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PRINCIPAL NAZI ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED IN THE
COMMISSION OF WAR CRIMES

CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITIES IN CONNECTION
WITH THE PURGE OF 1934

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THE PURGE OF 1934

THE NATURE OF THE PURGE. During the period from June 30 to July 2, 1934, a number of people were put to death without resort to normal forms of criminal procedure, by order of the National Socialist government. The number of dead officially announced in Hitler’s Reichstag speech of July 13, 1934 was set at 76, but there is evidence for the death of many more.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND. The purge was directed against three main groups: (1) SA-leaders. (2) Conservative and Catholic leaders. (3) Miscellaneous enemies of the Nazi Party, or of particular Nazi leaders. The historical background of the action must therefore be considered under three main headings.

A. SA-LEADERS. The purge of 1934 was due primarily to a crisis in the relations between the SA and the Reichswehr. The SA, on which Hitler had relied for the conquest of power, had by this time grown into a body of some 2,500,000 men, whose leaders, as part of the spoils of victory, were demanding that the SA be incorporated without loss of rank, into the forces of the Reichswehr. This demand was strenuously resisted by the Reichswehr, who doubted the military value of any outside organization, and feared that the activities of so large an armed militia, by attracting unfavorable attention abroad, would compromise their own more discreet rearmament efforts. Hitler saw that national rearmament could not be accomplished without the cooperation of technically competent Reichswehr and industrialist circles. He therefore decided to appease them by ordering (June 7) that the entire SA should take a month’s vacation, beginning July 1, during which time no uniforms (with a few unimportant exceptions) should be worn. Although Röhm, the SA Chief of Staff, accepted this decision, he made it clear, both in private conversations with Hitler and in a public statement (June 9) that he would stand firm against any permanent reduction of the numbers or status of the SA. This led Hitler to the conclusion that the best way of resolving the conflict with the Reichswehr would be to liquidate the top leadership of the SA.

B. CONSERVATIVE AND CATHOLIC LEADERS. The same period was also marked by increasing tension between the Nazi Party and the conservative non-party forces which still
remained in existence. This was partly due to the conflict between the conservative Reichswehr and the radical SA. It was also due in part to the growing discontent of Christian circles with the religious policies of the regime. On June 17 Vice Chancellor von Papen tried to mobilize these conservative forces by giving a speech at Marburg, which repudiated the more extreme theses of National Socialism, and called for increased religious freedom. Although Papen was disappointed in his hope that conservative and church leaders, including the Catholic bishops then assembled at Fulda, would openly rally to his leadership, the episode caused considerable excitement in Germany. This led Hitler to the conclusion that the stabilization of his regime could best be insured by liquidating a number of conservative leaders, particularly those associated with the Marburg episode, thus discouraging the survivors from undertaking any sort of independent political initiative.

C. MISCELLANEOUS ENEMIES OF THE REGIME. In the course of the Party's rise to power many leading figures of the Nazi regime had made a number of enemies, both within and outside the Party, whom they feared either as potential rivals or as repositories of damaging information, or against whom they desired vengeance. The purge provided a convenient occasion for settling many such scores.

EVENTS OF THE PURGE. On the morning of June 30 a meeting of SA-leaders was scheduled to take place at the headquarters of the SA-Chief of Staff at Wiessee, with the purpose of discussing the future of the SA. This meeting was apparently called by authority and at the suggestion of Hitler, who was expected to arrive about noon. (Strasser, p. 97) Around midnight, June 29 Hitler, then in Godesberg, signed an order deposing Röhm as SA-Chief of Staff and naming Lutze as his successor. (Jean François, p. 137) He then telephoned Wagner in Munich and Göring in Berlin, ordering the action to begin. (Hitler, Reichstag: Speech of July 13)

The next morning SA-leaders throughout Germany were rounded up by select police and SS formations, and placed under arrest. The operation was so well prepared and executed that nowhere, with the possible exception of Breslau, were the SA able to put up any sort of resistance. Large numbers of them were then shot, sometimes with and sometimes without the formality of summary trial by an improvised court martial. The principal places of execution were Lichterfelde in Berlin and Stadelheim in Munich.
At the same time other Party and non-Party figures were visited by SS and police squads, and variously dealt with.

The restoration of public order was officially announced on July 1, but there is some reason to believe that arrests and executions took place after that date. On July 3 there was issued a Gesetz über Massnahmen der Staatsnotwehr, purporting to justify all measures taken on June 30, July 1, and July 2 (RGBl., I. p. 529). An official account and justification of the purge was given by Hitler in a speech before the Reichstag on July 13.

OFFICIAL JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PURGE. In all official statements, complicity in a common plot for the forcible overthrow of the Nazi state was given as justification for the purge. The legal basis for action differed, however, as between Party and non-Party victims.

