoslovakia, was of singular importance. This particular "tour" actually consisted of a series of written problems on long-range operations (FERNAUFGABEN) to be solved in writing. Artillery Regiment Commander source was asked to participate, together with numerous other General Staff officers in the various age brackets, and he was present at the meeting in BERLIN, in Jun 1938, when General Beck, Chief of the army General Staff, presented a critique of the "Tour". It was here, for the first time, that source had the feeling that serious intentions were apparently at the bottom of the experiment, intentions which he thought could only originate from highest political quarters. General Beck spoke for several hours, and came to the following conclusion, upon which he laid great emphasis: An attack on Czechoslovakia by Germany should succeed in overpowering the Czech army in a few weeks; but in the meantime the French, acting to fulfill their obligations as allies, would have penetrated into Southern and Central Germany before any appreciable German forces could be brought up against them. With this he left no doubt in his hearers' mind that the Chief of the army
General Staff entirely disapproved the plan. Source does not know to what extent the results of this study were utilized when Germany marched into Czechoslovakia in the fall of 38.

In view of the situation described above (para C, 1), the method of preparing for the Polish campaign as described below, was used again, in its general outlines, for later campaigns. The procedure in the case of Poland was as follows:

1. In the first half of Apr 39, after the Polish Foreign Minister had returned from London with a military, mutual assistance pact, the Chief of the OKW informed Pa that the Fuehrer had ordered preparations for a strategic concentration of the bulk of the Wehrmacht against Poland, according to a broad strategic plan of his own. If diplomatic pressure for the return of Danzig and the Corridor should fail, armed force would be used. At the same time, forces were to move up to the area of the west wall, to hold the Reich secure against France. Regular mobilization would not be used.

2. On the strength of this, the OKW sent a directive, signed by the Fuehrer, to the higher commanders of the Wehrmacht. These commanders had already been informed orally, at the same time as the Chief of the OKW, of the Fuehrer’s intentions.

3. Next, the commanders-in-chief of the branches of the Armed Forces were, if necessary to consult with each other, then within a given period to report their plans orally to the Fuehrer. The Fuehrer took special interest in the plans of the army, and insisted, for instance, on a more vigorous pursuit of the enveloping operations on the Northern wing, from East Prussia, with the main effort to be centered East of the Vistula. As preparations for this campaign developed, and especially later, the Fuehrer extended his influence from the strategic to the tactical sphere, in all its detail. In the Polish Campaign, for instance, he gave detailed instructions on behavior in Danzig, on plans to prevent the blowing up of the Vistula bridge at Deschau (the plan failed), on movement of troop reinforcements for the army in East Prussia, etc. Besides, he was especially concerned with appointments to high command positions.

4. The plans, after approval, were converted by the OKW into a set of detailed orders for the strategic concentration of troops. The other two branches of the Wehrmacht did likewise. The army General Staff “Tour” of 1939 helped in working out details. That same year, the commanders who were to be in charge of higher formations were called in. It was also planned to use the impending large scale maneuvers, in the fall of 1939, to train the troops for the specific job that lay ahead of them, and to camouflage movements for troop concentration. As was done in the previous General Staff Tour, the 5 (?) Panzer Divisions then in existence were to be committed in mass (Geschlossen) for the first time, with strategic, long-range objectives of their own.
The OBERKOMMANDOÖ of the branches of the armed forces developed their plans, as far as necessary, in closest co-operation. The OKW was kept informed on these developments through the record of orders issued by the OBERKOMMANDOÖ, or by taking part in the critique that followed the army General Staff Tour, and by other means. It was also a rule that the reports made to the Führer by the commanders-in-chief of the branches of the armed forces, should at the same time be communicated to the Chief of the OKW.

v. The Führer first made known his final decision to launch the campaign at a conference with all higher commanders, down to Army Commands and equivalent commands in the other branches. This took place 8 - 10 days before X-day, and on this occasion the Führer explained in great detail the political and military reasons for his decision.

vi. Now the OKW summarized once more all the tasks assigned to the WEHRMACHT in one final directive, shortly before the beginning of the campaign, and at the same time set down detailed instructions for the cooperation of the branches of the armed forces at the beginning of operations.