A. PARTY MEMBERS. The killing of SA-leaders and other Party members was a summary act of criminal justice, based on the Führer's right, not only as head of the state but also as head of the Party, to act as supreme juridical (oberster Gerichtsherr) of offenses committed by Party members, whose breach of totalitarian party discipline constituted a particularly fundamental threat to the existence of a totalitarian regime. (See Carl Schmitt, "Der Führer schützt das Recht," Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung August 1, 1934 (p. 945-50) and Gottfried Neesse, Das Gesetz zur Sicherung der Einheit von Partei und Staat, Dresden, 1934)

B. NON-PARTY MEMBERS. The death of these people was a result either of suicide or of forcible resistance to legitimate arrest on suspicion of treason. (Evidence: In Hitler's Reichstag speech, the final authoritative Nazi version of the affair, all non-Party victims were placed in one or another of these two categories.) In theory it may have been felt that the Führer had a right to act as supreme juridical with regard to all Germans, and not merely Party members. (This is the position of Schmitt, op. cit. But see contra Neesse, op. cit., p. 83. "General Schliecher, der nicht der Partei oder der SA-Gerichtsbarkeit unterstand, wäre wohl erst nach ordnungsmässigem Prozesse zum Tode verurteilt worden, wenn er nicht durch seinen Unterfall auf die ihn verhaftenden Polizeibeamten seinen Leben zuvor ein Ende gesetzt hätte.")
But at no time was it officially claimed that this right had in fact been exercised in the case of any non-Party victim of the purge.

THE PROBLEM OF ASSIGNING CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTS TAKEN IN CONNECTION WITH THE PURGE. Because of the different legal position taken with regard to Party and non-Party victims, this problem must be considered under two headings.

A. RESPONSIBILITY IN CONNECTION WITH THE DEATH OF PARTY MEMBERS. The problem of assigning criminal responsibility in these cases is primarily legal. The fact that a number of SA-leaders and other Party members were executed without ordinary trial was officially admitted in repeated statements by Hitler and others. Since all Party victims were arrested before they had a chance to offer organized resistance (the only reported exception to this statement, namely the organized resistance of SA elements in Breslau, is officially denied by a DNB report of July 3) it is clear that these executions were not a legitimate exercise of emergency powers. ("Hitler war zu jeder Stunde so vollkommen Herr der Lage, dass der Staat gar nicht in eine Notlage geraten konnte." Neesse, op. cit., p. 83) The only justification for these admitted acts is that they were an exercise of the Führer's powers of summary jurisdiction, subsequently ratified "als Staatsnotwehr rechtes" by the law of July 3. Thus the question of criminal responsibility in connection with the death of Party members depends entirely on the legal question whether or not the powers claimed by the Führer, as subsequently ratified, were sufficient to justify the actions admittedly taken.

B. RESPONSIBILITY IN CONNECTION WITH THE DEATH OF NON-PARTY MEMBERS. The problem of assigning criminal responsibility in these cases is primarily a matter of factual proof. It is true that the Law of July 3 purported to ratify all "measures" taken on the preceding days, which might raise all the legal issues mentioned above. In the official report to the Reichstag on the measures actually taken (Hitler's speech of July 13) there was no mention, however, of any non-Party victims having died otherwise than by suicide or by resistance to arrest. In spite of the Law of July 3 it was also admitted that punishable "excesses" might have taken place in the course of the purge. (See Göring's speech before
the General- und Oberstaatsanwälten Preussens, 12 July 1934: "Soweit allerdings Ausschreitungen vorgekommen sein sollten, sind sie als Verbrechen ohne Ansehen der Person zu ahnden.") Thus if it can be shown that non-Party members in fact died otherwise than by suicide or by resistance to arrest, it might be possible to establish criminal responsibility without challenging the validity of the Law of July 3. Cases which would best repay investigation in this connection are listed in Appendix A. (p 8-14)

THE ASSIGNMENT OF SPECIFIC RESPONSIBILITY IN CONNECTION WITH THE PURGE. As a major step in the consolidation of the National Socialist regime, the purge is a part of the responsibility of all those who participated in the Nazi scheme of world conquest. In the case of certain individuals and groups, however, it is possible to establish a more direct and immediate responsibility for the events of these three days. Responsibility for specific criminal episodes in connection with the purge may be proved for certain individuals and groups with reference to the cases presented in Appendix A. Responsibility for the purge as a whole may also be established with regard to the following individuals and organizations.

A. ORGANIZATIONS BEARING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PURGE AS A WHOLE. The following organizations were so intimately associated with the purge in all its phases that they may be said to bear a general responsibility for the whole affair.