In addition, there were "special orders" dealing with measures pertaining equally to all three branches of the WEHRMACHT, e.g., the operational boundaries of the army, the safeguarding of important military, economic and traffic installations in enemy territory, currency regulations through military finance offices, etc.

A time schedule was set up in the OKW, as a guide for the Supreme Command in the decisive period shortly before and after the beginning of hostilities.

The Führer himself wrote the "Call to the WEHRMACHT", when the troops stood ready to march.

4. Preparations for the Invasion of Norway

In the case of Norway, the method of planning was different from the above in one important respect: there was nothing to go on for this operation, and the highest commands did not even have maps. Further, the tactical cooperation of the three branches of the WEHRMACHT, in this case, was necessary in every detail. The Führer, therefore, who sought to maintain his influence in all matters of planning, ordered the creation of a special "Study Staff" (STUDIENSTAB) in Jan 1940, which consisted of one Staff Officer from each of the branches of the Armed Forces, and was attached to armed Forces Operations Staff (WEHRMACHTFUHRSUMSTAB). Later this Study Staff was incorporated into the Army General Command (OBERKOMMANDO DES HEERES), which was responsible for the direction of operations. The Army General Command had to prepare its work in closest contact with the OKW, and in the matter of command remained tactically subordinate to the Führer, through the OKW. The channels of command for the OBERKOMMANDOÖ of the Navy and the air Force remained unchanged.

D. SUMMARY (STATEMENT BY SOURCE)

1. Preparations for war in Germany, as far as source could
observe them, were confined up to spring 1939 to such general measures as were part of the normal responsibilities of the WEHRMACHT. In one respect they even lagged far behind: no plans existed for strategic troop concentrations against specific countries, in contrast with earlier practices of the German General Staff. It was planned, in those years, by means of rearmament, fortifications and economic mobilization measures, to catch up with the progress made in neighboring states, which were in part heavily armed. These plans, however, were far from complete as late as autumn 39

ii. Hence, the preparations for war against Poland might well be called improvisations. A method of planning, and a method of training for carrying out the plans, were noticeably absent. The organizational plans, which did exist for the mobilization of the WEHRMACHT and of civilian National Defense, were put into effect to a limited extent only.

(M. E. H.)
PART TWO

AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
ON THE MILITARY CAREER AND POLITICAL VIEWS OF
GENERAL DER ARTILLERIE W. MULLIMONT

Note: For a chronological outline of source's career, see part III, pp 1-3.

A. THE DUTIES IN THE NATIONAL MINISTRY OF DEFENSE (REICHSMINISTERIUM)
(1927-1929)

My duties in the army Ordnance Office (HEERESAMT) of the National Ministry of Defense from spring 1927 to 1929 were:

a) To collect and evaluate the experiences of World War I in the field of raw material planning;

b) To observe the trend of development in the German raw material and other key industries, with regard to military requirements (e.g., construction of long distance gas mains);

c) To support economic efforts of national importance in that field (autarchy);

d) To study the military-economic planning of foreign countries in that field.

I had no special instructions for the performance of these tasks.

B. THE MILITARY MISSION TO THE U.S.... (Sep 1929 - Jan 1930)

My activities during my mission to the U. S. Army in WASHINGTON D.C., from Sep 29 to Jan 30, were as follows:

My task was to study military-industrial planning in the principal offices of the War Department (Planning Branch of the ass. Secretary of War, Ordnance Department, Quartermaster Department, etc.). For this I had the permission of the War Department General Staff (Liaison Officer), restricted each time to a few days.

In connection with this, I was asked by the officers of the Planning Branch to speak to the members of the Army Industrial College on the subject of German military-industrial activities during World War I, - a task which I could not prepare before receiving the necessary books, plans, etc. from the German War Department. Other lectures in English, at the request of various branches of the U. S. War Department, followed. Among my hearers, besides the officers of the Planning Branch and of the Army Industrial College, were a considerable number of generals and other high ranking officers of the
Until I got the things I needed to prepare the lectures, I spent one month's vacation in HAVANA (Cuba), with my wife, at my own expense.

C. AMERICAN PERSONALITIES ACQUAINTED WITH M. (Spring 29 - Spring 30)

During my mission to the U.S.A., from spring 29 to spring 30, the following officers of the U.S. Army became better acquainted with me. (Note: ranks and positions indicated are as in 1929-1930; officers marked with an asterisk knew me especially well).

- Col. R. C. FOY, Liaison Officer, War Department General Staff, Washington, D.C.
- *Major Donald ARMSTRONG, Ordnance, Planning Branch of the Assistant Secretary of War, Washington, D.C.
- *Capt. A. HURST
- Lt-Col BURLESON, Artillery, 12 Field Artillery Regiment, Fort Sam Houston, Texas.
- Maj Abbot BOONE
- Maj Jimmy JAMES, Cavalry, retired, Charlotte, N.C.

Of high ranking officers who became acquainted with me, then or later, I mention:

- General KAISER, then commanding the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Ga., now Chief of General Staff, at whose house I was a guest during my several days' stay, and at whose request I spoke in his presence to officers of the school on the subject of my participation in the German campaign against Italy in 1917.
- General DONOVAN, whom I met at the VON SIMSON residence in BERLIN-DAHLEM shortly before this war in Aug 39, at the suggestion of a common friend (Dr. LEVERKÜHN). We had an extensive conversation of the political and military situation in Germany at that time.

D. MY DUTIES IN THE NATIONAL MINISTRY OF DEFENSE (REICHSWEHRMINISTERIUM) (May-Sep 1930)

My duties in the National Ministry of Defense, May 1930-Sep 1930, after my return from the U.S.A., were:

- To write summary reports, mostly on the system and methods of
military-industrial planning;

b) To write similar reports on pre-military instruction in universities, and on military instruction in preparatory and officer schools and in the R.O.T.C.

c) To write similar reports on artillery and firing practice in the U.S.A.

As a special task I had to prepare and brief Gen. VON BLOMBERG for his impending trip to the U.S.A.

I was also given one month's vacation at that time.

E. W.'s Tasks in Spain (Sep 36 - Nov 36)

My tasks in Spain, from Sep to Nov 36, were:

c) To represent the interests of German volunteers at General FRANCO's HQ;

d) To consider his wishes for further/military support, and to act as an intermediary in this regard;

e) To further the economic services rendered by Spain in return for German help, for the benefit of German rearmament (this task I turned over entirely to business men after a few weeks).

F. W.'s Position and Duties as Chief of Home Defense and Assistant Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff (Chief LANDESVERTeidigung und STELLVERTRETENDER CHEF WEHRMACHTFUHRUNGSSTAB) (Nov 38 - Sep 44)

My position and duties as Chief of Home Defense and Ass. Chief Armed Forces Operations Staff from Nov 38 to Sep 44, were as follows:

From Nov 38 to Sep 39 I was subordinate to the Chief of the OKW; after 1 Sep 39 to the Chief of the WEHRMACHTFUHRUNGSTAB (who returned to the OKW when the German forces were mobilized). At this time I held the rank of a Brigadier General (BRIGADE KOMMANDEUR), from Apr 42 on that of a Major General (DIVISIONSKOMMANDEUR). My duties were to summarize the tasks of the Supreme Command in the field of a) operations, b) organization, and c) quarter-master activities, - following directives of the Chief of the OKW or, later (from 1 Sep 39), of the Chief of the WEHRMACHTFUHRUNGSTAB. These duties are described below in more detail:

c) In the field of operations and tactics I had to advise the Chief of the WEHRMACHTFUHRUNGSTAB; to prepare and issue directives; to correlate the daily reports from all fronts (except the East); to cooperate with the strategic commands of the three branches of the Armed Forces and with the Supreme Command of (German) Allies; to collect and evaluate military news from the enemy which was passed on to us by the High Commands of the three branches of the Armed Forces and by other sources.