I. THE SS. In all phases of the action, the SS were relied upon as the favorite executants of government policy. On 28 June all SS formations in Germany were alerted (placed in Alarmzustand), in preparation for the coming action. (See the Manchester Guardian in a series of articles published at the end of August, 1934, as quoted in the Weissbuch, p. 77). In the early hours of June 30, they were mobilized, and sent to occupy key positions in Berlin, Munich, and other cities (ibid, p. 78). The occupation of the headquarters of the SA-Gruppe Berlin-Brandenburg, Tiergartenstrasse, Berlin was effected by a force including a special SS-Standarte brought from Unterfranken a few days earlier especially for that purpose.

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(Weissbuch, p. 71). All reports agree that the firing squads which executed the SA-leaders were composed of SS-men. Reports on the death of non-Party figures (e.g. von Bose, Dr. Klausener, Förster) indicate that the SS was also active in this phase of the purge.

II. THE POLICE. The police were also freely used throughout the action. The peculiar importance of Göring and of Wagner lay in the fact that they were in control of the police of Prussia and of Bavaria respectively. In Berlin the force mainly relied upon was the Landespolizeigruppe General Göring whose barracks at the former Kadettenanstalt in Lichterfelde was the chief execution place in that region. A police general is said to have been one of the judges participating in the summary court set up in that place (New York Times, July 3, 1934). On July 7 Göring issued an order particularly congratulating all ranks of the Prussian Landespolizei for their perfect cooperation in the purge crisis (Frankfurter Zeitung, July 8, 1934). The ashes of victims, both Party and non-Party, were returned to their families in urns bearing the name of the Geheime Staatspolizei. (Strasser, p. 46). Reports on the death of non-Party figures (e.g. Schleicher, Jung) indicate that the Gestapo at least were active in this phase of the purge.

III. THE REICHSWEHR. Although the Reichswehr played a less active role than the SS or the police, it stood in the background as a force constantly at the disposal of the Nazi authorities. On June 25 (three days earlier than the SS) all Reichswehr units in Germany were alerted (Alarmzustand) in preparation for the coming action (Manchester Guardian, as quoted in the Weissbuch, p. 77). This Alarmzustand was officially terminated on July 1 (Frankfurter Zeitung, July 2). While remaining generally in reserve during the days of the purge, the Reichswehr also took some part in the proceedings. At 11 A.M. the SS guard before the Braun Haus, Munich was reinforced with 40 Reichswehr soldiers (Manchester Guardian, as cited in Weissbuch, pp. 77-8). A Reichswehr general is reported to have been one of the judges participating in the summary court at Lichterfelde (New York Times, July 3, 1934).
There is no indication that members of the Reichswehr took any direct part in measures against non-Party victims of the purge. They stood behind the government throughout the action, however, and must therefore bear a share of the general responsibility.

B. INDIVIDUALS BEARING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PURGE AS A WHOLE. Certain individuals were so intimately associated with the planning and execution of the purge that they may be said to bear a general responsibility for the whole affair. Individuals whose activities would best repay investigation in this connection are listed in Appendix B. (pp. 15-21)

Recommendations. Because of the special protection afforded by the law of July 3, it may be more difficult to establish criminal responsibility in connection with the purge of 1934 than in connection with many other excesses of the Nazi regime. It is therefore recommended that the prosecution of war criminals be based, if possible, on other, less controversial issues. Reasons have been suggested above for maintaining, however, that the law of July 3 does not protect excesses committed in the course of the purge against non-Party victims. It is therefore recommended that, if the prosecution of war criminals is to be based on the events of June 30-July 2, evidence of criminal responsibility should be sought in connection with the death of non-Party victims, as listed in Appendix A, rather than in connection with the death of SA and other party victims of the purge.
APPENDIX A

CASES WHICH MIGHT BE USED TO ESTABLISH CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
IN CONNECTION WITH THE PURGE

I. THE DEATH OF CATHOLIC LEADERS. The death of Catholic leaders provides the best occasion for establishing criminal responsibility in connection with the purge. In comparison with most other victims of the purge, these people were relatively little compromised by previous association with the Nazi regime and were less likely to have been engaged in treasonable activities. Their offense consisted in their attempt to defend religious liberties, in which they had been confirmed by the Nazi regime itself in the Concordat of 1933, against illegal infringements. Their vindication would be a popular move both inside and outside of Germany. The most promising cases for investigation are given below, in the approximate order of their promise.

1. MINISTERIALDIREKTOR DR. ERICH KLAUSENER.

PROBABLE FACTS. On the morning of June 30, 1934, Dr. Klausener was seated at his desk in the Reichsverkehrsministerium. Two SS men entered, said "You are under arrest." Dr. Klausener arranged the papers on his desk, said "Just a minute" and turned to the wardrobe to get his hat. As he did so he was shot and seriously wounded. He survived the attack by one hour, during which time the SS prevented anyone from entering the room to give him medical or spiritual aid. The minister, Freiherr Eltz von Ribbenach, was in the building at the time, but did not intervene. Klausener's body was not returned to his family until after cremation, a serious matter in the case of practicing Catholics. (Source: Jean François, pp. 174-5; Strasser, pp. 124-5)

PROBABLE MOTIVE. As a prominent Catholic layman, and leader of the German Catholic Action, he had been closely associated with Catholic resistance to Nazi interference in religious affairs. On June 24 he had presided at a public meeting near Berlin in behalf of religious freedom. As head of the Prussian police under the Severing ministry he may also have incurred special Nazi enmity.

THE PROBLEM OF PROOF. In this case the official explanation of death is particularly weak. Suicide is unlikely in the case of so devout a Catholic, and even

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if he did attempt suicide or resistance, the subsequent denial of medical aid clearly lies beyond the scope of legitimate arrest. Since that death took place in a public building, over a considerable period of time, it should be relatively easy to establish the facts through the evidence of surviving ministry employees and others. On July 2 the *Osservatore Romano* published a semi-official Vatican statement that the Holy See had absolute proof that Klausener did not commit suicide, but was killed. These Catholic sources also might provide evidence for the prosecution.

2. DR. FRITZ BECK

**PROBABLE FACTS.** On the morning of June 30, 1934, Dr. Beck was called by telephone and asked to make an appointment for that evening at his home in Munich, to give spiritual advice to an unnamed person. At 10 P.M. two SS men appeared and took him off in an auto. His corpse, recognizable only by a Papal decoration he had been wearing, was found the following Monday in a wood near Pasing. *(Source: *Held*, p. 454; *Weissbuch*, pp 126-7)*

**PROBABLE MOTIVE.** As a leading member of the Katholischen Aktion, and as the founder and director of the Munich Studentenhaus, which had given aid to many poor students, including Jews, Beck was particularly obnoxious to the Nazi authorities.

**THE PROBLEM OF PROOF.** The facts of Beck's death were announced by the Vatican, which might be able to provide leads for the collection of evidence.

3. ADALBERT PROBST, LEADER OF RHEINLAND CATHOLIC JUGENDBEWEGUNG

**PROBABLE FACTS.** On June 29 Probst was summoned from Düsseldorf to Berlin to take part in discussions with reference to the Concordat, and disappeared. When Pfarrer Wolker, head of the Catholic Jugend inquired at the Gestapo Headquarters in Berlin, he was informed that Probst had been arrested and shot in the interests of the state. Later his wife received official word that he had been "auf der Flucht erschossen." His ashes were returned to her by the police. *(Source: *Weissbuch*, p. 127)*
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PROBABLE MOTIVE. The Catholic youth movement, supposedly protected by the terms of the Concordat, had become a principal center of Catholic resistance to Nazi pressure, and Probst had become known as one of its most vigorous leaders.

THE PROBLEM OF PROOF. No special leads available.

II. THE DEATH OF LEADERS ASSOCIATED WITH VON PAPEN. As associates of a member of the Hitler cabinet, these people were more seriously compromised than the preceding group with the guilt of the Nazi regime. The suspicion that they may actually have been engaged in treasonable intrigues is also somewhat greater. The Nazi government never saw fit, however, to accuse von Papen himself of any improper behavior during this period and there is every indication that his associates were actually murdered because of their attempt, in connection with the Harburg speech, to mobilize conservative and Catholic opposition to the excesses of the Nazi regime. Their death may therefore be properly considered as a crime. The principal cases to be investigated in this connection are the following.

1. OBERREICHSGRAT VON BOSE, HOFROSFZ DES VIZEKANZLERS

PROBABLE FACTS. While von Bose was interviewing two unnamed industrialists at his office in the Vizekanzlei, Ecke Wilhelmplatz-Vossstrasse, three SS men pushed in unannounced and called him into the next room, where they shot him dead. (Source; Heiden, p. 453)

PROBABLE MOTIVES. As one of Papen's most trusted assistants and advisers, he had much to do with persuading him to give the Harburg speech (Jean François, p. 103). His death was a necessary part of the Nazi plan to isolate von Papen.

THE PROBLEM OF PROOF. Since von Bose's death, like that of Dr. Klausener, took place in a public building during office hours, the chance of finding witnesses among surviving employees of the Vizekanzlei would seem particularly good. If the industrialist being interviewed at the time could be identified, this also might provide a useful lead. Von Papen might also be useful.

2. DR. EDCAR JUNG

PROBABLE FACTS. On the night of June 27, before the purge itself had begun, Jung was seized at his home, leaving
behind him the word "Gestapo" written in pencil on the wall of his bathroom. During the succeeding days he is supposed to have been questioned regarding the supposed plot. His disappearance was reported to von Papen by Jung's housekeeper. The precise circumstances of his death are not known. (Source: Jean François, p. 126)

PROBABLE MOTIVES. Jung was the reputed author of the Marburg speech, and one of Papen's principal advisers in the affair. His death was a necessary part of the Nazi plan to isolate and neutralize von Papen.