b) In the field of organization I had to deal with fundamental topics pertaining to the WEHRMACHT in general, both of a personal and material kind;
with the principles of cooperation with para-military organizations attached to the RESOURCES (O.T., REICHSRABITZENST); with statistics.

c) In the field of quartermaster activities I had to survey the supply situation (except for the East), questions of transportation, provision of gasoline, etc.; to prepare and issue the fundamental directives for the administration of occupied territories (i.e., for the military or civil authorities); to direct the armistice commission; to cooperate with civil defense. Before the war I had about 12 officers on my staff, from 1 Sep 39 to Sep 43 I had 25-30, from Sep 43 to Sep 44 I had 40-45.

G. W.'s WITHDRAWAL FROM THE FUEHRER-HAUPTQUARTIER (6 Sep 44) AND NOTES ON HIS POLITICAL AND PERSONAL VIEWS

1. Alleged and Real Reasons for W.'s Withdrawal

The effects on my health following a concussion of the brain which I suffered on 20 Jul 44 were only the external cause of my withdrawal from the FUEHRER-HAUPTQUARTIER on 6 Sep 44. (See medical statement by the neurologist Dr. STAUBER, among my papers). The real motives were deeper and were the decisive ones. They are described in the following.

2. W.'s First Hopes. The German Army Officer and National Socialism.

From the very beginning I followed National Socialism only so far and so long as it seemed to promise to restore the dignity and greatness of the REICH on the international plane, and, on the national plane, to overcome and replace internal class war with the front line spirit (FRONTGIST) of World War times. These aims corresponded entirely to the basic conception (HILFT, SCHUTZUNGS) of the average German army officer.


Suspicion and aversion, however, which had already been aroused in me by the events connected with the RÖSHAUS-Putsch (Jun 34), by the changing of the flag, and by the consequences of the NÜRNBERG Laws (autumn 35) - to mention only a few examples - grew still more when the army and its officer corps, through the shake-up in Feb 36 (VON BLICKBERG, VON FRITSCH), suddenly saw themselves exposed to the direct influence of the Party's political system. This system, in its aims and still more in its methods, had meantime swerved far away from all expectations.

4. W. and Catholicism.

As a Catholic, who has his children educated in the same faith (witness: Pastor KISSEL, GÜNTHER KEGENHÖSER), I resisted a "movement" which was out to replace the Bible with the "Mythos" of a HOSSINGER, and which misused Christian terminology for the veneration of its leader and for its most profane institutions; a movement whose leading exponents, later, in my very presence, found frequent pleasure in uttering the coarsest profanities, and proclaimed that the church would be effectively exterminated once the war was over. My point of view had been known for a long time, once through the denunciation of my call on Bishop BORHOLL of TRIR, in 1937, and again through my occasional going to church during my stay in the FUEHRER-HAUPTQUARTIER. It was revealed anew during conversations which I had with my officers in the
presence of a member of the Fuehrer's inner circle. We made it clear then that we would rather quit the service than to let ourselves be forced to withdraw from the church.

5. W.'s Cultural and Family Background

In addition to the above, my personal attitude to manners and conduct of life was the product of several, significant factors. I was of Western descent (Walloon); my wife's family relations extended both to the high aristocracy (Princes WITTGENSTEIN, SCHÖNBURG-WILDESHEIM, MIE, DONNERSMARCK) and to the U.S. (her mother is Pauline ANHEUSER-BUSCH, born in CHICAGO, ILL.); I had travelled in foreign countries and made contacts with the Western nations, their people and their culture. The attitude referred to, therefore, was thoroughly opposed to that of the circle in the FUEHRER-HAUPT-KWARTIER. Consequently, I need not specially state that I emphatically rejected all rowdism and Party bureaucracy (DONZENTUM) of any kind, as well as all offences brought to my knowledge against the fundamental laws of civilization.

In witness of these statements (para 5) I refer to MINISTERIALRAT Helmut GREINER, who was on my staff till 1943, and was then expelled by the Fuehrer, on grounds of alleged lack of National Socialist convictions. Later GREINER resided in POTSDAM, BERGSTRASSE 2.

6. W.'s Estrangement in Hitler's Inner Circle

My reservations toward the Party, as described above, could not remain hidden in the long run, and rightly so. Gradually the point was reached where I was regarded as a stranger in the place. I have never been cordially spoken to by Hitler during my 4 to 5 years' stay, and the "inner circle" avoided associating with me. This was favored by the location of the headquarters of my staff - a staff which consisted solely of soldiers - which were always separate from those of the "inner circle".

7. W. and the SS. GOERING'S Opinion

The SS, in 1942, still had me on its "black list" because of various objections against a further enlargement of the WAFFEN-SS which I had raised in pre-war times (1939). (Witness: Col. MONA, until 20 Jul 44 in command of the Cavalry School at KRUMPNETZ-BERLIN, then transferred to the SS under compulsion).

GOERING, who used to overlook me intentionally when he was at the FUEHRER-HAUPT-KWARTIER, described me to a friend of his, in the fall of 1943, as "a high ranking member of the 'Generals, Free Masonry Circle' in the National Socialist State", - according to a written warning which I got at that time from a cousin of mine, Dr. Ing. Felix WIELAND, President of the Board of NORDDEUTSCHE AFFINERIE, HAMBURG, ALSTERTERRASSE 2.

8. W.'s attitude towards another War

My attitude towards another war made me look at the troubled events in the fall of 38 as a national misfortune. Gen. BECK, chief of the army General Staff, felt the same way. When a peaceful solution was finally reached, that autumn I was freed from a nightmare. My uneasiness was all the greater then, during summer 1939, I witnessed the entanglements with POLAND, but I hoped once again for a peaceful solution when the date for crossing the Polish border, 25 Aug 39, was postponed. (My wife can bear witness to this.) In my official position in the OKW, however, I could swallow myself of no means to influence this development. In all those months, for instance, I saw the
Fuehrer only once, in the BERGHOF, about 20 Aug, when he announced his final decision to wage war to the assembled generals of the WEHRMACHT. Throughout the month of July - following a custom of my youth - I stayed with my family on the Belgian coast (HENINYE, Hotel BELLEVUE), on vacation, without getting the slightest news on further developments.

9. W.'s Effort to Enlist Belgian Intervention

When, later, the conflict in the East threatened to expand into another world war, I made an attempt in autumn 39, together with a like-minded officer friend of mine, to induce the Belgian king to intercede between Germany on the one hand and England and France on the other. (The officer referred to is Lt-Col EBE VON PAPPENHEIM, then Military Attaché at the German Embassy in BRUSSELS). PAPPENHEIM, after securing the consent of the late Field Marshal VON REICHENAU, - who had himself confessed his uneasiness about the war at the BERGHOF assembly mentioned above, - did approach the king, probably through a middle-man. I feel justified, therefore, in the conviction that I held even today, that the king's effort at mediation which was made shortly thereafter, and which, according to the German press, was wrecked by British refusal, was due at least in part to my own initiative.

The only Germans living who know of my efforts in this regard are General VON PAPPENHEIM himself, whose whereabouts are unknown to me, and my wife.

10. W.'s Attitude towards the Methods of Conducting the War

i. General BECK's Military Principles - As a pupil of General BECK, who was dismissed by the Fuehrer as chief of Army General Staff in 1933 because of his opposition to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, I remained true to his principles that a General Staff officer must always cultivate a sober, calculating, and strongly responsible way of thinking. This led me into a steadily growing opposition to the methods of the Fuehrer, who looked upon and often condemned those principles as defeatist and contemptible notions.

ii. Poland - The provocations from the German population beyond the border, preceding in customary fashion the campaign against POLAND, were disgusting to me. (Witness: ADMIRAL CANARD, OMA). - As regards the method of conducting the campaign, I could form no judgment. Only Field Marshal KAAD and General JOBL accompanied the Fuehrer in his command train, while I was left in BERLIN, almost inactive, with my military staff.