THE PROBLEM OF PROOF. No special leads available, unless through von Papen.

III. THE DEATH OF MISCELLANEOUS ENEMIES OF THE REGIME.
Although many of these people were compromised by previous association with the Nazi regime, and were in some cases minor members of the Party itself, the fact that they were killed as an obvious act of Party or private revenge, rather than as incidents in the liquidation of the SA, may make these cases interesting as a basis for criminal prosecution. The principal cases to be investigated in this connection are the following:

1. GENERAL VON SCHLEICHER, FORMER CHANCELLOR OF THE REICH

PROBABLE FACTS. At 9 A.M., 30 June 1934, a carriage from Berlin stopped at the Schleicher villa at New-Babelsberg, near Potsdam. Six plainclothes members of the Prussian state police pushed their way into the dining room, where the General, his wife and his wife's 14 year old daughter were breakfasting. They asked, "Are you General von Schleicher?" When he said yes, all six simultaneously fired, killing him instantly. His wife, who sprang to his defense, was also killed. The men then left, after threatening the daughter not to reveal what had happened. (Source: Jean François, p. 174; Strasser, pp. 119-20)

PROBABLE MOTIVE. As Hitler's predecessor in the Chancellorship, Schleicher had long resisted Nazi aspirations, and was still feared as an able intriguer with useful connections. It is also said that, in the days of his Chancellorship, he had aroused the personal enmity of Göring by informing him to his face that Göring would never be considered fit for a ministerial post. (See Strasser, pp. 118-9) Although the official story at the time of the purge was that he was involved in a plot both with Nazi dissidents and with foreign powers (Hitler's Reichstag speech of July 13), this position seems later to have been
abandoned. In subsequent attacks on Schleicher published in the Volksche Beobachter he was denounced for his efforts to keep Hitler out of power in January 1933, but no reference was made to his role in 1934. At a meeting of high Reichswehr and party leaders, held at the Linden-Oper, Berlin, 3 January 1925, it is said that Schleicher and Bredow, as a result of Reichswehr pressure led by von Frisch and supported by von Blomberg, were officially though not publicly vindicated (London Star, 5 January 1935, as quoted in the New York Times). It is also said that on February 28 of that year, at a meeting in honor of the anniversary of the birth of von Schlieffen, Field Marshal August von Mackensen, on authority of the Defense Minister von Blomberg, read a list of Reichswehr deaths during the year, including Schleicher and Bredow, and announced that these last "died in honor" as victims of "accidents in the course of the National Socialist Revolution" (New York Times, March 10, 1935).

THE PROBLEM OF PROOF. Surviving servants and other members of Schleicher's household might be able to testify as to the circumstances of his death. Since the case aroused so much indignant attention in Reichswehr circles, inquiry in that direction might also be profitable.

2. GENERAL VON BREDOW.

PROBABLE FACTS. At 5 P.M., June 30, von Bredow, then in the tea room of the Adlon Hotel, was informed of Schleicher's death and advised to flee. After leaving the Adlon he was never seen alive again. Responsibility for his death was officially admitted in Hitler's Reichstag speech and elsewhere. He was probably shot on July 2.
(Source: Joan Francois, pp. 179-80)

PROBABLE MOTIVE. Bredow was known as Schleicher's right hand man. See above.

THE PROBLEM OF PROOF. No special leads.

3. GREGOR STRASSER.

PROBABLE FACTS. At 1:30 P.M., June 30, five plain-clothes members of the Gestapo entered Strasser's private dwelling, where he was eating dinner with his family, and took him to his office at the Werke Schering-Kahlbaum, ostensibly for a search of the premises. At the door of his office he was handed over to a waiting SS squad, which
drove him to the Grunewald and there beat him to death.
On July 7 his family received an urn bearing his ashes,
signed by the Geheime Staatspolizei, Berlin. (Source: Strasser, 54-56)

PROBABLE MOTIVE. Strasser had once been the second most influential man in the National Socialist Party. Because of his negotiations to enter the Schleicher party in December 1932, he had recently occupied no party or public office, although apparently remaining a member of the Party itself. He was feared by the Nazi leaders, particularly Göring, as an able and potentially dangerous rival, with useful conservative and other connections.

THE PROBLEM OF PROOF. His brother Otto Strasser has devoted much energy to solving the problem of his death. He might be able to supply useful leads.