iii. Norway - The occupation of Norway seemed to me to be a bad mistake since it occurred shortly before the campaign against France, and could only lead to a dispersion of forces. (See a critical monograph on this which I wrote at the time). My anxiety grew still more when, during this campaign, a great unsteadiness in the face of critical situations became noticeable in the Fuehrer on various occasions (e.g., NARVIK); nor could I understand how the bigger part of the German fleet should have been sacrificed for this enterprise.

iv. France - When the campaign against France was ordered by the Fuehrer, I took sides with the memorandum of the Army General Staff, which tried to prove that this attack exceeded by far the strength of the German army. The memorandum, however, was not submitted to the Fuehrer. I have already set down, in parts 8 and 9, the consequences I drew from this.

v. Russia - Finally, as to the Fuehrer's intention to go to war with Russia, I looked upon it as the beginning of a German catastrophe from the very
first moment when General JODL announced it to me and to the staff officers in Jul 40. Officially, I expressed these feelings in the course of various arguments I had with JODL - the only person within my reach; and in private life I showed them by having my family move from BERLIN to Bavaria as early as autumn 1940.

Then, in the winter 1940/41, my last hope for a peaceful solution had vanished (after WOLOTOW's visit in BERLIN), my conviction of an impending catastrophe grew more and more. It grew all through the winter crisis (1940/41) in the East, the miscarried campaign of summer 1942, up to the collapse at STALINGRAD. Throughout the following period, which was marked by a strategy of illusions, by a constant weakening in the organization of the Supreme Command, by the wearing out of the Air Force, by the break-down of submarine warfare, by the Fuehrer's rejection of all unfavorable news from enemy sources, and by the replacement of meritorious army generals with men of passing glory, - I felt an ever growing paralyzing effect upon my work and my health. When the U.S.A., about whose military potential I had never been asked by the Fuehrer, even in conversation, entered the war late in 1941, my uneasiness had grown to quasi certainty. (Witness: my wife).

11. Additional Circumstances affecting W.'s attitude

Under these conditions (pars 1-10) the development of my personal position in the FUEHRER-Hauptquartier could not but be most unsatisfactory. It became increasingly so, by reason of the following circumstances.

i. Relegation to Inferior Position - When General JODL returned to the OKW as Chief of the FUEHRER-Hauptquartier at the beginning of the war, he relegated me to an inferior position, while at the same time army officers in my age bracket were mostly promoted to the next higher position. In this way, of course, I was still more deprived of any possibility to advocate my own opinion than I had been before.

ii. Fuehrer's Indifference - I often did not see the Fuehrer for months on end. Not before Dec 41 was I finally charged by JODL to attend the daily conference (situation report) at the Fuehrer's, in order to relieve him (JODL) of the work connected with questions and orders that came up at these conferences. About two years elapsed before I was admitted again, at my own urging, in 1943 - after JODL had asked the Fuehrer's permission - to report on the situation in minor theatres of operation. Even then, as happened again after that until my withdrawal, I had to put up with the fact that the Fuehrer always turned expressly to JODL whenever a more important question arose in connection with these reports, and so openly excluded me as an adviser in front of all those present.

(Editor's Note: I have since learned, through a recent conversation with General JODL, that the Fuehrer suspected him of participating in the 20 Jul 44 attempt on Hitler's life. The Fuehrer expressed his suspicion to JODL on Aug 1, when WILLIMONT left on an inspection tour of the NORMANDIE front, and again later, after his withdrawal from the FUEHRER-Hauptquartier on Sep 44. On both occasions JODL defended WILLIMONT's loyalty as a soldier).

iii. Temporary Dismissal - In Nov 42, that is, after more than 4 years of service in my position, I was abruptly recalled from office by the Fuehrer, without investigation and without a word of parting, because of some trivial omission in the written daily report. A few days later I was reinstated by order of General JODL, after the Fuehrer had recognized the injustice of his procedure against me.
iv. Promotional Discrimination - after my one preferential promotion to GENERALLIEUTENANT (1 Aug 40) - through GOERING's efforts in the Air Force - and long before my promotion to GENERAL DER ARTILLERIE (1 Apr 44), I was overtaken and passed by a steadily increasing number of generals, some of whom had even been my former subordinates (e.g., ZEITZLER, promoted to GENERALLIEUTENANT on 1 Feb 44). Simultaneously with my promotion to GENERAL DER ARTILLERIE on 1 Apr 44, two much younger generals, who, like myself, had been assigned to the FUEHRER-HAUPTQUARTIER from the beginning of the war, were promoted to the same rank.