4. GUSTAV, VON KARR, FORMER MINISTERPRÄSIDENT OF BAVARIA

PROBABLE FACTS. At the time of the purge, Kahr was dragged from his bed and killed on a moor near Dachau. (Source: Strasser, p. 128)

PROBABLE MOTIVE. At the time of his death, Kahr was 73 years old, and long had been politically inactive. His death was clearly an act of revenge for his part, as Ministerpräsident of Bavaria, in thwarting the Beer Hall Putsch of 1923.

THE PROBLEM OF PROOF. No special leads.

5. DR. VOSS, FÜHRER DER NSJURISTEN

PROBABLE FACTS. On June 30, a squad of Göring's Police appeared at Dr. Voss's law office and demanded that he turn over the papers which he, as Gregor Strasser's attorney, had in his possession. Upon refusal he was shot down and the documents taken. (Source: Strasser, p. 41)

PROBABLE MOTIVE. Desire to prevent the publication of facts damaging to the regime.

THE PROBLEM OF PROOF. No special leads.
6. ALEXANDER GLASER, RECHTSANWALT

PROBABLE FACTS. On the evening of June 30, Dr. Glaser was shot by three SS men at the door of his home in Amselienstrasse, Munich. Severely wounded, he died at the Schwabinger Krankenhaus, and was buried by his family. Some time later an urn purporting to contain his ashes was delivered by the police. (Source: Heiden, p. 459)

PROBABLE MOTIVE. Dr. Glaser had represented Josef Ruber in a copyright suit against Amann. Glaser had earlier been tried, but freed on the intervention of Frick. His death would therefore seem to be a case of party revenge. It is also said that in 1933 he served as Syndikus of the München-Augsburger Maschinenfabrik, as the go-between through whom money went from heavy industrial interests to Hitler (Weissbuch, p. 124). A desire to prevent the publication of damaging information may thus also have had a part in the affair.

THE PROBLEM OF PROOF. The circumstances of Dr. Glaser's death were relatively public, and therefore might be comparatively easy to establish.

7. WALTER FORSTER, RECHTSANWALT IN HIRSCHBERG

PROBABLE FACTS. On June 30, together with a number of other Jewish citizens, Förster was taken by automobile some four kilometers from Hirschberg, and there shot "while attempting to escape." (Strasser, pp. 123-5)

PROBABLE MOTIVE. Apparently an instance of otherwise unmotivated action taken against Jews under cover of the purge.

THE PROBLEM OF PROOF. The facts of Förster's death, ostensibly as related by an eye-witness, were fully set forth in Nr. 21 (September 30) issue of Deutschen Revolution, cited in Strasser. Through Strasser it might be possible to track that witness.
APPENDIX B

INDIVIDUALS BEARING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PURGE AS A WHOLE. The following individuals were so intimately associated with the planning and execution of the purge that they may be said to bear a general responsibility for the whole episode.

1. BERCHTOLD, JOSEF. One of Wagner's principal associates in the Munich purge (Helden, p. 438). No further details available.

2. BLOMBERG, WERNER von. At the time of the purge, Blomberg was Reichswehrminister, and principal spokesman for the Reichswehr in its conflict with the SA. On June 25 he is said to have had an interview with Hitler at Monheim which played a major role in persuading Hitler to proceed against the SA. (Jean François, pp. 107-111). On June 29 he published a signed article in the Volkischen Beobachter proclaiming the absolute devotion of the Reichswehr to Hitler. In his order to the Reichswehr on July 1, in which the end of the Alarmzustand was proclaimed, he thanked the Führer on behalf of the army for the "soldaticher Entschiessenheit und vorbildlichem Mut" with which he had wiped out the traitors (Frankfurter Zeitung, July 2). Together with other leading members of the Reichswehr of the period, he shares responsibility for all actions taken by the Reichswehr during the purge (see above).

3. BRUCKNER, FRIEDRICH WILHELM. At the time of the purge, Bruckner was serving as Hitler's adjutant. He was with Hitler at Ochsenberg on June 29, and assisted him in making final preparations for the purge (Jean François, pp. 128-43). He also accompanied Hitler on his trip to and from Memmendorf on the morning of June 30 (Goebbels radio address, July 1), during which it is officially admitted Roehm and other SA leaders were arrested, and one member of at least of Roehm's entourage was killed (Hitler's Reichstag speech).

1. SA Gruppenführer; member of the Reichstag.
2. Was Commander-in-Chief of German Army and Minister of War; dismissed in 1938; no official position since.
3. Hitler's adjutant.
4. **BUCH, WALTER.** At the time of the purge, Major Buch was Vorsitzende des Untersuchungs- und Schlichtungs- ausschusses, highest tribunal of the Nazi Party. In the early hours of June 30 he was summoned by Wagner to the Bavarian Innenministerium to take a leading part in the suppression of the purge. (Jean François, p. 142) He accompanied Hitler on his trip to and from Wiessee on the morning of June 30, and is said to have been the man who personally executed Hitler’s order to shoot one member of Röhm’s entourage (Heiden, p. 446). The episode is referred to in Hitler’s Reichstag speech, but without either the name of victim or of executioner. He was in charge of the execution of SA leaders in the court of Stadelheim prison (Heiden, p. 446). Although his direct activities were in connection with the execution of SA leaders, his position may have been sufficiently important to give him general responsibility for the Bavarian phase of the purge.