v. Withholding of Decorations - In the matter of decorations, I only had the clasps (SPJagen) to the Iron Cross 2nd and 1st class, bestowed upon me by KEITEL in the fall of 39 and the spring of 40. When I left the FUEHRER-HAUPTQUARTIER, the Fuehrer refused me any further decoration, in spite of KEITEL's recommendation. It was only on 20 Apr 45 (1) that I received the Knight's Cross of the War Service of Merit Cross (RITTERKREUZ ZUM KRIEGSVJÄRMSKREUZ), a decoration which, in the meantime, had even been granted to many members of the ministerial bureaucracy. I myself obtained it only after I finally informed KEITEL in writing that the withholding from me of any marks of distinction on the part of the Fuehrer, together with my protracted illness, had already exposed me to suspicions of a most disagreeable nature as to the motives of my withdrawing from the FUEHRER-HAUPTQUARTIER. (Witness: GENERALLEUTENANT WINTER, Chief of the WAHRLEICH-ZENTRALAMT, OKW).

12. W.'s Requests for Transfer

For all these reasons (paras 1-11), from the beginning of the war on, I constantly put in urgent requests to be dismissed from a position which was oppressive to me in every respect. (Witness, GENERALLEUTENANT WINTER, see end of para 11, v). This was regularly prevented by KEITEL (not by the Fuehrer). The first time - I mention only a few examples - I begged to be transferred to the front when JOEL came back to office in the fall of 39. I asked again in summer 40, after the plans to attack Russia had been made known to me, and once more in spring 42. After my temporary removal from office in the fall of 42 (para 12, iii) I insisted, addressing myself to Field Marshal KEITEL, that he could no longer hold me. At that time he seemed to agree, but postponed his final decision until summer 43, because of various cases of sickness in the staff. When, in Sep 43, I managed to get a furlough to undergo a surgical operation (hernia), intending to use this prolonged absence to obtain, at least, a transfer to other duties, I was informed shortly afterwards that, by order of the Fuehrer, no changes in the staff of the FUEHRER-HAUPTQUARTIER could take place until further notice.

13. W.'s Withdrawal (6 Sep 44)

The last mentioned order was finally forgotten after the events of 20 Jul, and in the beginning of Sep 44, I was given the first, effective opportunity to free myself of the burden weighing on my moral and military conscience. This burden had become unbearable and the more oppressive as outwardly, I had to preserve and even insist on an attitude of confidence and assurance.

14. Witnesses

As witnesses of my general attitude (not of every individual instance) summarized in the previous paragraphs (paras 1-13), and reassuring the situation at the time, I can only mention again the person closest to me, my wife; and, beside her, the leading German psychologist, Geheimrat Prof. Dr. ERHARD, Professor at the University of MUNICH, Colonel of the Reserve (Med.) and
Consulting Psychologist of WEHR KREISKOMMANDO VII (MUNICH), who resided at TEGERNSEE, Upper Bavaria, in May 45. I was under his medical care since Sep 44.

H. V.'s INTERNMENT AND WISH

From 6 Sep 44 on, I stayed at my permanent residence in GERNBACH and TEGERNSEE, and remained there till 23 May 45, after reporting to the Allied Military Government post at MIESBACH on 9 May.

After my arrest I was brought to this internment camp, by way of AUGSBURG, on 2 Jun. Here I find myself thrown together, to a degree infinitely greater than ever before, with a community of people to which I never belonged, and from which I most urgently desire to be released as soon as possible.

29 Jun 45.

For the a. C. of S. G-Z, SHAEF

IWO V. GIANNINI,
Maj. AJS

SECRET