5. **DALUOEGE, KURT.** At the time of the purge, Daluoge was a SS-Gruppenführer and General der Landespolizei. He was mainly responsible for drawing up, under Göring’s direction, a dossier on the supposed Röhm plot, which was presented to Hitler in the middle of June, and did much to persuade him to undertake the purge (Jean François, p. 85). At 10 P.M., June 30 he was one of the leaders who met Hitler on his arrival at the Tempelhof airfield (DNB June 30, Frankfurter Zeitung July 2). On July 2 he was commissioned by Göring to take charge of the reorganization of the SA-Gruppen Berlin-Brandenburg, Pommern, Ostmark and Schlesien (Frankfurter Zeitung July 3). Clearly he was a leading figure in the planning and execution of the Berlin phase, and in the planning of the general phase of the purge.

6. **DIEITRICH, JOSEPH.** At the time of the purge Dietrich was SS-Führer der Leibstandarte Hitler’s. He is said to have been, after Göring and Himmler, the leading figure of the Berlin purge group (Heiden, p. 458). On meeting Hitler at his arrival in Berlin on June 30, he was berated for the excesses of his action, particularly in connection with the death of Schleicher (Heiden, p. 460).
7. DIETRICH, OTTO. At the time of the purge, Dietrich was Reichspressechef des NSDAP. He was with Hitler at Baden on June 29, at the time when final preparations for the purge were being made (Jean François, p. 132). He also accompanied Hitler on his trip to and from Miesau on the morning of June 30 (Goebbels' radio address, July 1), during which it is officially admitted that Röhm and other SA leaders were arrested, and one member at least of Röhm's entourage killed (Hitler's Reichstag speech).

8. ESSER, HERMANN. At the time of the purge, Esser was one of the four or five old Party fighters called by Wagner to assist him in the Munich phase of the purge. He was present at, and perhaps guilty of, the death of SA-Obergruppenführer Schmidhuber (Jean François, p. 162). He also accompanied Hitler on his trip to and from Miesau on the morning of June 30 (Jean François, p. 147), during which it is officially admitted that at least one member of Röhm's entourage was killed (Hitler's Reichstag speech). Although he may have been responsible only in connection with the action against the SA, his close association with Wagner during the early phases of the action may indicate a more general responsibility for the whole Bavarian phase of the purge.2

9. FRICK, WILHELM. At the time of the purge, Frick was Reich Minister of the Interior. On July 1 he stood with Hitler and General Lützmann at a window of the Reichskanzlei to receive the acclamations of the Berlin crowds (Frankfurter Zeitung, July 2). He signed the law of July 3, purporting to legalize the purge (RGBl. I, 1934, p. 529).3

10. GOEBBELS, DR. PAUL. At the time of the purge, Goebbels was Reich Minister of Propaganda. He joined Hitler at Baden, and remained with him throughout the following day (Goebbels' radio speech, July 1). Before proceeding to Miesau, he helped Wagner to draw up a list of purge victims in Bavaria (Jean François, p. 146). In subsequent days he was official apologist for the government in matters relating to the purge.4

2. Undersecretary in Propaganda Ministry.
4. Reich Minister for Propaganda and Enlightenment. Dead?
11. GÖRING, HERMANN. At the time of the purge, Göring was Ministerpräsident of Prussia, and as such responsible for the direction and discipline of the police and party formations which carried out the purge in that area. All accounts agree in ascribing to him a major share of the responsibility of persuading Hitler to embark upon the purge. When Hitler went in person to take charge of the purge in the south, he gave Göring a commission to take similar measures in Berlin and Prussia (Hitler's Reichstag speech). Göring not only carried out this commission to the satisfaction of his chief, but proceeded on his own responsibility to extend it in the direction of increased severity against non-Party figures (Göring's interview with the press on 2 July 1934, as reported in the Frankfurter Zeitung: "Ich habe meine Aufgabe erweitert."). Thus, except insofar as they may have been specifically disavowed and punished, all actions taken in connection with the purge of 1934, particularly in Berlin and Prussia, are clearly within the scope of Göring's responsibility.

12. GÜRTNER, FRANZ. At the time of the purge, Gürtner was Reichsjustizminister. He signed the law of July 3 (RGBl. I, p. 529) which purported to legalize the purge, and at the time of its publication added a supporting personal statement (Frankfurter Zeitung, July 4). He called and presided over a meeting of public prosecutors held on July 13, at which Göring gave a speech justifying the legality of the purge (Frankfurter Zeitung, July 14).

13. HESS, RUDOLF. At the time of the purge, Hess was a Reichsminister and Hitler's deputy. He met Hitler on his return to Berlin from Neudeck (June 25) and shared in his decision at that time to proceed to the elimination of the right and left extremists (Jean François, p. 115). On June 25 he prepared the action by giving a speech at Cologne emphasizing the absolute authority of the Führer. On the morning of June 30 he joined Wagner and Lutze at Munich, and proceeded to take charge of the Braun Haus and of the SA-leaders there detained. (Jean François, p. 147).

1. Reich Marshal and Minister for Aviation.
2. Dead.
3. Reich Minister without Portfolio.
14. HIMMLER, HEINRICH. At the time of the purge, Himmler was Reichsführer der SS and Leiter der Geheime Staatspolizeiamtes. As such he was in direct charge of the police and party organs which, under Göring's direction, played the leading role in carrying out the purge.

15. HITLER, ADOLF. As oberster Gerichtsherr, Hitler assumed full responsibility for all events of the purge (Hitler's Reichstag speech).

16. LITZMANN, KARL. On the evening of July 1, General Litzmann publicly symbolized the adherence of the Reichswehr to Hitler in the purge, by appearing with Hitler in a window of the Reichskanzlei to acknowledge the applause of the crowd (Frankfurter Zeitung, July 2).

17. LUTZE, VIKTOR. At the time of the purge, SA-Obergruppenführer Lutze was summoned to Hitler's presence in Godesberg and made Chief of Staff in succession to Röhm. He accompanied Hitler to Munich, and there remained with Hess and Wagner to take charge of the Munich phase of the purge.

18. MAURICE, EMIL. At the time of the purge, SS-Standartenführer was one of the four or five old Party fighters called by Wagner to assist him in the Munich phase of the purge. He is said to have been the man who killed SA-Gruppenführer Schmidt (Jean François, p. 162). He accompanied Hitler on the trip to Wiesssee, where he is said to have been the man who killed SA-Obergruppenführer Heines (Helden, p. 443). Although he may have been responsible only in connection with the action against SA leaders, his close association with Wagner during the early phases of the action may indicate a more general responsibility for the whole Bavarian phase of the purge.

1. Dead.
2. Dead?
3. Dead.
4. Dead.
5. SS Führer.
19. MÜTSCHMANN, MARTIN. At the time of the purge, Mütschmann was Statthalter of Saxony. He is said to have been one of the most active leaders of the purge outside of Berlin and Munich (Heiden, p. 438). No further details available.

20. SCHAU, JULIUS. These two SS Führer were with Hitler on the trip to and from Wiessee. (Goebbels radio speech, July 1) They may also have been with Hitler in Godesberg (Heiden, p. 757). There is no indication whether they assumed any general responsibilities through their association with Hitler during this early stage of the purge.

21. WAGNER, ADOLF. At the time of the purge, Wagner was Bavarian Innenminister. Following a series of telephone calls from Hitler at Godesberg, he initiated the action in Munich, proceeding "aus eigenen Entschluß" to make a number of arrests (Goebbels radio speech, June 30). Together with Hess he thereafter assumed the primary responsibility for the direction of the purge in Bavaria.

22. WEBER, CHRISTIAN. At the time of the purge, SS Führer and Stadtprat Weber was one of the four or five old Party fighters called by Wagner to assist him in the Munich phase of the purge. He accompanied Hitler on the trip to Wiessee, and is said to have been responsible, along with Maurice, for the death of SA-Obergruppenführer Heines (Heiden, p. 443). Although he may have been associated only with the action against SA-leaders, his connection with Wagner during the earlier phases of the action may indicate a more general responsibility for the whole Bavarian phase of the purge.

23. WECKE, WALTER. At the time of the purge, Polizeiprät Wecke was commander of the Landespolizeigruppe General Göring, stationed at Lichterfelde. As such he took a leading part in the suppression of the SA in the Berlin area (Heiden, p. 447) and may have had wider responsibilities.

1. Reich Governor and Gauleiter of Saxony.
2. Personal aide de camp to Hitler.
3. Dead.
4. Dead.
5. President of Kreistag.
6. Chief of Landspolizei in Prussia.
25. VON HOYRSCHE, UDO. At the time of the purge, Hoyrsch as Police President of Breslau took charge of the situation and became responsible for the purge in that city, including the death of his personal enemy SA-Brigadeführer von Wechsel-Leignitz (Jean François pp. 185-6). Whether the action in Breslau involved measures against non-Party was well as against Party figures is not clear.
3. Otto Strasser, Die Deutsch-Barmoläischen (Zürich, 1935)
4. Konrad Heiden, Hitler (Zürich, 1936)